I'm saying they're not in a position to greatly influence the situation in most of the missions.
Let's use the Congo as an example. There are seven foreign armies and 11 factions currently fighting in the Congo. If we were to put a battle group in there of 1,200 or 1,400, they would be a mere drop in the bucket. It would take them days and days to go 10 or 15 kilometres during most of their movement requirements because of the lack of infrastructure.
The vast majority, to be terribly unkind but accurate... I've had soldiers from Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh under my command. The soldiers are excellent. Their countries have them there for $150 per month, per soldier, paid into their national coffers. They're a source of income for those countries. As a result their soldiers are grossly underpaid—and I've had experience with that with these soldiers. They turn to the black market, the female slave trade, prostitution, etc., all publicly announced and described in the open media. They are a commander's nightmare. At present in the Congo, with that very large force, they maybe have part of the capital under control. So that's the type of success story the UN describes.
You may go into an area where the factions want somebody to help them re-establish peace. A perfect example, and probably the best recent one, is Eritrea and Ethiopia. That was conventional chapter 6 peacekeeping. “We're tired of fighting. Please come in, interpose yourself between our two forces along a common border, and give us a chance to get some breathing space.”
So yes, we can participate in those missions. The question is, what will our influence be? Not only that, they won't request combat soldiers; they'll request logistics, communications, legal, etc. When we send those folks overseas, we can't train them back here, because you need your service battalions.