National Defence Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome, Mr. Minister.

We all had a delay today, so we're a little late getting started. Is your time a little flexible, Mr. Minister?

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Minister of Foreign Affairs]

I am here to serve, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I appreciate that.

We've got some people coming into the second half of our meeting as well, so we'll try to balance what we need to do here.

As usual, we'll turn the floor over to you for your opening comments, and then we'll have questions. We appreciate your coming again to our committee. As we know, it's a changing situation in Afghanistan, and we appreciate the opportunity to hear from you today.

The floor is yours.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Before I begin, let me introduce to the committee Mr. Randolph Mank, who is the director general for Asia South.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Good. Thank you.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, committee members, colleagues, I would like to start by expressing my thanks to all of you for allowing me the opportunity to share my views on the role that Pakistan has played, which is an important component in the overall mission in Afghanistan.

This role, which is critically important, must continue. It must continue in helping NATO and Canada achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. It's timely for the committee to be focusing on this question as the international community increasingly encourages and engages Pakistan in our Afghanistan strategy. And I am certain that Canadians would agree with that.

This has been an issue of much discussion in the public and private forum of late. And after almost 30 years of turmoil and civil war, it's time for Afghanistan to rejoin the community of nations as a stable, secure, and self-sustaining democracy that will last and never again serve as a haven for terrorist groups. This long-term objective informs our nation-building activities in Afghanistan, activities that fall into three broad categories: helping to enhance security and stabilize the country; helping to strengthen accountability and representative government and democracy building; and helping to reduce poverty and improve the lives of Afghans.

Clearly, Mr. Chair, Canadians are in Afghanistan defending Canada's national interests by fighting against the threat of international terrorism. Canada and its numerous international partners have the means to help, and I would argue that there is a moral obligation for us to do so, that is, to help Afghanistan rebuild so that its people can live their lives free from oppression, violence, and the abysmal conditions that existed under a Taliban government.

The new government has been clear since our election that we stand for basic Canadian values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. We are playing an important part as a responsible NATO partner in a UN-backed mission and as a global actor by standing up for those values. And we are delivering these principles and values, along with humanitarian aid and relief, into this region.

Our efforts are already paying dividends. The December 2001 Bonn agreement, agreed to by a wide spectrum of Afghan interests, established the first phase of national reconstruction and consolidation. It outlined a basic framework of timetables for implementing a new and democratic Afghan state. The Bonn agreement led to the creation of a new constitution and the holding of successful presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, all of which enjoyed high rates of participation. Voter turnout was higher than 60%, and almost half of all voters were women, which is unprecedented in that country, I'm quick to add.

Mr. Chairman, Afghans expressed remarkable resolve by participating in these historic elections. They did so often under a threat of violence, but by so doing they have clearly indicated their intention to chart a new course for their country through the democratic process. While elections are an important part of that, democracy is the surest, safest route to lasting stability.

With the Bonn Agreement benchmarks met, a new five-year road map, the Afghanistan Compact, was agreed to last January by the Afghan government and 60 other members of the international community. Over the next five years, the Compact will guide our joint efforts through Afghanistan’s next phase of recovery. The Compact is a comprehensive five-year strategy incorporating security, governance and development benchmarks, which the Afghan government and its international partners have agreed to pursue jointly.

Mr. Chair, this is why Canada has brought together elements from the Canadian Forces, Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in a whole of government approach to addressing the compact benchmarks. Working together, we're doing the following: promoting the development of a stable and secure environment in Afghanistan; helping to build governance capacity in that country; and reforming Afghanistan's security sector, including policing and border control.

The overall objective of these activities, of course, is to create a conducive environment in which the reconstruction efforts can take place under an umbrella of security. Bringing together the best of what Canada can offer, we are making a meaningful contribution to international reconstruction and stabilization efforts there, but there's still much more to be done.

Implementing the Afghan compact and meeting the goals we have set with the Government of Afghanistan and our international partners will be an enormous challenge, and the costs of failing to deliver are equally enormous. Some would call this the challenge of our time, and our nation in generations to come will look at this as a defining moment.

Nation building is a complex process, and only a comprehensive and sustained effort by all players will ensure our success. Canada and NATO have long recognized the regional nature of the nation-building exercise we have undertaken in Afghanistan. This recognition is perhaps best exemplified through the establishment last year of an annual regional economic cooperation conference in Afghanistan, more commonly known or referred to as the RECC. It brings focus and foresight to the building of the Afghan economy and Afghan stability.

Meetings of the RECC bring together Afghanistan and its neighbours, along with representatives from the G-8 group of nations and the key international organizations, to develop regional cooperation plans to promote economic development and security in Afghanistan and the entire region. In fact, Mr. Chairman, my colleague, the parliamentary secretary for foreign affairs, Mr. Deepak Obhrai, has just returned from representing Canada at that second conference meeting, which took place in New Delhi last week.

While we recognize the importance of the multilateral mechanisms such as the RECC, we also accept that many of the challenges we face are best treated as issues between Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours. It was in recognition of this that the so-called tripartite commission was established in June 2003. This commission is a group of military and diplomatic representatives from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and NATO who meet about every two months to work out measures for improving security cooperation among the various players. The 19th meeting of the tripartite commission just wrapped up in Kabul on November 12. Some of the issues currently being addressed by the commission include the following: Afghan-Pakistan border security, which I expect we'll discuss further here; improved military intelligence sharing amongst the parties; the development of more effective countermeasures for dealing with the improvised explosive devices, the IEDs; and finally, enhancing operational cooperation between NATO and Afghan security forces.

Mr. Chair, the establishment of the tripartite commission is a recognition of the fact that solutions to many of the challenges we face in Afghanistan will surely not be found solely within the Afghan borders, and that the integral role Pakistan plays in this commission is a further recognition that of Afghanistan's neighbours, Pakistan is arguably the most important. There are many reasons why this is the case, but one way or another they all lead back to the fact that the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not being monitored or policed to the extent necessary. You've heard many of the expressions to describe it as “porous”, as “open”.

While many efforts are being made, there is one reality that can't be denied, and that is that 40 million Pashtuns are estimated to live along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It is from this tribal group that the Taliban insurgents who are attacking our troops derive most of their support—not solely, but this is the chief source. Moreover, it is estimated that some 30,000 Pashtuns move, effectively unhindered, back and forth across the Afghanistan border every day.

Just to put it in some historical context, if I might, Mr. Chair, this border was officially drawn by the British government—the British Indian government—and the Afghanistan kingdom back in 1893. It's been treated as an international border, while at the same time Afghanistan has never recognized it and has disputed it from its origins.

Mr. Chair, we must recognize the effort Pakistan has undertaken in recent years to mitigate cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan. However, much more needs to be done. They have talked about fences; they have talked about mines, which we oppose; aerial surveillance. Again, I will come back to this subject, but they have deployed some 90,000 troops into the border regions and have suffered over 800 casualties fighting insurgents since 2002. Nevertheless, we believe President Musharraf's government can and must do more, and, Mr. Chairman, Canada is willing to help.

As I told Pakistan's Prime Minister Aziz at the recent micro-credit international gathering in Halifax, Canada maintains a strategic friendship with Pakistan based on a broad range of mutual interests. And although security concerns remain at the forefront of our engagement, we accept that there are limits on what can be achieved through military cooperation alone.

Canada has done much in recent years to assist Pakistan outside of the security sector. For example, the Canadian International Development Agency is a significant contributor to development efforts in Pakistan, including the innovative $132 million debt for education swap, which will convert Pakistan's bilateral debt to Canada into increased spending on education in Pakistan. We hope that through such endeavours the Government of Pakistan will be better able to enhance and expand its public education system, ideally doing away with situations where parents have no real choice but to send their children to unregistered madrassas for formal education. We have seen, sadly, that these have often become recruiting centres for extremism.

Canada also gave generously to relief and reconstruction efforts following the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. Last month, on the first anniversary of the earthquake, Minister for International Assistance Verner announced a further contribution of $40 million for reconstruction assistance, bringing Canada’s total contribution to more than $130 million.

On top of these efforts, Mr. Chair, we are fortunate to enjoy a mature relationship with Pakistan to also promote Canadian values within the Musharraf government, including human rights, full democracy and good governance, as well as non-proliferation arms control and disarmament objectives.

In our relations we have always concentrated and encouraged a greater separation of Pakistan's political and military establishments and a strengthened commitment to democratic principles. President Musharraf has committed to free and fair elections in 2007, I note, and we have worked with Pakistan on previous occasions to urge them to embrace more true democratic principles. And while we have not uniformly seen eye to eye on all matters, democracy in particular, the Pakistani government has never backed away from engaging us on these difficult issues. I would say that this is true of the meeting I had with the Prime Minister of Pakistan only a few weeks ago.

Nevertheless, the level of political and military engagement in Pakistan is arguably greater now than at any point in the past, and in March of this year, Prime Minister Harper and Defence Minister O'Connor visited Pakistan, and Minister O'Connor made a return visit this past September. On both occasions we raised the importance of security and development missions in Afghanistan with the Government of Pakistan and the premium we placed on Pakistan's cooperation. We also raised with their government our concerns regarding the activities of insurgents within the Pakistani territory. In fact, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz and I discussed again these same issues this past month in Halifax. I also had similar discussions with President Musharraf when he was in attendance at the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month.

All of this, Mr. Chair, is to say that Canada, along with our allies, continues to encourage Pakistan to step up its efforts to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Specifically, we requested Pakistan's efforts to seek out and arrest senior Taliban figures inside their country; improve border security; sign, ratify, and implement key United Nations conventions and resolutions against terrorism; legislate and enforce more robust anti-money laundering laws and counter-narcotics training; and work to prevent the exploitation by insurgents of refugee camps inside Pakistan. We believe these constitute realistic objectives that Pakistan can do, but they can't do it alone. They can do it with our assistance, and we will positively contribute to the attainment of the international community's objectives there.

Mr. Chair, I believe you will find the record will show that the Minister of National Defence, who appeared before you, also spoke of a further confidence-building measure, and that includes the proposal—and I believe there has been some action on this file--to have liaison officers, with Pakistan having a liaison officer inside Afghanistan while we would have a similar officer serving in their country.

While we ask more from Pakistan, we ourselves are also willing to do more to provide assistance. Canada is working with Pakistan's security and law enforcement personnel to increase their capacity to deal with border management and related issues. We're working to enhance the liaison arrangements, as I mentioned, between Canadian Forces stationed in Pakistan and Pakistan's armed forces, consistent with our understanding that security is not only about military threats. We're looking at innovative ways where we can better harness our development assistance tools to help to improve the livelihoods on both sides of the border. In this way, we hope to give young people, who are most vulnerable to insurgents' propaganda, a reason to reject any calls to join that cause.

I would like to give you two examples of the additional types of activities in the works.

The capacity of Pakistan's security forces in the border regions is limited, particularly given the enormous security challenges they face in the rugged terrain. Military personnel are spread thin and often lack the proper equipment, particularly communications technology. This lack of capacity contributes to the degree of lawlessness throughout the border regions and undermines government efforts to address the cross-border movement of insurgents.

Through my department's global peace and security fund and counterterrorism capacity-building fund, we are looking to increase the capacity of Pakistani security forces. Projects currently being developed, Mr. Chair, include a Pakistani police capacity-building course that aims to have our RCMP trainers work with Pakistan to enhance the professional development of their security and law enforcement personnel along the border and elsewhere, and the provision of appropriate communications equipment, including satellite phone technical assistance, to the relevant Pakistani authorities to help secure the Pakistan-Afghan border and respond to the presence of security threats--that is, to detect and interdict smugglers and cross-border movement of insurgents.

I'd mention a few of the other examples, but this is just some of the work we are doing with Pakistan and our NATO allies to identify further opportunities and further engagement at the border.

Mr. Chair, in closing, I would like to reiterate my appreciation for the work this committee has undertaken. I commend you for recognizing the key role Pakistan plays in helping to achieve Canada's and our allies' objectives in Afghanistan. These issues are complex, and I think it goes without saying that there are no easy answers, but I'm confident that we can work with Pakistan and the international community to resolve the problems that exist. To paraphrase my friend, Minister O'Connor, we appreciate what Pakistan is doing, but we know they can do more.

I thank you for your time. I anticipate and appreciate your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

We'll go to our first round. It's a ten-minute round.

Mr. Dosanjh will begin.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you for being with us, Mr. MacKay.

Minister, I have a couple of questions. One would be on Pakistan. What you've delivered by way of your remarks is essentially a summary of what we've been trying to get Pakistan to do. I don't think the world has seen very much evidence of Pakistan doing very much. In a sense, and I mean no personal criticism, you've actually, on behalf of the Government of Canada, delivered an apology on behalf of the Government of Pakistan for not doing the kinds of things that we want done around that border.

Pakistan is a training ground for terrorists, particularly in the region bordering Afghanistan, through madrassas and otherwise. Pakistan has not, in the last several years, produced one major Taliban figure for the world to see, although the suspicion everyone in the world has is all the major figures, particularly Mullah Omar and others, live in Pakistan, and most people know where they are. What they have handed over were some low-level al Qaeda figures, with the exception of one or two major figures. They enter into peace agreements with groups of Taliban or Taliban-sponsoring groups, which has resulted in the last few months in a 300% increase in attacks in Afghanistan on our troops and others.

I understand the need to urge Pakistan to work with us; all I have seen this government do is mollycoddle Pakistan on the international stage, while they can be brave with China, on the other hand, without any problems.

I would like to know why this government does not have the courage to speak clearly and bluntly of the need for Pakistan to come through with some of the expectations. I understand we need to provide them with aid; I understand we need to provide them with training. I'd like to know what you really intend to do. How do you intend to deal with this when Musharraf simply brushes off the criticism that Blair or others might have of what he isn't doing to assist us?

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Dosanjh, for the question.

I guess you share my frustration, having served as a defence minister during much of the time you've just described.

As far as being an apologist for Pakistan, that's not at all what I'm here to deliver. In fact, on every occasion, both privately and publicly at forums such as this, I think we have delivered our outright encouragement and have demanded that Pakistan improve its efforts; that they do more in the areas you have described and that that I described in my remarks; that they in fact step up efforts at the border; and that they should very much go after the insurgents, individuals and leaders, within the Taliban circles.

I'm not here as an apologist for anyone. I'm here to outline what the government has been doing. I would suggest that we have engaged regularly, often, and directly with leading Pakistan figures and will continue to do so.

I find it ironic that, coming from your party, you would criticize us for doing so and for engaging so directly when, at the same time, you're criticizing us for engaging other countries in the same way and demanding that we do so. One doesn't seem to be consistent with the other. We have to do this with all countries. When we have occasions to meet with leaders and give those tough messages, we'll continue to do so.

We knew many of the penetrating statements, the obvious, that you have told us about--the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. It's why we're calling on them to take more action, to improve border security, and to act more forthrightly at the United Nations, which was the message we brought with us when we met with President Musharraf in New York.

These solutions are not easy without the full participation of Pakistan. They're a sovereign country, just as we are. We can only bring these messages to them in a forceful but respectful way if we expect them to act.

I would suggest that implementing these measures around the border is the most direct way we can achieve the mutual objectives of stopping this flow.

This flow of the Pashtun, as you well know, has been going on not for hundreds of years but for thousands of years. This isn't something that can be stopped overnight.

Let's look at the length of the mission, which has been five years, in comparison to the length of time people have been crossing that border.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

Moving to another issue, from the newspapers and otherwise, I understand there are many aid agencies in Afghanistan that are essentially paralyzed and do not want to work because of the situation that's been created. I understand 33 humanitarian groups have signed a petition asking for change by those countries with military forces in Afghanistan because the aid agencies' “neutrality has been compromised”. CARE Canada and World Vision Canada have now refused government contracts in Afghanistan.

Added to that, DND very recently increased the commander contingency fund in Afghanistan by another $1 million. Colonel Mike Capstick, who testified before this committee, recently said it tends to take up to two years to get funding in use on the ground in Afghanistan.

We now share the objective with you of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan. For doing that, you would agree that aid agencies, the NGOs, are a vital part of the work. What is the government doing about this? Are we encouraging NATO to work more closely with the aid agencies?

Why is the government not trying to solve the problem for the delivery of aid and development funding through CIDA and international and domestic aid agencies, rather than giving the military an additional but, in the grand scheme of things, small amount of money?

Is it your strategy that the military should take the lead on providing aid? Would it not further alienate the NGOs that we so badly need on the ground?

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

I would answer it this way: one doesn't happen without the other. And until we have greater security, we'll have no greater development. That's the unfortunate reality. Until we're able to establish greater security and push the development into the regions of the country where the threats and the insurgents remain active, it's very difficult. For obvious reasons, some of these agencies you've mentioned are reluctant to provide the important humanitarian relief they need to provide. Yet they would do so at incredible risk to themselves. The governing bodies of these organizations are reluctant to release them to do so until things have stabilized further.

Having said that, some of the projects we have under way in Afghanistan include a girls primary education program, $14.5 million to see to the development of 4,000 community schools; integrating women into markets, which is another $5 million contribution, where 1,500 women are being provided with assistance to develop horticulture operations and home-based gardens; the global polio eradication initiative in Kandahar province, another $5 million to inoculate children to help protect against the suffering and scourge of polio paralysis; emergency food assistance to Kandahar province, $4.9 million; 12,000 families targeted by the world food program--this is direct aid for displaced individuals living inside that province in the Panjwai and Zhari districts; micro-finance investment support, $12 million, and this was a recent announcement by Minister Verner--over 200,000 clients in 19 provinces in Afghanistan and over $70 million in loans provided through 12 micro-finance institutions. This, of course, also includes contributions made by the previous government.

So the development is happening. I would suggest further development will happen exponentially more quickly once more security has been achieved. There is very much a hand-in-glove approach that has to be taken. If we're able to make more progress in bringing stability to the south, we'll similarly be able to increase the development that would happen on the ground.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

You have 45 seconds.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

The question of ITAR with respect to the $4.9 billion, 17 tactical lift planes.... Why was that not resolved before a decision was made? I understand from the newspapers that a decision has been made. That's an issue that falls squarely within your jurisdiction rather than with Public Works. I'd like to know why it wasn't paid any attention to. It's a very serious issue. It may end up in violation of our charter. It may result in our not being able to do maintenance in our country.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

I certainly hope not. I can assure you that was one of the initial problems we inherited with respect to procurement. We recognized right away we were going to have to address this issue. I've taken it up with my counterpart, Secretary of State Rice. I've spoken to the ambassador to the United States and stressed the importance of that. I know that Minister O'Connor and Minister Day have similarly spoken to their counterparts. We've set up a joint committee with American and Canadian officials to work this problem through.

You're absolutely right to point out that as we move forward with these procurement projects, it's going to be important that there is no disparity in the treatment of employees who want to work on this important technology that will be a part of the procurements. And I'm confident, with cooperation, that we will eventually be able to find a resolution to this. But it's going to take a great deal of diplomatic effort, and we've begun that in earnest and will continue to do so.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Thank you, Mr. Dosanjh.

Mr. Bachand, ten minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wish to welcome the minister.

I too wish to begin by talking about Pakistan. It seems that the Pakistani position is deliberately unclear. Some even say that this country may have concluded direct agreements with the Taliban. I observe the conflict in Afghanistan, and I think that one of the ways of solving the problem is to better control the Pakistani border. You seem to have the same concern as us in this respect.

I would like to hear your opinion on the Pakistani secret service. We hear increasingly that not only is Mr. Musharraf’s regime close to the Taliban but also that many in the secret service are helping the Taliban. What do you think?

I would also like you to tell us a little more about the infamous liaison committee. When the Minister of National Defence appeared before the committee, he said that there had been a mistake in translation. I was on my way to the airport when I heard Mr. Musharraf answering questions on the CBC. He was really angry; he said that, since his country is a Canadian ally, he would not like to like to have to get into battles with any Canadian troops that might enter Pakistani territory.

Was it really a translation error? Did anything come of his comments? Is it simply a matter of exchanging officers? Why would this involve a uniquely bilateral relation between Canada and Pakistan? Why not convince the NATO countries of the appropriateness of taking part in this process? Considering that there are 30 nations belonging to NATO, I think we would be in a better position to soften Pakistan’s position, which at present is rather unclear.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Bachand, for your question. I am going to begin by answering your last question.

I wasn’t there for that exchange with Mr. Musharraf, but I read the report. This question was very emotional for him, since it affects his country deeply. I think that his thinking was rather emotional, since he said that Pakistan had lost over 800 soldiers in the conflict, particularly on the border.

Addressing that issue of the border itself, this Durand Line, or Durant Line, as it's sometimes called, is not a new problem for Pakistan and Afghanistan. This goes back, literally, for centuries. It's one that is aggravated by the terrain itself, as I understand it.

Although no one NATO country is tasked with dealing with the issue of the border, increasingly there's a great deal of focus on how we can assist Pakistan in their efforts to control the movement, particularly of insurgents.

I think Canada has a great deal of expertise we can offer. I specifically offered our assistance to the Prime Minister when I met with him in Halifax. He was speaking at that time about more aerial surveillance and more patrols.

They have a huge number of soldiers there now. But in proportion to the vast size of the task and the type of terrain, there is no easy solution, other than increased concentration; the use of communication; and further satellite phones, because they can't often get reception between various checkpoints. I would suggest that there can be other innovative ways that don't include land mines but might include blockades that would effectively prevent passage at some of the known areas where there is a flow of individuals. We're certainly working with other countries, other NATO allies, and the Pakistani government, to try to close off that flow of individuals into Afghanistan.

There is the political dynamic as well. As I said, Afghanistan doesn't really recognize where that border begins and ends.

On your question about the Pakistani secret service, this, again, is a thorny issue, which I've heard President Musharraf try to address. He has indicated that they are in fact former secret service.

Those are members of the former secret service, not the current one who took part in those activities.

He has also acknowledged that the insurgency may be assisted by some of those individuals. He has not acknowledged the identity of these people, which I think is where we perhaps need to press him more, or suggested how we stop them and in fact arrest them, if that's possible.

I have not personally heard, and perhaps Minister O'Connor is the more appropriate one to question, of any direct evidence that would link the existing secret service—or any government agency in Pakistan, for that matter—to the insurgency. Musharraf denies this. NATO and other countries have been watching this closely and pressing him on the subject matter, but to my knowledge, there has been no evidence of this thus far.

I can tell you that through our high commissioner in Islamabad and the embassy in Kabul, we are constantly monitoring and on the lookout for any such evidence that Pakistan is officially, in any government capacity, involved in insurgency.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Chair, I would also, with your permission, like to ask a question about the International Traffic and Arms Regulations, or ITAR.

But before that, I want to recall something comical, Mr. Minister. I will always recall the time when I bought my first car. I had seen it in a garage and it was really the one I liked. My father told me then that, if I went to the garage to see this car and I wanted to buy it, I had to be very aloof and not show how much I wanted it.

The government has made a lot of progress towards the procurement of planes, particularly with Boeing. It practically gave the company a cheque, by saying that it had secured the contracts, with the result that subsequently it is hard to negotiate. Boeing and Lockheed Martin may eventually say that their planes were wanted and that they were prepared to supply them to us, but that ITAR was not prepared to let them go.

The government does not have any negotiating arguments left to convince Boeing and Lockheed Martin to be permissive. With such a contract, technological transfers and intellectual property rights are extremely important. And these aspects are the direct concern of ITAR. If the Americans do not want to go along with it under ITAR, you will no longer have a solution. It will be impossible to backtrack and say that you do not want their planes anymore, that you want to buy them somewhere else.

Has the Canadian government placed itself in a position of weakness in relation to the negotiations? Someone will have to make sure, before the final signing of the contract, that ITAR will be more flexible.

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

I agree with you on what you say about negotiating power, but I think that this decision is not final. Still, this is not my decision to make but rather that of the Minister of Defense, and it will be presented to Cabinet.

I know, contrary to reports in the paper today, that there was a great deal of time and effort put into these procurement projects, and there were many who expressed interest. But you really would have to take this up with Minister O'Connor, as to the final decision. I'm not going to speculate on the contract itself, but ITAR's issue is one that has always been a factor.

We want to and we will maximize the benefits to Canada. We will ensure that Canadian jobs, Canadian technology, and Canadian innovation will be part of this procurement. To that extent, I know we have officials who had been specifically given that instruction as part of these negotiations and part of the bidding process. We'll make sure we get the best equipment possible for our troops. And just like you when you were buying your first car, we're going to check under the hood.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

Ms. Black, you have ten minutes.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Minister, for coming today and bringing us up to date on your efforts around Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan. I guess you are the person who is in charge of the diplomatic efforts for Canada in this regard. I think you have a very difficult diplomatic situation to deal with.

We have Pakistan on one side of the border. They've received a lot of money internationally from the Americans. They have recently, I understand, completed some type of negotiation or agreement with the Taliban in the tribal area of Pakistan. They have come up with some type of an agreement with them not to follow up on some of their activities. We have a government in Kabul that's really distrustful of Pakistan. You told us today there are some 30,000 Pashtuns who cross the border each day, and many of those we know are insurgents. It's a very complex and dangerous situation, and in the middle of that we have 2,500 Canadian soldiers who are meant to be working in this area to bring security and peace.

You've also talked in your presentation today about the things the Canadian government is asking Pakistan to do. You've said that these are to seek out and arrest the senior Taliban figures in Pakistan—whom I think the whole international community knows are there—to improve the border security, which would be a major step forward; to ratify UN conventions against terrorism, which Pakistan has not done; to legislate something around the money laundering that goes on; to work, you say, to prevent the exploitation of refugees and the turning of them into insurgents. That's a big order.

I want to ask you this. What is the diplomatic road map of our government when we're now giving more aid to Pakistan in order to try to seek their efforts to meet these five objectives you've talked about? How are we going to monitor that? How will you ensure that Pakistan is doing these five things that you, on behalf of the Canadian government, have encouraged them to do?

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

The most direct way I can answer that, Ms. Black, is to say that we are very much engaged in direct discussions with them. I spoke directly with their President. I know that our Prime Minister had a number of contacts directly with President Musharraf, including a visit to Pakistan, as has our defence minister when he visited that country.

They are very aware. The pressure, of course, is not only coming from Canada. The NATO summit in Riga that will take place next week will very much be focused on many of these same issues directly and keeping up a unified approach by the NATO countries and others. There are a number of NATO countries, we can't forget, that are also in Pakistan, like Croatia, whose foreign minister was here this week. There's a large conglomeration of communities, if I can put it that way, that are zeroing in on what has been, in my view, perhaps the most unpredictable and difficult challenge for all of us in Afghanistan, and that is, cutting off the source of the people, the violence, and the drug trade as well--a source of extreme tension between these two countries.

There's an obvious dynamic that I think is apparent to all between President Karzai and President Musharraf. That is also a factor. That human dynamic of trust and cooperation needs to be enhanced as well, if I can put it that way. There's no magic way to do that other than to try to do what in fact the President of the United States did, and that was to have the two individuals sit down and discuss some of these issues themselves directly. We cannot forget the responsibility of the Afghan government in all of this as well as the Pakistanis. They have to be prepared to do more themselves, and on that border it is an enormous challenge.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

I understand that, but I'm asking what specifically we will do as a government, what you will do as the minister, to measure whether or not the Pakistani government is taking these five steps that we've requested of them or for which we're providing more support to them. Will you have a measure? Do you have a road map of watching and determining whether in fact they're taking this seriously and taking real concrete action to address those five points?

[Peter MacKay, Conservative, Central Nova, NS]

I think the road map for all of us is the London Conference on Afghanistan compact that was put in place, with numerous benchmarks that include much of what we're discussing here around the border. Prior to that, there was another compact that essentially set out various broader themes of good governance, a return to some of the very principles of democracy itself, the development side, and the issues related to sovereignty itself--that is, the Afghan people having full control over their entire country. The south is where the majority of the difficulties still exist. That's the more general answer.

The more specific answer is that in our embassy in Kabul and our high commission in Islamabad we have regular contacts, and our diplomats there are engaged with government officials in both countries. We have other political contacts, which I've referred to, and we have these international fora that also provide for the checks in the box as to what we have done, what we can see, in concrete terms, to measure work that's supposed to be under way at the border.

Are we still seeing the same degree of movement? Our military information coming from the field is the most direct answer to your question, where we can say, “Well, we've been told there are soldiers at the border, that there is construction of certain checkpoints and fences, that there is aerial surveillance; show us that this is actually happening.” We can't, unfortunately, just take people at their word when they say they're doing something in this area, when we know that the insurgency is continuing, and in some cases escalating.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Has Canada had any involvement in the counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan? It seems that the source of money for a lot of the insurgency is from the poppy. I know we have had an alternate livelihood program going, but is there any real countrywide or multilateral program that will effectively help people out of poppy production, to have an economic base for their area and their family where they don't feel they have to rely on poppy production?

There was a program on CBC this week that really showed the latent kind of criminal element almost, or smugglers element to it, but also showed the individual poppy farmers who really said they had no alternative other than poppy production.