What I'd like to help clarify is that in fact it wasn't just the Iltis to the Nyala. We also went through an intermediate round with the Mercedes-Benz G wagon.
For some years, the army had identified as one of its requirements the ability to increase the soldier's survivability, increase the protection for the vehicles that our troops had been using in a succession of operations.
We first got the Nyala in Kosovo, when I was in command there, and that was because the mine threat was very high. Certainly current operations have much more significant directed threats against troops in softer vehicles.
We did not have the ability to replace the Iltis quickly enough, as we met the first operational requirement in Afghanistan. When we lost our first two soldiers in the IED strike in 2002, we took a very quick look at how we could up-armour the G wagon, which was coming into service, and we thought that would be sufficient for the time being.
We then began to find, certainly as a result of the IED strike on January 15, 2006, that the G wagon was not sufficient for the types of threats we were facing, and we had been looking at the Nyala as a longer-term solution.
So we already had significant experience with the Nyala in a previous operation in Kosovo. We realized it was in the spectrum of the type of protection that we would need for this particular generation of adversaries.