National Defence Committee on March 23rd, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Good afternoon, everyone. I call our eighth meeting to order.

As per our agenda today, we have a witness representing the Embassy of Russia.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on Monday, March 2, 2009, this is a briefing on the recent incident of a Russian military aircraft approaching Canada's airspace.

Now we are going to hear from the witness from the Embassy of the Russian Federation, Mr. Dmitry Trofimov, Head of Political Section.

Mr. Trofimov, the floor is yours.

[Dmitry Trofimov, Head of Political Section, Embassy of the Russian Federation]

Thank you.

Senators, members of Parliament, ladies and gentlemen, it's my great honour and pleasure to be a guest speaker of one of the pivotal committees of the upper chamber of the Canadian Parliament.

Actually, I might have started with the traditional British small talk about the weather: sunny--it used to be--but a bit chilly, and hopefully it has nothing to do with the subject we're discussing today.

As for the episode that gathers us today, one might characterize it in pretty different ways. You might use the words “misunderstanding, misapprehension, misinterpretation”...[Inaudible--Editor] whatever. Let us analyze the whole story, but let us not over-exaggerate it; at least we don't.

I'll start with what happened. On February 18, 2009, two Russian long-range strategic aircraft, Tupolev 95MS, took off from Engels Air Force Base in Saratov region, in the Russian Federation, and flew over the Arctic up to the Beaufort Sea, where they turned back home. The approximate vicinity to the Alaska-Yukon border was about 200 kilometres. It was a regular preplanned flight in international airspace. The flight was undertaken according to Russian Ministry of Defence regular military training and air patrol plans in the northern latitudes, and all the international flight regulations were strictly respected.

Nine days later, a press conference in Ottawa took place and the respective comments of both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Minister of Defence Peter MacKay ensued. The only public comment from the U.S., since as you mentioned.... I started by saying that it was in the vicinity of two borders and two states. So the only public comment from the U.S. was that of U.S. General Gene Renuart, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, which was this: “The Russians have conducted themselves professionally; they have maintained compliance with the international rules of airspace sovereignty and have not entered the internal airspace of either of the countries.”

As far as I can see, there are several aspects to analyzing the whole case. First and foremost, we should view it from the international law perspective. As you will understand, relations among states in the 21st century are, first and foremost, based on international law. When it comes to international flights, particular rules should be derived from the relevant international treaties, either multilateral or bilateral.

Number two is the specific issue of notification, which is partly a legal issue, but mostly it's an issue of mutual confidence, which on its own part should be based on the balance of interests, which in actual terms means something very simple: reciprocity.

Point number three is a very popular and very widespread question nowadays: Is there any hidden agenda? In other words, why do Russians do that?

Point number four is the issue of political rhetoric, which seems to be on the radar screen of both the media and the public but which might be quite detrimental. I might remind you that America-bashing or, generally speaking, west-bashing used to be extremely widespread in the former Soviet Union, while Russia-bashing appeared to be extremely popular on the other side of the hill. The Cold War has been over for many years, but regretfully, that Cold War mentality is still there, which is deplorable. All that rhetoric about “the Russian Bear in the air” in the Commons and in the media--that's from not even yesterday but the day before yesterday. Besides rhetoric being useful for domestic purposes, if there are any, it can hardly be of any help for interstate relations. Anyway, I should have stated that the only bears that really matter today are those that are responsible for this slump in our stock markets, whether it's in London, New York, Toronto, or Moscow.

Last but not least, while analyzing the whole case, we should not forget about the background. We should not forget about our bilateral relations. We should not forget about what the Germans call the zeitgeist, or the spirit of the times, which, as far as I can see, is pretty much not in tune with what was going on and what was said.

Naturally, I guess, most of you remember by heart that famous speech of Lord Palmerston in 1848, made before the British Parliament, when he reminded everyone that Britain had “no eternal allies” and “no perpetual enemies”. All the British interests are “eternal and perpetual”, he said, and “those interests” we are “to follow”. It's a very simple and very basic thought.

We should take into consideration, while analyzing any case like that, where are the real interests of Canada and where are the real interests of Russia. Where are the interests and the pace of our bilateral cooperation, which is undoubtedly mutually beneficial, whether it's in Afghanistan, where we prop up Canadian efforts in all the various ways we can, in the last while by sharing intelligence with Canadians, which in many cases was of great help? That is not saying a word about all of our cooperation in the Arctic, which initiated this Arctic bridge from 2007, while we are extremely important partners when it comes to international cooperation in Afghanistan, international terrorism, international disarmament, regional conflicts, or whatever.

The latter reminds me of yet another thing. Last November I took part in a debate at Ashbury College: “Canada should strengthen its military in preparation for the next Cold War”. The keynote speaker was one of the most prominent Canadian military men, General Rick Hillier. His answer to the question was crystal clear. Should Canada strengthen its military? Yes. Should that be in preparation for the next Cold War? Sheer nonsense. Naturally not. That type of Cold War Russian threat has gone. The real threat is, as he defined it, not a bear anymore; it's a barrel of snakes. It is the combination of international terrorism, drug trafficking, regional conflicts, piracy, and whatever. The list is very long.You know it by heart as well, as far as I can see. I can't agree more.

Actually, from the very beginning, I was informed that I wouldn't have much time for the introductory statement. It's my understanding that we will have approximately an hour for a question and answer period. I thank you for your attention and am now open to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you, Mr. Trofimov. I appreciate your remarks.

Our first speaker will be Mr. Wilfert.

I know you're sharing your time with Mr. Coderre, Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

That's correct, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir, for coming here today.

You've explained what apparently is a contradiction between what the Russian government has indicated and what the Minister of National Defence has stated. On February 27, I wrote His Excellency, the Russian Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Mamedov, and I have to say that I received a quick and cordial reply from him. In his letter, he says “there is regretfully no either Russia-Canada or Russia-NATO relevant treaty or agreement, which would stipulate regular exchange of notifications on the military flights”. He did indicate that Russia does have an agreement with the United States through the 1991 START agreement.

In your opinion, sir, would it benefit Canada and Russia to establish such an official agreement on this issue? How do you see it taking place?

[Dmitry Trofimov]

Thank you.

To start with, let me clarify several legal issues along with the issue of notifications and your direct question, with your permission.

Very briefly, first, from the point of international law, the only issue was the correlations in the definitions of international air space and national air space. So all the notes that in most cases might be applied with regard to flights of military aircraft, for instance, do respond to the so-called Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, with all its regulations regarding national air space.

National air space, I might remind you, covers the air space over national territory, which is the land block with the adjacent territorial sea, which, according to the UN 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, is up to 12 nautical miles, or 22.2 kilometres--if I'm not mistaken, but that's an approximation--which means that whatever happened in the zone of approximately 200 kilometres from the coastline of either Canada or the United States has nothing to do with the regulations of this particular Chicago Convention of 1944. Naturally, it has something to do with the international space regulations, which are also applicable to the Chicago Convention, but only when it comes to civil aircraft.

Article 3 of the Chicago Convention indicates that there are special but pretty different rules. One applies to so-called state aircraft, and that is aircraft that are used for the purposes of the military, the customs, and the police. That's exactly the case, and there is not a single article in either the Chicago Convention or any other existent international conventions that might cover the flights of military aircraft when they are in international air space.

There are several special cases like the one that deals with the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which is purely for demilitarized zones, but that's pretty different.

So if we're talking about the Arctic, there is nothing we might use as an obligatory international obligation with regard to either behaviour if it is just an air training flight--naturally I'm not speaking about military activity--or when we're speaking about notifications.

With regard to notifications--and I'm speaking about the period of the Cold War--as early as the process of detente starting in the early 1970s, both sides realized that there was really a grey zone in international law and something should be done to regulate, one way or the other, the flights of military aircraft, which eventually made a start for different multi-layered confidence- and security-building measures based on a variety of international and bilateral--actually, Russian, or Soviet and American at that period of time--and multilateral treaties. One of those is the so-called Stockholm Document of 1986--

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I'm going to interrupt you. Your ambassador clearly says that there is no Russia-Canada or NATO-Russia relevant treaty agreement, and he said that's regretful. The essence of my question is, in your opinion, would it benefit Canada and Russian to establish such an agreement, and if so, what would you suggest?

[Dmitry Trofimov]

The only effective and efficient thing we have nowadays is the START I agreement, which expires on December 5 of this year. That was the only international bilateral agreement that stipulates such notifications. So step number one, let Russia and the States...and hopefully after all this, the reset button will be pushed. There are all the indications that it will and might happen, so let Russia and the States sit at the bargaining table and have either a renewed or yet another agreement instead of START I so as to keep those notification procedures afloat, because that is the only element we might use. As a matter of fact, while the Americans are informed on a permanent basis--as it used to be in that particular case--whether or not they pass this information to Canada is a pretty different issue. I think we might naturally think over the possibility of elaborating on this particular issue, and actually, the extremely extensive political dialogue--

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Mr. Trofimov, thank you very much. We don't have enough time. You'll be able to answer that another time.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Chairman, I'll take that as a yes, because I notice that in the handwriting of the ambassador, it does say something about START.

[Dmitry Trofimov]

It is naturally yes. It will just need normal diplomatic channels to be used and normal procedures to be switched on, nothing but that, but it will take some time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Mr. Trofimov. You said that the aircraft that flew over, or came close to, Canadian airspace were Tupolev Tu-95s, often known as Bears. I assume that these planes are equipped with the latest GPS technology.

With a GPS, can you come within a few centimetres of Canadian airspace without really entering it? Do those planes have that technology?

Please answer quickly because I have three other questions to ask you.

[Dmitry Trofimov]

It's a pretty technical question, and to start with, it's definitely not my cup of tea. To be pretty clear, I've never flown any military plane, not a single time in my life. I understand they should have something like what you're talking about, definitely. If I understand you correctly, you're implying that the planes of whatever country might fly in the extreme vicinity, up to centimetres of the restricted zone of national airspace. In most cases none of the international players do that. As a matter of fact, American flights or American aircraft or NATO aircraft with, as a matter of fact, Canadian crews on board do fly in the very vicinity of St. Petersburg on a regular basis, on pretty much the same legal basis, which I've mentioned, because there are no restrictions on doing that. Naturally, we would both prefer not to have those flights at all, theoretically, but that means we'll just push ahead with the disarmament and we'll specifically focus on the bombers. Well, the Russian side has indicated many times that we are in favour of radical reductions of the bombers of, first and foremost, the Russian and American air forces, no doubt.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

For your information, Tupolevs are equipped with extremely accurate equipment that allows them to fly very close to the border.

Is it possible that these flights are taking place to test the efficiency of the NORAD response? That was a very common tactic a few years ago. By coming close to Canadian airspace, is Russia looking to go back to that approach in order to test the NORAD response?

[Dmitry Trofimov]

Well, once again, I've specifically mentioned the so-called principle of reciprocity, which is one of the basic principles in international relations. If we're talking about flights in international airspace that are very close to the national airspace, then naturally we should put at the bargaining table all the active participants of those international military flights, participants from all the countries that are engaged. That includes the States, Canada, France, and the U.K. That, I would say, would be a proper discussion. I think so. Otherwise, it would be rather difficult to focus on the Russian side. Besides, since we haven't heard even a single remark from Washington but for the above-mentioned statement made by the head of NORAD, the American general, which was, as you might indicate, pretty positive, it means a very simple thing. It means that both sides are very much aware of normal training or activities of the opposite side.

There's one more important aspect, if I may, just for you to understand in that particular case why Russians do those flights. A very brief answer is operational efficiency, reliability, and international responsibility. I will explain what I have stated. I've recently glanced at the--

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I have to interrupt you, because I will not be able to ask my questions otherwise. I am going to ask them one after the other, and, if you do not have time to answer—the chair is telling me that I have two minutes left, in fact—I would appreciate a written response. Is that possible?

It is said that Russia is spreading its wings internationally at present to show its military capabilities, not just in the air and in space, but at sea as well. People say that Russia wants to demonstrate its great military prowess, that its period of decline is now in the past and it wants to be seen as a world power once more. I would like to know your views on that.

For my second question, I would like to know if, in your opinion, the fact that this incident took place on the day before the American president's visit was a coincidence, and if so, why? If it was not a coincidence, I would like to know what Russia's intentions were.

Finally, some Canadian political commentators are telling us that the Conservative government wants to increase its military presence in the Arctic and that, in order to do so, it has to show that a formidable adversary is periodically testing our borders. What do you think of that statement?

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

You have 30 seconds, Mr. Trofimov.

[Dmitry Trofimov]

Okay.

As for whether it was a coincidence, naturally it was nothing but a coincidence. It was not a strong coincidence, but it was nothing but a coincidence, because it's a budget issue for the military on either side. It's a preplanned thing for a year or half a year before that. It's the same way the Canadian military works, absolutely the same.

With regard to the second part of your question, being a foreign diplomat and therefore being a guest of Canada, I'd rather refrain from speculating on the domestic reasons of the Government of Canada.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

Ms. Black.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for appearing at our committee today. We appreciate your time.

In your opening comments, you mentioned, and your own military sources have been quoted as saying, that these flights are routine training missions and that Canada is routinely notified in advance. As you also mentioned, the American general from NORAD said they were notified. But Canadian sources, including a member of this Standing Committee on National Defence, have disputed this and have said that Canada was not informed in advance. I'm rather perplexed by this contradiction. It seems to me that it's a matter of fact and we should be able to straighten that out. It's kind of concerning that there's such a breakdown in communication between Canada and Russia at the diplomatic end or at the military level.

Could you tell us the process that occurs on your end, the Russian end, to notify the Canadian government before one of these flights occurs, in terms of how far in advance this notification is sent, from what department it's sent, and from what level of that department the notification is sent? What form does this notification take? Also, what steps, if any, are taken to ensure that the notification has been received at the other end?

I have another question, so I'd appreciate it if you'd give me enough time to give you that question as well. Thank you.

[Dmitry Trofimov]

Thank you.

Point number one is that the Russian side hasn't stated that Canada specifically was given the notification. It has been stated several times that the countries adjacent to the flight path were notified. My reading of this statement--because I know how it works--is very simple. We've already discussed it. We have the so-called nuclear risk reduction centres, where the States, according to the bilateral 1987 agreement.... We have the START I Treaty, which contains the specific notification protocol. When it comes to the military flights, as I mentioned from the very beginning, there are no other international instruments that make it obligatory for either of the sides to share this information with other parties, so all this information goes straight to the States.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

It goes to NORAD?

[Dmitry Trofimov]

Actually, it's not obligatory that it go to NORAD. When I say the States, I mean Washington.

As far as NORAD is concerned, those confidence- and security-building measures that we—by “we” I mean the international community first and foremost, the States and then the Soviet Union—started elaborating in the early 1970s eventually included some non-obligatory steps, which are still being undertaken on both sides, that might include NORAD as well. As a matter of fact, we recently had bilateral military staff talks with Canada. They were on January 21 here in Ottawa. The Canadian side specifically raised the issue of those notifications, but in only one particular respect. They expressed gratitude on behalf of NORAD, for sharing notifications of the flights with NORAD. We were not obliged to do that, but still we did that.

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you very much.

So it may be that Canada wasn't specifically notified, then.

[Dmitry Trofimov]

No.