I will answer you in English if you'll allow. Thank you.
I'm just going to turn to proposed subsection 486.4(3.2) in the legislation, and, just in the very simplest of ways, eliminate one problem but not solve the other.
You can simply delete the section that says the prosecutor has to advise of the ban's “effects and the circumstances in which they may disclose information that is subject to the order”. That would remove the giving of legal advice by the prosecutor, which we're saying is a serious problem.
In solving that, though, as we've said, somebody needs to explain it. The judge isn't really in a position to explain the effects because, of course, any good giving of legal advice involves receiving information. It involves a conversation that's privileged and confidential, so that someone can understand the scope of what they're being advised.
Independent legal advice is what's needed here. We even have cases where we've applied to lift publication bans, where we have tried to limit our involvement and asked the prosecutors to do this. Then the prosecutors come back to the complainant and say, “We can't agree to do it unless the complainant has independent legal advice.”
We say, “All right, then appoint me.” I want to say to the judge, “Then you need to appoint me as counsel.” The prosecutor can bring an application to do that. We do that in other areas of the code. Perhaps looking at that and importing that sort of concept from sections 276 and 278 into this area would be good, although you have to be careful about standing. That opens up a whole other mare's nest.
I can give you some answers. This duty to inform of the existence of the publication ban could also be equally imposed on the judge in the same way that a judge does a plea inquiry. That would also work. We also have to bear in mind when the bans are imposed. It needs to be easy to impose them early. When is that duty triggered? At some point, somebody needs to tell the complainant, and there needs to be a legal duty to do so.
The other thing I will just note is that a complainant can't mistakenly breach the publication ban. There is a mens rea element to this offence. You have to know that a publication ban exists, and the prosecutor would have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt to successfully prosecute someone for breaching a publication ban. It's a little detail that gets lost when we have this sort of discourse. I just want to raise that for the committee's consideration when you're thinking about this in the amendments.
Thank you for the question.