Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to the 24th meeting of the standing committee.
I am professor of oceanography at Laval University and scientific leader for the research icebreaker Amundsen, which you are perhaps familiar with, as well as scientific director of ArcticNet, Canada's Network of Centres of Excellence, which studies the impacts of climate change and modernization on the maritime Canadian Arctic. I am certainly no geopolitical specialist like my colleague, but I follow closely and even participate in the debates and works of my colleagues who are experts in this field.
ArcticNet brings together about 110 Arctic specialists in 27 Canadian universities and six federal departments and agencies. A central objective of our network is to inform policy and adaptation strategies to minimize the negative impacts of change in the Arctic and, if possible, maximize the positive outcomes of those changes.
One of the main tools of ArcticNet is the research icebreaker Amundsen, which enables our international teams to reach the Arctic seas and their shores. Through its regular presence in the Canadian Arctic and its visibility in Canadian and foreign media, the Amundsen contributes substantially, I would say, to asserting Canadian sovereignty over these remote maritime regions.
Within the ArcticNet scientific program, we have several projects that address the issue of Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic seas.
Let's recall first that Canadian sovereignty over the islands of the Canadian Archipelago has been recognized by the international community since the 1930s. As experts in international law have explained to you with much more competence than I possess, the major issues of Arctic sovereignty for Canada concern the Arctic seas, not the lands or the islands.
For me, there are essentially two issues. The first is the status of the straits of the Canadian Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage. The question is, are these straits Canadian internal waters on which Canada has full control over the traffic--that's the Canadian position--or are they international straits linking two international bodies of water and therefore open for what is called the “innocent passage” of surface vessels? That's the American and European position.
The second large issue of sovereignty in the Arctic is the claim by Canada to a fraction of the Arctic Ocean beyond the present 200-mile limit within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
These two issues are fairly separate. They're not linked in any specific way.
These are two issues of strategic importance, the outcome of which will affect Canada's standing in the international community and, potentially, redefine the missing Arctic dimension of Canada.
Concerning the Northwest Passage, Canada has been reactive rather than proactive for way too long. If a clear position had been expressed 50 years ago when the passage was choked with ice, the situation would likely have been resolved to the advantage of Canada. Thus, our group, ArcticNet, and our investigators fully support the recent initiatives of the federal government to strengthen the Canadian presence in the Arctic.
Among other things, there have been the announcement of the building of a research station in the High Arctic; the announcement of a polar class icebreaker, the Diefenbaker; opposing the selling of RADARSAT-2 to American interests; and also the very firm position on the Arctic taken recently by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
As for the expansion of Canada's jurisdiction beyond the 200-mile limit in the Arctic Ocean, it must be emphasized that the interest of this expansion is essentially strategic, not economic. It is often believed that Canada will gain exclusive access to vast mineral, petroleum, and fisheries resources.
However, such resources are distributed primarily on the shallow continental shelves over which we already have sovereignty--and recognized sovereignty--so this sovereignty is not challenged except for minor border skirmishes with the U.S.A. on the western Arctic front. We know that fisheries resources in the deep basin are insignificant. We also know that whatever petroleum or mineral resources are available there, it would be technically impossible to exploit them.
The strategic importance of this offshore region should nevertheless not be neglected, since a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean with its new marine routes would likely play the same role as the Mediterranean Sea played in antiquity. It's going to be of extreme strategic importance.
If we come to the role of the Department of National Defence in asserting our sovereignty in the Arctic, the first evidence is that Canada does not possess the means, military or other, to monitor the immense maritime territory that is at stake. Beyond simple surveillance, our capacity to respond directly at sea to military or security situations is extremely weak, especially during the winter months.
Without attempting to give a full overview of the situation, let's just mention that the 18 Aurora aircraft that are deployed by DND to monitor the entire Arctic territory provide very little capacity to act in the Arctic seas if something happens there. The two heavy icebreakers that we have and the four medium icebreakers of the Canadian Coast Guard are deployed in the Arctic for the summer months only and leave the area by early October. We can compare this with the Russian fleet of icebreakers, which at this time, although declining, still comprises about 12 heavy icebreakers that all surpass in size and power the most powerful Canadian icebreakers.
As early as 2005, ArcticNet recommended the building in Canada of at least two polar-class icebreakers. The recent announcement of the Diefenbaker, to be delivered by 2017, partially fulfils this recommendation. On the other hand, to give the new frigates of the Canadian Navy some limited capacity to break ice is generally considered a poor decision. Experts doubt that the ships will have much utility in the Arctic except in the summer months, while the structural modifications allowing them to break ice will greatly reduce their performance in open waters.
In conclusion, taking into account that Arctic sovereignty is first and foremost a maritime issue, I have the following general recommendations to consolidate the role of DND.
First of all, we need to augment progressively the country's airborne and satellite capacity to monitor its Arctic seas by expanding and upgrading the aircraft fleet and by supporting the development of the Arctic remote sensing program of the Canadian Space Agency.
Furthermore, to provide a suitable capacity to act on the ground, if you will, in our immense Arctic maritime territory, Canada needs at least two polar class icebreakers that can operate for 9 out of 12 months in the area. So in addition to the Diefenbaker, I would recommend that we start building a second icebreaker. Of course, as long as I don't have to pay personally for the bill, it's okay with me.