National Defence Committee on June 13th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I call the meeting to order.

This is the sixth meeting pursuant to Standing Order 108(2). The committee is dealing with a motion to study the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

We want to welcome our witnesses here today, Mr. Boivin and Mr. Massie.

We will allow you an opportunity to present your offerings here, and then there will be a round of questioning, one or two, whatever it takes to satisfy the committee. Feel free to take a reasonable amount of time. So 10 to 15 minutes would be nice, if that's what you have, and then we'll turn it over to the committee for questions and hopefully a good give-and-take during that time.

Mr. Boivin, are you going to start?

Go ahead, the floor is yours.

[Marc André Boivin, Coordinator, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP), Centre d'études et de recherches internationales de l'Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM)]

Thank you.

My name is Marc André Boivin. I work for a research group that's called the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, which is at the University of Montreal.

First, I'd like to do my presentation in two parts, first basically un état de la situation, and then I'll close with some general recommendations as far as the Canadian policy in Afghanistan is concerned.

Let me start with l'état de la situation.

Since the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, the international community has begun a long-term process to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Since, much of the groundwork has been laid. A true race to govern is on between this political project endorsed by the international community and the Afghan forces that presided over the dismantling of the country for more than two decades. Unfortunately, recent developments lead us to believe that the international community is currently losing this race to govern.

Let's talk about the difficulties. Canada is one of the new Afghan government's first and most reliable partners, and Afghanistan has an enviable role in Canada's foreign policy. It is important today to clearly understand the difficulties involved in the stabilization and rebuilding process that is underway and to put into context the potential impact of Canada's action in this area.

The main difficulty is the resurgence of extremist elements, the return in strength of the Taliban and other elements who are opposed to recognizing the authority of the government in Kabul. The spectacular rise in violence, namely in southern sector where the Canadian soldiers were redeployed, is also a symptom of the central government's loss of control over entire regions. A report recently published by the London Senlis Council confirms, following a study in the field in the Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar regions, that government authority does not extend beyond the main centres where foreign troops are deployed. The actual power of the Kabul authorities in the regions has always been well below its ambitions. However, the problem is that developments and these ambitions are moving in opposite direction and that the initiative is now controlled by insurgents in entire regions, mainly in the south and the east.

The second difficulty is the marked increase in the production and sale of narcotics. The Taliban's return in strength is explained in part by considerable illegal revenue from a spectacular increase in the production and sale of narcotics. This increase affects, among others, the region of Helmand and Kandahar, where British and Canadian contingents are deployed, and where, not coincidentally, the insurgents are among the best organized. A natural alliance has been formed among producers, traffickers and insurgents, all of whom are strongly opposed to recognizing a state of law. This dynamic became significantly worse because of the policy to eradicate poppy fields favoured namely by the American government. That alienated local people by depriving them of their livelihood and provided the Taliban with an opportunity to score political points. Moreover, the eradications tended to hit the poorest peasants especially hard, thus strengthening the sense of injustice and alienation vis-à-vis authorities in Kabul. Any kind of solution will require a long-term strategy to progressively restore a lawful economy through a combination of targeted measures for development, incentives, and repression.

The third difficult stems from the Afghan government's fragile foundation. This measured approach is an integral part of the Afghanistan Compact, itself inspired by an Afghan national development strategy submitted by the Karzai government. Its main aim is to develop the capacity of the Afghan government so that it will one day be autonomous and responsible. To date, the bulk of its budget is provided by international donations, which is not only untenable in the long term, but also contrary to exercising its sovereignty and damaging from a domestic point of view. International efforts have come up short in terms of training Afghan police officers, and have done even worse in establishing a legal system. Moreover, countries continue to prefer direct investments instead of assistance through the Afghan government, a more effective short-term approach but which hinders the development of the Afghan government's administrative capacity in the long term. According to some Afghan officials, the world is providing Afghanistan with intensive care, instead of providing it with a remedy.

The fourth difficulty is the lack of consistency in international efforts. Canada's action is part of international efforts that have proven to be inconsistent and disparate. Three missions are currently active in Afghanistan: a UN mission responsible for development and coordinating development assistance, a NATO mission with a peacekeeping mandate, and a US-led counter-terrorism operation.

Discussions to merge the two military missions, Enduring Freedom and ISAF, have encountered squabbling between the Americans and Europeans, who do not agree on including more offensive aspects as part as a unified operation. Yet most countries are participating in both missions. It must also be added that NATO had enormous difficulty convincing its members to agree to substantial deployments. The countries have moreover imposed the various restrictions that strictly limit the action of forces on the ground.

The fifth difficulty stems from action with too much of a military focus. Security has been placed at the centre of international involvement in Afghanistan. That echoed the dramatic events that precipitated the instigation. But establishing sustainable peace for Afghanistan will require economic development and political stability. Canada is no exception to that trend, with the presence on the ground but it's essentially military in nature. I reiterate that there is currently a race on to govern Afghanistan. A solution that is strictly military is counter-productive in the longer term, as witness the recent deterioration in the security environment after five years of efforts.

The sixth difficulty is the conflict's regional dimension. Afghanistan is the epicentre of a highly unstable region. Its two main economic partners, Iran and Pakistan, are also its two main potential sources of political and military problems. So Afghanistan could suffer a backlash from the current confrontation between Iran and the United States. Evermore seriously, Pakistan is closely tied to decades of several war that ravaged the country. The tribal regions, namely at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are used as refuges for the Taliban and other extremist elements, and have played a significant role in their recent resurgence. A rise in violence has had a direct negative impact on relations between Islamabad and Kabul. The complexity of the situation is increased by the link to the rivalry between Pakistan and India. Moreover, Pakistan's military dictatorship is based in part on radical Islamic doctrine, which limits its ability to take action.

Now I'll go to the recommendations.

Canada has played an active role in Afghanistan from the start, and it should see its commitment through. However, we should not underestimate the significant obstacles awaiting the completion of our mission there. The situation, as noted, significantly deteriorated in recent months, putting Afghanistan's recovery further in the future and raising doubts on the current stabilization and reconstruction process.

The first recommendation is to stay the course, but with an open debate.

Canada's involvement follows a humanitarian imperative and our focus on failed states. It is also a necessary gesture towards our American partner and is consistent with our latest international policy statement. But Canadian support has been dwindling, and the Canadian government cannot shy away from explaining its foreign policy choices.

In the current political situation, Canada's involvement in Afghanistan cannot remain the sole prerogative of the Prime Minister's Office, and attempts at doing so are eminently counterproductive. All four parties stated their support for the mission during last April's debate on the issue. How could the renewal of the mission vote go so awry only three weeks later?

As in other democracies, notably in Europe, Canada should discuss and vote in Parliament on the renewal of major international deployments well in advance and on a regular basis. The pitfall is the possibility of inconsistency, but the Prime Minister's Office is not immune to such a risk. Furthermore, this would shed more light on Canada's foreign policy and bring the debates closer to the Canadian citizens.

The second recommendation is that emphasis should be put on the political and development aspects of the mission.

Part of the Taliban resurgence in the south and east can be blamed on the strictly military character of Operation Enduring Freedom. It took two years for the American command to recognize that in order to be successful, they needed to engage in nation building. Even the subsequent provincial reconstruction teams were dominated by military personnel and considerations.

President Karzai lately has been critical of some of the blunt methods used by the Americans and coalition partners, namely, house searches and aerial bombardments. Canada has an extensive and distinguished record in stabilizing post-conflict societies, yet our involvement in Afghanistan has also been mainly through National Defence.

The 3D approach, advocated in the international policy statement, is sensible. The time has now come to put more emphasis on diplomacy and development if we are to help the Afghans sustain peace by themselves in the long run. The Afghanistan Compact offers a unique opportunity in this sense, as well as the programs set up by the UNDP and the UN in general.

The extension of ISAF to the south, of which the Canadian military is part, will probably bring a more balanced approach to the fore, in which security is viewed in a larger sense than the dubious war on terror and consequent hunt for terrorists allow. This is not to say that the military should not engage in offensive actions; rather, they should avoid being strictly focused on them, this being especially true in the alarming situation that now prevails in the Kandahar region.

On the third set of recommendations, Canada's action is part of an international effort. Related to this point is the fact that Canada should try to exert a positive influence on its partners in Afghanistan. To the United States, Canada should point out that the job in Afghanistan is not done and that Iraq should not make it deviate from its responsibilities.

Commitment issues are also a concern with our European partners who, when they commit troops, tend to severely restrict their use. Furthermore, Canada is in an ideal position to mediate between the Europeans and the Americans and foster a deal that would unite the two military missions in Afghanistan. The United States should probably be aware by now of the benefits of a more legitimate multilateral NATO tag to its actions, however curtailed they may be.

Finally, on awareness of regional dimensions, geography has put Afghanistan in the middle of powerful regional players with vested interests in the country. Peace will not be sustainable without their consent and support. The most important actor in this respect is no doubt Pakistan. Canada should keep a close watch on the Pakistani government's actions and inactions. The issues of democratization and decentralization, Kashmir, and radical Islamic militancy will all directly affect Afghanistan.

If we want our efforts to bear fruit, we need to be mindful of these complex realities and make good use of our diplomatic assets.

To conclude, Canada cannot solve all of Afghanistan's problems by itself. But by deploying a significant contingent, sustaining a high level of development assistance, and providing political support, it has earned a place at the table. It should put that to good use and push for a more encompassing, sustained long-term approach to establishing peace in Afghanistan. It's our only valid exit strategy.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much. We'll get back to you during questions, hopefully.

Mr. Massie.

[Justin Massie, Research Associate , Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes, Université du Québec à Montréal]

Good afternoon. My name is Justin Massie and I hold the Canadian Research Chair for Foreign Policy and Canadian Defence at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

Today I would like to speak about a domestic and political aspect of the Canadian Forces' role in Afghanistan and that is, the current confusion and division among Canadians regarding the rationale, appropriateness and nature of this mission.

This division continues despite many efforts by Members of Parliament and the media to explain Canada's mission in Afghanistan. These efforts appear to be in vain. The most recent survey, of June 8, 2006, showed that 44% of Canadians are opposed to the mission. Compared to the 62% and 45% opposed in March, and 54% in May 2006, these figures show that a considerable number of Canadians disapprove of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, essentially since Canada took over command in Kandahar.

In principle, such a division should not be worrisome. Public opinion is volatile, and the country should not be governed by public whims. The role of the CF abroad must address other imperatives in order to become more consistent. It should be noted, for instance, that a majority of Canadians were opposed to Canada’s participation in the Gulf war in 1991 before it began, yet a majority approved after the fact.

However, the noteworthy aspect of the current situation in Afghanistan is the confusion over the nature of Canada’s role, confusion that is at the root of the division that is evident in public opinion. I think one of the criteria for a mission’s success is the collective belief that the forces are acting fairly and by necessity. To achieve this, the government cannot ignore the fact that a significant group of Canadians does not understand why the CF are deployed in such large numbers in Kandahar or what the justification is for soldiers being killed.

The persistent ambiguity among members of Parliament, in the media and in public opinion in general is, in my opinion, the result of a widening gap between the perception of Canadians and the actual operations conducted by the CF.

From 1956 to 1960, a significant attachment was quickly formed with respect to the role of Canadian peacekeepers, so much so that their role became more mythical than real. Barely 10% of Canadian troops were assigned to peacekeeping operations during the cold war. This is nevertheless the symbol and trademark that the CF inherited, both in Canada and abroad. Canada is inevitably linked with the emblematic United Nations peacekeepers.

In spite of the change in the nature of conflicts, including the increase in civil conflict as opposed to conflict between states, Canadian governments have persisted in justifying the deployment of CF abroad by invoking the peacekeeping image. Responding favourably to this image, Canadians developed the notion that Canada is a peaceful nation, which promotes peace. Underlying this perception is the widespread idea among Canadians that war is an aberration and is avoidable and that it can be prevented through cooperation and negotiation.

The 1990s saw exponential growth in the number of peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council, the tendency of a number of Western countries to favour NATO over the UN, and the growing participation of developing countries in UN peace operations. In reaction to this, Canada considerably reduced its commitments to the UN to focus instead on NATO missions.

This shift in the role of the CF was not marked, however, by a significant public attachment to any particular role. Faced with change in the nature of its operations, Canadian governments justify interventions with new concepts, including human security and peace building, which were a reflection of the ideals underlying the peacekeeping image of previous years. During that time, Canadians were tempting to find a new role for Canadian Forces that corresponded to their concept of war.

It was following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and especially in reaction to the US foreign and defence policy response, that Canada was forced to more clearly define its international role. The new international context involved fighting terrorism as the primary if not sole imperative of US foreign policy. Furthermore, the resurgence of new transnational threats compelled Canada to change the traditional role of the Canadian Forces from the cold war period, and to clear up the ambiguity that persisted in the 1990s. Only the former was achieved.

What we can see today is the fact that the Canadian Forces are standing resolutely beside their traditional allies in a fight against terrorism, at the expense of their former peacekeeping role, which is deeply rooted in the national psyche. The combat operations that are an inherent part of the Canadian commitment in Kandahar, in order to fight insurgents, are in sharp contrast to the fifty-year-old image of the Canadian Forces. There are, of course, Canadian soldiers assigned to humanitarian roles in Afghanistan. This is a role that receives a great deal of media coverage for its actual scope, but the primary role of the forces deployed there is to pursue Afghan and other insurgents, using force.

In order to succeed in rebuilding Afghanistan, we need to first ensure that a government is legitimately elected, second, ensure that the country is monitored and that it is secure, and third, establish those infrastructures that are necessary for sustainable socio-economic development. We are currently at the second stage, which we must complete before moving on to the third.

The Canadian mission in Afghanistan, which will oversee the transition from operation Enduring Freedom to the ISAF, is acting within the frame of this second stage. Combat operations are therefore much more extensive than the rebuilding efforts.

In my opinion, this mission is based on a different concept of war from what predominates in Canadian society. In order to effectively fight terrorism, it is in my opinion sometimes necessary to prevent its emergence and sometimes to counter it offensively. The idea behind this reasoning is that confrontation is inevitable and thus that military efforts are essential to achieving peace.

As a result, there is great confusion among Canadians at present. Consider, for example, the withdrawal of the Canadian Forces from the Golan Heights, the few forces deployed in Haiti, and the few troops available for a significant deployment in Darfur. These three missions correspond to the traditional peacekeeper image. Compared to the current engagement in Kandahar, this situation implies first, a reduction in the ability of the Canadian Forces to intervene in missions that are more traditional for the Canadian Forces and, above all, demonstrates the will to depart from the previous role to a more dangerous and warlike one. Major military and political consequences should be expected, including the difficulty of operationalizing military requirements in a manner that is consistent with humanitarian necessities.

The reason for the current confusion and division in Canadian society can, in my opinion, be attributed to the gap between a political will to create a new military role for the Canadian Forces, based on new strategic imperatives, and the public perception of the international role the Canadian Forces should play.

In order to reduce this gap and to win Canadians support for a new role for the Canadian Forces, the symbols and myths of the past will have to be tailored to Canada's new commitment in Afghanistan or, alternately, this commitment will have to be tailored to Canadian's values and principles.

The difficulty in reconciling ideals and strategic imperatives stems from the unique relationship between Canada and United States. The image of an elastic is often used to illustrate this dilemma. Canada must stretch the elastic as much is possible in its relationship with the United States, without breaking it. On the one-hand, Canada must accept the power and international strength of the U.S.—political, economic or military, and adjust to it. On the other hand, Canada's independence must be preserved by invoking images and symbols, including that of a peacekeeper, that enhance Canada's distinctness.

The dilemma between the need to move closer to the United States and the need to develop a distinct foreign policy can be resolved. It is a question of manoeuvring so that America's might can contribute as much as possible to furthering and developing Canadian interests, while also reassuring the United States that our interests are compatible with theirs.

The peacekeeping role of the Canadian Forces, combined with a firm commitment to NATO during the Cold War, solved this dilemma. Today, along with a firm commitment to the fight against terrorism, there must be a new uniquely Canadian trademark.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

We'll start our first round of questions. It's a seven-minute round. We'll start with Mr. Khan.

[Wajid Khan, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

In listening to you, I feel I'm listening to myself. I agree with you that the merits of foreign engagement in Afghanistan have not been made very clear to the Canadian public, nor has the understanding of the reality on the ground been made clear even within our own caucuses.

My question today is on the Bonn accords. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, DDR, was slow to bear fruit. How do we sell the benefits and dividends of the ISAF's counter-narcotics policy and overall stabilization policy to former and current members of the Afghan militia forces, i.e., the descendants of the mujahedeen?

The second question is, what in your view is driving the current high level of Taliban and Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin, HIG, activity in the southern province?

The last question is, given the problems with phase three's fourth-generation processes, is there a real chance that we could find private military companies, PMCs, more active in Afghanistan in the future?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Do one or both want to tackle that?

Mr. Boivin, go ahead.

[Marc André Boivin]

Regarding the DDR scene and setting the counter-narcotics priorities, I mentioned in my presentation that the Afghanistan Compact mentioned this. It is truly critical because in order to sustain peace you need to have economic dynamics favourable to establishing a peaceful solution.

The Afghanistan Compact, the UNDP, and the World Bank have all set up programs that are much more balanced in how they manage this phasing out of opium, the basic idea being that the production of opium is not necessarily being directly attacked so much as its relative importance within the economy is being gradually reduced.

What that entails for the local Afghan who is growing poppies for his livelihood is that the crop is not being hacked down by the army and westerners, and then the next morning he has to feed his family, and the Taliban turns to him and says, we offer protection, this is a legitimate livelihood, and anyway it's for western consumption, etc.

This is related to your other questions, which is just how difficult phase three was for NATO. Personally I have many doubts regarding private military companies, most of which have to do with accountability. We've seen all sorts of problems in Iraq regarding this, and I would tread very carefully here. That being said, phase three has been extremely difficult, and phase four promises to be extremely difficult as well. How do you solve these problems? We might have to go through that, but let's be very cautious here.

I'm not sure I understood your second question about the level of Taliban and extremist activities.

[Wajid Khan, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

What is driving the activities so high? The Taliban is using a new modus operandi of suicide bombing, al-Qaeda has reinvested itself, and the activity is much higher than before. What is causing that?

[Marc André Boivin]

Probably the main factor is counter-narcotics and the revenue that it brings, but also the fact that Pakistan has been at least tacitly allowing for activities to develop in certain regions.

I'm not a specialist regarding Pakistan's case, but I can tell you it is very complicated. You have different regions with different realities. Some of these regions on the border are controlled by Islamist powers, and the Pakistani army has been trying to put down these movements. Having a refuge has helped the Taliban and different extremists—al-Qaeda and so on—tremendously to regroup, rearm, and reorganize. You have a group with a refuge, training camps, and money. In the long run, that delivers the results we see today.

[Wajid Khan, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

We had a visit there, and I know for a fact that the Minister of National Defence has been there. There are 74,000 to 80,000 troops deployed on the Afghan border. You realize that with the terrain it is virtually impossible to stop the infiltration. I met with the military attachés of the United States, and they were very impressed with the work Pakistan is doing. They said they could not succeed without the cooperation between the commanders on either side.

My question to you, sir, is, is there a will in the NATO nations and the national resources to continue with this mission rather than cut and run?

[Marc André Boivin]

The question is addressed to me?

[Wajid Khan, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Either one.

[Justin Massie]

I would just like to answer the previous questions.

With respect to opium and the production of narcotics in Afghanistan, it is indeed important to fight against warlords and narcotics. However, I believe that it is imperative for Canada, NATO and the Enduring Freedom mission to first gain control over the territory and secure it, even if that means progressively casting the warlords aside. In other words to ensure a certain amount of political stability, we cannot cast aside key individuals in Afghanistan who hold power or have influence in certain regions of the country. We must first try to stabilize the situation with the players who are there and then demilitarize and progressively disarm them.

The insurgents' resurgence in Afghanistan is linked to a greater international presence in some regions of the country and, in the case of Canada, to its presence in Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan. With media coverage of these events and an increase in coalition forces, which will continue progressively in the months to come, we can expect to see a rise in insurgency activity.

We are dealing with people living in a failed state, as is the term used in Afghanistan. Yet at the same time we know that terrorism stems more from hatred than poverty. There are a number of countries in the world where people live in totally inhuman conditions, but where there is no terrorist activity. Some individuals are using ideological manipulation to make people hate the principles and values of a number of international societies.

I have the same reservations as Mr. Boivin does with respect to private military companies. Given the accountable nature of their activities, their involvement must remain at the level of providing logistical support to the Canadian Forces or any other coalition force in Afghanistan.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation. I think that your statements reflect to a great extent the Bloc Québécois's position.

In fact, I had the opportunity to go to Afghanistan a few weeks ago, on an invitation from NATO. We were brought to Kabul, to the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force and we visited a provincial reconstruction team in Faizabad, in northern Afghanistan, in order to see how these troops worked. However, the military personnel was German. We were told that the provincial reconstruction teams were not all working under similar circumstances and, for example, they did not want to send us to Kandahar because the situation there was very unstable.

I did make an attempt to go there, however, when a female Canadian soldier was killed, but I was told that it was not possible. My impression was simply that this was a polite refusal.

During our stay there, we heard some very interesting briefings. I'd like to hear your comments on this because I think that the points made reflect to a certain extent your own concerns.

The name of the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is General Richards. Currently, we're told, the northern part of the country is stable. The forces are now in the western part of the country and soon they will go south.

In fact, General Richards raised some interesting points about Canadian soldiers. He said that the formula currently being used to fight the Taliban needs to be somewhat changed. Canadian forces should be focusing on security so that the population and the people on the ground see progress being made, that is, more schools, more health services, more infrastructure services such as roads, drinking water, etc.

I imagine, after having said the same thing to other witnesses, that this must be music to your ears.

In other words, Canadian soldiers should somewhat contain their efforts. Rather than advancing with a view to removing the Taliban, they should be content with establishing a security perimeter in order to give civilian forces an opportunity to focus on reconstruction. I would like to hear your comments on that.

My other question is on changing agriculture. I have heard two things and I'd like to hear your opinion.

Let's start with poppy cultivation. We all know, as people have pointed out to us, that poppies are used to produce morphine which is used in hospitals, for health purposes. It has been suggested that western countries make room for Afghanistan in order to ensure that a part of the supply come from Afghanistan.

The most important point is that changes have to be made within agriculture and there has to be a guarantee to Afghans that European economic community countries or NATO countries will purchase their production. It's easy to tell a producer to burn his poppy field, and then leave the rest up to him. He's going to want to know who will buy the potatoes he's going to be producing.

Several people from the European Union are saying that we must be prepared to purchase a part of their production in order to ensure that the agriculture changes are successful.

Those are my two questions.

[Justin Massie]

Firstly, on the matter of reconstruction, which is always seen as a diametric opposite to combat or fighter operations, it has to be understood that, for as long as insurgents are prepared to act as suicide bombers, it will remain difficult to build schools, or indeed any infrastructure. Ensuring security has to be the number one priority, and the support of the local population remains key to meeting this objective. When active in a future of operation, Canadian Forces must always ensure that there is more local support for their operation than there is for those of the insurgents. To my mind, it is a little like walking a tight rope and I do not have a model solution to offer soldiers. I think that Canadian soldiers in the field would know more about this. It is always important to tread carefully to ensure that the local population has a positive impression of Canadian forces and their operations. This is key to having access to information, which is crucial for the Canadian Forces. Intelligence gathering in a country such as Afghanistan is no easy task. Satellites and other technologies are not the answer, what is needed is dialogue with those who are attune to what is happening in the field, in Afghan villages. If the Canadian Forces are able to rise in the esteem of the local population by securing their villages, they are likely to be privy to more information and will, in turn, experience greater success in hunting down terrorists.

As regards agriculture, I think it would be a good idea to commit to purchasing a certain percentage of Afghan production. However, bear in mind that selling opium generates far higher revenues than selling potatoes or other commodities. It is far easier for Afghans to grow poppies on their rugged terrain. This means that if we commit to buying Afghan commodities, we will have to be prepared to pay not the regular international market price, but a price that will allow the local population to meet their needs. In today's context, it is easy to see why the father of an Afghan family would prefer to grow poppy seeds as opposed to wheat or other crops.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

There's only half a minute left. Could you give a quick comment?

[Marc André Boivin]

You asked about hunting-down terrorists versus security, my answer to that would be that General Richards will be taking over command of the Canadian troops from July 31 onwards. I think that should answer your question. As I fully explained in my brief, a broader vision of security will be implemented.

However, as Justin said, when you are in a situation of war or a virtual war, it is difficult to build schools during the day while knowing too well they will be burnt down at night.

You also asked a question about changes in agriculture, but I do not have time to answer because my 30 seconds have expired. I'm sure I will have other opportunities to answer your question.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Very good. Thank you.

Ms. Black.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you both for coming and making your presentations to the committee today. We appreciate what you've presented to us.

I had an opportunity to read your presentation ahead of time. At the very end, you said that in order to win Canadian support for the Canadian Forces, symbols or myths will have to be tailored to the new role that Canada has under Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. As an alternative, you proposed that the commitment be tailored to fit more within our Canadian values and principles.

Which approach do you think might be more useful?

[Justin Massie]

I knew that somebody would ask that question. It is a difficult choice to make. Unfortunately, I think that a lot of Canadians perceive Canada's role in Afghanistan as having been reduced to following US leads. As such, the difference between Canadian and US involvement seems fuzzy, if not inexistent. More has to be done to put a truly Canadian stamp on our involvement. This has always been one of the problems with Canadian foreign policy. I am fortunate enough not to have to make such decisions, but I believe the Canadian presence in Afghanistan to be necessary. To my mind, the needs of the local Afghan population, the international security context and Canadian interests all mean that it would be inappropriate to consider withdrawing Canadian troops.

However, changes could be made to Canada's commitment in Afghanistan. I'm not necessarily talking about changes to the types of operation that our troops carry out, but, rather, the way in which the facts are presented. Firstly, I believe it's important to state the facts as they are, rather than simply talking about the fight against terrorism. That is not to say, however, that we should seek to provide easy solace to Canadians by saying that our mission consists of reconstruction and allowing young girls to go to school.

At the moment, the Canadian mission consists primarily of guaranteeing security, maintaining control and undertaking combat operations. To my mind, therefore, accepting to assume the command of the transition between operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF was a political decision that is not in keeping with the spirit of the symbols and myths that characterize Canadian foreign policy.

However, assuming command of the NATO operation which, if memory serves me well, is scheduled for 2008, would better reflect the Canadian myths and ideals that have made our foreign policy what it is today. This is because NATO is an international organization and the type of operations the Canadian command is likely to undertake in such a context are more likely to correspond to Canadian ideals.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

That takes me to my next question, because I want to ask both of you about your understanding of the changes on the ground when we leave Operation Enduring Freedom and are under the ISAF-NATO mandate. What do you perceive to be the difference in the operations of this mission under that mandate as compared to the OEF mandate?

[Marc André Boivin]

First, there is a major difference between the two. I've been very frustrated at the media coverage and some of the comments that I've heard during the debate in Parliament. From the get-go, the Canadian Forces were sent in the south to be part of the stage three of ISAF. There was quite a bit of confusion regarding what exactly the troops were doing there, and it was not mentioned enough that it was part of ISAF's extension, not part of Operation Enduring Freedom. That's the first point.

The second point is that ISAF was initially created by the UN. It's under a UN mandate, supported by UN resolutions. And the British.... It's not directly UN because it was not managed by the PKO at first, but the British took command, then the Turkish, and eventually NATO took it over. But contrary to Kosovo, it's UN-mandated and UN-supported.

These are important points to make for the Canadian public. ISAF, from the get-go, has been more peacekeeping-oriented and general security-oriented rather than hunt-for-terrorist-oriented, as Operation Enduring Freedom has been. That's not to say that Operation Enduring Freedom does not play a useful role. Some of the regions in Afghanistan have been a refuge to elements that are violent, that have been extremely disruptive to Afghanistan and the Afghan people. But they're more of a strategic reserve for punctual action than they are right now at the centre of the action. So it's better if ISAF's at the centre of the action, and that's what's coming on the ground.

I think it's reassuring to hear Mr. Bachand's interview with Commander Richards, who said that there should be a more encompassing idea as to what the security should be.

Just to get back to your drug purchase point.... I'm sorry if I took some of your time.

Alain Labrousse, a drug expert, has told me that these programs have already reached their limits and that it would be impossible to purchase everything that Afghanistan produces. Therefore, there are limits to what can be done through what you mentioned earlier.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

You have one minute.