Thank you.
Chris led an hour ago, so I'll take my turn. I hope we can both stick to 10 to 15 minutes, and then we'll have some time for questions. I will be brief.
Let me thank you, at the outset, for inviting us. It's a real pleasure to meet with you. This is my first experience here. I hope that, in 45 minutes, we will be able to talk to you a bit about an issue that has become the number one priority for NATO.
Five years ago, all of the material I had in my office pertained to the Balkans. Suddenly, we started to receive, every morning, information about Afghanistan and South Asia. Things changed a great deal. Every morning, the North Atlantic Council receives a page indicating all the progress achieved in terms of development and reconstruction.
This is something completely new for NATO. We are becoming extremely interested in everything that touches on reconstruction and development. We acknowledge that, without security, there can be no development and that, without long-term development, there will be no security. These are the two sides of the same coin. At NATO, we have a completely new integrated approach.
I think there are in essence three questions we have to ask ourselves about this mission. First, is it still in Canada's national interest, and in the national interest of the 37 countries, to be carrying out this mission and to carry it out over the long term?
As I just mentioned, I went back and looked at who was in Afghanistan in 2001, keeping in mind that this was basically five years ago--in other words, in a political sense, yesterday. In 2001, Afghanistan was a sanctuary for extremist groups from almost 24 countries, all training in well-manned, well-funded terrorist camps. Al-Qaeda had 3,000 fighters, of course, from at least 13 Arab countries. The Taliban also hosted Islamic extremist groups from Russia, Pakistan, China, Burma, Iran, Central Asia, and several countries of the Far East, all of whom fought for the Taliban while carrying out operations in their own countries. These are the same people who want to take over again.
So I think we need to be clear that with 20/20 hindsight, our national interest in being there, as Canada and as an international organization--in fact there are two international organizations--is absolutely key. Afghanistan was and can become again the Grand Central Station of terrorism, with extremists coming in and leaving better trained and better funded.
The second point is--and I think this is the question that is asked certainly in many of our countries--is it winnable, and are we winning? That is the question I get from journalists from at least the 37 troop-contributing nations. If you watch the daily news you might wonder, because the press corps certainly does not want to cover, will not cover, except in the most extreme circumstances, the positive developments. I sat down personally with the press corps in Kandahar and Kabul twice in the last three months to ask them what I have to do to get them to cover the building of a school or a road. They are very clear: they will not do it. They will do it if the school burns down. I've been told this in private meetings. That's the way it is. It is very hard to get the press--and I say this with due respect to my press colleagues--to write the positive stories, so it's a challenge.
The positive story is there. I will let Chris, who of course leads this effort in Afghanistan on the reconstruction and development side, to speak for it, but let me say this. There are now 17,000 reconstruction and development projects under way in Afghanistan, according to our NATO statistics, of which 1,000 are being carried out directly by the NATO provincial reconstruction teams. Chris will give you much more detail on the other development indicators.
What I can say is that on the security front, the Afghan National Army has grown in the last five years from zero to about 30,000 soldiers. We are aiming for 70,000. They are deployed and fighting all over the country. NATO countries have donated to them tens of thousands of small arms, millions of rounds, 110 armoured personnel carriers, a dozen helicopters. We have operational mentoring and liaison teams embedded in the Afghan National Army. It is an institution that is really just going through its birth pangs. It has difficulties in terms of pay, difficulties in terms of retention, difficulties in terms of recruitment, but we are making progress in all of these areas. It is our exit strategy, as an international community, to help the Afghan national security forces to be able to fight their own fight, and then we can step back and play a more supporting role.
The Afghan National Police is an institution that needs more work. I think they're maybe a step behind the Afghan National Army. The EU has committed to step up its support for them, but this will be a very long-term effort, and we can discuss that in more detail if you want.
The second question--I think the committee is particularly interested in this one--is do we have enough forces, and are the other allies pulling their weight? This is a political issue, I know. NATO's answer to this one is quite clear: we're not quite there in terms of the forces we would like to have in Afghanistan.
Now, you will rarely hear a satisfied NATO official when it comes to force levels. With more we can always do better. But in general, yes, we have what we need. A little bit more can be added, but in general, yes. And yes, the other allies are in general pulling their weight, taking into account the real political considerations in all of their countries.
Since the Riga summit three months ago, we have added about 7,000 troops to the force levels. Most of these are Compact troops. The U.S., of course, is the principal contributor, with the 10th Mountain Division and the 173rd Airborne. The U.K., as you know, has just announced an increase of 1,500 on top of the 500 or so that they had announced earlier.
These are the big-ticket items, but there are also Norwegian special forces, and special forces from other countries who have not made it public. The Danes are looking to increase their contribution, and the Australians are looking to double their contribution with 500 regular forces and 250 special forces, with transport. The German Bundestag is likely to approve the deployment of six Tornados, with about 500 associated troops for reconnaissance purposes, and more UAVs, more C-130s, etc.
In the south, an area particularly relevant to Canada, the number of troops has gone up in the past 18 months from 1,000 to about 12,500. In a year and a half, there has been a 12-times increase in what we have from eight or nine countries, all working together and supporting each other across the zone. So the idea that Canada is in the south alone is simply wrong. The idea that other countries are not contributing or increasing their contribution does not reflect the reality of the 12-times increase in the number of troops in the south, of which, yes, 2,500 are Canadian, but the rest come from other countries.
I might also add that Canada is not bearing the burden alone when it comes to casualities. The Secretary General expressed his condolences just last week to the Spanish, who have lost over 20, and to the U.K., who have lost far more than that; they lost two more last week. Over a dozen NATO countries have lost troops in significant numbers. I can tell you that we have a flag down in front of NATO headquarters on a regular basis.
I would just point out that these sacrifices are being made by everybody, in all zones--in the north, in the west, in the capital, in the east, and in the south. The U.S., of course, has lost far more than everybody else. I think they are up at about 350.
We are also making progress in removing what we call caveats, the geographic restriction on the deployment of forces. I can tell you that Minister O'Connor and General Hillier have been forceful advocates in private NATO meetings. The result was that at Riga there was a commitment from all 26 countries that in extreme situations, in emergency situations, troops can go anywhere in support of any other NATO ally. Just two weeks ago, French Mirage fighters, which deployed and fired in close air support for Canadian troops, killed a lot of insurgents who were threatening our soldiers. So it has happened, they do it, and it is a good thing. We have made progress in that regard.
I have two more points and then I'll finish.
Where do we need to make improvements? Chris will go into more detail on this, I believe, but I'll mention governance, and stemming the support that is coming across the border from Pakistan. We have to work with the Pakistanis. They have to be part of the solution to this. NATO is doing that through the Trilateral Commission, but of course continued high-level political attention needs to be paid to this issue.
Narcotics are obviously a cancer fuelling the Taliban insurgency. Like any mafia, they are taking their cut and using it. So it is of direct security interest to us that we address this issue. It is not impossible to do. In the 1970s Pakistan was the biggest producer of narcotics, of opium, in the world; 70% came from there. They were producing 900 tonnes a year. By 1997 Pakistan was producing 24 tonnes, and by 1999, two tonnes. That's right next door. As with Thailand, as with Turkey, this can be tackled, and I think we should look at it.
By the way, this is what the Afghan government wants. They want this problem removed from their country--because it fuels corruption, because it fuels the Taliban--and we want to support that.
Finally, let me give you some poll numbers, because there is an idea out in some of the press that the Afghans will reject foreign forces as they have always done in the past, or that they like the Taliban.
There are three major polls that have been conducted in Afghanistan in the past few years--Altai Consulting, Asia Foundation, and the BBC. Seventy-five per cent of Afghans, if you average them out, strongly support the presence of foreign forces. That's five years later, after all of these attacks. Second, 80% support their elected government, and 3%, which is basically a rounding error, want the Taliban back. That's today. These are strongly encouraging numbers. We are getting traction. We are supporting the Afghan people in their struggle, and it is working with all of the great challenges we face. I think it's an encouraging story.
Chris.