National Defence Committee on June 10th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Welcome, everybody, to meeting number 26 of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, February 23, 2009, we will continue with our study on Arctic sovereignty.

We have the pleasure of having with us the associate director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Mr. Robert Huebert.

Mr. Huebert, you have seven to eight minutes, and after that the members will have a discussion with you. Thank you very much for being with us.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Associate Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary]

Thank you very much. It is indeed my pleasure to be here. I applaud the committee for its examination and work on this critically important issue.

There are about four major points that I want to make. The first one is the issue of why we care about Arctic sovereignty and security. The issue, of course, has reappeared before successive Canadian governments since...well, Confederation, to be honest. We are facing an Arctic that is in massive transformation. It is in transformation all the way from the physical component to the cultural and livelihood element, to economics, and to geopolitics. It is virtually impossible to find another region of the world that is engaged in such a degree of change, literally before our eyes. The critical issue, however, when we consider Arctic sovereignty and the growing necessity for Canada to take this even more seriously than it has in the past, is accessibility.

One of the critical points about the changing nature of the Arctic is that there is both the perception and the reality that it is becoming more accessible. Countries as far away as South Korea have now become major players on the commercial side for the development of industry in the Arctic region. Countries such as China have an advanced Arctic research program. Indeed, China has one of the world's largest Arctic scientific vessels; in fact, it is larger than any ship we have in the Canadian navy. We have before us today an issue in dealing with the climate change that is making it accessible.

If that were not enough, we also have the recognition that the Arctic is probably the last major source of undiscovered resources for the world. The U.S. Geological Survey has conducted a series of studies that has led it to make the estimation that 30% of all undiscovered natural gas is in the Arctic region and up to 13% and possibly more of all undiscovered oil reserves in the world is also there. The Russians are about to complete the development of a gas field in the Stockman offshore region that will be the third-largest gas-producing sector in the world. In Canada, we have already moved from being a zero producer of diamonds to being the third-largest producer of diamonds, on the basis of three mines in the Canadian Arctic. In other words, it is indeed a treasure trove.

The third element of transition that makes it so critical for Canada also is that we have a changing northern population. One of the factors that most Canadians are unaware of is that the Canadian Arctic contains the youngest population of all regions. As such, it has some of the most challenging and difficult social and educational issues of this country.

As the world starts to come to the Arctic, the issue of how we actually enforce security and sovereignty in this region becomes critical.

The last point, and this is the one I really want to focus on, is the changing nature of the geopolitical circumstance. We have had a tendency in Canada to look at the last 15 years of cooperation and basically non-activity in the circumpolar north—with one or two important exceptions, such as the Arctic Council—and say that things will continue into the future. I am here to tell you today that there are in fact indicators that this geopolitical certainty is becoming questionable.

First and foremost, through the impact of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea we are seeing boundaries being revisited and redrawn as we speak. They pertain primarily to the continental shelf, and we can see possibilities of disputes coming into the forefront with the United States and Russia, and possibly Denmark.

We see some efforts to ensure that these disputes are resolved in a peaceful manner, but we are also seeing indications of other types of disputes over boundaries. The Europeans, in a recent document, have let Canada know that Europe is going to be taking the American position on the status of the Northwest Passage. We do indeed, despite what I know some of your preceding witnesses have said, have a sovereignty issue developing regarding the Northwest Passage.

We also have a coming boundary issue involving the Beaufort Sea. The Americans are about to release a report in which they call for a moratorium on all Arctic fishing within the region that they believe to be their waters, and there is a very definitive overlap with regard to the Beaufort Sea.

There is a more troubling issue, however, from a geopolitical perspective, and that is that if we look at both the policies and the current armament programs of our circumpolar neighbours, since 2004 we have seen a growing flurry of policy statements from all of the Arctic nations, as well as several non-Arctic states, as they begin to revisit their own Arctic security policies. Norway, Russia, and the United States are increasingly taking a unilateral approach to how they perceive their Arctic security.

Beyond simply documents, beyond simply saying it in paper form, all three of those countries have also reinstituted rearmament programs that will touch on the Arctic. I've made available for the committee a brief summary of some of those developments. The Norwegians are now about to redevelop their military with an extremely capable war-fighting, albeit small, northern capability. In November they signed a contract with the Americans to buy the 48 F-35s. They have also figured out how to put an Aegis combat system on a frigate, the first nation in the world to figure out how to do that on such a small capability. The Russians are both rearming their submarine force and engaged upon a program of rebuilding aircraft carrier capability, of which they say the majority, if not all, will be deployed in Arctic waters.

No one is at this point suggesting that we are resuming the bad days of the Cold War, but one does not have to be a rocket scientist to put together undetermined boundaries, the promise of great wealth, and the rearming—to a limited but nevertheless vigorous capability—of the major powers of the international system and to recognize from a historical perspective that usually when you mix those factors together, the international system tends to have difficulties in the area of cooperation.

Ultimately, Canada is facing a new Arctic. It is an Arctic that we can perhaps try to ensure becomes cooperative. Perhaps we can ensure that these new developments are marshalled in ways that provide for the proper security of the region, but that, if mishandled, could in fact hearken back to some of the more difficult times of the 1980s.

What, in conclusion, would I suggest that Canada has to be focused on and aware of? First and foremost, Canada has to make sure that its instrumentation is first-class. What do I mean by “instrumentation”? I mean that our surveillance and enforcement capabilities are equally as strong as those of our circumpolar neighbours. Even if we are able to mitigate some of the harsher edges of some of the disputes, we will need these forces to know who is coming into the Arctic, and we will need to have these forces to ensure that Canadian laws and regulations are enforced. The Arctic will remain a harsh environment, and to talk about anything but the best capabilities is simply to set ourselves up for failure in the long term.

We also have to ensure that our decision-making processes are geared to the Arctic. If any region of Canadian policy requires an all-of-Canada approach, it is the Arctic. DND cannot do it alone; DFAIT cannot do it alone; the coast guard cannot do it alone. They all must work together. In my estimation, the issue is one in which the government has to be, at its most senior levels, made cognitive and, quite frankly, to bump heads together.

I am often asked whether the icebreaker should be coast guard or navy. Quite frankly, I don't care. My attitude is, paint them pink instead of worrying about whether it will have a red or a grey hull, but we need that type of capability in the Arctic region.

Lastly, it is a time for Canada to not only have this capability, which of course many will characterize as unilateral, but we also have to take a leadership role on the circumpolar nature.

To a certain degree, the Norwegians provide us with an interesting model. They're doing everything possible to try to engage the Russians in cooperative efforts, but they are indeed arming themselves with a very robust war-fighting capability if things indeed do get worse in the long term.

So I leave you with this thought. The Arctic is transforming; the world is going to be coming to the Arctic. That is abundantly clear. We need to ensure that when in fact the world does start arriving in numbers in the Canadian Arctic, Canadian values, Canadian interests, Canadian security, and Canadian prosperity are protected.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Mr. Huebert.

I will give the floor to Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Professor, for being here.

You certainly have articulated some very important points. I read with interest your paper on The Reluctant Arctic Power, particularly dealing with the United States.

In terms of capabilities, which you talk about, at the moment we can't muster more than nine out of 20 CP-140s to patrol three coastlines. We can only get seven out of 14 CH-149 Cormorant search and rescue helicopters in the air, and we don't need to talk about the CF-18s and the C-130s. So in terms of the increasing importance, particularly after the Russian security report that has been released, can you outline to us the strategy you would like to see in terms of addressing some of those military capabilities? I will then lead to the sovereignty issues and the divvying up or the dividing up of the Arctic.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Certainly. In terms of the re-equipment, the major issue is that we have a long-term challenge before us. To be quite blunt, and this is quite frankly a bipartisan issue, we have not had a good record in our procurement policy. We have had an issue where we tend to buy a whole bunch all at once and then basically let them rust out. This is unfortunately a legacy that we can back up in terms of our assessment.

If we have ever needed to get a long-term procurement policy for our air assets, our naval assets, and our space assets, this is the time. We need to be drawing out exactly what types of replacements we immediately need. For example, the replacement for the coast guard icebreakers has to be a priority. We're going to be in the situation of having more ice coming into our Arctic as the ice actually disappears. So we need that capability.

In terms of the aircraft capability, we need to ensure that we have some means of proper search and rescue. Now, I'm not necessarily wedded to the idea that they all have to be flying a Canadian flag. They can be rented, they can be borrowed, they can be assigned, but we need to have that capability in the north.

So we have to be thinking about how we respond from a procurement position, first of all, to have it, to meet the immediate needs, but then the reality is the Arctic is going to be our third ocean. It's not going to be that we will buy all these things once and then we can forget about it. We will have to be thinking in the long term. I think the suggestions of what the Americans have done in regard to their carrier and their submarine programs give us some lessons that you can in fact build one ship, one set of aircraft at a time. This is to ensure that, first of all, it stays in Canada, which is always an important consideration, I think, for most Canadians, and rightly so, and second of all, that we are responding to this long-term program.

In terms of what we need, we need search and rescue first and we need the icebreakers, but then we need immediately after that the offshore patrol vessels and we need the replenishments for the long-range aircraft. At that point in time, we will then have to make a decision in terms of what we are going to be doing for fast air or the fighter replacement. It's all very expensive, but a long-term policy cries out for this.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you for that.

In terms of various departments or a cross-governmental approach, which department do you believe should be actually taking the lead in monitoring, securing, and protecting our north?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

There is no question in my mind that this should be with DND. DND has the experience on the two coasts. They understand what is necessary. They have shown the best track record of not only having a vision--once again, one can look to lead mark and vectors, and it doesn't matter in terms of the policy--but they also understand surveillance. I think they understand surveillance the best of all the departments in the context of how to operate with other departments. Other departments simply do not have the finances or training to deal with that.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you for that.

What's your view on making NORDREG compulsory? Could you explain the importance this change would have on Arctic sovereignty? Do you see any potential constraints, and should this be in fact a priority for government?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I have absolutely argued in favour of making NORDREG compulsory. To take a metaphor from Calgary, the idea of having the Deerfoot Highway given a speed limit but then asking everybody to report whether or not they are speeding is ludicrous. I think it's equally ludicrous to turn around and say, if indeed we are, that the Northwest Passage is internal waters, which has total party acceptance on that particular issue. If we are serious that the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act has to be enforced, then you have to have reporting mandatory--full stop.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you for that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You still have two minutes if you want to continue.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Professor, the Russians have been sending out two types of signals: one seems to be cooperation, particularly with Canada, on some of the Arctic issues and claims; the other is building up, as you said, their capabilities. Briefly, what's your assessment of that?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

They've been developing this under key policies. They have been doing the classic bad cop, good cop. The bad cop for the Arctic is Chilingarov. He's the one who is making by far the most unilateral statements--the patrols are, clearly. The Russians are clearly developing a diplomatic technique of pushing those countries. On the one hand, they hope to show their good will in terms of cooperation, but they're also letting everybody know that underneath that cooperation is a very stiff steel fist, in my opinion.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Professor, there are conventions that deal specifically with partition of the Arctic. I'm thinking of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea under article 76. Could you briefly comment on that, and the implications with regard to oil interests, particularly?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The major thing about the partition is about oil. It's about the soil and subsoil.

If everybody does what they say they're going to do, which is to follow the rules exactly, then we may see this as an example of great cooperation. The test will be when we have an overlap with either the Americans or the Russians, which looks as if we will, and if we can mediate and decide upon it peacefully. I'm hopeful that the structure is in place that we can do so, but it is dependent on what happens in other events in the international system. The Russians would have been very willing to do so earlier. After Georgia, they've sort of signalled that they're not quite so willing.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you for the clarity of your answers.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Mr. Bachand, go ahead, please.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Huebert, you made a very good presentation. It was extensive, but I sense that your reasoning turns on military capability.

In the matter before us, the sovereignty over the Arctic that is being claimed by a number of countries, I'm not sure that's our best asset. I don't mean we should get rid of our weapons and send doves to fly above the Arctic to show that we are pacifists. However, I get the impression that, regardless of the military equipment that Canada can afford to have—that's another problem—we won't be able to face the Russian or American navies.

For me, the military aspect weighs less heavily in the balance. I'm more in favour of relying on international cooperation; I'm more in favour of compliance with international law. On that point, and you mentioned this, there is a convention. In addition, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has just recognized that 230,000 km² belongs to Norway. I was in Oslo two weeks ago, and that was a major topic of discussion.

I wonder whether the solution doesn't lie in a mix of both, relying more on international law. I nevertheless want to reassure you with regard to the military aspect; I was in Oslo for a NATO meeting. The major discussion focused precisely on the Northwest Passage and the Arctic, and on the evolution of events. You know, I was at a NATO meeting three years ago to talk to them about the Arctic and about the opening of the Northwest Passage. It's as though I was speaking Chinese; my colleagues didn't understand me at all. Now, suddenly, everyone understands the issue.

I'm wondering whether, from a military standpoint, our traditional alliance with NATO isn't the best solution because we won't have to pay for everything you've mentioned. I believe that international law should settle the matter. That won't prevent shows of force by the Russians, who blow hot and cold by times. I don't think the military solution is the best one. Sticking to our NATO friends seems to me to be a better idea. However, I think international law should apply, through the UN.

I would like you to clarify your thinking. Do you still claim that Canada must acquire all the military equipment you mentioned? Wouldn't it be better to work with international laws? If some decide to brave international law and go beyond international law, what do you think of NATO as a police force to enforce international law in the Arctic?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Those are outstanding questions, sir, and thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to clarify on the international cooperation.

You're absolutely right, we need both. They cannot be separated. In fact, if there has been a critique with Canadian policy in the long term, it's that we've had a bit of a tendency to say we do either one or the other. The reality is that to do it efficiently in the Arctic, you need to do both.

Furthermore, even on the issue of the military, I would argue that the correct orientation would be security. The reason is that many of the enforcement capabilities we're going to need for such typical law and order issues—such as fishing regulations and environmental protection—can only be handled with the full, if not complete, participation of the navy and the air force. In other words, there's a bit of a terminology issue in terms of saying military versus security, because you're going to need the RCMP on board for enforcement but a lot of it's going to have to come from the military.

On your point about the interaction between international cooperation and military, I would draw your attention to this, in regard to Norway. As soon as Norway made its claim, as soon as Norway had its claim accepted by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the Russians resumed surface naval operations in the disputed zone for the first time since 1989. The Ustinov and another ship were deployed to each of the disputed zones that the Norwegians and the Russians have.

The Russians and the Norwegians, on the international cooperation side, have an agreement that they would be disagreeing on their continental shelf. So it gets back to this Russian dual policy. On the one hand they're saying yes, let's go cooperatively, but they're also sending very clear signals from a military position that frankly, in my view, escalate the situation and suggest why the two have to be completely hand in hand. You have to have the strength to back up the international cooperation. That is unfortunately the viewpoint of both the Americans and the Russians, and we are basically stuck in the middle.

Turning to the point on NATO, the challenge we have with NATO is that from a political perspective it is our NATO allies that create the biggest problem in terms of the Northwest Passage. The Russian position on the northern sea route is almost a carbon copy of our position on the Northwest Passage. We've never made common cause with them. In other words, we've never gone to the UN and said that we have identical positions and that we will back the Russians if they will back us. There was a whole host of good reasons not to do that, but the reality is that our positions are very similar.

So we've got this complexity when it comes to the Arctic that the countries that have been showing the greatest military issues to us, of course, are the Russians with their overflights and with their sailing into the disputed zones. But by the same token, from a diplomatic perspective, it is the European Union and the Americans, in very recent documentation, that have said clearly that the Northwest Passage is an international strait and therefore Canada does not have complete control over international shipping.

So we are indeed headed into a complicated time, but the answer is that we've got to have the capability backed by good diplomacy. We need both. It's complicated, but I can't see us doing one without the other.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Mr. Huebert.

I will now give the floor to Ms. Leslie.

[Megan Leslie, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for your presentation. I'm new to these issues, so I very much appreciated your being precise and the good explanations you gave. I hope you'll bear with me on some of my questions that may seem a bit simple to you, perhaps.

You talked about Arctic security being a bit about the ability to respond, and I think you said you don't care whether it should it be the coast guard or the navy, we just need to do it. I think about the ability to respond and the coast guard, and it seems to me that the coast guard may be in a better position to respond quickly. It's something that's much less costly.

I'm just wondering if you have thoughts about the coast guard being able to carry out these functions. You said your preference was for DND to run things.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Let's be very clear in terms of the cost. Everything is expensive. When the coast guard is talking about replenishment of its existing capabilities—and it desperately needs to replenish them—you are talking, as a minimum, $720 million per ship. That's probably going to get you a straight replacement cost. The realistic cost to get a modern-day icebreaker that is going to be required for the next 20 to 30 years and to operate successfully, you're talking probably $1 billion each. This is equivalent to anything that the navy is doing in the context of its Arctic offshore patrol vessel. There is no cost savings whatsoever.

The coast guard is by far better in terms of experience of operating in the Arctic. The navy is going to have to rely on the coast guard for training, there's no question whatsoever. But by the same token, the navy has shown that it has been able to sustain funding in a way that exceeds the coast guard. In a perfect world, we would not have starved the coast guard. The coast guard now is facing the current situation that its operating budget is being cut today, which is quite frankly ludicrous, in my view, given what is coming down the line.

The ice services are alleged to be receiving less funding. The navy tends to politically be a stronger voice in Canada. That's what leads me to say that in that particular context, you need to have the navy involved in that aspect. But the bottom line is you need both of them operating together. You need the navy's ability to sustain, to have surveillance, but you need the coast guard's experience in the Arctic. You can't have one without the other, quite frankly.

[Megan Leslie, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you.

When we're looking at increasing our presence, my understanding is that the real question is the Northwest Passage. Looking at your recommendations, the second recommendation of yours is "improve Canadian surveillance and enforcement capability". Do you see this concentrating around the Northwest Passage, or do you have bigger boundaries in mind?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I would say the Northwest Passage is but one of the boundaries. We are going to have the issue in the Beaufort Sea; we're going to have the issue in the continental shelf.

Let me be very clear on this. Do I think the end of our policy should be about sovereignty, to say “we have sovereignty”? No. We need control. I don't care what you call it. You can go through an international agreement. But we have to ask what it is that we want the sovereignty for. We want the sovereignty to ensure that Canadian regulations, Canadian environmental standards, and Canadian northern communities are protected. If we can get that through an international agreement, I'm all for that too. So sovereignty is a means. This often gets misunderstood in the press. I think that we sometimes lose ourselves in that argument. I think that's a critical distinction.

[Megan Leslie, NDP, Halifax, NS]

If we had international agreements or if we had some decision through arbitration, say, of Hans Island or the Beaufort Sea, then we're good there.