National Defence Committee on Oct. 6th, 2009

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

You tell me.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

I'm just telling you. Thank you very much.

I will give the floor to Mr. Braid, please. It's your turn, for five minutes.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

It's great to have you here. I'm also a graduate of international relations at the University of Toronto. Clearly I didn't fully maximize my degree, because I unfortunately didn't take any of your courses.

I just want to pick up on two of these themes. With respect to the Northwest Passage, your position is unequivocal that the waters belong to Canada and that they are internal waters. Could you briefly explain the basis of your position and how you came to that conclusion?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

The historic waters claim is based on the fact ultimately that Inuit have occupied, lived on, done a thousand things, in the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, and there is an archaeological record to this that maybe one day we would want to amplify and make more of. There's an oral history record to all of this, and it is an historic internal waters claim we have that is derived principally from the fact of Inuit occupancy and use. The Inuit gave their title, as it were, to Canada in steps and stages, but in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement there was a transfer of title and they gave it to Canada in return for all kinds of things that they still have yet to receive from the Government of Canada. There is a dimension that can be called the “honour of the crown” at stake here. That is, we have not lived up to our side of the treaty with the people of Nunavut in particular, it seems to me. But there is something serious to be done here, and I believe it's within our capacity and we should move on with it.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Secondly, in your presentation, you propose a model of stewardship based on cooperation. The success of that model, of course, is contingent upon all parties equally cooperating. Could you briefly touch on who those other parties would be and the state of their level of interest in cooperation?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

The other parties are all of the Arctic eight, if you like, or simply the five coastal Arctic countries, if you want to simplify this to begin with. Indeed, let's hold it to the five.

The readiness to cooperate is not great right now. There have been some words and statements made of good wishes and intentions, but the fact is that in the Arctic Council and elsewhere, the five, and indeed the Arctic eight, have confined themselves to studies and statements about guidelines and things that should be done. None of that is mandatory. Though there have been some really good studies—the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, for instance, is a beautiful piece of work, and just recently there's been the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, all of which are very good studies of the situation—the follow-on to collective action is not there yet. Because the governments of the region on the whole, like Canada, want to preserve freedom of action, maximize sovereignty, and not to be caught up in extraneous considerations, so to speak, most of them have enough on their table. So there is a problem.

In building the capacity to cooperate, as I say, you could work out a stewardship agenda quite easily, but actually getting people to do the job and to get interested in cooperating is quite another. For that we need the United States and Russia to work—especially Russia. Russia is the antithesis of stewardship in many ways, and how are you going to bring the Russians aboard? They account for about 180° of arc in this region or circle, and they are not very interested in stewardship so far. How are we going to get them on?

There are answers to that. One of the ways, to be quite simple about it, is to exercise bribery. We need to make it easier for them to be stewards. For that, money is required; and for that, non-Arctic countries are required, I think.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

That was very helpful. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

I now give the floor to Mr. Paillé.

[Pascal-Pierre Paillé, Bloc, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I shall share my time with Mr. Bachand if there is time left.

Thank you for coming here, Mr. Griffiths.

I came a bit late. Maybe you already have answered my question, but I do not think so.

You said, in a text that I have here, that the United States does not see itself as an Arctic country. You add that Alaska might be more tied to the Arctic and that Washington might be less open to see it as a priority than Alaska.

Would it be possible that the U.S. will become more interested in the Arctic given the increasing interest from Russia? Do you think that the Americans and the United States are worried by the fact that Russia seems to be willing to apply some political pressure at the international level?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Yes, that's a good question.

The United States is really not aware, as I say, of itself as an Arctic country. The Alaskans themselves feel cut off from the lower 40, and there is just a lack of connection to the Arctic—until lately. Things are starting to change now.

What actually changed is that there has been all this talk about climate change and melting of the ice. That really went nowhere with the U.S. government until the Russians planted the flag at the pole. At that time, I am told, the telephone began to ring off the wall in the U.S. Coast Guard, because the coast guard are the ones who know about the Arctic. Everybody—other departments in the U.S. government—started phoning to ask what was going on. It is the Russians who have triggered the U.S. strategic interest in the Arctic in a new way, and I think that is probably going to persist.

The U.S. has an Arctic strategy paper that came out in January. It was one of the last statements of the Bush administration. I believe the U.S. government now is working on a further road map as to where they go next, beyond the strategy statement that came out of the old administration. I should think they'll be tracking Russia very carefully.

I would think the Russians are going in various ways to keep stimulating the American interest. There is to be a parachute drop of Russian special forces on the North Pole next year. I can tell you that is going to get lots of coverage. That is an expression of the belligerent side, the paranoid and fearful side, of the Russian approach to the Arctic.

The other side is the Law of the Sea: let's cooperate. I don't know if you know the Ilulissat Declaration, but it's the declaration of the Arctic five in the summer of 2008, saying that they're all going to cooperate and they're going to go by law. The Russians are very much on board with that, but the Russians are a bit schizophrenic and the readiness to be belligerent.... And that is probably born, by the way, of fear of what NATO has done to Russia and how it has brought former Soviet states into the alliance, etc. There is a Russian paranoia about NATO.

In any case, I think the Russians will act and react and they will keep the U.S. interest rising. That's my long answer.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Griffiths, you are certainly aware of the Northern Strategy that was recently announced by the Canadian government.

I would like to know your opinion on the fact that seven small Inuit municipalities in Northern Quebec are excluded from the Northern Strategy. I also asked that question to Mary Simon. Do you believe that these seven Inuit villages should be included in this Northern Strategy?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

I'm not so sure whether it's the villages that should be included in the strategy, but yes, Inuit Quebec and the Inuit area of Labrador should be part of the northern strategy, it seems to me. I should reread the document, but I'm not sure they're excluded. If they're not excluded, then it's up to them and up to their friends to say let's include them and make sure they're not forgotten. But yes, they are Inuit and they are pretty well above the treeline—that's one way of thinking about the Arctic—and they should be part of it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Perfect. Thank you very much.

Now, Mr. Payne.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Professor Griffiths. I appreciate your coming today with the very informative information that you've provided us.

I don't know if you've had an opportunity to read an article from the National Post on September 26. It talked about the Arctic ice and the rises and declines and the satellite photos taken by a Japanese organization. What it has shown, and reads here, is that in fact in some cases the Arctic ice is expanding. I actually attended an event last night and listened to Lord Lawson, who indicated that in fact the Arctic ice, as well as the Antarctic ice, is actually increasing. I don't have that as a fact, but that's the comment made.

I'm just wondering, from your thoughts around this, what impact would that have in terms of shipping, particularly in the Northwest Passage?

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

There is great variability in ice conditions in the Canadian Arctic and perhaps in the Arctic as a region. In the years up to 2007, whatever it was, there was reduction, and suddenly a very sharp reduction, in the summertime ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean. Since then it has been increasing each year. There has been not a reduction of ice cover but an enlargement, so this is what I would call variability. Who knows where it goes from here?

Actually, there is no necessity, I think, to expect a linear continuation of what we've experienced--this would be my view. It could be that things will get significantly colder for a number of years. The fact is that basically the planet is heating, and unless that stops, sooner or later the Arctic is really going to thin out still further. But before that happens there may be cycles, cycles of greater ice cover, more preservation of old ice, and more difficulty, therefore, of shipping, and the ships will not be there.

You could also imagine, if you want to think of somewhat worst case outcomes, a reduction of the strength of the Gulf Stream, and you get a big change in the north Atlantic, where everything becomes quite a lot colder. It may be not an ice age or a little ice age, but there are things that have happened historically in only a few years. The Gulf Stream, as we call it, has suddenly stuttered and stopped, with tremendous consequences and sometimes for a very long time.

These things are not ruled out, but we can only go with what we see. I think what we see is a pattern of warming, with some variation within it, but the longer trend is toward warm. I would think that's the common-sense trend we should prepare for.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Okay, Professor, I do have some other questions.

As for your comments in terms of speaking with the Chief of the Defence Staff, you said there is no military threat from combat. You actually talked about better approaches of policing and search and rescue. I believe what you said is to police what is ours. I'm wondering if you could expand on that issue and give us your thoughts on how that might be managed.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Actually, those are more professional questions about the use of armed force, which I really don't have a handle on except to say that the military provides in the Arctic a platform and capabilities that all other government departments can use. It's in many cases vital if there is a need for sudden action, and perhaps if there's a need for surveillance as well, long-term surveillance. So there are areas in which the Canadian Forces should be equipped to act and able to render these services of surveillance, monitoring, and to some degree enforcement or intervention, I would say. That may mean pre-positioning of search and rescue or emergency response goods, stuff that we would want to have ready to use at short notice. It may mean an application of SARSAT to surveillance capabilities under various things that are now being done. Also, one might ask about the need to monitor traffic in the northwest passageways; that is, a sonar system, which has been considered but I believe is not under active consideration, even though it was part of the set of commitments of the government.

There are these kinds of things that could all be done, but I'm not the one to recommend about that.

[LaVar Payne, Conservative, Medicine Hat, AB]

Thank you, Professor.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Bagnell, for five minutes.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

Thank you.

Unfortunately, I have to go to the House in a few minutes, so I'm going to leave these. You'll remember at the last meeting I talked about this amphibious Arctic vehicle. I went to the factory, so if anyone wants a brochure, I have them here. They're quite a thing.

I have two questions, and one is from my colleague Anita, who had to leave.

We had a debate yesterday in the House--the first hour. There will be another hour of debate in a month and then there will be a vote. It's on a motion that would change the name of the Northwest Passage to the Canadian Northwest Passage or the Canadian Arctic Passage. I'm wondering what you think of that. It seems to have unanimous support from all the parties, just to show our position. So the Canadian Northwest Passage or the Canadian Arctic Passage: do you have a preference for either of those or any comments on that, the change from the Northwest Passage?

The second question that Ms. Neville had was, what do you see as the role? I noticed that in your press release in the Globe and Mail you talked about the Inuit involved in the northern governance. Perhaps you could expand on how you see their involvement.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

On the latter question, it's the marine council again. It seems to me to be a way in which Inuit can be more involved in northern governments, especially on maritime or marine issues, and we would start with a marine setting.

But also, there could be.... Is there a committee of the House of Commons for high northern or Arctic affairs?

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

There's the northern and aboriginal affairs committee.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

There is. Okay. I should know that, but I've not read any of the proceedings. There's a place where some things can be done.

As to renaming of things, I have not heard of this. It's an interesting proposition. I think I'd favour, if you ask me, Canadian Arctic Passage.

The Northwest Passage is actually a passage that has an historic meaning that maybe should be respected. It's a passageway from the Davis Strait all the way out and through to the Aleutians. It's a big, long thing. The Northwest Passage is not simply what goes through Canada, which may be nicely captured by saying Canadian Arctic Passage.

[Larry Bagnell, Liberal, Yukon, YT]

The Europeans also question our claim to the Northwest Passage. For an international strait, as you know, one of the requirements you need to make that legal claim is that it is a useful commercial route with a number of commercial boats going through it, as in the Corfu decision.

I'm just wondering if you think we'll be more at risk. With the ice melting, more European ships could go through and it could be more useful to them. Would that have an effect on our claim of internal waters? It would give them more strength for their strait claim.

[Prof. Franklyn Griffiths]

Yes. If these ships go through under Canadian law, they reinforce the Canadian position that these are our Canadian waters. If they go through in violation of Canadian law, then we get into trouble, but nobody's doing that. I would think that the outlook is going to be for ships to conform to Canadian regulations, which are increasingly inseparable or indistinguishable from the regulations that would be used if the Northwest Passage were actually an international strait.

In other words, the difference between what would be done under a strait regime and our own internal waters regime is vanishing. There's less and less reason for anybody to want to go to court, to take Canada to court on these things, because in a court of international law I believe we would come out well. In fact, we would be able to say that this is a frivolous case being brought before the court. What we do is exactly what would be done--or pretty close to it--under the international law of the straits regime.

My guess is that, one way or another, the Europeans are not a problem. We are not going to court. That's my view of it. Unless somebody makes a very bad mistake, we don't need to worry about going to court. This is not a legal matter finally now; it's a political one and a commonsensical one.