National Defence Committee on June 10th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Professor.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Bagnell.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Thank you.

Thank you for coming, Mr. Huebert.

My question is mainly about the Beaufort. I asked the government about the dispute, what they were doing to solve it, and the answer I got is that there's no dispute in the Beaufort, and then they went on that it's a well-managed situation. Yet the Americans are putting out oil and gas leases in the Canadian Arctic in the Beaufort, and we send diplomatic notes. And thank goodness the government is doing that; I commend them for that. But if they're sending diplomatic notes complaining, it's very funny that they would give me an answer that there's no dispute.

I'm wondering what you think Canada should do about this non-dispute.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I do think there is a dispute. I'm a little bit sympathetic to a government that says there isn't a dispute, because historically you never want to let a stronger opponent know that you're actually scared of them. When you acknowledge a dispute it sends them that signal. I appreciate that.

As a non-government academic, I can say quite frankly from where I sit that there is clearly a dispute, and it is about to be escalated. The U.S. Department of Commerce is going to enforce a moratorium on all Arctic fishing, once the Secretary of Commerce signs off on it. This includes the Canadian zone. They're saying they have the sovereign right to stop all fishing. It's a good idea, to be quite frank, and we don't understand what's happening, but the idea that the Americans are doing it unilaterally is problematic.

What we should be doing is entering into some form of a joint management scheme with both the Americans and the various relevant aboriginal groups, because we have a land claims issue due to the 1984 western Inuvialuit land claims agreement that gives certain fishing and marine cultivation rights to the Inuvialuit. There should be some element where we agree to disagree on the actual formal drawing of the borders, but engage in best practices for the harvesting of marine mammals and fishing, perhaps enforcing the precautionary principle until we understand this new fish stock.

We should also engage in a joint management scheme for the development of oil and gas. Let's be blunt here: the development companies are all the same. It doesn't matter if it's BP or Exxon Mobile. The ones that are on our side of the Beaufort are the same on their side. Through free trade we have a common market for the sale of oil and gas once it reaches North American soil.

In my mind, the ingredients of a successful joint management scheme to mitigate this from becoming a much more serious dispute are there. We need to have the political will to do so. If the Indonesians and the Australians, who went in when Indonesia was collapsing, were able to enter into a joint management scheme for the North Timor Sea, Canada and the United States should be able to do it.

This will not ultimately solve it. We will still have the disagreement about which interpretation of the 1825 treaty is correct. But if we handle the fish issue, the oil and gas issue, and the land claims issue, that will resolve where the points of the crisis will come forward. I think we should do it sooner rather than later.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Can the Inuvialuit go to the International Court?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

No. The decisions that the ICJ gave for both St. Pierre and Miquelon and the Gulf of Maine issues cast certain questions about their capability in making decisions. We are much better off if we go to direct bilateral negotiations.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

If the Europeans and the Americans win their battle on the international strait in the Northwest Passage, it means those Russian bombers the government was so scared of when they weren't even in our airspace will now be in the middle of our Arctic. Do you want to comment on our chance of losing that, or what we should do on the whole issue?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I think there is a good chance, because the international community does not understand that the existence of aboriginals living on and off the ice as one unit makes the Northwest Passage different. Many individuals I discuss this with will say that the Philippines is an international strait, and the Gulf of Hormuz is an international strait. But I say that the ice cover makes this different; this is a fundamentally different issue.

The fact that out of 90 or so international voyages 87 have sought our permission probably strengthens our case today. But I entirely agree with the preceding witness, Suzanne Lalonde, who said the first one that's not American that goes through successfully without asking permission will set the worst type of precedent. The best way of handling this issue is something Canada actually led in the 1990s with the creation of an international agreement called the polar code. It basically said that if you were coming into the region you had to follow certain regulations. Unfortunately, the Americans squashed that, much to their regret.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

We'll give the floor to Mrs. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

Canada has no submarines that can run properly below the ice. What are your thoughts on how we would deal with submarines from non-traditional allies that intrude into our territorial waters?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The non-traditional allies won't be a problem; it's a country like Poland, say, that's a new entry into NATO. We can probably handle it with the NATO underwater management scheme. Basically, NATO has an agreement. If you're a member of NATO and you're operating subs, you have to tell the other people. And you can ultimately in international courts say that of course we're letting the Polish or the British or the French subs up there because we're all NATO allies. Now, it might be a fig leaf, but we will always have that in international law.

The problem we face is what happens if the Russians or Chinese start running nuclear-powered subs underneath the ice cover. Well, there are two factors. First of all, we're fortunate that even if the Russians do it, they won't use it as a piece of international law, because then it would go against their claim. The Americans would immediately say, “Oh, great! Thank you, Russia. By the way, we've got one of our nuclear subs underneath your ice right now. So that must mean you're also an international strait.” The Russians, fortunately, are in a bit of a straitjacket.

The issue is what happens if a country such as China, somewhere in the future, starts to do it. Where we need to have it firmly entrenched is in the fact that we have complete surveillance capability and the ability to go to the international protest when somebody such as China, if it ever were to come into the water.... In other words, if we can show under good governance systems that we know what's happening under the ice, and then can protest it.... I'm not talking about sinking. No one is ever talking about that, because the environmental issue would be such a disaster. But you simply go and say that of course we knew the Chinese were there; we knew as soon as they came in; they shouldn't be there; those are internal waters. And then we make the point to the Chinese, asking how they would like it if we were in the Taiwan Strait. There are various diplomatic ways we bring pressure on them. And that's how we respond to it in that particular context.

But the critical point is that we have to have the ability to know what is going on and we have to have the ability to be willing to play a little bit of diplomatic hardball afterward.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

I'm going to get back to that after I ask this question, just in case we run out of time.

Previously you said we need to have the ability to enforce compliance. Are you saying that as a consequence of Canada's inability to enforce everything with respect to environment, fishing, and security, Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage has, by default, been capitulated?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

No, I wouldn't be so harsh in that context. In fact, what our operators have done, and they've done it superbly.... Because of the lack of limitations, what they have done—and this has worked in our favour because of the harsh conditions—is basically said to anyone who may be breaking our rules that if they don't follow our rules, we're not going to share this information with them; we're not going to give them this assistance. And Radarsat has been an important tool. The Canadian Ice Service has been an important tool. Coast guard assistance has been an important tool.

The problem we're facing now is with the diminishing of the ice, with the greater globalization of the technologies of new types of ships that can come in, that type of stick doesn't work any more. In other words, the operator's stick is not going to be such a major issue in the future. This is where we have to be able to say, ultimately, either with a coast guard vessel or a navy vessel, that if someone simply says they don't need our Radarsat, they don't need our escort, and they're going through, we can then, with RCMP on board, embark on the type of arrest we did when we were in fact involved with the turbot crisis with the Spanish. In other words, it may get risky, but that is how you do enforcement in the long term.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

We had some members of NATO, particularly the British, who feel that regardless of any intrusion into our territorial waters, they may be called upon to help patrol the waters because we just don't have the capability at this point. What are your thoughts on that? Is that something that's going to be necessary?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

No, it won't be necessary. The British do a lot of talk in that regard, but the reality is they are way behind us in surface capabilities. Where they have a better capability, of course, is with their nuclear-powered subs. We know they've been going to the North Pole since 1987 on an annual basis with the Americans. But in terms of any form of enforcement, you really need to have the surface capability. That is where the short-term and medium-term threats will come to Canada. And in that regard, Canada is still ahead of the British.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

You may recall the Russians planted a flag on what we feel is our territory. Now the ambassador from Russia to Canada has said that was sort of like climbing Mount Everest and planting the flag, that it really meant nothing in terms of claiming territory. Do you buy that?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Well, they also said at the same time that it's like the Americans planting a flag on the moon; it didn't mean anything. It meant everything. When the Americans had Apollo, it basically said that their intercontinental missiles had that accuracy. In other words, it's a signalling.

What you really have to look at, when the Russians planted the flag, is what Chilingarov, the Russian scientist, said. He was the one who planted the flag. He was also a Duma member, and now he's the special representative to the Russian president. He said of course this is Russian territory; it goes beyond the spirit. And he said yes, they would be able to cooperate with the Canadians—and he said this on CBC—as long as the Canadians go along with everything they say, because after all, everybody knows the Canadians are paper tigers.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

So that becomes the more chilling part.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Perfect. Thank you, Professor Huebert.

Mr. Bachand, you have five minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

People have come here to tell us that it might perhaps be a good idea for us to have resources to detect submarines in two passages in the Northwest, M'Clure Strait and Lancaster Sound. You don't necessarily see a submarine, but you can hear it go by; there is an audio signature. We can know whether it's a Russian, Chinese or British submarine. Do you think that would be a good solution?

I go to NATO meetings, where they increasingly talking about changes in arsenals. Today, the international arsenal doesn't consist merely of boats and aircraft. It's something else. We realize that Russia, among others, can use energy as a weapon against NATO countries and western countries. Moreover, it was said that certain things happened last winter when there was a dispute between the Ukraine and Russia: part of Europe hasn't been supplied for a number of months. The international community was wondering who was right. The Russians said that Ukrainians were diverting some of the gas, and the Ukrainians said that the Russians had actually shut off the valve.

On the diplomatic front, it's important to develop major energy sources. Negotiations are currently underway to determine how to divide the Caspian Sea, which is extremely rich. I went to Azerbaijan and I can tell you that the people there are very interested in those discussions. I very much like the fact that can be used as a weapon. The weapon that Russia is using can be turned against it. If it no longer has a supply market or a market to sell its gas, it will be stuck with that gas. When we talk about new arsenals, we can also talk about cyber attacks, of which Estonia has been a victim. Other things are currently brewing as well.

I think the solution lies in determining the limits of the entire continental shelf. Once the continental shelf has been divided, and everyone has respected the limits, a police force will be necessary to enforce the international decision. Will Canada do that only at home? Will the United States do it at home? There could be an international police department, such as NATO, that would be responsible for enforcing the international decision that could follow from a violation of the international treaty.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Thank you, sir. That is a wealth of critical importance.

In terms of the energy weapons, I agree with you entirely: you have to start looking modern.

In terms of the surveillance capability, where Canada's trying to develop it--and I'm a firm supporter of it--is in the listening acoustic capabilities. But we are just experimenting with it right now. It's a program of Northern Watch. We have to ensure that not only is it properly funded, but once the Canadian development of this is created, we in fact go ahead with the deployment.

The third major element of your point is the issue of who should be the ones who are monitoring the north once it is divided. Be aware that we are probably not going to get the answers from the commission until about 2030, 2040. So we have a very long period. The commission is doing about two to three reports a year, and there are a hundred before it right now, so you can just do the math in terms of how long it will be when the Canadian report is ultimately deposited in 2013.

Now, on the issue of who should be there, I am of the firm belief that once they reach agreement it should be the circumpolar nations that should say to their operators that they have to cooperate. They work the best together. Let's ensure that the environmental, economic, and security issues are all worked on. That would be the critical point to lock everybody into a cooperative venture.

Don't bring in the outside world, because that makes it problematic. Keep it within the context of the Norwegians, the Americans, the Canadians, and if we are in good relations with the Russians in 2030, 2040, you bring the Russians in.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Should they be doing the policing, also?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

They should be doing the security enforcement. It goes beyond just mere policing. You will have to have the top-level capability to ensure that the environmental standards are upheld. Just to think of policing, the RCMP or local police enforcement will not be able to do it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bachand and Professor Huebert.

I'm now going to hand over to Mr. Blaney.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Lévis—Bellechasse, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to the committee, Mr. Huebert. It's a pleasure to see you. First I want to thank you for sharing your work with us. Thanks as well for the two excellent articles that you presented during your presentation. I've also had the chance to tell other stakeholders that, with your work and your knowledge of the Arctic, you are also contributing to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. I encourage you to continue what you're doing.

I was listening with some concern to my colleague opposite about the idea that we might not need traditional equipment such as destroyers, submarines and ships to ensure our sovereignty in the High North. You said in English that we needed to have capability backed by policy. In French, I would say, literally, “to have the means to achieve our ambitions”. In that sense, I think you clearly indicated that the “Canada First” defence strategy is a step in the right direction, to the extent that we can build and deliver ships across the country.

You talked about China. We often consider the circumpolar countries. However, I believe you also alerted us to the possibility that other countries—I wouldn't say those countries have no business there—might find an interest there. I believe our country is going to take that into account, particularly with regard to China.

My question concerns the United States and the Northwest Passage. The Americans published a new document in January in which they again emphasized that the Northwest Passage is an international waterway. That obviously runs counter to our national sovereignty claims. Could you tell me about that document? Also, how can we continue to assert ourselves while respecting the “Canada First” strategy and the negotiations?