Thank you, but that aspect of reasonableness is not what I'm concerned about.
Proposed paragraph (c) says, “if…the conduct could reasonably be expected to cause the intimate partner to believe that the intimate partner’s safety…is threatened”. That part is fine.
However, in some situations, the accused could say that it's entirely reasonable that the partner believed their safety was threatened. The question is whether the accused had reasonable grounds to commit the acts. If, in the opinion of the court, the accused had reasonable grounds to commit the acts, despite the fact that it was reasonable for the partner to believe that their safety was threatened, the accused should be able to be exonerated. That should be a valid defence.
There are two elements of reasonableness, therefore. With regard to paragraph (c), which you're referring to, the question is whether it's reasonable by anyone's standards to believe that the intimate partner may have believed that their safety was threatened. It may be reasonable to think that they may have believed that. However, did the accused have reasonable grounds to act as they did? I don't know if that's clear, but there is a difference between the two. It's not the same element of reasonableness. The notion of reasonableness is not measured in the same way or at the same time.
I didn't see that in amendment G‑2. As I said, though, I didn't have time to carefully read each line of amendment G‑2 earlier. I just skimmed it.
I'm sure you read it before this morning. I'd appreciate it if you could offer some reassurance in that regard. If not, might it be possible to find a way to include our proposed amendment in amendment G‑2?