National Defence Committee on Nov. 1st, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. McKay, your time has expired.

General Vance, could you provide a very short response?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

That's the second time you've referred to a mindless task or a task that would dull the senses. I guess, I don't know which ones you mean.

The short answer is that we guard against that by continuing to invest in training, putting people in realistic scenarios that cause them.....

You were with General Bowes, who would never be one to say there is one answer to any situation. There is no one solution; there are many solutions to a problem. So giving the soldier the opportunity to practise and an opportunity for education outside of the strict training regime are things that directly affect our readiness to be able to function as a force.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Opitz.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

General, I'm going to take off from that line, because I think military education in critical thinking deserves some definition.

First of all, General, in my experience having worked for you in the past at LFCA, I've never felt particularly constrained by any ideas that I had, and I was always encouraged to step up and share.

There are lots of ways we institutionalize this in the forces, for example, at the Canadian Forces College. We also send members abroad to other war colleges to work jointly or with other military partners around the world. There is war-gaming and rock drills, and things like that. I've thrown a bunch of ideas out there, though not necessarily in order.

In terms of the continuous Canadian Forces education system, could you first of all discuss a bit about some of the courses at CFC and their role in developing critical thinking and planning through scenarios?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Thanks for the question.

Before I begin, Mr. Chair, I would like to add to the list of people we would respectfully recommend speak to your committee. There is the chief of military personnel, who manages the officer professional development and NCM professional development system. Through him investments are made in the institution, including via such places as the Canadian Forces College, our recruit school in Saint-Jean, and so on.

I would answer your question by saying that the study of warfare, like the study of so many other large human enterprises, is vast and demanding. The more we do it, the more we understand that it demands thinkers, as well as those who can take that thought and execute it appropriately. At some point you have to do something; you can only stay academic for so long. At some point, you pull the trigger.

To build an armed forces that is trying to achieve best practices in comparison with its allies, you ask what the norms are, what its country demands of it, and what are the raw materials you start with in terms of the personnel and equipment and training. All of that is something that the armed forces leadership, and some of the people I've described to you already, do every day.

The courses that we demand of future leaders--and the more senior they get, the more challenging the courses--are intended to reinforce the idea of using the tools at their disposal correctly and wisely from a technical perspective, at the same time as being able to recognize that even the best possible technical solution may be wrong for the context he or she is in. History is replete with people fighting the last war: if you had done the best cavalry charge ever, it wouldn't matter if the other guys had machine guns.

We try, with great vigour, to avoid being in that kind of a situation. We try to be innovative and to stay up with the times. We would never want to be accused, as an institution, of placing our soldiers in a situation where they were ill-prepared, or being led in the wrong way for the context at hand. We invest a great deal in our leadership, at all levels, to ensure they do it correctly.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

I would agree that some of the most ingenious people that we have in this country are Canadian soldiers. They come up with tremendous ideas and solutions on the ground.

General, in your present job, can you describe the processes you follow when you initiate a planning session? When you're given a task—task A for argument's sake—how do you initiate that planning and who are the other stakeholders you bring in to work on that?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Thank you for the question.

It's a complex process, in which there are parts, including just inside the fence, and there are others that include wider government. Generally speaking, in response to a crisis—and Haiti would be a good example here—there is an immediate connection made among the senior levels of the Canadian Forces, specifically the Chief of the Defence Staff, the minister, the deputy minister, the Privy Council, and oftentimes the Prime Minister's Office or the Prime Minister himself.

We want to act quickly and robustly to great effect, and Haiti was an example where all of those people I mentioned were involved, along with Foreign Affairs, and the consular services that had existed in Haiti. They all came together very quickly. There's an organization in Foreign Affairs called START. They're intimately involved in this sort of thing. It is made expressly clear that we are to respond, act, and create positive effects for the people.

When it comes into the department, in straight military planning, often looking at it from the perspective of all the services, it's the job of my staff and, ultimately, me to recommend to the CDS a course of action; how we might achieve that course of action; and what that course of action will cost, in terms of both straight-up resources and taking resources away from other tasks that could be ongoing. We provide the chief advice, and then provide him with the instruments with which he can order that--written rules of engagement, and so on.

The role of my staff is to try to support the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Canadian Forces in the department through all of the interlocutors to arrive at a conclusion of what we're going to do, write the orders to actually get it done, and then maintain it.

For something more deliberate, it's the same thing but only at a slower pace. Often there's consultation with Foreign Affairs and the centre of government on what we wish to do, how long we wish to stay, and so on. Once we have a decision--usually determined as a result of a minister writing a letter or getting a response--we then take it into pure military planning and put the assets together.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Your time expired two minutes ago.

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

I'm sorry. I'll try to answer more quickly. Ask easier questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Kellway.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, General Vance, for coming today.

My particular interest in your presentation revolves around what you described in the text as strategic or strategic/policy readiness. I understand that there are certain operations of a.... I don't know if I'm using the right language. I knew I had to learn French when I got this job, but I didn't know there was a whole other language I'd have to learn from this committee.

But there are certain postures that we have to maintain in a steady state over time. They don't change much, I presume, like search and rescue, and Canadians in crisis.

The notion of strategic readiness, I presume, is an evolving concept. In other words, what we're getting ready for in strategic terms evolves over time. I wonder if you could confirm that's the case. Can you tell me a little more about the kinds of discussions and interactions there are between the Canadian Forces and government policy to establish that strategic readiness?

Does that make sense?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

It absolutely does. It is a great question, and speaks to the heart of readiness en général.

To answer your question specifically on what we are getting ready for, if one thinks that readiness has a time component to it, like the speed of response, then we stay ready on short notice for those things that are highly likely to occur. The requirement to respond, in search and rescue for example, is on very short notice. Then there are those who are prepared to respond to international crises, such as Haiti, who don't need a lot of work-up training for the purposes of defence and self-defence. But you're still exporting those forces very quickly in support. The DART is a very good example of a high-readiness unit that can go off and support individuals in crisis around the world and sustain itself for a period of time. So that's where time comes into play.

Then we've got forces on a notice to move, for something that might take a little longer to materialize, but still may be important. This means being able to get involved in a place where Canada has strategic interests, or where Canadian values are at stake—Libya is a case in point. We had air assets and sea assets ready to respond; we didn't know they were going to go to Libya, but simply to that type of crisis.

And so the pat answer would be that we're ready for anything. But, of course, that really doesn't describe it all. We are ready with a timeline associated with these forces, for things that are most likely to happen but we're not 100% sure when they're going to happen. We have a timeframe within which the government would like to be responsive. But then there is the broader policy direction—in this case, contained in the Canada First defence strategy—where Canada also wishes to be able to demonstrate leadership in significant enterprises and events. In this case, we saw Lieutenant-General Bouchard—a product of the Canadian Forces education and training system, a product of his service, a product of a joint capacity—in a position to lead internationally.

Where it gets a bit more challenging to understand is when you look at broader capabilities. How big of a war would we get into? How long would we stay there for? These are questions for government policy that really result in investments in the Canadian Forces, into which size.... And “size” means endurance, because you can't put it all overseas at once; you have to be able to rotate it out. I suppose you could put it all overseas at once, but it would be a one-shot deal, and you'd be there until the job was done—and the world doesn't really work that way any more.

So it's a great question; it opens up a broad avenue of things to discuss, and I hope I've at least tried to answer it.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Well, yes.

One of the things that strikes me, in listening to you and reading through the slides, is the issue of equipment and procurement. The procurement timelines seem very lengthy, depending on what exactly you're ordering. When we get into ships and fighter jets and these sorts of things, it seems to me that we're talking in the realm of decades or many years. That's why I'm interested in the issue of the time horizon for this kind of readiness planning.

If you know that a fighter jet's going to take 10 years to procure, who's thinking out 10 years? And what is that conversation like? What's the world going to be like in 10 years? Where are we going in 10 years?

I note that we've decided to purchase a stealth jet, an attack fighter that supports battle groups with its bombing capabilities. Presumably this is thought about somewhere in this readiness concept. Someone's thinking that we need to be ready for something that uses that kind of equipment. Can you comment on that?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Your time has expired, so just make it a very short response. I know it's a big question, but....

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

I will answer.

I think that is a perfect question, should you have the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff before you, because he ultimately is the one who presides over force development, force management, and the resources looking to the future.

The short answer is, being ready for the future is a constant challenge. Not only do you have to be ready for the future when those fighters or those ships come into being, but they also have a lifespan of 20 to 25 years, so a great deal of effort is put into getting the starting point right. In other words, starting the process so you get the piece of equipment at the right time when either the world is changing or your own equipment is rusting out. But it also has to have some endurance beyond that; hence, the decisions that you know about already, in terms of what it is that we need. So there is an ongoing, incredibly important process that informs us as to procurement—when, what type, for how long—and which does take into account what we see the future of conflict being.

I would recommend that you chat with the vice-chief about that.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Chisu, you have the floor.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

General, I understand that your mandate is to provide the CDS with advice that enables the planning, initiation, direction, synchronization, and control of operations at the strategic level. From the organizational chart that you presented to us, can you tell the committee what your relationship is with the three different environmental chiefs? I didn't see any kind of relationship, or command relationship, nor what kind of relationship you have with the commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, the commander of the Canadian Army, or the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. And in this context, how do you coordinate with all of these chiefs and other colleagues in the command structure of the CF to ensure the readiness of the Canadian Forces?

That's my first question.

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Thank you.

The relationship is a consultative one. They are in no way responsible to me. I'm a staff officer for the Chief of the Defence Staff.

The process that we follow for the purposes of readiness is to ensure that, on an annual basis, the Chief of the Defence Staff directs those who provide forces, and directs what forces are to be ready for what reason. And most of the time, that's an enduring equation. It doesn't change a great deal, but there are provisions for it to change, that is, we need to be ready to do search and rescue, to be ready to go offshore with a modest-sized organization like the DART or to reinforce support elsewhere, and to be ready over a longer horizon and be able to go do something like in Afghanistan.

I make certain before the chief signs that direction that the appropriate staff work and research is done to ensure that it's all within the art of the possible and, ultimately, I produce the documents for him to sign.

In terms of crisis response, again, we consult amongst those service chiefs and their staffs to ensure that our picture of what we think is ready is indeed ready at that level, and to give warning and seek advice as we start to put together plans. And ultimately, my primary relationship with them is through the Chief of the Defence Staff, because they are the principal advisors to the Chief of the Defence Staff on their respective services.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

General, how has your office or responsibilities evolved from 2006, when this directorate was established?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

That is a great question. In 2004-05 when the first challenge of the transformation of the Canadian Forces occurred and we adopted the command structure of Expeditionary Force Command, Canada Command, Operational Support Command, and Special Operations Command, the CDS developed the ability to exercise or give command and control to those commanders. And so small staff, called the strategic joint staff, was created.

It has evolved from a staff that at one time was seen to cover the entire waterfront of functions, to one that is really focused on operations. So it has actually become a little bit more focused. My job principally is to manage an intelligence-to-deduction-to-assignment-of-forces equation that can be recommended to the CDS to say, here's what we think needs to happen, or here's a recommendation to you, or based on his own survey of the world--which happens more often than not--to have a look at this and to ask what can we do, are we ready, tell me a little bit more about that? I also get input, external to Defence, as to where we think there are some concerns.

The strategic joint staff works as an operations staff of the Chief of Defence Staff.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

I have another question, General. Have you recommended or initiated any model to measure the overall readiness of the Canadian Forces? Maybe this is a little bit of an aside, but the deployment time when you are going on an operation or the so-called rotations are every six or seven months for the troops. Is any thought being given to extending that timing, because this costs money? There is a lot of money involved in rotating the troops. Is there any thought given to increasing the rotation time? I understand that there were some measures taken in that direction, but maybe you could elaborate on that.

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Certainly. This is again an ideal question for any one of the service chiefs. Looking at the human component in regard to having six months versus a longer rotation, there are many factors that come into play, including the families, the endurance of soldiers on operations, and whether it is the type of operation that demands high-intensity for a short period of time or one where a soldier has the endurance to last longer.

All of these factors come to bear as we make decisions about the future. A rotation policy is set. It's a policy and is extant unless it gets changed. The army has just recently gone to an eight-month cycle, which gives the army a bit more endurance, given the force size that it has. So over the course of two years, you save a task force. It wasn't necessarily done for cost-saving reasons, though there's always a resource management equation. It is actually done to make certain that with those low-density enablers that we have--intelligence and so on, who are smaller sized in the Canadian Forces--we can actually extend them longer, reconstitute them, and redeploy.

So we do measure. We do measure readiness constantly. I report quarterly to the chief on readiness and trends, and also to give the chief a view of what we have available to us and what its status is.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. It was brought to my attention, General, that in your slides, in the French definitions, the definition for “strategic” is missing.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

There is a section with definitions. In the English version, readiness is divided into three elements: Tactical, Operational and Strategic. However, in the French version, only tactical and operational readiness are mentioned. I would like to get the missing page.

[An hon. member]

My apologies.