For example, in the challenge function, there are a set of assumptions at the front of any SOR, saying that these are the assumptions we use: we're going to have this many crew in an aircraft, we're going to have it based here, these are the response times, and so on. These can also be posed as questions, because they all have value and cost impacts.
So the response time may be made shorter by a basing option that has more distribution across Canada. But that might cost more. So you have to do those kinds of trade-off analyses to find out which set of solutions and which capabilities give you the best value. You have to make sure you're asking for the right things in the high-level SOR, which we're talking about now. This will be scrutinized by my people and, from a capability perspective, by General Ward's folks. Those go into the SOR evolution as these things go forward.
So I think we could probably go back and see that any of the approved SORs were not the first or second versions. There are numerous iterations as the challenge function takes place in the department, from the perspective of cost, affordability, of how many people are involved and how much money it will cost, and of what will be the life-cycle ownership costs of that capability over its 20 years.
There are also various permutations and combinations of all of those things that then get assessed by the military sponsors of that capability. We look at it as well, and a decision is taken departmentally that we're good to go.
We also work with various other folks—I work with a Treasury Board analyst as well—and they have challenge functions and questions, since they're looking at and questioning us regarding whether this is the best value for the government.