National Defence Committee on Sept. 27th, 2006

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I made the comment earlier that I'm not an expert in this region of the world and I'm somewhat hesitant to get too far into this.

Pakistan is a very complex country. President Musharraf has enough challenges internally as it is, let alone with the problem of Afghanistan. The recent agreement struck with the Taliban is exacerbating the problem in Afghanistan; I don't think there's any doubt about that.

I don't know what the solution is, but it seems to me that however we go forward here, if there's going to be any positive outcome, the international community has to engage politically in Pakistan, so as to be part of the solution instead of part of the problem. I'm not sure that has occurred to the extent that I think is necessary.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Good. Thank you.

We'll go over to Mr. Calkins and then back to Mr. Murphy.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, for being here today.

I'm going to change the topic a little bit. I hope you've been following the media lately, and some of the comments that have been made. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin criticized the mission recently and said that Canada has lost its way in Afghanistan. I want you to comment. Do you think the focus of the mission has changed since the initial deployment? What do you think the impact would be if we were to withdraw our troops to a different region, back to Kabul, and limit the NATO commander's ability to deploy Canadian forces? Is that a place we should be going right now, and what do you think about those comments?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I'm not sure I want to get drawn into particular comments, but let me clarify something from my perspective. Just so we're very clear, the focus has changed, but it's changed by design. If you go back and read the UN Security Council's resolution that authorized ISAF and you look at the evolving strategy as it's occurred, the initial ISAF mission was in Kabul. It has changed considerably. Canada's commitment has changed considerably. Those were reasoned decisions and clearly decisions the international community made, the UN made, and Canada made in terms of its involvement as the strategy evolved. We have to be careful of revisionist history in that regard.

As for whether we've lost our way, I'm not going to comment on that. I think I've said enough about it. I'm of the view that we're there and we need to stay there. I'm starting to repeat myself, which is always a great danger. I don't think we should be cutting and running.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Wetaskiwin, AB]

I'm going to move away from that.

Earlier today a Canadian military convoy was ambushed by a suicide bomber in Kandahar. Fortunately no troops were injured, but the attack did damage a Canadian military vehicle, the RG-31 Nyala. I would like some comments on that.

I remember in the early deployment—which would highlight your previous comment that the nature of the mission has changed—sadly, some Canadian troops were killed when their Iltis jeep ran over a mine--or it was a suicide bomber, roadside bomber, or whatever the case may have been--back about three or four years ago. As our mission has changed, our equipment has changed. I know the issue of tanks and everything else has been raised. Can you give us an assessment, your opinion, of the fact that the mission has changed, and tie it together with the fact that we've needed to change the equipment on the ground there, and give us some indication of whether or not the equipment the forces have over there right now is adequate to do the job?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that this is a complex area and I could spend hours in it. So stop me if I go too far.

First, one of the common problems you have to deal with is availability. That is to say, we may know what we want, we may even have taken steps to get what we want, but it's not available. Iltis is a classic case in point, where we had to deploy it because that's all we had. It wasn't that we didn't recognize that it was inadequate. Indeed, we were pushing forward with contracts to get the G-wagon to replace it. We just couldn't move the system fast enough to get it. So there are those kinds of problems.

There are problems of what you have and what you deploy, and the tank is an example. Then there are the straight limits of technology in terms of what the art of the possible is regarding equipment.

To declare my colours, I ran the army equipment program as a colonel in the early 1990s, when we were working through these sorts of problems in the Balkans. We learned very quickly that some of our approaches to equipment procurement had not kept pace with reality; we learned some hard lessons there.

We've done a lot better. Certainly the Canadian army is better equipped today than at any time since I was in uniform. It doesn't mean that there aren't inadequacies, that there aren't areas where it needs to improve. So I'm generally happy with where it is.

The biggest area--and I'll bring it right down to what I think your concern is--is that of protection. It's a tough one, ladies and gentlemen, I'm sorry. It really is tough, because the reality is that in land warfare the big three are mobility, firepower, and protection. If you go back historically, the changes in military operations on land have always been as a result of a change in the balance of those three. For some considerable amount of time, firepower dominated. Chemical and other energy weapons are such that they can go through virtually anything. It may take a bigger brick to throw at it, but even the most modern, biggest, heaviest main battle tank can be punctured. Anything can be beaten; therein lies the problem.

We've recognized this. We can't go everywhere with a traditional heavy main battle tank; it won't do the job. We may use it in certain areas, and the reason we have tanks going into Afghanistan is principally because of protection. It's not because of the firepower. The firepower on the LAV-25 is every bit as good as anything in the theatre. They don't need tanks for firepower; what they need is the protection.

Before someone asks why you didn't put more protection on it, you can say it's because--I was going to say physically impossible, but that would be incorrect--this has severe limitations. If you put more and more armour on it, it gets heavier and heavier, and then it can't go anywhere. So the LAV-3, which is one of the best light-armoured vehicles in the world today, is still pushing the limits of weight. We can't put more on it. We're already at the extremes of materials technology to develop new armours that will stop it.

So what we're dealing with, ladies and gentlemen, is one of those points in history where we're waiting for some breakthrough in technology that will allow us to solve the problem. It will not be new armours; it will be new countermeasures to effectively replace that. You are going to see armoured fighting vehicles introduce stealth technology, so they can't be seen or detected. You're going to see some improvements in materials technology, but you're also going to see significant improvements in active systems. Effectively you're going to see sensors on board those vehicles that will detect incoming rounds or explosions, and weapons systems that will knock incoming missiles or round out of the air. That might sound like Star Wars to you, but the technology is almost there today.

More passive armour, more hunks of stuff, isn't what you need. You can't put enough on, and the difficulty we're dealing with now with mines and IEDs--improvised explosive devices, as we tend to call them--is that the technology is so advanced and the terrorists have the technology in spades. As fast as you develop a countermeasure, they have something to beat it. So you're playing that sort of game.

I've sort of wallowed around the issue, but I hope I've given you a sense of what the problem is here.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

I'll go to Mr. Murphy, then Ms. Gallant, then back to the official opposition, and that will end the second round.

Go ahead, for five minutes.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you very much for coming, sir, and I want to thank you for your frankness and insight.

There's one area that I want to explore with you, and that is the whole area of communications in the military. Our role in Afghanistan, as you can appreciate, is a very hot topic in Canada. Every politician has an opinion, and all the NGOs have opinions. We're getting comments from George Bush. We had Pervez Musharraf yesterday, Karzai last week. I think the Canadian public genuinely has a thirst for knowledge on this issue. From my vantage point, and correct me if I'm wrong, I think it would be helpful if we had more communication from the military. I know Brigadier-General David Fraser was interviewed, but he's usually interviewed on a specific incident, usually a fatality or some specific problem in Afghanistan.

I know it's a theatre of conflict and you're not going to say what you're doing, but is there any strategy out there for the military to communicate with the Canadian public directly as to the objectives, the strategy, the challenges, how things are going? I honestly think the Canadian public has a thirst for knowledge, and the message is that the waters are muddy because there are a lot of different views and opinions. There are people talking who really don't know the issue, I don't think, and then you have these foreign leaders talking, some of whom don't have a lot of credibility.

My example is going back to the Gulf War, back when General Norman Schwarzkopf spoke every night on TV. He gave a very clear delineation as to what the American military were doing. He had so much credibility before the western people. Is there any strategy, or do you think the Canadian military should be doing more?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Communication obviously is a major challenge in this era, and I think all militaries have learned over the last couple of decades and have got better at it. There are always improvements to be made. It seems to me, however--and I hate to use the term again in a different context--there needs to be balance in that. I think senior commanders, the Chief of the Defence Staff and people like that, need to be available to the public. It is my perspective, and I'll share it, that the current CDS is very available. He is available to talk on a range of issues and is relatively forthcoming, recognizing that he is a servant of the government. He always has a challenge, as does everybody in uniform, to strike that right balance.

Similarly, it is my experience that commanders in theatres of operation have always been available to the media. I don't have intimate personal knowledge, so I'm not challenging anything you've said or implied, but I would be surprised if David Fraser is not having regular briefings where he is available to answer questions on the part of the media and so on.

To take the additional step of then having the military on a regular basis--to use the Schwarzkopf example--give nightly war briefings is an extraordinary step, in my view. I'm not suggesting there aren't cases, and maybe the Gulf War, as you put it in the context of what Schwarzkopf and the U.S. at the time faced, may have been an example of where that was desirable, but I have difficulty personally in imagining a Canadian general standing up and giving daily operational briefings of the conflict.

I must admit it's not something I've given a lot of thought to, but it does seem to me to be a bit over the top and may send the wrong signals. I would certainly think that the implications on the nation...it starts to have a military role in society that perhaps is much stronger than a democracy should have, personally speaking.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

The point I'm making is that the only time we really see David Fraser, or hear from him, is usually after a fatality in Afghanistan, when he's asked to explain how it happened. He passes on his condolences to the family and friends of the person and explains it as best he can. I still think there would be a role--I don't know how it would come about and I'm looking for your guidance--but I honestly think in the Canadian public there's a tremendous thirst out there to have the gaps filled in the public's knowledge. I think they would really benefit and they would want to hear it from somebody who is on the ground over there, explaining what the objectives and strategies are.

Again, if you have any final comments, that's the only issue I wanted to talk about.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I must admit, although I hadn't thought of it in quite that context, I would share the view. My only addition would be that while the military can play a role there, ultimately it's not the military role to explain the national objectives of why we're there. It can support that, but it's not the military role to do that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Over to Ms. Gallant, and then back to the official opposition.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Jeffery, for clarifying that the tanks are not being deployed to destroy civilian infrastructure but rather to protect our troops. And welcome back; it's as refreshing to hear from you today as it was when you were a commander sitting as a witness.

Indeed, I wish this committee had had the opportunity to ask questions, the types of questions that the first member of the opposition asked, prior to the initial deployment to Afghanistan. Perhaps we wouldn't be going through this information exercise with the public, and asking the question of why we're over there in the first place, had we had the opportunity to debate the deployment in the first place and have a vote on it, the way this government has provided for the extension.

It is to the credit of our superb training and the professionalism of our troops that they're performing so admirably, despite the lack of proper equipment they had initially when they were deployed to Afghanistan. Is the Canadian Forces equipment being used in Afghanistan today adequate for the mission, in your opinion?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Is it adequate?

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

In your opinion.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Yes. As I think I said earlier, it is probably some of the best equipment we've had in my time in uniform. But let me be clear: there are always deficiencies. It is virtually impossible in any....

You know, for every system there's a counter-system, and you're constantly playing catch-up to try to do that. Add to that the difficulties of procuring equipment and getting it into a theatre of operation. That is happening, but there's always a time lag, so there's always an issue. There are some issues that you just can't get over, but that's not unique to us. Every military has exactly the same problem.

Protection, as I said, is the biggest area of concern. Certainly my understanding and knowledge indicates that we continue to be doing as much as we possibly can. The only area that I know is an operational concern is on the air side, particularly helicopters. They're available because they're part of the NATO force, but there are no dedicated Canadian ones. That does reduce the flexibility somewhat.

That's the only system that I can think of, or that comes to mind, that might be an issue.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Now, together with the Taliban, we do have in Canada a political party and a sector of society that wants to cut and run, but run to areas that previous witnesses have stated are equally if not more dangerous. Were Canada to do so, we know that they'd want to cut and run from those areas once remains started to be repatriated from there.

You were a Canadian military leader in the days when our troops were deployed to Kosovo and Bosnia. Do you recall whether or not the same sorts of questions as to exit strategies were being asked long before the mission was complete?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

You're stretching my memory, but I think the answer is yes. It seems to me we've always had those sorts of debates about whether there is an exit strategy and, if there is, what it is.

Frankly, it makes it a lot easier if you have a clear exit strategy--and politically and militarily, one should--but the world isn't quite that simple. It's easy to get yourself into a situation without clarity in terms of how you get out of it. That is a reality. That said, having gotten yourself in that position, I think it's then a responsibility to continue to work to sort out what that exit strategy is, and to shape the circumstances to allow you to do that.

I'm honestly not sure where your question is coming from, but yes, it has been a problem.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

If I understand you correctly, as the mission progresses and as we perhaps see the completion or accomplishment of our goals, at that time we'll have a clearer idea of where we should be going in terms of finalizing our commitments there.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Yes. I would certainly stop short, though, of saying we don't have to worry about it until we know where we're going. One has to go a bit further than that. But you can also do it too early.

The classic case in point is the first Gulf War, when the U.S. put down very clearly, “We're not going to Baghdad. We're not going any further than this,” which at the time made eminent sense. And the military leadership loved it because it gave them a clear exit strategy. They knew exactly what to achieve, and at the end of that everybody could come home.

I think history has shown, though, that a more far-reaching look at this to consider changing the exit strategy might have actually saved us a lot of grief later on. So just because you have an exit strategy doesn't mean it's right. It makes it easy from the point of view of management of the campaign, but it needs to be revisited in terms of whether you're achieving your political objectives.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

The time's up. We're going back over to the official opposition to end the second round.

Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

General, I was reading this morning with a great deal of interest Jeffrey Simpson's piece in The Globe and Mail. I don't know whether you had a chance to see that. What he's talking about are the rules around counter-insurgency. He's citing David Galula, the great French counter-insurgency expert. Jeff Simpson says that this expert listed five rules for success against insurgents, and that it would appear that none are being used by Canadians and other NATO forces in southern Afghanistan.

The rules are these: do not divide the military-civilian command; put a civilian in control of the overall operation; since counter-insurgency is ultimately a political affair, try to avoid large-scale conventional military force in response; and above all, remember that the target is the support of the local population--which is what you've alluded to in terms of the hearts and minds situation.

First of all, is it important to follow those rules? Jeffrey Simpson thinks they should be followed. I'm just asking your opinion without actually making a comment on them. I just want to know from an expert whether or not those are important rules, and if they are, are we following them? If we're following them, are we following them adequately?

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

Bearing in mind I haven't read the article, and I'm not particularly familiar with the author you've stated--

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

His last name is Galula. It's the first time I've heard of him.

[LGen Michael Jeffery]

I'll look it up, but I'm honestly not familiar with his work. I haven't come here to refresh myself in terms of counter-insurgency theory and doctrine, which is in part what one does when you start to quote principles.

That said, the comments you made, just based on what you've said, certainly resonate with me. Those make sense to me in terms of the kinds of things one must bear in mind. On the degree to which they are or are not addressed in Afghanistan, I'm less clear.

But I think one point is very important here. We are in a coalition, an alliance. This is a NATO operation. We are under NATO command. It is at that level that those things need to be applied, not at every level all the way down. There may be arguments for some of that. To my knowledge, it is civilian controlled. NATO is civilian controlled. The operation in theatre, the UN mission there, is civilian controlled.

As to the division of command and control, I'm not clear on that in terms of what is implied there. The difficulty is that when you get into the Canadian area of David Fraser and the particular task force there, it may have a different complexion. The principles shouldn't be violated, but I'm not sure in the context--again, I haven't read the article--whether they are.

Therein lies the difficulty of drawing conclusions on a coalition effort and applying them to a national force. We're part of a bigger whole.