National Defence Committee on May 11th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Good morning everyone. I would now like to call the 16th meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence to order. In accordance with Standing Order 108, we continue our examination of the role of Canadian soldiers in international peace operations after 2011.

We have the pleasure of having with us Ms. Mia Vukojevic, from Oxfam Canada.

I want to thank you for being with us. You have the floor for five to ten minutes, and after that the members will be able to have a discussion with you. Thank you very much for being with us this morning.

[Mia Vukojevic, Manager, Humanitarian Programs, Humanitarian Unit, Oxfam Canada]

Good morning, everybody. I would like to thank the committee for inviting me and Oxfam to come to talk to you today.

As you know, Oxfam has many years of experience in working in conflict situations alongside international peace operations and missions, as well as alongside the Canadian military in conflict and in disasters. Just some of the examples are Sri Lanka post-tsunami, for disasters; Pakistan, after the earthquake in 2005; Haiti now; but also the big conflicts in the Balkans, and so on.

I currently work as the manager of humanitarian programs for Oxfam Canada. I have 20 years of experience in humanitarian work. I started doing it in the country I originally came from, Croatia, where I witnessed the work of the Canadian military in 1992-93 to 1995.

I hope my presence here will be valuable to the topic you're looking into, but I think it's important that I state that my presentation and my opinions are coming from a particular perspective, which is the perspective of a humanitarian development organization and the issues we are looking into. My presentation, and probably the answers I'll be able to give to your questions, will be closely related to my experiences.

In the introductory statement, I would like to address basically two issues, which are provision of humanitarian assistance by military in general and by the Canadian military, and protection of civilians in conflict.

It will not come as a surprise to you that Oxfam Canada as a humanitarian NGO believes that the military, including the Canadian military, should have a limited role in provision of humanitarian assistance outside Canada.

We believe the Canadian military should be engaging in providing humanitarian assistance only as a matter of last resort, and that's because that's how it is defined in international humanitarian law, because of differences in the missions that militaries have, because of cost efficiency—because there are huge differences in how costly humanitarian assistance provided by military organizations is— effectiveness, understanding of local culture, and so on.

I will not stay longer on any of these. If you have questions about them, I'm happy to provide examples and elaborate.

I think Canadian military should be engaging in providing humanitarian assistance by using its unique capability strategically. When I say this, I mean such things as that, instead of providing parcels to displaced people, the Canadian military has capacities that no other civilian organization has, such as heavy lifting, infrastructure repairs, logistical capacities, and so on; that provision of humanitarian assistance by Canadian military should be done with clear humanitarian direction and in coordination with other humanitarian actors, rather than on its own; and that it should be time-limited. As soon as civilian actors, primarily and preferably the local government, are able to provide humanitarian assistance, the Canadian military should reduce its engagement. This should also stand the case for international humanitarian agencies, of course.

As I said, I think Canada should develop its logistical lift, search and rescue, and similar capacities to supplement capacities of Canadian NGOs and other Canadian government departments and in such a way maximize Canada's contribution to humanitarian efforts around the world in the most cost-efficient and effective way.

On protection, as a humanitarian organization Oxfam believes that all civilian men and women caught in humanitarian crises, regardless whether it is a conflict or humanitarian disaster, should be assured both assistance and protection. Those are two axes of humanitarianism globally: assistance and protection regardless of who they are, regardless of their political belief, what side they are on in conflict, and so on—as long as they're civilians.

Protection of civilians, however, has been an area that has been eluding the diplomatic missions, the international community in general, UN peacekeeping missions, humanitarian organizations—everybody. We have not performed really well in terms of providing protection of civilians historically.

To this day, while assistance is being provided now with reasonable speed and quality, protection is still a major issue. Just look at the Democratic Republic of Congo, camps in Darfur, Haiti, and so on.

Traditional peacekeeping operations, for example, up until the late nineties didn't even have protection of civilians in their mandate. Only starting in 1999 have most of them had protection of civilians as a part of their mandate. But even when they do, there are all sorts of caveats to it in terms of what they can do and the different terms they use to limit it and restrict it.

The traditional peacekeeping missions with a UN mandate are still highly improvised, basically tools for conflict management. We do it when we don't know what else to do and when it seems as though it may work. But then we don't provide sufficient resources, tools, and skills for people who are doing peacekeeping operations, and then—especially for them—in terms of protecting civilians in those operations.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made efforts to improve, to provide better tools, more clarity, sufficient resources, etc. While progress has been made, there is still a long way to go. Ultimately, United Nations peacekeeping operations still represent a uniquely legitimate international mechanism for protection of all civilians in a polarized world. While they're not perfect, Oxfam believes they're still the best we have.

We believe that UN peace operations that focus on the protection of civilians should be considered as an option for engagement of the Canadian military after 2011, and I would like to stress “United Nations peace operations” in that regard.

Peacekeeping can still be a vital tool, one among many, alongside diplomacy, pressure, sanctions, assistance, and so on, for making sure that civilians are safe in conflict. To be effective in this, Canadian soldiers will need to be sent to the right places at the right time with the right missions and the right tools, and they'll have to work closely with humanitarians and local communities, each bringing its distinct competencies.

As UN peace operations require further rethinking and reinvestment, and the UN is currently undergoing the process of doing so—I'm not sure whether you're aware of the “New Horizon” project that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is undertaking—the Government of Canada should engage with this process to ensure that the system has improved by the end of 2011.

We believe that with Canada's history in peacekeeping and its reputation internationally as an impartial and credible player in all sorts of conflict, Canada can influence the current process whereby the United Nations is trying to reform the way they do peacekeeping operations and make them more effective, more efficient, more strategic, and so on, so that the Canadian military can then be engaged with fewer failed operations.

We believe that the focus on protection of civilians will enable the Canadian military to focus on its distinct competencies and get away from competing with humanitarian agencies in distributing food and water. Rather, it will complement what civilian agencies are able to do in terms of protection of civilians—but that's very limited—and it could be playing on its strengths in that regard.

I would just like to end by saying that my first contact with the Canadian military was in September 1993 in Croatia, in Medak Pocket. I'm not sure how many of you know of that operation. I went in there as an interpreter for the European Union, to where Canadians, in spite of the terrible mission given to them by the United Nations—a lack of resources, inappropriate tools, an inappropriate decision-making mechanism and everything, were able to do the right thing and try to protect civilians.

These are the kinds of examples in which I think we can make a huge difference.

Thank you.

I think I'm on the wrong channel. I'm hearing French from it; I apologize—also for not speaking French. I take being an immigrant and a new Canadian as an excuse. I'm working on it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you.

The first question will be in English by Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome. Many of us here are accused of being on the wrong channel from time to time, so don't feel too bad.

In the report For a Safer Tomorrow: Protecting civilians in a multipolar world, Oxfam highlights particularly the 2005 UN world summit dealing with the issue of responsibility to protect civilians. Can you comment, from that summit five years ago and the issue of conflict management, on how you see Canada playing a constructive role in terms of better coordinating both the NGO component and the military component to live up to the summit goals of 2005?

[Mia Vukojevic]

For me there are two questions there. One is about responsibility to protect in general, as an international tool that we all have. Then there's the question about how Canada can better coordinate the humanitarian assistance in its military efforts.

For Oxfam the responsibility to protect was a valuable tool that should have been taken more seriously by the United Nations and by at least some of the main governmental contributors. The main value we see in it is that it doesn't look just at any of the individual phases or tools that are in our repertoire for conflict management but looks at the whole spectrum and puts a great emphasis on prevention, strengthening the capacity, and building the institutional capacities and the civil society in advance too, in order to prevent the conflict.

However, originally it was sometimes seen as just focusing on the military intervention bit. We've done a lot of work in trying to get away from that, to educate civil society and populations. Alongside lots of other NGOs we saw it as a useful tool.

The 2005 statement of the United Nations was seen as a huge step ahead in recognizing the responsibility to protect as a legitimate tool and also in recognizing its broad scope. However, we've seen several cases since then in which the responsibility to protect has been invoked in situations to which actually it wouldn't apply. That creates even more confusion and resistance in countries that were resistant to it to start with, because they see it as infringement of their sovereignty.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the government has indicated that they want everyone out within a year. Internationally we have a responsibility under the right to protect, if we go back to the 2005 document, and yet we are going to really abrogate that responsibility. You have a difficulty, if you have a sovereign government instructing the international community to basically get out for its own interests while at the same time we pay at least lip service to this right to protect, yet see mass rapes and mass murders going on, particularly in the eastern Congo.

How do we reconcile the issues of national sovereignty with the issues of the international obligation under the right to protection, if in fact we believe it is paramount?

[Mia Vukojevic]

It's not an easy question, and I don't pretend I know the answer. The responsibility to protect speaks about not waiting for the moment, like the one in DRC, in which the government invokes its sovereignty, but working alongside them, supporting them or putting pressure on them to avoid moments like this.

Also, the responsibility to protect has lost some of its credibility, because some important international governments and players have left it and have stopped talking about the responsibility to protect and putting their weight behind it. This all undermines the idea that sovereignty is limited and that civilians and the populations of the country have rights, and that these rights include the right to not be exposed to violence, and that the state is ultimately the first responsible to protect its own civilians.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

It reminds me that when the forces of Julius Nyerere, at the time President of Tanzania, invaded Uganda to oust Idi Amin, African leaders publicly denounced the Tanzanian government and privately congratulated him—hypocrisy gone wild, of course. He was going in basically on the issue of the responsibility to protect, although it wasn't around then but was obviously an issue, and at the same time that the hypocrisy that “we want to deal with sovereignty” was paramount.

[Mia Vukojevic]

If you'll allow me, I believe that has changed somewhat, that internationally there is an understanding that sovereignty is about not just the rights of states but also the responsibility of states to their citizens, and in that way it is limited.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

We could still use the example of Cambodia, when the Vietnamese were denounced for invading. There are many examples. It's not an easy issue.

You had talked about the right time, the right tools, and the right mission with regard to the Canadian military.

[Mia Vukojevic]

I don't know what those are, but I do believe that the Canadian military, with its years of experience, and the Department of Foreign Affairs, with the number of missions we have gone to and participated in, would actually be able to help the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop the right tools and figure out what the right times are and what the right missions would be.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

And that would mean better coordination among NGOs in Canada, the Canadian government, the Canadian military, etc.

[Mia Vukojevic]

Exactly.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Do you envision a kind of structure that would help facilitate that kind of execution?

[Mia Vukojevic]

I think some of the models the Canadian government has engaged around Sudan, with the Sudan task force and similar ones, have worked reasonably well. I know that most of the participation at those tables, at least originally when I was involved in 2004 and 2005, was from CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs. I think the Ministry of Defence should be, and I think now is, engaged more closely in that coordination mechanism.

Basically, my whole theory is that we should be using the strategic strengths of different arms of the Government of Canada to do the things they do best in order to make the most effective contribution to peace or humanitarianism in the world.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

I will now turn the floor over to Mr. Bachand for seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to begin by apologizing to Mr. Wilfert. Last week, he read a statement in French, which I didn't fully understand. I jokingly said that I would like a translation. I just want Mr. Wilfert to know that I appreciate his efforts to speak French. I hope he continues to make an effort, even though he has problems at times, which is totally understandable. I promised him that I would apologize, and so I have.

Welcome, Ms. Vukojevic. I hope you are well. Everyone has agreed on the meaning of “peace keeping”. There are several different types of peace operations, namely peace keeping, and peace building. In my opinion, the two principles are quite different. In the case of Afghanistan, our operations fall more into the category of peace building. Our military is helping to build the peace much more than it is helping to keep the peace. Peace keeping implies that the various parties have reached an agreement, that our military's sole role is to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Our soldiers have been deployed to Afghanistan on a peace building mission, because there is no peace. That is quite different. I'd like to hear your thoughts on the subject.

How do groups like Oxfam interact with Canadian Forces? Soldiers often tell us that NGOs such as yours would never be able to offer appropriate services without their protection. Others feel that providing humanitarian aid is not really the role of the military. What role do you believe Oxfam and other NGOs should be playing in a hostile environment like Afghanistan, where soldiers are engaged in peace building, not peace keeping, operations?

[Mia Vukojevic]

Thank you for your question, a highly pertinent question I was hoping to avoid.

Situations like Afghanistan are really hard for us, as I believe they are for the Canadian military. I believe the militaries are not necessarily the best placed nor do they have the required skills and capacities on their own to build peace. While I think they have a role to play in building the peace, I think there are distinct capacities--peacekeeping, peacemaking. And as I'm not a military expert, you can discard my opinion. But I think the militaries have a role to play in peacebuilding efforts, Afghanistan being one of the hardest environments. There are other examples of situations where the peace operations and peace missions have worked really well by combining the efforts of humanitarian organizations, national governments, national civil society, development efforts, institutional support to the government to build peace jointly.

I think with the way conflict has been developing--with fewer and fewer international conflicts and more conflicts within the countries where one group of people has as legitimate a right to that country as the other group of people in that country, and they are fighting between themselves, it becomes even harder for us to do development, as it does for the Canadian military to build peace in those circumstances.

So to sum up, the way I see it, it should be a much broader effort than the military's effort, and I think the role of the military in terms of peacebuilding should be to provide a secure environment so other players can perform the roles for which they have the distinct competencies. When the Canadian military says NGOs wouldn't be able to provide assistance if it wasn't for the military, the usual NGO response is that if they were able to secure the environment, we wouldn't have a problem providing assistance. This is the circular argument we get into in the field all the time.

I hope that answers your question.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

So then, you're admitting that they have a role to play. Afghanistan is an extremely hostile environment. It is hard to tell these people that they are responsible and that if they had security safely under control and if they secured the perimeters, your presence might not be required. The two seem to go hand in hand in a hostile environment. As I see it, neither Oxfam nor any other NGO would be able to operate freely in an environment like Afghanistan without military protection.

It is true that you play a complementary role. My second question has to do with that very role.

Does Oxfam normally advise the Commander of the Canadian military on the type of operation to conduct and on where operations should be conducted? Conversely, does the military inform you of the type of operation it plans to carry out so that you can remain in a secure area? In other words, do you maintain a bilateral relationship, that is, do you keep each other informed of your activities?

[Mia Vukojevic]

I think over the years we did get much better in terms of communicating and coordinating at the headquarters level. At the field level, it's very different, depending on the situation. In environments that you call “hostile”, I don't think that actually happens, because while we would inform the Government of Afghanistan, local government, and the United Nations what our activities were and where we were going, I don't know that we would go directly to the military and tell them, “This is our plan for next week and these are the areas we are going to go to”.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Why not?

[Mia Vukojevic]

Afghanistan in particular, and I would say Iraq, may be the only two places where that's the case, because we have seen a deterioration of the security situation for our personnel, both international and national, since the engagement of the NATO forces and intervention in 2001. We do not have proof that these are directly related, but the staffing, the field, often tells us that association with the militaries directly fighting the Taliban makes us a legitimate target, basically, because they see us as allied with the force that they are fighting.

But I have to say, it's very different in all the other places I have been in and have worked in, from the Balkans to Sudan. In Sudan, actually, I have to tell you, in Darfur specifically, our staff has been in daily coordination, even with African Union observers initially. They were literally coordinating who was going to go where. So there was the deterrent effect of international staff being in a different position. The African mission had very few people and they were not able to cover everything, but the coordination was great. It's still happening in Sudan.

It happens in lots of missions, in more missions than you think. It's often done through the United Nations coordinating mechanisms, but as long as it works, it's for the benefit of the people.

The two exceptions, I would say, are Afghanistan and Iraq, and I am afraid that Somalia may become the third one.

[The Chair, Conservative, Maxime Bernier]

Thank you very much.

Now I will give the floor to Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you for your presentation.

I have a couple of questions. I'll start with your comment about the potential role of the military in humanitarian assistance on a limited basis and ask if you would comment from the point of view of what you saw the Canadian military do in Haiti in the first part of this year. It was a very short mission. We were out within 60 days. And we were doing something very specific. Is that the kind of mission in which you see the military playing a humanitarian role, or are there other types of things as well?