Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting us here today.
I would also like to thank you for the serious attention that you have paid to the Afghanistan file. The time was right and also crucial for the plight of this country. Following a quarter century of conflicts, Afghanistan is going through a transition and is facing a more promising future, one that is more likely to evolve under the banner of peace and stability.
As a Canadian who is working in the United Nations and has worked in Afghanistan now for three and a half years, it is a particular pleasure to appear before you with my colleague from NATO, James Appathurai.
Afghanistan is not only a test of wills for the Afghan people and a test of their courage to stand up against the phantoms of the past, represented by the Taliban and other terrorist groups. It's also a test of the ability of the international community to come together, through its national institutions and international organizations, behind a common project of nation-building that deserves the attention it is receiving but is not as well understood as it should be in all the quarters where it should be.
Our challenge is to help you carry the message of what is actually happening in Afghanistan today to the Canadian people and the broader community. There are achievements, and I'd like to signal some of them, but there is still a conflict. I would like to describe that conflict and outline some of the major challenges to which James has already referred.
I'd like to begin by paying tribute to all of my colleagues in the Afghan government and the international community who are working day and night to try to realize the objectives embodied in the Afghanistan Compact. They are objectives that 70 countries and international organizations have agreed to and stood behind, and objectives that, above all, represent the aspirations and hopes of the Afghan people.
If there has been progress, Afghanistan has had the benefit of having exceptional people on the ground. As the Standing Committee on National Defence, you deserve to know that the Canadian soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, general staff, and flag officers who have served in Afghanistan have been not only exceptional representatives of their country but among the very best to have served in Afghanistan at all.
General Grant, the current commander in Kandahar; General Fraser, his predecessor; General Leslie; and General Hillier have given exceptional leadership to ISAF and the international effort to bring security to Afghanistan. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers who have served under them have proven their worth and professionalism in ways that, despite blanket media coverage in Canada, are still only dimly understood here at home. They have stood against an enemy and stood for security at a time when an opportunity has been seized to bring positive change to Afghanistan as a nation and as a society.
Let me just run through some of the headline statistics to remind everyone how much has been done.
In only five years a health care system that was virtually non-existent under the Taliban has been able to achieve 85% access levels to a basic package of health care services. That means 85% of the population of Afghanistan can now reach a clinic, can reach a hospital when necessary, and can receive basic forms of inoculation and medical treatment that were not available in the past.
Now 7.3 million children have been vaccinated; 5.4 million children, an historic high for Afghanistan, are attending Afghan schools, and 34% or them are girls.
The GDP was $4 billion in 2002--I cited a slightly different number to the previous committee because it was from a different international organization, but the scale of growth is the same. The GDP, which was $4 billion in 2002, is now $8.9 billion. There has been explosive economic growth in Afghanistan, and we're talking only about the legitimate economy, not the poppy economy, which is estimated to have grown strongly, but not as strongly as the non-illicit side of the ledger.
Four million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. A strong currency has been reformed and has maintained its value. Low inflation continues to be a fact of life, and the budget in Afghanistan is balanced.
What does this actually mean in the lives of Afghans? Let me give you a couple of anecdotal stories.
Some Fridays, when some of us are able to get away from the incessant demands of life in Kabul, we go walking in rural areas within one hour's drive of the city. On one recent occasion I had the pleasure of spending about five hours walking up the valley with a colleague who had been in that valley in 2001, just after the Taliban withdrawal.
In 2001, this valley was full of burned-out houses, schools, and public buildings, all of which had been put to the torch by the Taliban itself. The job at that time was to do an inventory of property that was still standing. Today, every one of those buildings has been rebuilt, repainted, and in many cases restored.
A micro hydro system, financed by the Government of Korea, sits at the base of the valley and supplies 2,000 households in this valley with electricity, households that never had energy in the past. A reservoir that serves the micro hydro station has given a new rationality and new reach to irrigation in the valley.
A national solidarity program, a rural development program financed primarily by Canada, has been implemented in all villages of this valley. Schools are open every couple of kilometres. They were never there before. There are two clinics in the valley.
This change has transformed the lives of people in this district. It is admittedly one of the better-served districts of Afghanistan; the same story could not be told everywhere across the country, but it shows the impact of concerted international efforts, and Canada has played a very central role in those.
But there is still a conflict. And what is the nature of that conflict? Why is the insurgency stronger in 2006? Why is it continuing in 2007? One of the legacies of the Bonn Agreement is that it was not a peace deal. Several parties who've played a prominent role in the Afghan history of the past 25 years, including in the conflict, were excluded from the Bonn discussions. Mullah Omar and the Taliban obviously were not captured as a leadership structure of the Taliban; they were pushed out of Afghanistan, and they were excluded from the discussions that led to Bonn, that led to elections and the foundation of new institutions in Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of one of the strongest jihadi parties for part of the conflict, the strongest jihadi party in the 1980s, was not part of the discussions at Bonn in November and December 2001. Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of the major jihadi commanders from the 1980s, was excluded.
These are the groups that have reconstituted themselves, that have come together to challenge the constitutional order, to challenge the hopes and aspirations of Afghanistan today. And it is, to some extent, Afghanistan's failure and our failure to recognize that the threat still existed, and that it was still as existential to Afghanistan's transition as it has proved to be, that has perpetuated and worsened the conflict. But there has also been, quite frankly, lacklustre performance by some of Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular the Government of Pakistan, to act against Taliban leadership structures.
You will recall that Pakistan at one point considered it an article of faith, part of its national interest, to support the Taliban. This is plain from President Musharraf's memoirs, it's plain from the memoirs of other Pakistani officials, and it's not really denied as a fact. Are groups and interests in Pakistan still supporting these groups, still giving sanctuary to Taliban leaders? Probably. The weight of evidence is on the side of the prosecution in this case. And quite frankly, for those of us interested in the defence of Afghanistan, the defence interest of Afghanistan, in bringing security to Afghanistan, this has to be a high priority.
Let me, in defence of this proposition, note that this issue is not really open to debate any longer. As General Eikenberry, the last commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, said in congressional testimony only a couple of weeks ago, we cannot win this fight in Afghanistan alone, and “...I do emphasize Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remains a significant problem that must be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan...”.
This is a consensus that is shared within NATO, within the United Nations, and within the principal capitals concerned with the future of Afghanistan. And quite frankly, it needs to be addressed cooperatively through support, through positive, mutually reinforcing dialogue, but dialogue that will lead to a better security situation for the region and for the world.
Security, however, in Afghanistan is an objective that will not be achieved by military means alone. The security equation in the country today includes many more elements and many more challenges than simply prosecuting the campaign against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
The ministry of the interior and the role of police in Afghanistan remain an overriding priority for the international community, and indeed for the Afghan government. It's important for us to understand how much progress has been made, particularly in 2006 and 2007, quite frankly, after several years of neglect, when the policing in Afghanistan perhaps didn't receive the levels of attention it deserved.
Four tiers of selection, merit-based vetting, and competition have taken place to ensure that a ministry of the interior that was dominated by factional interests and, above all, by the interests of the Northern Alliance comes to be governed by the principle of merit and comes to be dominated by police officers who are, quite frankly, the best available in the country at their jobs. Tier one reform, which affected the senior leadership of the ministry, took place early in 2006. Tiers two, three, and four, reaching right down to the major level and lieutenant-colonel level, are being completed as we speak. With that reform comes a pay and rank reform similar to that implemented for the Afghan National Army, which quite frankly, for the first time puts the ministry of the interior on a professional basis and allows officers to step away from the temptation of corruption, from involvement in the drug trade, and from the factional affiliations that have dominated that ministry for too long.
There is still work to do. Finance and administration remain weak points for the ministry and accountability frameworks need to be strengthened. Civil administration, for which the ministry of the interior is also responsible--that is, administration of provincial and district levels--has not received the same attention as policing has received, and we in the United Nations would invite all interested donors to give more attention to this field. We hope that some of Canada's resources announced yesterday--war reconstruction, development, and institution-building in Afghanistan--will be dedicated to the governance challenge, as we have been given to understand will be the case.
What do we talk about with the people from the Department of the Interior? I will give you an example. Last summer, there was a riot in Kaboul following an accident that occurred in the northern part of the city. A coalition truck had crushed several people, including Afghan citizens.
Following this riot, which the Kaboul police contained with a great deal of difficulty, a new chief of police was appointed. This individual did not have any of the requirements to fill the position. The international community was very disappointed in the decision made by President Karzaï. He made this decision under very difficult circumstances. Indeed, a riot in a city like Kaboul is a destabilizing event these days.
We then initiated some reforms, not only in the process for selecting the Kaboul chief of police but all of the chiefs of police for the largest provinces in Afghanistan. On January 13, our hopes with respect to this matter were fulfilled. President Karzaï decided that 40 new chiefs would be appointed to various positions, including the chief of police of Kaboul. In all cases, the individuals appointed were professionals representing the ethnic, political and professional diversity of the Afghan police.
In all honesty, I can tell you that for the first time chiefs with a rank higher than that of colonel were selected on the basis of their merit. This was a very important message that was sent to the entire Afghan population and to the international community. These are facts demonstrating our ability to reform Afghan institutions and provide a professional foundation.
Mr. Chairman, I will not continue to cover all the points I would like to, and I would prefer to leave as much time as possible for an exchange, but let me simply list other areas where important progress has been made.
Disarmament in Afghanistan has been a remarkable story. Funded in very large measure by Canada, it has been the inescapable, necessary complement to the emergence of a professional army and police, which has started to take place, as highlighted by James.
The national development of security institutions responsible for security and intelligence in Afghanistan has had remarkable achievements. In late 2006 and early 2007, they were responsible for dismantling some of the most nefarious networks that were facilitating suicide bombings in Kabul, in Khowst, and of greatest importance for Canadians, in Kandahar. And we hope that success can be perpetuated in 2007.
Finally, the Afghan National Army remains an essential institution that must be stronger if we are to meet our objective of Afghanizing the process of providing security in Afghanistan. As a final point to the committee, I would call on Canada to give all due attention to the forms of support that are possible for the Afghan National Army. The Canadian army has already partnered very successfully with the ANA, but more can be done. There are innovative approaches that can be undertaken, and quite frankly, everything we can do to support the Afghan National Army institutionally will shorten, and not perpetuate, the need for the sorts of military investments and reconstruction investments that have been made so generously by this country and by others.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.