National Defence Committee on Feb. 27th, 2007

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

I understand that as well as direct IRBs, there are indirect IRBs. So that all of our companies in our various constituencies can have a potential chance at sharing in the benefits of this procurement, would you describe the IRB eligibility criteria used by your department when evaluating an IRB package submitted by the prime contractor of a defence procurement contract?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Mr. Minister, you have only one minute left.

[Maxime Bernier, Conservative, Beauce, QC]

Thank you.

What is important for us is to have high quality and high technological value for Canadian industry. That's one of the main criteria. We also want to be sure it's something that will be useful and that the company will be able to use this technology to get other contracts in the future with other foreign clients.

It's something we're proud of, because we worked with industry for the first time and with the nine technology lists. We developed these lists and we just asked Boeing to follow the lists. That was important for the industry, it was important for us, and with it I think we will be able to build and continue to build the aerospace industry here in Canada.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, Mr. Minister.

That brings to a close this portion of our meeting. We're going to suspend for a few minutes while we switch to in camera, so that we can deal with future business.

[Proceedings continue in camera]

[Public proceedings resume]

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We call this meeting to order, please.

I'd like to welcome Christopher Alexander, deputy special representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, and James Appathurai, spokesman for the NATO International Staff. We're here for a briefing on the missions of the UN and NATO in Afghanistan.

We finished our Afghanistan study awhile ago. We're working on the report. Right now we're doing procurement, but we welcome you here. We look forward to your comments, and then if there is time for questions, we'll open it up and try to divide it evenly. If not, we're interested in hearing what you have to say.

Go ahead, whoever's going to start.

[James Appathurai, Spokesman, NATO International Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization]

Thank you.

Chris led an hour ago, so I'll take my turn. I hope we can both stick to 10 to 15 minutes, and then we'll have some time for questions. I will be brief.

Let me thank you, at the outset, for inviting us. It's a real pleasure to meet with you. This is my first experience here. I hope that, in 45 minutes, we will be able to talk to you a bit about an issue that has become the number one priority for NATO.

Five years ago, all of the material I had in my office pertained to the Balkans. Suddenly, we started to receive, every morning, information about Afghanistan and South Asia. Things changed a great deal. Every morning, the North Atlantic Council receives a page indicating all the progress achieved in terms of development and reconstruction.

This is something completely new for NATO. We are becoming extremely interested in everything that touches on reconstruction and development. We acknowledge that, without security, there can be no development and that, without long-term development, there will be no security. These are the two sides of the same coin. At NATO, we have a completely new integrated approach.

I think there are in essence three questions we have to ask ourselves about this mission. First, is it still in Canada's national interest, and in the national interest of the 37 countries, to be carrying out this mission and to carry it out over the long term?

As I just mentioned, I went back and looked at who was in Afghanistan in 2001, keeping in mind that this was basically five years ago--in other words, in a political sense, yesterday. In 2001, Afghanistan was a sanctuary for extremist groups from almost 24 countries, all training in well-manned, well-funded terrorist camps. Al-Qaeda had 3,000 fighters, of course, from at least 13 Arab countries. The Taliban also hosted Islamic extremist groups from Russia, Pakistan, China, Burma, Iran, Central Asia, and several countries of the Far East, all of whom fought for the Taliban while carrying out operations in their own countries. These are the same people who want to take over again.

So I think we need to be clear that with 20/20 hindsight, our national interest in being there, as Canada and as an international organization--in fact there are two international organizations--is absolutely key. Afghanistan was and can become again the Grand Central Station of terrorism, with extremists coming in and leaving better trained and better funded.

The second point is--and I think this is the question that is asked certainly in many of our countries--is it winnable, and are we winning? That is the question I get from journalists from at least the 37 troop-contributing nations. If you watch the daily news you might wonder, because the press corps certainly does not want to cover, will not cover, except in the most extreme circumstances, the positive developments. I sat down personally with the press corps in Kandahar and Kabul twice in the last three months to ask them what I have to do to get them to cover the building of a school or a road. They are very clear: they will not do it. They will do it if the school burns down. I've been told this in private meetings. That's the way it is. It is very hard to get the press--and I say this with due respect to my press colleagues--to write the positive stories, so it's a challenge.

The positive story is there. I will let Chris, who of course leads this effort in Afghanistan on the reconstruction and development side, to speak for it, but let me say this. There are now 17,000 reconstruction and development projects under way in Afghanistan, according to our NATO statistics, of which 1,000 are being carried out directly by the NATO provincial reconstruction teams. Chris will give you much more detail on the other development indicators.

What I can say is that on the security front, the Afghan National Army has grown in the last five years from zero to about 30,000 soldiers. We are aiming for 70,000. They are deployed and fighting all over the country. NATO countries have donated to them tens of thousands of small arms, millions of rounds, 110 armoured personnel carriers, a dozen helicopters. We have operational mentoring and liaison teams embedded in the Afghan National Army. It is an institution that is really just going through its birth pangs. It has difficulties in terms of pay, difficulties in terms of retention, difficulties in terms of recruitment, but we are making progress in all of these areas. It is our exit strategy, as an international community, to help the Afghan national security forces to be able to fight their own fight, and then we can step back and play a more supporting role.

The Afghan National Police is an institution that needs more work. I think they're maybe a step behind the Afghan National Army. The EU has committed to step up its support for them, but this will be a very long-term effort, and we can discuss that in more detail if you want.

The second question--I think the committee is particularly interested in this one--is do we have enough forces, and are the other allies pulling their weight? This is a political issue, I know. NATO's answer to this one is quite clear: we're not quite there in terms of the forces we would like to have in Afghanistan.

Now, you will rarely hear a satisfied NATO official when it comes to force levels. With more we can always do better. But in general, yes, we have what we need. A little bit more can be added, but in general, yes. And yes, the other allies are in general pulling their weight, taking into account the real political considerations in all of their countries.

Since the Riga summit three months ago, we have added about 7,000 troops to the force levels. Most of these are Compact troops. The U.S., of course, is the principal contributor, with the 10th Mountain Division and the 173rd Airborne. The U.K., as you know, has just announced an increase of 1,500 on top of the 500 or so that they had announced earlier.

These are the big-ticket items, but there are also Norwegian special forces, and special forces from other countries who have not made it public. The Danes are looking to increase their contribution, and the Australians are looking to double their contribution with 500 regular forces and 250 special forces, with transport. The German Bundestag is likely to approve the deployment of six Tornados, with about 500 associated troops for reconnaissance purposes, and more UAVs, more C-130s, etc.

In the south, an area particularly relevant to Canada, the number of troops has gone up in the past 18 months from 1,000 to about 12,500. In a year and a half, there has been a 12-times increase in what we have from eight or nine countries, all working together and supporting each other across the zone. So the idea that Canada is in the south alone is simply wrong. The idea that other countries are not contributing or increasing their contribution does not reflect the reality of the 12-times increase in the number of troops in the south, of which, yes, 2,500 are Canadian, but the rest come from other countries.

I might also add that Canada is not bearing the burden alone when it comes to casualities. The Secretary General expressed his condolences just last week to the Spanish, who have lost over 20, and to the U.K., who have lost far more than that; they lost two more last week. Over a dozen NATO countries have lost troops in significant numbers. I can tell you that we have a flag down in front of NATO headquarters on a regular basis.

I would just point out that these sacrifices are being made by everybody, in all zones--in the north, in the west, in the capital, in the east, and in the south. The U.S., of course, has lost far more than everybody else. I think they are up at about 350.

We are also making progress in removing what we call caveats, the geographic restriction on the deployment of forces. I can tell you that Minister O'Connor and General Hillier have been forceful advocates in private NATO meetings. The result was that at Riga there was a commitment from all 26 countries that in extreme situations, in emergency situations, troops can go anywhere in support of any other NATO ally. Just two weeks ago, French Mirage fighters, which deployed and fired in close air support for Canadian troops, killed a lot of insurgents who were threatening our soldiers. So it has happened, they do it, and it is a good thing. We have made progress in that regard.

I have two more points and then I'll finish.

Where do we need to make improvements? Chris will go into more detail on this, I believe, but I'll mention governance, and stemming the support that is coming across the border from Pakistan. We have to work with the Pakistanis. They have to be part of the solution to this. NATO is doing that through the Trilateral Commission, but of course continued high-level political attention needs to be paid to this issue.

Narcotics are obviously a cancer fuelling the Taliban insurgency. Like any mafia, they are taking their cut and using it. So it is of direct security interest to us that we address this issue. It is not impossible to do. In the 1970s Pakistan was the biggest producer of narcotics, of opium, in the world; 70% came from there. They were producing 900 tonnes a year. By 1997 Pakistan was producing 24 tonnes, and by 1999, two tonnes. That's right next door. As with Thailand, as with Turkey, this can be tackled, and I think we should look at it.

By the way, this is what the Afghan government wants. They want this problem removed from their country--because it fuels corruption, because it fuels the Taliban--and we want to support that.

Finally, let me give you some poll numbers, because there is an idea out in some of the press that the Afghans will reject foreign forces as they have always done in the past, or that they like the Taliban.

There are three major polls that have been conducted in Afghanistan in the past few years--Altai Consulting, Asia Foundation, and the BBC. Seventy-five per cent of Afghans, if you average them out, strongly support the presence of foreign forces. That's five years later, after all of these attacks. Second, 80% support their elected government, and 3%, which is basically a rounding error, want the Taliban back. That's today. These are strongly encouraging numbers. We are getting traction. We are supporting the Afghan people in their struggle, and it is working with all of the great challenges we face. I think it's an encouraging story.

Chris.

[Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, United Nations]

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting us here today.

I would also like to thank you for the serious attention that you have paid to the Afghanistan file. The time was right and also crucial for the plight of this country. Following a quarter century of conflicts, Afghanistan is going through a transition and is facing a more promising future, one that is more likely to evolve under the banner of peace and stability.

As a Canadian who is working in the United Nations and has worked in Afghanistan now for three and a half years, it is a particular pleasure to appear before you with my colleague from NATO, James Appathurai.

Afghanistan is not only a test of wills for the Afghan people and a test of their courage to stand up against the phantoms of the past, represented by the Taliban and other terrorist groups. It's also a test of the ability of the international community to come together, through its national institutions and international organizations, behind a common project of nation-building that deserves the attention it is receiving but is not as well understood as it should be in all the quarters where it should be.

Our challenge is to help you carry the message of what is actually happening in Afghanistan today to the Canadian people and the broader community. There are achievements, and I'd like to signal some of them, but there is still a conflict. I would like to describe that conflict and outline some of the major challenges to which James has already referred.

I'd like to begin by paying tribute to all of my colleagues in the Afghan government and the international community who are working day and night to try to realize the objectives embodied in the Afghanistan Compact. They are objectives that 70 countries and international organizations have agreed to and stood behind, and objectives that, above all, represent the aspirations and hopes of the Afghan people.

If there has been progress, Afghanistan has had the benefit of having exceptional people on the ground. As the Standing Committee on National Defence, you deserve to know that the Canadian soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, general staff, and flag officers who have served in Afghanistan have been not only exceptional representatives of their country but among the very best to have served in Afghanistan at all.

General Grant, the current commander in Kandahar; General Fraser, his predecessor; General Leslie; and General Hillier have given exceptional leadership to ISAF and the international effort to bring security to Afghanistan. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers who have served under them have proven their worth and professionalism in ways that, despite blanket media coverage in Canada, are still only dimly understood here at home. They have stood against an enemy and stood for security at a time when an opportunity has been seized to bring positive change to Afghanistan as a nation and as a society.

Let me just run through some of the headline statistics to remind everyone how much has been done.

In only five years a health care system that was virtually non-existent under the Taliban has been able to achieve 85% access levels to a basic package of health care services. That means 85% of the population of Afghanistan can now reach a clinic, can reach a hospital when necessary, and can receive basic forms of inoculation and medical treatment that were not available in the past.

Now 7.3 million children have been vaccinated; 5.4 million children, an historic high for Afghanistan, are attending Afghan schools, and 34% or them are girls.

The GDP was $4 billion in 2002--I cited a slightly different number to the previous committee because it was from a different international organization, but the scale of growth is the same. The GDP, which was $4 billion in 2002, is now $8.9 billion. There has been explosive economic growth in Afghanistan, and we're talking only about the legitimate economy, not the poppy economy, which is estimated to have grown strongly, but not as strongly as the non-illicit side of the ledger.

Four million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. A strong currency has been reformed and has maintained its value. Low inflation continues to be a fact of life, and the budget in Afghanistan is balanced.

What does this actually mean in the lives of Afghans? Let me give you a couple of anecdotal stories.

Some Fridays, when some of us are able to get away from the incessant demands of life in Kabul, we go walking in rural areas within one hour's drive of the city. On one recent occasion I had the pleasure of spending about five hours walking up the valley with a colleague who had been in that valley in 2001, just after the Taliban withdrawal.

In 2001, this valley was full of burned-out houses, schools, and public buildings, all of which had been put to the torch by the Taliban itself. The job at that time was to do an inventory of property that was still standing. Today, every one of those buildings has been rebuilt, repainted, and in many cases restored.

A micro hydro system, financed by the Government of Korea, sits at the base of the valley and supplies 2,000 households in this valley with electricity, households that never had energy in the past. A reservoir that serves the micro hydro station has given a new rationality and new reach to irrigation in the valley.

A national solidarity program, a rural development program financed primarily by Canada, has been implemented in all villages of this valley. Schools are open every couple of kilometres. They were never there before. There are two clinics in the valley.

This change has transformed the lives of people in this district. It is admittedly one of the better-served districts of Afghanistan; the same story could not be told everywhere across the country, but it shows the impact of concerted international efforts, and Canada has played a very central role in those.

But there is still a conflict. And what is the nature of that conflict? Why is the insurgency stronger in 2006? Why is it continuing in 2007? One of the legacies of the Bonn Agreement is that it was not a peace deal. Several parties who've played a prominent role in the Afghan history of the past 25 years, including in the conflict, were excluded from the Bonn discussions. Mullah Omar and the Taliban obviously were not captured as a leadership structure of the Taliban; they were pushed out of Afghanistan, and they were excluded from the discussions that led to Bonn, that led to elections and the foundation of new institutions in Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of one of the strongest jihadi parties for part of the conflict, the strongest jihadi party in the 1980s, was not part of the discussions at Bonn in November and December 2001. Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of the major jihadi commanders from the 1980s, was excluded.

These are the groups that have reconstituted themselves, that have come together to challenge the constitutional order, to challenge the hopes and aspirations of Afghanistan today. And it is, to some extent, Afghanistan's failure and our failure to recognize that the threat still existed, and that it was still as existential to Afghanistan's transition as it has proved to be, that has perpetuated and worsened the conflict. But there has also been, quite frankly, lacklustre performance by some of Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular the Government of Pakistan, to act against Taliban leadership structures.

You will recall that Pakistan at one point considered it an article of faith, part of its national interest, to support the Taliban. This is plain from President Musharraf's memoirs, it's plain from the memoirs of other Pakistani officials, and it's not really denied as a fact. Are groups and interests in Pakistan still supporting these groups, still giving sanctuary to Taliban leaders? Probably. The weight of evidence is on the side of the prosecution in this case. And quite frankly, for those of us interested in the defence of Afghanistan, the defence interest of Afghanistan, in bringing security to Afghanistan, this has to be a high priority.

Let me, in defence of this proposition, note that this issue is not really open to debate any longer. As General Eikenberry, the last commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, said in congressional testimony only a couple of weeks ago, we cannot win this fight in Afghanistan alone, and “...I do emphasize Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remains a significant problem that must be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan...”.

This is a consensus that is shared within NATO, within the United Nations, and within the principal capitals concerned with the future of Afghanistan. And quite frankly, it needs to be addressed cooperatively through support, through positive, mutually reinforcing dialogue, but dialogue that will lead to a better security situation for the region and for the world.

Security, however, in Afghanistan is an objective that will not be achieved by military means alone. The security equation in the country today includes many more elements and many more challenges than simply prosecuting the campaign against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

The ministry of the interior and the role of police in Afghanistan remain an overriding priority for the international community, and indeed for the Afghan government. It's important for us to understand how much progress has been made, particularly in 2006 and 2007, quite frankly, after several years of neglect, when the policing in Afghanistan perhaps didn't receive the levels of attention it deserved.

Four tiers of selection, merit-based vetting, and competition have taken place to ensure that a ministry of the interior that was dominated by factional interests and, above all, by the interests of the Northern Alliance comes to be governed by the principle of merit and comes to be dominated by police officers who are, quite frankly, the best available in the country at their jobs. Tier one reform, which affected the senior leadership of the ministry, took place early in 2006. Tiers two, three, and four, reaching right down to the major level and lieutenant-colonel level, are being completed as we speak. With that reform comes a pay and rank reform similar to that implemented for the Afghan National Army, which quite frankly, for the first time puts the ministry of the interior on a professional basis and allows officers to step away from the temptation of corruption, from involvement in the drug trade, and from the factional affiliations that have dominated that ministry for too long.

There is still work to do. Finance and administration remain weak points for the ministry and accountability frameworks need to be strengthened. Civil administration, for which the ministry of the interior is also responsible--that is, administration of provincial and district levels--has not received the same attention as policing has received, and we in the United Nations would invite all interested donors to give more attention to this field. We hope that some of Canada's resources announced yesterday--war reconstruction, development, and institution-building in Afghanistan--will be dedicated to the governance challenge, as we have been given to understand will be the case.

What do we talk about with the people from the Department of the Interior? I will give you an example. Last summer, there was a riot in Kaboul following an accident that occurred in the northern part of the city. A coalition truck had crushed several people, including Afghan citizens.

Following this riot, which the Kaboul police contained with a great deal of difficulty, a new chief of police was appointed. This individual did not have any of the requirements to fill the position. The international community was very disappointed in the decision made by President Karzaï. He made this decision under very difficult circumstances. Indeed, a riot in a city like Kaboul is a destabilizing event these days.

We then initiated some reforms, not only in the process for selecting the Kaboul chief of police but all of the chiefs of police for the largest provinces in Afghanistan. On January 13, our hopes with respect to this matter were fulfilled. President Karzaï decided that 40 new chiefs would be appointed to various positions, including the chief of police of Kaboul. In all cases, the individuals appointed were professionals representing the ethnic, political and professional diversity of the Afghan police.

In all honesty, I can tell you that for the first time chiefs with a rank higher than that of colonel were selected on the basis of their merit. This was a very important message that was sent to the entire Afghan population and to the international community. These are facts demonstrating our ability to reform Afghan institutions and provide a professional foundation.

Mr. Chairman, I will not continue to cover all the points I would like to, and I would prefer to leave as much time as possible for an exchange, but let me simply list other areas where important progress has been made.

Disarmament in Afghanistan has been a remarkable story. Funded in very large measure by Canada, it has been the inescapable, necessary complement to the emergence of a professional army and police, which has started to take place, as highlighted by James.

The national development of security institutions responsible for security and intelligence in Afghanistan has had remarkable achievements. In late 2006 and early 2007, they were responsible for dismantling some of the most nefarious networks that were facilitating suicide bombings in Kabul, in Khowst, and of greatest importance for Canadians, in Kandahar. And we hope that success can be perpetuated in 2007.

Finally, the Afghan National Army remains an essential institution that must be stronger if we are to meet our objective of Afghanizing the process of providing security in Afghanistan. As a final point to the committee, I would call on Canada to give all due attention to the forms of support that are possible for the Afghan National Army. The Canadian army has already partnered very successfully with the ANA, but more can be done. There are innovative approaches that can be undertaken, and quite frankly, everything we can do to support the Afghan National Army institutionally will shorten, and not perpetuate, the need for the sorts of military investments and reconstruction investments that have been made so generously by this country and by others.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

We're going to have to shorten up to get everybody in. We're only going to have about a three-minute round here, so be brief, and we'll hopefully get some more comments. Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Mr. Coderre.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

It's going to be brief, because I have a simple question. There is a complex answer, probably, but I'll share my time with my colleague Mr. McGuire.

It seems that it's going well, but I'd like to know your point of view regarding the German report, because it says that it's painfully slow. We believe in the triple-D. I think that not only does the Pakistan question need to be addressed, but we should focus more on the diplomatic issue and be a bit more muscular on that. Maybe we should take a look at that. What's your point of view versus what the German report said?

Second, we spoke a lot about Pakistan. What's the status vis-à-vis Iran? Is there some situation there? Are there some al-Qaeda cells? I think I know the answer, but maybe we should take a look at that.

Finally, what's your point of view on detention? There is a situation regarding the transfer to the Afghan government--we're talking about torture and stuff--through the United Nations. I'm pretty sure you have some point of view. You know that we have an inquiry here and that we're taking a look at that, so I'd like to hear about that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Be very brief.

[James Appathurai]

I'll very happily leave the detention issue to my colleague from the United Nations. I'll only say that NATO's policy is 96 hours maximum, and then anyone detained is handed over to the Afghan authorities, with full notification to the International Red Cross. So there are no black holes when it comes to detention, from a NATO point of view.

I think you can easily put “going well” and “painfully slow” into the same sentence and be intellectually coherent. It is painfully slow, but it is making achievable progress, measurable progress.

This was arguably the poorest, if not one of the bottom five poorest, countries in the world, destroyed by war, with all the problems that we all know--the regional problems and so on. People's lives are getting better. They have more money, they have more access to health care, and their kids are in school--not all of them, but slowly, slowly, it's getting there.

I think that's the only way we can look at this. If you just look at the problems, you'll be discouraged. But if you look at the progress, you know you're getting traction. We in NATO believe firmly that we are making progress. Clearly, the UN feels the same way.

Chris may have more to offer on Iran. What I can say is that from a NATO perspective, we have had low-level technical cooperation from Iran when it comes to airspace issues and making sure there are no misapprehensions or confusions when it comes to that. But we certainly have no information that Iran is playing a negative role when it comes to security issues related to us. That, I think, is a very important statement.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Your time is up, Mr. Coderre, I'm sorry.

We'll go to Mr. Bachand.

[Keith Martin, Liberal, Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, BC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair. Since we started a little bit late, I wonder if you'd be kind enough to ask our guests if they could stay until 11:30.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

It's not a point of order. We have another committee here afterwards.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

It's not up to us. There's another committee at 11 o'clock. We're on a tight schedule.

Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to express my dismay at the situation. We are hearing from two very important individuals and we have but three minutes to ask our questions and hear the answers. That doesn't make sense. We could discuss the matter later.

I have six questions, but I'm not asking you to answer. I would like you to send me your answers, in writing, because I feel that this is important.

You spoke about reconstruction. We, the members, are getting contradictory information. With NATO, I went to Faizabad and I did not see a great deal of reconstruction. I travelled to Kandahar with the Standing Committee on National Defence and, for security reasons, we were not allowed to leave the camp and see what was actually going on. I would like to know if there truly is reconstruction in Afghanistan and, if yes, where is this taking place. I find it very difficult to believe that much reconstruction is occurring in the Kandahar region, but I would like you to show us, on a map, where this reconstruction is taking place.

Let's talk about the survey. Earlier on, you talked about percentages. I would like to know what you think about the statements made by Gen. Richards, who for the past few months has been saying that if there is no change in attitude or in the mandate of the mission, 70% of the Afghans are going to be heading back to the Taliban.

My next question is for Mr. Appathurai. A little earlier you said that it was important that international organizations agree amongst themselves. I have just returned from Brussels and I don't understand why NATO and the European Union are incapable of agreeing with each other and are incapable of holding a meeting on an issue as important as Afghanistan. I would like you to explain, in writing, why you think this situation is occurring.

We talk about health services that have changed. However, the Senlis Council has just said that the Kandahar Hospital is really a place where people go to die, that is a place where people systematically die. You are telling us that things appear to have improved, but that does not seem to be the case. Once again, contradictory information.

Mr. Alexander, I would like you to talk to us about the amnesty. Currently, President Karzaï is grappling with the decision made by the Parliament to grant amnesty to many of the bandits whereas the international community is objecting. I would like to hear about the latest developments, I would like to know how that is going to work. We even heard that mollah Omar may be given amnesty and that he is being told that, if he ceases his involvement, he will now be part of Afghan society. I find it very difficult to understand some things.

Finally, let's talk about the 3D approach. It was confirmed to us in Kandahar that there are 2,500 soldiers, 6 Foreign Affairs representatives and 6 CIDA representatives. It seems to me that there truly is an imbalance in the mission's mandate. I would like to hear your opinion on the matter.

I heard the buzzard go off. I will expect your answers, in writing, in a few days time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Are you prepared to do that for us?

[James Appathurai]

Of course.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Ms. Black.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

While I share my colleague's dismay at not having an opportunity to really get into a substantive question and answer period, it was interesting to hear you, Mr. Appathurai, talk about the media not telling the story. The fact of the matter is the Canadian media and most international media are embedded with the military and they tell the story that the military allows to be told from any objective perspective.

I also had some trouble listening to you talk about the casualties that other countries have suffered, because I don't take any comfort that other countries may have suffered higher casualties than Canadians have. I found that a disturbing comparison.

I'm wondering how often you've been in the area of Kandahar where the Canadians are right now, specifically to the internally displaced persons camps, where we see in the media--this is one thing we have seen in the media--people who are obviously not getting enough food aid. That's not getting through. Perhaps Mr. Alexander would respond to that. Why isn't food and clean water reaching the people in these internally displaced camps to the level they obviously need?

You also talked about the situation with Pakistan. You raise it, everybody raises it, but we need to find some solutions for it, and we need to find some action that's going to prevent the insurgents from going back and forth across the border. It's not enough just to raise it; we need some answers to that.

The other question I wanted to raise is around the issue of the detainees. Mr. Alexander, perhaps you can respond to this. Maybe if you don't get time you could do it in writing, also.

What are the conditions of the Afghan prisons? What kinds of situations are we turning people over to? We've been told about torture. We've been told about abysmal conditions. I would like to have some kind of report on exactly what the state of the Afghan prisons are at this point, where people are being turned over.

We know there are investigations going on now by Canadian authorities into this. We know the agreement that was signed by General Hillier is not up to the standards of the agreements that were signed by the Dutch and by the British in terms of following the care or the treatment of prisoners as they go through the system in Afghanistan and whether they're being transferred over to other nations as well. We don't know that, we really don't know that, and I think that's a big problem.

Finally, in terms of the numbers who are serving in southern Afghanistan, you talked about that. I've tried to question our own minister and officials around how the NATO mission meshes with Operation Enduring Freedom, which is still going on. There are still a large number of American soldiers fighting in southern Afghanistan, independent of the NATO mission. We don't have any information about how those things mesh.

We know that the two-week training program for the Afghan national auxiliary police is simply a two-week program and then--out into the field. It's worrisome. You acknowledge that the training of police is way behind. We were told, when we were in Afghanistan, it was seven years to ten years behind the training of the Afghan National Army, which really is not progressive and not, I think, at the rate the international community had hoped for.

So those are some of my observations. I'm sorry we don't have time for some back and forth.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, Ms. Black.

Hopefully you're taking notes, and we'll get you the blues as well. Do you have any idea, as the questions are coming forward, how long it would take to respond to what you're hearing?

[James Appathurai]

I could take three minutes and run through a few of them.

Do you want to go first?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Allow me to just finish up with the government, with Ms. Gallant, for three minutes, and then we'll try.

Then I think Mr. McGuire wants to pose a question so that you can respond in writing.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you are going to send answers to these questions back to the committee, could you provide them to all members of the committee? I'm going to start off with a question that I know will be of interest to my colleague from Quebec, one of many Quebeckers who form a nation within a united Canada, who also sits on the parliamentary committee for NATO.

Mr. Alexander, you told us about the many wonderful infrastructure projects that have gone on and the benefits to Afghans as a result of our being there.

Mr. Appathurai, you mentioned the original reason. You alluded to the fact that terrorism was the original reason for our being in Afghanistan.

Now I want to talk about NATO. When NATO was first formed, as you know, the countries grouped together in response to the Cold War. We're more at the ready, a steadfast reactionary group, and it's only in the fairly recent past that we've become an expeditionary force. As you also mentioned, we have casualities, and the greatest of sacrifices is being made by all coalition countries, as well as by countries who aren't a part of NATO. We have seen Jordanian soldiers over there and countries who wish to be part of NATO, but every time we have a casualty come back to Canada in a flag-draped casket, political hay is made out of this, and there are movements about taking our troops out of Afghanistan.

My first question is this. If NATO were to leave Afghanistan before the mission were completed, what impact would that have on NATO as a whole, and on its future? We know that the European Union has its force, so there could be things competing there. I'm curious as to the caveats that France has. That's really important here in Canada, because the leader of the opposition currently has dual citizenship, and anything can happen in politics.

[Denis Coderre, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

On a point of order, that's a disgrace. That's pathetic.