National Defence Committee on April 29th, 2009

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

If we had search-and-rescue assets in Yellowknife and Whitehorse, how would they be able to respond to an incident in the eastern Arctic compared to assets in Trenton?

[Col (Retired) Pierre Leblanc]

I haven't done a comparison of something on the east coast of Baffin. It might be easier to do the search and rescue out of Trenton, or possibly Comox--not Comox, but Greenwood.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Yes, Mr. Blaney?

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

Mr. Chair, I do not have a question. I just wanted to say that I find the documents submitted by the witnesses to be very impressive. They will be very useful to our study.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee and helping us with our work. We will now take a short break so that the other witnesses can join us.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Order, please.

Joining us now are Vice-Admiral McFadden, Commander of Canada Command from the Department of National Defence; Alan Kessel, Legal Adviser from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade; John Hannaford, Deputy Legal Adviser and Director General; and Paul Gibbard, Director of Aboriginal and Circumpolar Affairs. Welcome to all of you.

Vice-Admiral McFadden, you have the floor for seven minutes.

[Vice-Admiral D. McFadden, Commander, Canada Command, Department of National Defence]

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I was asked to speak today on whether the Canadian Forces are properly equipped and trained so as to enable us to protect and assert Canadian national sovereignty in the Arctic.

I know that you recently heard from members of Strategic Joint Staff and DND's policy group. I intend to expand on their comments in order to convey how it is that Canada Command operates and so exercises sovereignty over an area that is unquestionably one of our country's most precious inheritances, but also one where the harshness of climate, ruggedness of terrain and tyranny of distance make the conduct of operations extremely difficult.

The main theme of my comments centres on the principle upon which Canada Command was founded, namely, that we are truly a joint command that takes the capabilities of the navy, army, air force and space forces, and blends them in order to create an integrated effect. This means that we examine what we want to achieve in Arctic operations and then look over the breadth of the Canadian Forces to see what we can currently bring to bear and what capabilities we need to develop for the future.

In fact, we also look outside the Canadian Forces. When we plan and conduct operations, whether in the north or in the rest of Canada, we recognize that the military is but one element of state power and authority. We have close contacts at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels, and with the peoples of the north, and we strive to deepen those partnerships, ensuring that our operations are part of a whole-of-government effort.

Looking even more broadly, we are engaged in discussions with our Arctic neighbours. For example, there is the Commander of Joint Task Force North, Brigadier-General Dave Millar, who I believe you will be getting up to see in the not too distant future. His command is located in the Arctic, and he runs operations from there. Over the past few months, he has met with the commander of the U.S. Joint Task Force in Alaska, as well as the Danish commander of Island Command Greenland.

In fact, Rear-Admiral Kudsk of the Danish navy actually observed Operation Nunalivut, a sovereignty operation conducted earlier this month, and I hope we'll have a little more time to talk about it. He and Brigadier-General Millar spent the night out on the land with one of the Canadian Ranger groups on patrol on Ellesmere Island.

In the same spirit of cooperation and openness, we notified Russia that a maritime patrol aircraft would be overflying a scientific ice station that is located in international waters in the Arctic Ocean. Again, this occurred during Operation Nunalivut, with surveillance flights being but one of the means of building awareness of activity in the north and of establishing our presence there.

Of course, it's this increase in activity, in conjunction with climatic change, that drives expanded efforts in the Arctic. Sovereignty is one of the pillars of the government's northern strategy, and that includes an appropriate military role. But the effects we achieve are not merely those of awareness and presence. Perhaps to an even greater degree, our operations in the north support other government departments in exercising their mandates.

These are the departments and agencies that retain the lead for dealing with northern security issues. Despite this, they often draw upon the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to help fulfill their mandates. That's no different from the role we fulfill elsewhere in Canada.

What change in the Arctic means for us is that we will need to be prepared to do more of what we have been doing and also improve our ability to operate in the north.

The frequency and intensity of our operations have already increased significantly. As well, there are a number of initiatives underway to increase the footprint of the Canadian Forces in the region and to expand our operational capabilities: initiatives such as the expansion of the Ranger program, development of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, as well as construction of a berthing and refuelling facility and a training centre in the Arctic.

I hope to be able to expand on the scope of the exercises we're conducting as well as on some of those initiatives, perhaps in response to your questions.

Fundamentally the Canadian Forces are not militarizing the north; rather, they are developing greater capacity to conduct broad-based and more effective sovereignty operations in our Arctic. To do that, we're not just developing greater military capacity, by which I mean air, land, sea, and special forces, as well as infrastructure and training; we are also, as a result of our operational presence through the joint task force command, our institutional strength in planning, and our culture of exercising, helping other government departments develop and mature their own capacities to deliver greater operational effect.

We have learned that in the north everything must be done in a cooperative fashion, whether jointly within the Canadian Forces, with our partners at all levels in Canada, or with our Arctic neighbours.

If you consider the harsh terrain, the limited infrastructure, and the vast distances involved, you see an environment in which the challenge of deploying and sustaining military forces is even more difficult than operations conducted at the other end of the earth, but that is what we are doing, in significant numbers and with increasing frequency. We are addressing those challenges. Increasing activity on our part is under way, and new capabilities and facilities are being brought online.

The Canadian Forces will play their part in what must be a whole-of-government approach to exercising sovereignty over Canada's Arctic, while also reaching out to our own peoples in the north and to our Arctic neighbours as well to ensure that Canada exercises its responsibility as an Arctic nation.

Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you wish to take questions at this stage or to proceed to the second presentation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

We'll have the second presentation, and then after that the members will ask questions.

I want to thank you, Vice-Admiral McFadden, for your presentation.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Kessel, legal advisor from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Welcome.

[Alan H. Kessel, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We are delighted to be here today, especially with you as chair. As you mentioned in the beginning, we are here with Mr. Hannaford and Mr. Gibbard.

I've decided to do a bit of a slide show today, because I think it's very useful to see some of the key pictures we have, as well as get a sense of the Arctic from the top down. We can also take a look at a region that's emerging on the verge of climate change and how we, as the Government of Canada, intend to deal with the severe challenges there, including safety and pollution risks.

The Canadian government is implementing the Northern Strategy, which is based on four main objectives: asserting Canadian Arctic sovereignty in a region that is attracting more and more international interest; facing the challenge of climate change in the north; fostering economic and social development to benefit northern residents; and allowing northern residents to exercise more control over their economic and political destiny.

Today, I will limit my remarks to the first and fundamental objective—Arctic sovereignty—given the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs' previous involvement in the Northern Strategy.

The basic reality is that there is no threat to ownership of the lands, the islands, and the waters of the Arctic. They are Canadian. The fact that climate change is diminishing the ice cover poses no threat to our ownership. They're Canadian, and they will remain so.

Canadian Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well established, and based on historic title. We heard U.S. President Bush, when he was here in August of 2007 at the Montebello summit, say the following:

...the United States does not question Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic islands, and the United States supports Canadian investments that have been made to exercise its sovereignty.

I know that you've been listening to various academics and others who have indicated that the sky is falling. Hopefully we will show you that it isn't really doing that.

Let's see what there is out there. We do have three existing disputes in very narrow areas. They include, one, Hans Island, with which you're probably most familiar; two, Lincoln Sea; and three, the Beaufort Sea. The first two are with Denmark and the third one is with the United States.

Let's take a quick look at Hans Island. It's very difficult to see Hans Island here because it's so tiny. We don't have a big blow-up picture to show you.

It's really only a dispute over the land. We, of course, say it's Canadian. The Danes also claim it. In fact, if you take a look at that square, you'll see that the maritime boundary goes straight up the channel equally, stops at the island, and then it continues from the island above.

There's no, or very little, resource potential up there that we're aware of. Since 2005 we've had very much a process of talking to the Danes about this issue. It's a diplomatic track. It consists of making sure we're managing the issue properly. Nothing happens on the island that we aren't aware of. Of course, the Danes are keen to work together on any project that goes on up there. So the Hans Island issue is being managed.

The Lincoln Sea, which is on the next slide, is a very tiny maritime dispute. The two small zones of 31 and 34 square nautical miles north of Ellesmere Island--you can see the teeny little dots up there--result in a disagreement over how to measure the equidistance line.

This is well on the way to resolution. We now have technology, particularly satellite technology and GPS systems, that can very quickly tell us what the difference is between the two sides. We will ultimately resolve this issue through discussion and negotiation.

The more interesting one is the next one. As North America is looking for energy security in a very difficult era, both Canada and the U.S. are now looking again at a pizza-pie-shaped space up in the Beaufort Sea that has essentially been on ice as a dispute for a while between the two countries.

Just to give you a little bit of history, in 1825 there was a treaty between Russia and the U.K. that set the 141st meridian as the boundary line between the two countries. We rely on this line as determining the degree of longitude, the definitive maritime boundary, into the Arctic Ocean.

It says, in fact, in that particular treaty, jusqu'à la mer glaciale, and we continue that line straight up into the Arctic. The Americans, of course, are disputing this. They indicate that this is only a land boundary, and that were you doing a maritime boundary, you would have to use an equidistance rule.

That's the indication on the right. The red line on your picture is the Canadian line, and the line on the right is the American line.

That's an issue that has been in dispute for some time. It's well managed, in the sense that no activity goes on in that space—although we are told by the Americans, by others, and our own people that there's probably a considerable amount of hydrocarbon wealth below the surface, including oil and gas. For that reason alone, it's in the interest of Canada and the United States to ensure that this area is resolved. That is something this government will look at as well.

Now let's go on to a more interesting discussion. I know you have heard from some people about the Northwest Passage. It's taken on a great deal of life on its own. Pundits, academic observers, as well as newspaper journalists have a tendency to want to expand on what the issue really is. Maybe if we just chat a little bit about this we can reduce it down to its proper proportions.

The Government of Canada put straight base lines around the Arctic Archipelago as of 1985. All the waters on the land side of that base line are internal waters to Canada. No one disputes that those waters are Canadian at all; the issue really is over the question of navigation, or the legal status of those waters. We, of course, consider them to be internal, and we have an unfettered capacity to regulate them as we would for any land territory.

The U.S. has indicated on occasion that it is an international strait running through this archipelago; and that would give foreign vessels a right of passage through these waters. Clearly, this is not a unique argument of the U.S. Their geostrategic interests are to ensure that any connected bodies of water should be considered an international strait for their purposes, from their interests' point of view.

They have also indicated that the northern sea route.... Our Russian neighbours to the north have a very similar issue, in that the Americans consider the Russian route to be an international strait. The Russians had also put base lines around their archipelago, and the Russians and we share an identical view with respect to the legal status of that area, namely, that they're internal waters and we disagree with our American friends.

In fact, this issue is not new. You may recall that during the “Shamrock Summit”, when President Reagan was in Canada, there was a discussion about the SS Manhattan going through that area, and both countries decided we would regulate our operations through a treaty—and certainly those of icebreakers. The Americans signed an agreement with us in 1988 indicating that the U.S. must seek consent for U.S. government icebreakers to use these waters, an agreement that has been respected and has worked well for both sides up to the present.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You still have one minute.

[Alan Kessel]

I still have one minute, my goodness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Needless to say, that is an issue we can discuss further in questions.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[Alan Kessel]

And I won't have to complete my thought.

The other issue of the extended continental shelf is very interesting. The slide shows the region of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans where Canada began its scientific efforts to delineate the maximum extent of its continental shelf in accordance with international law.

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is a scientific organization and does not settle disputes or overlapping claims. It deals with the interface between international and national zones.

I can discuss that further in the questions.

On cooperation with our neighbours, there's a continued cooperation with all our neighbours, and I know this is a theme that our other departmental colleagues have indicated. We cooperate closely with our American friends, especially on icebreaking and surveying of the seabed. We cooperate with the Danes. We cooperate with our Russian friends across the sea, particularly when it comes to issues where we can join them vis-à-vis the legal status of passages.

One last thing before I close. The ministerial conference in Ilulissat in Greenland in May 2008 was specifically between the five coastal Arctic states. It was a meeting of those states that have a right to delimit their continental shelf. It was not really about social or other issues; it was purely about the legal rights to continental shelf delimitation. We all agreed to work within an international legal framework, one that had been developed over 40 years and is now considered the Law of the Sea. That declaration was an attempt to at least shut down some of the speculation in the press and other places that said that for some reason there was a race on to the north, and we indicated quite clearly that this was a cooperative adventure.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

I will now give the floor to Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentation.

Claiming something and having effective control over something, of course, are two different things. We can think of the Argentinians who claim the Malvinas Islands, or, as the British call them, the Falklands. They've claimed that for 150 years, but they don't control it. The Japanese still claim, of course, the northern territories. The Russians occupy it, but they don't control it, of course. The South China Seas Islands are claimed by six or seven countries, and the list goes on.

First of all, today Minister Cannon is in Tromso, Norway, I guess outlining Canada's priorities. Can you tell me what those priorities are at this conference?

Also, Vice-Admiral McFadden, as Commander of Canada Command, was your office contacted, and what, if any, input did you give?

[Alan H. Kessel]

This has two parts, and I'm going to ask Paul Gibbard to give you a briefing on the Tromso conference. Then Vice-Admiral McFadden can speak right after.

[Paul Gibbard, Director, Aboriginal and Circumpolar Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Very briefly, the Arctic Council, as you know, is a grouping of eight Arctic states. Regarding the purpose of the meeting, foreign ministers meet every two years. It's an opportunity to recognize some significant achievements—and there have been some significant achievements—and to develop a work plan for the next two years.

In terms of significant achievements, two initiatives in which Canada had a major leadership role are the Arctic marine shipping assessment and the Arctic oil and gas assessment. I think the marine shipping assessment is a valuable tool. It gives us a sense of where marine shipping is heading in the future, to the degree to which some of these issues are or are not going to be immediate for us in the future, and in what parts of the Arctic, and some of the ways in which we need to start thinking through how we respond to the challenges we face. The Arctic oil and gas assessment gives us a sense of some of the challenges we have in developing those resources from social, economic, environmental, and other perspectives.

In terms of looking forward, there are a number of issues that are high on the council's agenda. Underlying those issues continue to be the issues of sustainable development and environmental protection.

I'd be happy to provide more details, but that, in a nutshell, is the summary of what the minister has been doing in Tromso today.

[VAdm D. McFadden]

With respect to the question as to whether my office was contacted before the minister went, the answer is no, but I would expect that contact to be at the end of the conference. What came out of it would be something that we would normally be apprised of through Foreign Affairs.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

We've had other departments, here and we talk about the whole of government, but I'm not sure whether or not we actually see that. Could you, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, provide us at some point with the minister's remarks? Thank you.

Admiral, I know you're probably familiar with Niels Wang, a Danish admiral who is one of the leading proponents with regard to the issues of climate change and security. Clearly, he says that any forces have to have the best surveillance tools, the ability to be able to track foreign vessels both under and on the water, and that sovereignty claims are one thing but they need to be able to exercise that as another.

Would you suggest, in terms of our ability with regard to the Northwest Passage and others--and we heard diametrically opposed comments here today.... I used to think if you put two economists in a room you'd get ten different theories, but obviously that applies to lawyers.

Could you talk to this committee about the effectiveness that you think we have in terms of the tools north of 60 in order to be able to execute, given the fact that we hear reports that the Russians are now prepared to put military forces, particularly bases, on their coastline in order to exercise both mineral and other claims in the north?

[VAdm D. McFadden]

Yes, sir, the words we would use would be “situational awareness”. How would you know what's going on in the area over which you claim jurisdiction? There are a number of means by which we do that. I have no doubt that there are some very substantial projects coming online, some of them already here, some of them still on the books, but a fairly aggressive timeline of bringing them on.

I already made some of my comments about how vast this area is, so there's a great deal of emphasis being placed on initially space-based programs. Polar Epsilon is a project to provide space-based situational awareness. We have recently gained access to a second satellite that has been launched, RADARSAT-2, which we have already validated through some of the exercising that we're doing, one as late as earlier this month, Operation Nunalivut.

There's an intent to progress that Polar Epsilon project to a phase two. That would see the launch of three more satellites. The first launch is in 2014, and we would anticipate a full operating capability to be online by 2017. By “full operating”, I mean there would be persistent coverage of the area above 65 degrees north. So from a space-based surveillance system, there are some fairly aggressive programs being brought online.

We're also conducting at the moment a technology demonstration phase of one of the things I heard a previous witness talking about, and that is choke point operations. There's a technology demonstrator under way in Gascoyne Inlet called Northern Watch, which is attempting to determine how we can bring together a series of sensors, space-based and underwater sensors, as well as surveillance forces that we would deploy on a periodic basis, to be able to establish a more coherent surveillance picture as to what's going on above and under the water. That technology demonstrator is approaching the stage of going to a second stage of operational input later this year.

[Alan H. Kessel]

Mr. Chairman, may I respond to--

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

In ten seconds, yes.

[Alan H. Kessel]

Ten seconds, absolutely.

First of all, you have to get your lexicon right. Your lexicon is about claims. We don't claim anything; we own it. This is Canada. You keep talking about claims. Are you insinuating that we do not own this?

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Others do. Therefore, if they claim it and we claim it, in the sense that we say it's ours and others say it isn't, unless you can show effective control, Mr. Chairman, it doesn't matter what we say we own, if we cannot in fact enforce what we say we own.

[Alan H. Kessel]

I disagree entirely with you. We own--