It's an honour to be here, and I thank you for the invitation.
I first went north as a labourer. I worked in Moose Factory, building a church school in the summer of 1953. A couple of summers after that, I was up at what was then called Great Whale on the eastern shore of Hudson Bay, helping to build a mid-Canada radar line, which has since been dismantled. Those were my first tastes of the north. And they never went away; I've always had an affection and an interest in things northern.
I became engaged in Arctic policy, northern policy stuff, with the incursion of the U.S. supertanker Manhattan into our waters in 1969-70. That's where I really got turned on. By then I was teaching international politics at the University of Toronto. It was a violation of Canadian sovereignty that actually got me going on Arctic policy studies, and I've been interested ever since.
Now, however, I don't think quite the way I used to in 1969-70. I was previously what you might call a fire-breathing sovereigntist, an Arctic sovereigntist. There was no question in my mind that there was an urgent need for Canada to stand up—in this case, to the United States—and see to it that sovereignty over our waters, over the many passageways called the Northwest Passage, would be assured.
Since 1969-70, my views have slowly evolved. I've come to believe that we are not well served by trying to plan and base public policy in the north—that is, southern public policy in Canada for the north--on sovereignty matters. Sovereignty is not, to my way of thinking, a good foundation for us. It is a foundation that is unsteady. It comes and goes in cycles. And it is not something that makes for constancy in Canadian behaviour.
I am thinking in particular of the Polar 8 icebreaker, which we said we would buy in 1985. In 1985, the U.S. icebreaker, Polar Sea, came through the Northwest Passage without a by-your-leave. And I broke the news of that visit, that intrusion, in an op-ed piece in The Globe and Mail in the summer of 1985. I was still, in the summer of 1985, a strong, unqualified sovereigntist.
But the Polar 8 didn't come through. We couldn't hold to it. In fact, the Arctic sovereignty threat seemed to recede. The same was true of the fleet of Arctic-capable nuclear attack submarines we were going to buy a bit later. We were committed to this, but they never got through. It was impossible for the government of the day to sustain that project, and it languished.
Today, what is happening to the offshore patrol vessels? Where are they? I would say they are now in abeyance. They're awaiting a whole series of decisions to be made about shipbuilding. But my guess is that this is going to be another case where we commit on the basis of sovereignty and do not carry through. We can discuss this, but it seems to me that we have a problem. It's one of constancy and of finding a better basis.
One of the reasons the basis is not good is that we have, in my view, greatly exaggerated the threats to sovereignty this country faces. The reality in Canadian public life, or politics, is that there is an exaggerated worry about sovereignty. We even worry about Hans Island. And the media picks this up. The few of us who know about it worry about the Lincoln Sea and our differences—a minor one, in my view—with Denmark and Greenland. People know rather more about the Beaufort Sea and our dispute with the United States. There's the outer continental shelf, which is getting more and more attention, and we could talk about that, but there's the Northwest Passage especially, which remains quite a serious worry and concern, and it's an exaggerated one.
To my way of thinking, all these issues, but especially the Northwest Passage, see Canada in very good shape. We do not need to worry the way we do. We do not need to talk of asserting sovereignty. Asserting sovereignty, to my way of thinking, is like pushing on an open door. There's really nobody resisting us, to the extent we think we are being resisted.
Part of the reason for the worry and exaggerated concern is that I believe the media have been listening to those I would call “purveyors of polar peril”. Those people have got it wrong. But the media love a story, and maybe politicians like the story too. This is not a partisan statement. I think this is true of Liberals; this is true of Conservatives today. I think it is an interest in the story and in playing in some way on the Canadian identity. If you like, we could talk about identity politics and whether that is a good basis for defence, but there are also a whole lot of other public policies we might want to pursue.
I'm not going to talk much more, because I'd like to leave it with a brief opener.
The Chief of the Defence Staff said not long ago, at the end of August, that there is no conventional military threat to the Canadian Arctic. He said so, and I think he's totally right. There's no nuclear threat to the Canadian Arctic; there's no asymmetrical threat of any proportion to the Canadian Arctic.
What we do have instead, and some would call these sovereignty threats, are what I would call policing threats. They don't require combat capability, but constabulary forces and abilities to police our waters, to know what's happening, to act in emergencies, to act for a search and rescue. In all of this there are things the military can do and that the Canadian Forces should be equipped to do. Basically the need for hardware is relatively slight, and to justify it on a sovereignty basis is not the best, in my view. Instead we should be thinking about policing what is ours, accepting no fear and no uncertainty. We should be confident.
In the long haul, it seems that we do have a sovereignty problem when it comes to the defence of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago by a stand-alone Canada whose sovereignty claim to the area is contested by virtually all, except perhaps the Russians. If it came to having to defending this claim and acting on it in a militarized Arctic 20 or 30 years from now, in a greatly ice-reduced Arctic, having to police these waters against any and all who come in--all submarines, nuclear included, and all surface vessels--I think we'd be hard put to do this. In fact, it would break the bank. It would eliminate a great many options that we might like to pursue in defence and foreign policy.
I think this is something we should try to head off, and for that I'll end by saying that we should pursue a strategy of stewardship in the region: to build confidence, to reduce the risks of our having to stand alone and defend the Arctic Archipelago in a worst case scenario down the road that is preventable.
Thank you, sir.