Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have to admit that Ms. Besner's answer has convinced me. I wouldn't have raised my hand if I had heard her earlier.
I understand the argument that a real possibility may be interpreted as being less restrictive than reasonable grounds. However—and I say this respectfully—I don't agree with Mr. Housefather or Mr. Garrison on this point. I think the requirement of having reasonable grounds to believe that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred could result in more investigations than what amendment CPC‑1 proposes.
What Ms. Besner's telling us is really interesting. At the stage where you decide whether to conduct an investigation, you ask yourself whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a miscarriage may have occurred or whether it's in the interests of justice to conduct an investigation. Those are the two conditions that must be considered before looking into the case.
However, that doesn't mean you order a new trial. Proposed paragraph 696.6(2) provides that both conditions must be met for the commission to remedy the situation following an investigation. It's not “or in the interests of justice”, but rather “in the interests of justice”. Furthermore, the first condition is then that there must be reasonable grounds to conclude, not to believe, that there has been a miscarriage, which is also more restrictive. Consequently, it seems to me that the objective of our Conservative colleagues' amendment CPC‑1 is already met by proposed paragraph 696.6(2), which would help prevent abuses.
If we retain the present wording of Bill C‑40, we will hear more cases in which miscarriages of justice may have occurred, which I think is wise. Consequently, I'm going to vote against CPC‑1.