National Defence Committee on Dec. 8th, 2009

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

General Natynczcyk, in terms of carrying out the mission, you've given a description in your presentation of the village approach, which I think has received the support on a tactical level and as a theory of carrying out this type of activity. And it sounds very positive, with one exception in my mind. How many villages do we have in Afghanistan, and how many troops would it take to carry out such a needed strategy in an effective manner over more than one village or over the entire country? That seems to me to be the weak point here. Is that something you've thought about?

It's one thing to present a model, but it's quite another thing to actually be able to carry it out over a wide area.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Again, the Canadian Forces are in a specific area in Kandahar City and to the south of Kandahar City, and our area of responsibility has been condensed to allow for a significant concentration of forces that we've never had before because of the reinforcement by our U.S. allies in this region. So where we had been operating, up until this past April, with one battalion in the Kandahar region, we now have four battalions of U.S. and Canadian troops operating in the Kandahar region specifically, and then an additional three battalions with the Stryker Brigade operating around our area.

So it's not only the Canadians who have taken on this village approach. We were just one of the first to get on with it, and we've had some success. But now, again, through General McChrystal's assessment and strategy, which is a counter-insurgency strategy, he is advocating the same approach for all of ISAF; that is, protecting Afghans where they live, enabling that hold in the villages--the village approach--such that the Afghan ministries can build in terms of governance but also to create the security environment such that non-governmental organizations and international organizations can come in and start the development projects. So our region is within that area where the Canadian battle group is, but we now have these other three battalions that are under our command. In addition to that, one of the battalions is a military police battalion that is actually living with the Afghan police force in the city of Kandahar. In addition, one of our companies has been continuously employed in providing security for development in the city of Kandahar. That's why we call it a “stability company”.

But that is changing the context, and again, I ask General Lessard to wade in and expand on it.

[LGen J.G.M. Lessard]

I have just three points on the village approach, which we also call stability operations.

First of all, they only started about six months ago, in May, so we're really only in the first six months. Second, we're concentrating close to Kandahar City. Kandahar City is the vital ground in southern Afghanistan, the key component, of the counter-insurgency. Third, it's not just Canadian forces or ISAF; it's ISAF with, especially, our Afghan security forces partners. At the end of the day, we want local Afghans to see their own security forces giving them security.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I have one final question. General Natynczyk, are you satisfied that we have the detainee transfer fixed and working to your satisfaction? We heard recent criticisms that the Afghan security forces were complaining that they had been given these prisoners, and they wouldn't take them, because they didn't have enough information to do anything with them. That strikes me as being a significant problem. Would you care to comment on that?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You have a minute. Go ahead, General.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

I was the vice-chief as we worked from the first agreement, in December 2005, through to that second agreement. The agreement with regard to detainee transfer was a best practice. We worked with the Department of Foreign Affairs and other justice colleagues so that we came up with what I thought, from my standpoint, was a very good, gold standard of a detainee transfer agreement.

The key issue, in terms of the environment in Afghanistan, is that the government has not passed a terror law. They can hold people who have been accused of a crime against the state. I'm not a lawyer. Some of you might be. It is very difficult to get a prosecution against an individual who has been accused of a crime against the state.

One of our challenges is that we have very sophisticated and classified means of intelligence to find out who the Taliban are. We don't turn over people, in my view and in my understanding, unless we have clear evidence that they have done something wrong. Again, we have seen people who we know, through intelligence, clearly have committed crimes. Or our soldiers have actually seen them on the ground having participated in an event, having gunshot residue, or having perpetrated an explosion of an improvised explosive device. Yet putting the evidence together such that a prosecutor and a judge can effect a prosecution so the person stays in jail is difficult in a country that doesn't have a terror law protecting the peace. That's why it's a constant challenge. And every case is different. I would just say to you that I am very confident in the process we've put together to put the cases together the best way we can. But we cannot expose those who have provided information to us or how we have garnered some of the intelligence to find out who the perpetrators of the insurgency are.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much, General.

I will give the floor to Mr. Braid.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning and for your presentation and your strong leadership of the Canadian Forces. You are clearly demonstrating to us how the Canadian Forces will meet Parliament's deadline to withdraw by 2011 in a planned way.

It's clear that our mission in Afghanistan has been the most significant for the Canadian Forces in decades. General, could you speak a little bit to the positive impact of this mission, the positive effects of this mission, on our Canadian Forces in terms of training, the development of our forces, the equipment, and our international reputation?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

I'll just say to you, Mr. Chair and ladies and gentlemen—I don't want to boast, but I'm very proud of our men and women—that you have one of the finest forces in the world. You do because the men and women of the Canadian Forces have rotated through one of the most difficult and austere environments in the world, into an area where the culture in some cases is very primitive, where your men and women have proven to be among the best trained in the world. Part of it happens even before someone puts on a uniform, because of our Canadian culture. The fact is that we come from a multicultural mosaic, we come from a country of immigrants, we come from a country where culture is respected, we come from a country with a high educational standard, and your men and women in uniform are well educated, and we're very patient.

I remember one battalion commander told me, “Sir, your soldiers are just plain smart”. When we take those individuals, when we take ordinary Canadians, and we put them through the rigour of the training that we do, they become extraordinary leaders, whether those leaders be young infantrymen or whether they be these generals. But as I said to a platoon out in Shilo just recently, “Whether you have just finished this basic training course as infantrymen, or even if you just finished your three-year hitch as a basic soldier, you have no choice but to be a leader, because we have provided the structure for you”.

We have just raised our game over the past few years because of this Afghanistan experience. I just think right now—again, I'm going into my 35th year—that I have never been part of this organization at a time when the proficiency and capability from privates on up has been at this incredibly elevated level. We were raised in the Cold War, when we thought we were doing the right things, but we did not have that experience of combat. Those young privates, those corporals, those lieutenants, and those captains are the future of the Canadian Forces, and their experience is immense.

Each and every day, at this moment, you have men and women who are going out the front gate courageous and so confident in their ability and in their equipment. Right from the helmets on their heads, to their boots, to their flak jackets, to the vehicles they are driving, they are confident in achieving their mission. Their eyes are trained and their instincts are incredibly highly refined, so they know what right looks like. Also, they have the discipline. They have the discipline that's rooted in Canadian law, in international law, in the law of armed conflict, in the Geneva Conventions. They carry it on a soldier card, they've gone through rigorous training, and they know what right looks like. Those are the men and women who are out there today.

What we're hearing from our allies—and I don't want to pat ourselves on the back, but it's from our allies—is that we have among the best soldiers, sailors, airmen and women, and special forces in the world. It will only get better, because in 30 years' time those lieutenants who have earned their spurs in Afghanistan will be sitting right here. We are products of the Cold War and Bosnia and Kosovo, and those young corporals and young lieutenants have much vaster experience from the current involvement.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you, General.

We are indeed, all of us, very proud of the Canadian Forces. Thank you for underscoring all the reasons why we are.

You indicated in your presentation that there are three U.S. battalions under Canadian command. You also suggested that's somewhat rare. Tell us why that's happened.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Again, I'll start and I'll ask General Lessard to add to this.

I do know, having spoken to General David McKiernan, who was the commander of ISAF until June, and to General McChrystal, how absolutely impressed they were by Canadian leadership in Afghanistan.

That leadership goes back to individuals such as Brigadier-General Jon Vance and Brigadier-General Dan Ménard, all the way through to their staffs, through to those officers and those NCOs who worked for that Task Force Kandahar, the battle groups that have served there, including 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment, and now 1 PPCLI, as well as the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.

What our allies have seen is that our proficiency, whether it be the operational command...going back to when General Lessard was the Regional Command South commander last year; down to General Vance, at a tactical level, as a brigade commander; down to those battalion commanders; and right down to those soldiers. Our allies know that for them to put a U.S. battalion under the command of the Canadians, they will get at least the same level of leadership that they would get from a U.S. battalion.

The other dimension is the fact that our leaders understand counter-insurgency tactics and doctrine and how we actually apply all of that doctrine to reality on the ground in Afghanistan in order to protect the Afghans where they live, create that security environment, and enable other government departments such as CIDA, with NGOs and IOs, to bring effect through governance, humanitarian assistance, and development projects that lead to jobs, education, medical care, and, therefore, hope.

[Peter Braid, Conservative, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You can take 15 seconds.

[LGen J.G.M. Lessard]

Just to continue on with what the chief was saying, about a month ago, when I was in Afghanistan, I had a good chat with General McChrystal. It's no coincidence that there are three U.S. battalion task forces under Canadian command. What we've seen from the commander of Task Force Kandahar and the brigadier-general commanding the Canadian Forces is innovation, leadership, and especially perseverance.

The chief mentioned the Canadians doing counter-insurgency that's population-centric--in other words, protecting the population. Some countries talk about it and others do it. We do it. And we do it very well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

I will give the floor to Mr. Dosanjh.

I know that you will share your time with Mr. Wilfert.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

General, I asked you a question about MPCC. There is a contradiction that stands out in the newspapers, and I want to offer you the opportunity to comment.

There must be an explanation for what you said in May of 2007 with respect to the incident that was discussed in the House yesterday, the evidence of Colonel Noonan and the evidence of General Deschamps under oath, and the diaries of the soldiers on the ground.

It's your time. I just want to give you the opportunity to shed some light on why there is a contradiction.

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Thank you.

I just saw the soldiers' notes in The Globe and Mail yesterday. I'll just say that I wasn't on the ground on June 11, 12, 13, 2006, and neither was Colonel Noonan, neither was General Deschamps, and neither was the military police corporal. He wasn't there at the event. He was there after.

I covered this issue on May 4, 2007, as if it were yesterday. Now this is a déjà vu moment all over again. It's interesting, when someone looks at an operation it's almost like watching a hockey game. We're all watching the same hockey game and we're all seeing different things.

You have to try to get a context around this environment. The bottom line up front is the event of June 2006 happened on the battlefield. This was not an event that happened back at Kandahar with regard to transfer. This was not a transfer to a prison. And the Canadian Forces did the right thing. Those are the three points I want to make right up front.

In June 2006 the context is key. This is prior to Operation Medusa. We were under Operation Enduring Freedom. Therefore, we were working for the Americans. This is prior to the NATO mission. We were working under the transfer agreement of December 2005. We had moved from Kabul down to Kandahar in that period of February on. We were dealing with a fledgling Afghan army and we had very little confidence in the Afghan police. As a result, the guidelines were that we would not transfer our detainees to the Afghan army or the Afghan police unless they were being mentored by their American mentors. We would not do that transfer, certainly not on the battlefield.

I remember in May 2007, when I was understanding what was going on, speaking to the platoon commander who actually owned the soldiers on the ground and speaking to Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hope, the battalion commander, who was the battalion commander, Task Force Orion, in the summer of 2006. As I looked to my own notes that I took listening to the platoon commander and listening to the battalion commander, I said I want a refresh, and I spoke again to Colonel Ian Hope last night just to confirm that I was good to go here.

This was Operation Jagra. This was led by the Afghan security force. It was the Canadians supporting the Afghan army and the Afghan police, one of the first operations that they would work together. The Canadian Forces were there to assist the Afghan security forces. It was our approach and guideline for this operation that if there were detainees to be taken, it was the Afghan security forces who would do it. We would not do it. This was their operation.

This event that occurred, our soldiers questioned a group of Afghans. When we question it's like stopping someone at a speed trap. You walk up and you're looking at the individual. Is that person clean? You're off in a farming area. If that person is dirty, he could be a farmer. If the person is clean, normally the Taliban would clean themselves up before going into a fight. Then there are all the tell-tale signs I don't want to share with you in this forum, but we would do an assessment just talking to the guy, just like a police officer would on the side of the road, asking you how it's going.

Based on the soldier's assessment they had no interest in the individual, but the Afghan police were there. The Afghan police see different things, for whatever reason. The Afghan police decided to take this person under custody and they took this individual off.

We didn't take this person under custody. If we did detain this person we would have brought in the military police. We would have taken this person into closed custody. We would have had the military police process them there. That individual would have moved back to Kandahar airfield, gone through a medical assessment, gone through tactical questioning, and if that person was still a person of interest, then we would pursue with our transfer agreement that I've mentioned before. But what we did on the ground was just basic routine questioning, as we do to thousands, so we ensure we don't take people who could be innocent.

Now, when the Afghan police took this individual away, the Canadian Forces members on the ground--again looking to those strategic privates and corporals--got kind of suspicious. They said “hmm,” and they went to check on what was going on. That's where they saw that the Afghan police were beating the individual with their shoes. They intervened. This is courageous now, because I remember speaking to folks who were there. It was courageous, actually, to take control of this individual. They called in the military police at that time. The notes you see are from the military police who were called in, who then took the individual and went through the process.

It goes to the fact that what the individuals did on the ground at the time was the right thing in terms of handling this individual. Having talked to Colonel Ian Hope, I just want to say that his memory of this event is that he had two or three firefights happening at the same time, that this was happening on a battlefield.

I just want to say that again, knowing that our men and women followed their soldier card so that they would apply Canadian law, international law, law of armed conflict, and the Geneva Conventions and do the right thing. I always talk about the strategic corporal, and I have trust in that strategic private, that strategic corporal, to do the right thing all the way through.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you, General.

I would give the floor to Mr. Boughen. You have five minutes.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for giving us your time. I know you're very busy with a lot of different activities. As you look back on the contributions that Canada has made to the Afghan people in education, medical, and social changes in their country, what do you think has been the biggest thing that we have done as a nation to help them in nation-building? They didn't have much of a nation before we arrived, in terms of democratic nation-building.

What would you say has been our biggest contribution as one country to another?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

I would say from my perspective—and again, I'll ask General Lessard to weigh in—I think we've provided them hope. They've gone through 30 years of war. They used to be a quite civilized culture. Thirty years of war is almost two generations, and all they have experienced is conflict. For us to provide especially education and medical care is providing hope for that next generation to live a better life.

Again, that education won't occur without providing the security, but key is something that we're finding the most difficult, and that is governance--governance not only federally, but governance at a provincial and district and community level. Again, so much is based upon their culture, but I would say that from my standpoint, we provide them hope through education and medical support.

Marc.

[LGen J.G.M. Lessard]

On the governance and development side, I see really two things. One of them, to reiterate what the Chief of Defence Staff is saying, is basic services, of course. The other is increased economic activity. Many Canadians do not know that just in the last 12 months we've seen bazaars, markets--many bazaars opening up in Kandahar City. That's not just the economic activity that it represents, it also gives hope to local Afghans.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

I just have one other question, gentlemen. We see in the papers and the news media announcements that the U.S. troops are looking at a date when they're going to leave Afghanistan. I think it's not far from our date of 2011. Is Afghanistan in a position now where they're able to govern themselves, to defend themselves, to defend their democratic way of life, or are they going to be overrun with insurgents? What are your thoughts on that?

[Gen Walter Natynczyk]

Mr. Chair, I have not had the opportunity yet to sit down with Admiral Mullen, my U.S. counterpart, and General Dave Petraeus to actually understand from a U.S. perspective their full plan in 2011. You'll be aware that right now they have in the order of 67,800 soldiers on the ground, and the President of the United States indicated what amounts to a surge of about 30,000 troops on top of that 67,800.

I do not know at this point in time, on the announcement of the end of that remit in 2011, whether that is back down to 67,800, or whether it's down to zero. I just don't know that. The fact is that it will take some time, especially in other regions of the country, training the Afghan army and police, and especially the growth.

You may want to add on there, Marc.

[LGen J.G.M. Lessard]

I'll make my comments on the issues of Afghan leadership. Right now we're mentoring the Afghans in security, governance, and other activities. Slowly but surely, we're seeing the Afghans taking the lead, in both security and governance. It will take time, but I am sure that before long we will see the Afghans taking the full lead in their country.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thank you.

Thank you, Chair.