National Defence Committee on June 13th, 2006

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

They terrorize their own people.

[Marc André Boivin]

I think there's a distinction to be made between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. I think they allow them to train and organize. They certainly brought the terrorists closer to statehood. But there's a major difference between interstate wars, with the resources and the way you can do it.... It's very different.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses.

It was mentioned that there's a gap between Canadian operations in Afghanistan and Canadians' understanding of the operations in Afghanistan. Do you have recommendations about what would assist Canadians in understanding the current mission?

[Justin Massie]

A communications expert could make specific recommendations in that regard. In my opinion, that is exactly what is at stake. If the political decision is taken to indeed commit Canada to an operation like the one under Enduring Freedom in Kandahar, which is the opposite of our traditional position, or of traditional types of engagement, the question is whether Canadians will be willing to adopt this new role. Do we want Canadian Forces to do that kind of thing in the long term, and will Canadians support it, or is this just a temporary role? If that's the case, a long-term commitment would mean that Canada would play a traditional role, and we would not have to justify the presence of Canadian Forces in combat operations rather than when it is involved in a reconstruction effort.

I have no specific recommendation as to how to present this role to Canadians, except to say that we are upholding the Canadian principles of human rights and democracy, which is one way to gain their support over a short period of time.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Go ahead.

[Marc André Boivin]

One of the recommendations would be to bring the debate to the Parliament. I think it was incredibly refreshing to see these issues being debated in Parliament last April. It certainly gave the Canadian public at least a chance to see some of the issues surrounding our policy in Afghanistan. I think this was a good thing. It should not be a one-shot deal. I mean, it was a good example of how the government can put forth and explain its policy in Afghanistan and discuss it with the other members of Parliament.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Neither of you have been to Afghanistan. My next question is, how are you obtaining your information? I think we mentioned that the public is largely receiving their information through the media, which as you mention is generally reporting on events that have a shock element, whether it be to sell newspapers or attract viewers. The reports I have, from civilians on the ground and the soldiers themselves, are that they're being embraced by the Afghanis, the non-combatant Afghanis, and that soldiers are actively building trust with the village elders. Where possible, they have tea and go through that ritual.

My questions is, what are your sources of information on our participation there? There's this constant mention that we somehow have a change in mission from peacekeepers to combatants. Admittedly, the Kandahar region is less stable due to the presence of insurgents. Aren't our soldiers merely adapting to the changes in the theatre of operation, as opposed to changing the roles of soldiers?

[Justin Massie]

I agree with the fact that the nature of conflicts has changed and that Canadian Forces have adapted to that change. What I am saying reflects the information which is available to Canadians. But there is a certain level of misunderstanding, which is also reflected in the media and the type of coverage you get. If we are saying that things are going well on the ground, why is this not common knowledge?

I also get my personal information from other people who have been to Afghanistan and whom I have spoken with. I have not personally heard that the situation has slowly improved over the last couple of months. As a citizen, I would like to receive this information so I can gain a better understanding of what Canadian Forces are doing in Afghanistan.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

You're just about out of time.

Mr. Bouchard, and then back to the government.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you for your presentations. You are certainly presenting us with a different point of view.

My question is for Mr. Boivin. Even though we have been there for five years now, the situation has not improved. There has been an increase in violence and in the illegal drug trade, and the government has lost control of the situation. Long-term corrective measures, if it comes to that, will be taken. What criteria will Canada use to measure progress in Afghanistan and over what period of time would that progress be measured?

[Marc André Boivin]

There has been an increase in violence, but only in certain areas. The overall picture is not completely negative. It varies from place to place. We have made significant progress. A government was elected, even though some aspects of it are problematic, but overall, the election was legitimate and has been recognized by various international institutions. Of course, it's always possible to focus on the problems which plague Afghanistan, such as the increase in violence in certain areas and the illegal drug trade, but we cannot tarnish the entire country with the same brush. Certain areas are affected by these problems, particularly the area we are talking about here, and where Canadian soldiers are deployed. The situation is worrisome.

As for corrective measures, it's simply a matter of investing more in development programs and programs which promote political stability. One of the main problems with Enduring Freedom is that it is strictly focused on military action. With the deployment of ISAF in the south, and with Afghanistan Compact, which was presented, we are taking a step in that direction.

As for how to measure progress, Afghanistan Compact contains a whole series of measures on how the situation has evolved, on corruption levels, on services provided to the Afghan population, and so on. The tools are there. For Canada, it's simply a matter of taking advantage of these instruments which have already been created.

[Robert Bouchard, Bloc, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

My second question is for Mr. Massie. You said that historically, when Canada is conducting a peacekeeping mission, the public has the impression that the country was doing just that. You yourself would like to see Canada's presence in Haiti and Darfur. Yet Canada has dedicated considerable resources to the Afghan mission, to the extend that it may not have enough resources to intervene elsewhere, such as in Darfur. Are the Canadian Forces low on staff or have too many military personal been assigned to the Afghani mission?

[Justin Massie]

I wish to clarify that my opinion is based on an impression. It is based on Canadians' impression, and not necessarily on actual facts. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was not the must important aspect of the Canadians Forces' work. I did not state personally whether or not we should be more active in Haiti or Darfur, but rather, that those missions better reflect the image that Canada has maintained over the years, and had we taken part of those missions, internal strifes in those countries may not have reached the point they are at today.

Nevertheless, I feel that the Canadian Forces' commitment in Afghanistan is substantial enough for us to reduce our ability to intervene elsewhere. When we are involved over a long period of time, given the rotational means and recruitment difficulties, we would have a hard time intervening elsewhere in an equally significant military and non-policing way.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Mr. Calkins.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Thanks again, gentlemen, for being here today. I found your testimony to be quite interesting.

One of the things I wanted to touch on here is the influence of the United Nations. I think it could be argued that influence is waning. You said that Canadians are confused about the role in Afghanistan, but I think Canadians are also confused about just how relevant the United Nations is in today's new world, if we want to call it that.

I'm just wondering, would you say the United Nations might be considered a symbol of the past, whereas NATO seems to be a little more effective in dealing with some of the international issues, especially in Europe in recent history? Shouldn't that be one of the things we should also be looking at--educating the public to some of these new realities?

[Marc André Boivin]

Personally, I would tend to disagree that the UN is a symbol of the past. That is not to say the UN does not have its problems. A significant overhaul was attempted last fall, and that overhaul was not generally accepted per se. But certain aspects of it were accepted and were advanced.

The UN is not a symbol of the past in the sense that in the Democratic Republic of Congo it is pursuing a mission with the MONUK that is in many ways similar to the mission in Afghanistan. They've taken a very bold stance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, conducting offensive operations in the eastern parts, and they are taking the fight to the different groups involved in horrible activities throughout the eastern conflicts.

Is the UN a symbol of the past? It seems to be a symbol of the past if we look at the last 10 years in Canadian foreign policy. Since the mid-nineties, most of the Canadian deployments have been through NATO, and so this is not a new reality, this is a 10-year-old reality. NATO definitely has assets, and the western countries have pulled out, ever since the catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. Not only Canada, but all the western countries have pulled out of the UN and have tended to use tools closer to home, like NATO.

Now, this is not entirely a bad evolution. The Africans have done it with the African Union, and we do it with NATO. But we need to be careful here. I don't think Canada should disengage completely from the UN, because some of its work is definitely relevant, positive, and still up to date.

[Justin Massie]

The UN is the only legitimate, international and truly global decision-making body and Canada must participate actively in efforts to reform such organization. NATO can better support Canadian operations, but legitimate, international approval must be given by the Security Council.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Thank you.

Just changing the course of the questions here a little bit, I'd like to get back to some of the discussions regarding the positioning of the operations in Afghanistan and the perceived problems with the border with Pakistan.

You mentioned in your testimony that there were opportunities for al-Qaeda or the terrorists--the Taliban, for example--to regroup in Pakistan. It's very difficult terrain, and I know the Pakistani government has deployed about 70,000 to 80,000 troops there. The Government of Pakistan is under considerable political pressure from the United States and its allies in this war on terrorism, and in its effort through Operation Enduring Freedom, to make sure we root out this evil.

Also on the ground in northern Pakistan, I believe it's not exactly the most conducive place, from a domestic perspective, for President Musharraf to be able to exercise his will. So he's torn between trying to appease international allies on that front and keeping the domestic peace where he doesn't have the command and control he would like to have.

I'm just wondering if that's true, if you could elaborate on some of the difficulties. Without being able to get rid of or to stop the migration of people and arms and other things like that across that border, to be successful, are we looking at a much larger role for the Government of Pakistan?

[Marc André Boivin]

Obviously Pakistan will need to play a very essential role if we are to achieve any sort of peace in southern Afghanistan. Barnett Reuben, who is an imminent specialist in Afghanistan, who has been there several times--and it's not in the media--said that in order for Pakistan to control, or at least to help Pakistan to control in the long term, you have to talk about democracy. Right now you have a military dictatorship, which in itself has limits as to what it can do on the ground with its internal stability and necessities.

Pakistan is a very prickly issue. You poke it on one side and another problem comes up, all throughout. I think the Canadian government should pay very close attention to what's happening in Pakistan and try to better understand the internal dynamics of Pakistan, but at the same time, keep the pressure on to deliver results in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's role is not solely negative either, because lots of commerce in Kandahar, legitimate commerce, is with Pakistan, and they share also an ethnic Pashtun identity.

So it's a prickly issue, but definitely one to pay close attention to.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

We'll go over to Mr. Hubbard, and then back to the government side.

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's certainly interesting to listen to the presentation.

[Technical difficulty--Editor]

I too am perplexed about what's going on with our efforts in Afghanistan. With it, of course, we're talking about our foreign policy, we're talking about our defence policy, and also the effort in terms of domestic policy not only in Canada, but for our allies to...[Technical difficulty--Editor].

It appears rather difficult in terms of defence that we have over 60,000 people in uniform in this country, and the effort in Afghanistan completely cripples our defence policy in terms of peacekeeping in other places in the world. [Technical difficulty--Editor]...in our defence department. That is a perplexing point of view.

More perplexing in terms of Afghanistan is the history of the area. I would like to pose a question in terms of the concept of the Russians being there before us, the attitude of the Afghani in terms of foreign intervention. Maybe you can give us some evidence in terms of the Russian effort. They spent a long period of time and put tremendous effort in, and lost thousands of soldiers in trying to subdue Afghanistan. What are we doing differently that's going to win the respect, the hope, the love, and the comfort that we would need to make better relationships, in terms of making Afghanistan a westernized state that will be in love with democracy and accept the rule of law and the rule of government that we as Canadians perceive as part of our effort?

It's a long question, but what are we doing differently from what the Russians did that can cause us to get out of there as friends of the Afghani people and as victors in terms of our efforts in trying to westernize and democratize the Afghani state?

[Justin Massie]

Democracy is not something that can be forced upon, that cultural issues must be taken into account, and attempting to make Afghans fall in love with democracy is rather absurd. To my mind, the strategy must be more about allowing ordinary Afghans to benefit from the presence of foreign troops, and the will power of the international community to be involved in Afghanistan. Afghans must be given concrete opportunities to experience progress, such as farming a different product other than poppies, that will bring in just as much income and free them from the control of the militia, insurgents or others.

As for the difficulty in deploying more soldiers, of the 60 000 Canadians soldiers, one must bear in mind that most soldiers cannot be deployed in combat operations. One should also consider the logistical and command support required for any deployment, as well as the difficulties inherent to rotation. Canadian forces members also need to come back home after six months or one year to rest, and not be asked automatically to return to duty.

As regards recruitment, the biggest difficulty is the lack of instructors. To my knowledge, and according to my information, many Canadians want to join the Canadian Forces, but applications are not processed quickly enough for lack of instructors to train them. Because of this, soldiers are not being trained fast enough in order to be integrated into the armed forces, thereby allowing soldiers who are already deployed more rest time.

[Marc André Boivin]

It's 2,500. I spoke with the commander of the Quebec region, who explained to me some of these numbers, which for us as civilians can sometimes be puzzling.There are actually somewhat more than 60,000. You have to separate them between the naval, aerial, and ground units, which means for starters, let's say, that we're talking about 20,000, not 60,000. My understanding of logistics is that for every one combat soldier, you need seven to support, so you add in that factor.

What the general told me is that 2,000 to 3,000 is the long-term presence sustainable. We can go all the way up to 5,000 with our current contingents. Does that mean Afghanistan is crippling? I think the word would be a bit strong. The international policy statement made by the Liberal government mentioned that we should focus on certain crises instead of trying to sprinkle our presence all over the place. I think that's what the previous government did and the current government is doing, and I think it's the right approach.

We should bring up the number of our military. It's a good initiative started by the Liberals and continued by the Conservatives. It's a step in the right direction.

Are these 2,500 troops crippling? I think the word would be a bit exaggerated.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to Mr. Hiebert, please.