National Defence Committee on May 6th, 2010

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

I call the meeting to order.

I'd like to welcome you to the Standing Committee on National Defence, meeting 15. We are continuing our review and study of the role of Canadian soldiers in international peace operations after 2011.

With us today, from the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations, is Jocelyn Coulon, the director; and as an individual, we have Douglas Bland, chair of the defence studies program at the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University.

Mr. Bland, I understand, is going to start. You have about five to seven minutes each, gentlemen, and then we'll go into the first round, starting with the official opposition. Depending on how many questions there are, we will probably go a couple of rounds.

Mr. Bland, it's yours.

[Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair, Defence Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I have a few written notes that I will use, and then I will be very keen to join your discussion and answer your questions.

If I turn to my notes, my first point for the committee is that a study of the future of peace operations that begins from the premise that peace operations or peacekeeping are military operations distinct from war-fighting sets up a false dichotomy that may diminish the study's influence in the formulation of Canada's future defence policies.

Peace operations and peacekeeping operations are forms of warfare in which, as in all the other forms of warfare, means and tactics are adapted to meet the needs of particular circumstances. To set these operations outside the realities of warfare confuses policy and defence planning, and raises unrealistic expectations in our community. As we have seen in the Afghanistan campaign, these confusions can hinder the operations of the Canada Forces in the field and harm Canada's national security.

Scholars have long described warfare as occurring along a spectrum of conflict. At the lowest end, one might place unstable peace or ceasefires during conflicts. At the high end, we find total war with few limitations on the scale or ferocity of operations.

Examples of operations conducted at the low end of the spectrum include the large deployment of the United Nations into the Middle East in 1956, an operation that is still ongoing; and into Cyprus in 1964, an operation that is also still continuing. In both cases, lightly armed forces were deployed in situations where the likelihood of the UN becoming involved in armed conflict was very low.

At the high end of spectrum, we find the world wars, and along the length of the spectrum we find so-called limited wars, for instance in Korea in 1950; and in the Middle East in 1956, 1967, and 1973, and in Lebanon, for instance, more recently.

All wars, as defined by their particular characteristics, can be placed here or there along the spectrum of conflict.

Wars that share particular characteristics often assume particular modes of conduct and tactics. For instance, urban warfare, guerrilla warfare, revolutionary warfare, and civil warfare have their own defining characteristics and, thus, often their own defining modes of operations and combat. However, they are all wars by general definition. They have their own grammar, but not their own logic. In other words, they are identified by their particular means and modes, not as operations set aside from the general circumstances and demands of warfare.

Thus, peacekeeping and peace operations, too, are not distinct from warfare. Rather, they are another type of military operation. They have their own grammar and they have their own logic.

When we assume today that peace operations are not warfare because they occur in particular circumstances under the direction of international authorities and use particular tactics and modes of operations, we make a serious error. Moreover, when we assume that all future peace operations must be stuffed into the configurations of the operations of the 1950s and 1960s, then we make a dangerous error as well.

Let me support these remarks with two illustrations from Canadian military operations during the period 1990 to 2010. The Canadian Forces were deployed in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 under a UN blue flag, and were equipped for that mission on the assumption that it was a peacekeeping operation. Our combat units arrived in theatre with a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition per member, and in white painted vehicles. They almost immediately came under fire from well-equipped local forces. For 10 years these units attempted to conduct peacekeeping operations in the midst of a conventional war. The Liberal government of the day refused to acknowledge this fact and sacrificed the lives of 25 soldiers, and created scores of seriously wounded casualties as a result.

Today the Canadian Forces are involved in a war in Afghanistan. At the unit level, this is as deadly a war as any we have fought around the world, and it is conducted with every conventional weapon the Canadian Forces own. Yet in the midst of this war, Canadian soldiers and public servants serving the Government of Canada are conducting complex peace operations—development and humanitarian missions, for example. Our Afghan mission cannot be labelled as either a war or a peace operation; rather, it is a conflict mission we are waging with the means and methods appropriate to the circumstances.

The questions that this committee is addressing and the recommendations that it will make are important, but a study aimed at influencing future defence policies that reaches conclusions based on the notion that peace operations are separate and distinct from warfare may seem incredible, and thus be set aside by defence planners.

The international environment in which the Canadian Forces can expect to operate in the future will not allow for the deployment of peacekeeping forces not prepared at the outset for the rigours of combat among people in disintegrating states and communities.

I would hope that the committee would break from past attempts to separate peacekeeping missions from warfare and be the first to boldly alert Canadians to the operational realities and limitations of what I call third-generation UN missions--warfare by another name--and to the dangers these conflicts present to the men and women of the Canadian Forces.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Thank you, Mr. Bland, for your remarks. We do have copies of your submission.

Mr. Coulon, you have seven minutes in which to make your presentation.

[Jocelyn Coulon, Director, Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, this committee is of course reviewing the role of Canadian servicemen and women in peacekeeping operations post-2011. I have a couple of ideas that I would like to propose, as well as a few suggestions to make not only about how peacekeeping operations have evolved, but also about what Canada could in fact take on, whether it be in Africa or in other theatres of operations.

However, to begin with I think that it is important to make a number of distinctions—Douglas Bland stressed this point in his brief. Peacekeeping operations are only a component of today's broader peace operations which include conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peace-making and peacebuilding. Along this spectrum, there is also traditional peacekeeping, which is what Canadians have been used to for the past 50 or so years.

These peace operations, Mr. Chair, have got considerably bigger, to the extent that they are unlike anything we have seen over the past 65 years. Twenty years ago there were 12 peacekeeping operations globally; 11 of which were led by the United Nations, and one other by a multi-national force based out of Sinai in between Egypt and Israel. Now, as I described in my written brief, nowadays peace operations run the whole gamut including 40 peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding missions spread out over 5 continents, including 200,000 peacekeepers, 6 international and regional organizations, and 2 coalitions, which currently play a role in these missions, billions of dollars for the reconstruction of fragile states and to provide a fresh start for the people of 23 countries located primarily in Africa, with a success rate commended by most researchers and research centres, including RAND Corporation and the Human Security Report.

The reason why today's peace operations have become so popular among decision-makers as conflict management and resolution tools is that they have been fine-tuned over the years and produce results. There are a number of activities included under the mandates of today's peace operations including confidence building, arresting war criminals, creating or strengthening state structures, disarmament and mine clearance, reintegrating child soldiers, protecting civilians including women and children, reforming the security sector, etc.

In fact, the success of peace operations is increasingly on the radar screen, taken into account even by a number of western countries that had more or less dismissed them in the 1990s. A number of concrete examples attest to this growing confidence. In 2006, seven European nations, including big countries like France, Germany, Italy and Spain, came to support the mission in Lebanon, and on their conditions, I should point out Mr. Chair, which is important for Canada on a go-forward basis. In September 2009, during an unprecedented meeting in the history of the United Nations, the U.S. President spoke directly to those countries that provide the UN with contingents and promised them that the United States would remain committed. And then, in February 2010, the new British Defence Green Book stressed that "the exceptional role that the UN plays in terms of international architecture, peacebuilding, and security and governance, is more important than ever".

So for the past five years, there have been many western countries that have begun to consider a return to the peace operations model, or have actually taken the leap and are taking part in UN, NATO, European Union, and OSCE-led operations. They are supporting peace operations conducted by the African Union and other regional organizations.

I will speed up. As you know—and Douglas pointed this out in his testimony—the 1990s were tough in terms of peacekeeping operations. There were mistakes and disasters, and we often forget the success stories. I was a journalist for 20 years. And as you are aware, honourable members, journalists write bad news stories because people don't want to read about good news stories. There is good news to report as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned. Of the 120 peacekeeping missions led by various international organizations over a 20-year period, the overwhelming majority were a success. We therefore need to remind our political decision-makers, the public, and researchers, of this.

What does that mean for Canada? I think that if you were to look at the way the Europeans negotiated their return to the UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006, you would realize that a number of criteria were set enabling the French, Italians, Germans, and others, to deploy their forces safely. Of course, a peace operation will never be a war operation. I understand the distinction that my colleague is making and I also understand the definition of war. However, peace operations follow the rules set out by members of international organizations, in agreement with the various parties. Let me come back to my core idea, and that is that most of these peace operations actually work.

And so, given the reforms carried out at the United Nations in the past 10 to 15 years, and more specifically, in light of what we call robust peacekeeping, which permits France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, to deploy tanks, aircraft, helicopters, and ships to Lebanon to carry out the UNIFIL mandate, I do believe that this is a new era for peace operations. They are not like Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, and the old peacekeeping missions.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair—and I will respond to questions that you may have—I believe that Canada has acquired an exceptional reputation and experience in Afghanistan. Now, it is true that we have lost 140 soldiers. And yet, we should be very proud of what Canadians have accomplished in Afghanistan, for our security, for the security of NATO, and for the world. On the strength of the nearly 10 years of combat experience, relationships with the people, and of the interoperability with our allies on the ground, I do believe that now Canadian soldiers are well equipped to participate in peace operations, whether it be in the Congo or elsewhere in the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Merci, Monsieur Coulon, pour votre présentation.

We will go to the first round. I would remind members to put their questions through the chair.

Mr. Dosanjh, for seven minutes.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Bland and Mr. Coulon. You both raise very interesting issues. What I get from both of you, if I could combine the two presentations, is that it is a field where there is much less agreement than we would like to have on what a peace mission or a peace operation might look like in the next 10, 15, or 20 years, and what Canada should do.

You can't have a definition that's etched in stone. I realize that. Every mission is different. As Mr. Bland eloquently said, every mission has its own “grammar”. But can you tell us how our construction of a mission, or any missions, in the next five or ten years might be impacted by our experience in Afghanistan? We've lost 143 lives, and there is a certain feeling in the country, as you argue, that no peace mission is without danger. In any peace mission, you can always lose lives, and I recognize that.

So can you take a leap five or ten years hence and see what might happen?

[Dr. Douglas Bland]

Let me respond to the first remarks, Mr. Chair.

In my academic business—my military business was another period--we like to begin, as I'm sure Jocelyn will agree, with a definition of the terms we're using. What we've never been able to do, in my view, is find anybody who could settle down and tell us what peacekeeping was and keep to that definition for very long. We call them peacekeeping missions, or peace operations, or muscular peacekeeping. We keep running around trying to find a definition. That suggests to me that we are trying to define something that perhaps is too difficult to define, because it always changes in the circumstances.

That's why, in my own view and that of lots of people, especially members of the Canadian Forces, peacekeeping is assumed to be warfare, and has the conditions of warfare, and the circumstances, and they will change right in front of your face, as they did in Cypress in 1974, when the little peacekeeping force came under attack by the Turks. They killed a friend of mine, a Canadian Forces officer, in that operation. The morning was quiet, and he was dead by the afternoon.

So when we look at the experience in Afghanistan and other places, since the end of the Cold War, especially in Bosnia, the people who led the Canadian Forces...and are leading the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan are young officers trained and experienced in the former Yugoslavia. Rick Hillier, Andy Leslie, Mike Jeffery--all these people grew up in those circumstances, when Canadians didn't understand it but they did. And when they went to the next operation, they said, “We're not doing that again.”

So I would think that the policy and the plans that military officers in Canada will put forward will be to say that peacekeeping is warfare, and that's the first assumption; that we'll adjust the needs of the deployment to the circumstances of the mission, either a lot of stuff or not so much stuff, but we're going to go there with the assumption that we're in a dangerous environment; that we need logistics support and can't depend on allies to provide for our logistics support and so on; that we need our own rules of engagement, our own weapons and so on; and that if, when we arrive there, it's kind of benign, well, the commanders will stand down a bit.

It's very hard, as we learned in Bosnia, to go on a mission and then call back home and say, “We need more than six rounds of ammunition here. People are trying to kill us.”

I think the general remark to your question, then, is that people are going to assume that the operations they go on are military combat operations, and that operational effectiveness--i.e., “Will it work in conflict?”--is the first question they will ask you.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Mr. Coulon, do you want to add to that? I'm interested, because you show that these operations have in fact expanded, contrary to popular belief, and you referenced Afghanistan at the end, and also Lebanon.

Can you tell us what you think missions might look like and how they might be constructed?

[Jocelyn Coulon]

Mr. Chair, I agree in part with my colleague Doug's definition, but I do not want any generalizations to be made regarding peace operations. There are dangerous peace operations, and we know which ones they are. When the United Nations Security Council or other organizations adopt a military posture on the ground, they go to great lengths of course to provide soldiers and servicemen and women with as much protection as is possible in a peace operation.

Now, I would like to stress the fact that not all peace operations are characterized by the violence we have seen in Rwanda, Bosnia, and other theatres of operations. As I said earlier, there have been studies of 120 peace operations over a 20-year period. And based on our calculations, roughly 10% to 20% of these operations were somewhat violent in nature. The overwhelming majority of these operations therefore were conducted with the consent of the parties involved and with lightly-armed military forces akin to those we have been used to seeing for many years.

Now, of course, the UN, having learned that things can change rather quickly, such as in Cyprus in 1974 or in Bosnia in the 1990s, endowed its soldiers with a certain robustness—if you'll pardon the expression—not only in their conduct, but also by providing them with certain military materiel and equipment.

I do believe that as the committee considers the notion of peace operations, it must keep in mind the full spectrum of peace operations.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our two guests who are leaders in this area, Mr. Bland and Mr. Coulon, whose report I read after it was presented to us about a month ago. I must tell you that you are making quite a substantial contribution to this committee's work. I think that we are getting off on the right foot by listening to you and your suggestions. My questions are for both of you.

In a previous debate, we decided to do something about peacekeeping missions. Members began the conversation by asking whether we were dealing with peacekeeping, or peacebuilding. I find your way of making those distinctions original.

Yes, there still are peacekeeping missions. And yes, there will surely be a lot of peace enforcement missions too. And, there will be peacebuilding missions. I wonder if, as we look at the problem as a whole, it might be useful to develop a whole series of toolboxes, if you will, so that when considering a particular conflict, we can say, well, here is what we have available to us under this particular mandate. The international community could indicate that the NATO mandate should be used to carry out a particular type of mission, or the European Union mandate for another type of mission. So, that would be your first toolbox.

Naturally, I would like to hear what you have to say about the UN reform. It is not normal that the Security Council should have to sometimes take years to respond to a conflict where hundreds of thousands of people are being killed. And so, in my opinion, there will be no progress on this until the UN is reformed.

Now, the doctrines would constitute another toolkit. We could look at the array of existing doctrines, and also those new ones that are coming to the fore. And I would also like to hear your thoughts about the duty to protect. We could add that to the array of actual services we provide, by saying that we can no longer wait for the UN or NATO. Canada would intervene by itself under its duty to protect. This is a doctrine which has not been fully fleshed out, and that the UN has not really fully delved into.

As far as the rules of engagement are concerned, they could be adapted. You're not talking about the same types of rules of engagement for peacekeeping missions as you are for a peace enforcement mission. How should we address the matter of rules of engagement when the various national parliaments that are taking part in the operation are free to set the rules of engagement?

And finally, when it comes to component parts, I think that the UN is currently making an effort to tack on the civilian component. I believe that it was you, Mr. Coulon, who recommended a unified command. When I say “civilian”, that means that the other components are the military or police. I think that it would be difficult to convince the military that a civilian could direct the operation. I would like to hear your opinion on that. It is true that currently there is a civilian coordinator, often from the UN, but generally speaking the command on the ground is in the hands of the army and the military forces rather than the police.

I may have jumped around a bit, but let me sum up. Who do we get the mandates from? When it comes to doctrines, I would like to hear what you have to say about the duty to protect. How do we address the matter of the rules of engagement? Given the various components at play, is a unified command the best way or is there another way of coordinating between the various groups, the military, police and civilians?

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Gentlemen, I'll ask for some succinct answers, as you have about three minutes.

[A voice]

Three minutes each.

[Dr. Douglas Bland]

I think it's a seminar, actually.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Well, I was going to thank the guest speaker, but....

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Three minutes.

[Jocelyn Coulon]

I'll start, and I think Doug could answer on the doctrinal aspect and perhaps on the rules of engagement. I'm not military, and I think he has a better understanding of that than I have.

So I will make my comments in French.

First, I would like to remind all MPs that, during a peacekeeping operation, most of the time—95%, I believe—a civilian is the one heading the overall peacekeeping operation. That person is called the secretary general's special representative for the Western Sahara, Congo, or Ivory Coast. In short, that individual who heads the overall operation and who is responsible for the various civilian, civilian and military police components is traditionally a diplomat.

Then, you have the second in command, the force commander. This individual will direct all of the peacekeepers or European Union military or other international organizations staff. For over 10 years, that is how the United Nations has operated, to the satisfaction of member states, who have a very clear chain of command.

I want to come back to the Security Council reform. I believe that your question implied that the Security Council takes too long to make a decision regarding a peacekeeping operation and, as a result, it needs to be reformed. The question does not concern the reform; it concerns the political will of members of the Security Council. Be they 15, 20 or 25 members, if they lack the political will to do something, nothing will happen. It is not just the UN, it is not the UN secretary general who makes the call to deploy armed forces.

This has an impact on another of your questions which was the following: If the UN can do nothing, can Canada do anything? Can Canada, on its own, deploy forces? I would note that, in 1996, Canada launched an operation in Zaire to try to save millions of individuals. This operation was a failure for all kinds of reasons that would take too long to explain. Canada does not have the means to do this.

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

I'll ask Mr. Bland for a very short intervention. I'm sure we'll be able to come back to these in the next round.

[Dr. Douglas Bland]

I'll work them in someplace, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Thank you very much.

[Dr. Douglas Bland]

The first principle--with which I'm sure all the members here, along with the members of the government and the House of Commons and the Senate, and most Canadians, will agree--in consideration of any of these kinds of things, in any deployment, is the safety of the members of the Canadian armed forces.

That's not to say that they're going to go in someplace and hide out and stay inside the wire, so to speak. They just won't do that.

But we don't want, ever again, to deploy forces as we did into the former Yugoslavia, where they'll be subject to harm, danger; notify their superiors about that; and be left there on their own. So that's the first consideration.

As to rules for going on missions, if you read through all the white papers since 1947, and period statements on defence, and so on, you'll see in all of those papers a set of conditions that must be met before the Canadian Forces can be deployed on peacekeeping operations. We never used them. We have never followed those; or maybe a little bit here, a little bit there. All of these decisions are taken in the circumstances.

Finally, as for civil-military command and so on.... These are loaded words; “command” for sure is. Certainly senior military officers have to cooperate with civilian authority. So the civilian authority that directs Canadian operations overseas is the Prime Minister, and the cabinet, and the government, and, more largely, the Parliament of Canada.

But before we go down that road too far, you have to understand--and I'm not assuming that people don't understand, Mr. Chair—that command arrangements in Canada are directed by the law. There's the National Defence Act, and orders and statements to the Canadian Forces must be passed through the CDS and so on. So you would have to adjust the law and you'd have to do these other things.

What I teach at school when we talk about public administration and defence administration and so is that there's a thing called “administrator's delusion.” The administrator's delusion is the assumption that if you get the process right, the outcomes will be right. So we spend all our time talking about the process, hoping to find the magic way to make decisions and to run operations so that these things come out well.

Well, it is a delusion. You have to have people, including politicians and public servants and military officers, who can adjust sensibly to the conditions they find themselves in when we deploy people overseas.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bryon Wilfert]

Thank you very much. Around here, we call it “political” delusion.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!