National Defence Committee on Nov. 29th, 2011

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

Yes. When you look at the threats and hazards raised, yes, we are very deeply involved when it comes to issues of cyber. Canada Command maintains a watch, but we are not the lead agency and department, nor within the Department of National Defence are we the lead organization. We are supported in any issues or concerns over cyber.

On IEDs, these are issues we are openly discussing within our military: how we can ensure that we are ready and able if these types of threats and issues were to come to Canadian soil.

So we do have discussions and we do have the capability to be ready, but I'll just remind the committee again that when it comes to the issue of terrorism, it is the role and responsibility of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We would be in support of them, given that they have the lead as a lead department with the Department of Public Safety.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Okay.

If I can ask you another question, General, what were the lessons learned from the natural disasters that occurred this summer? What are the lessons learned in how we can improve our reaction time?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

If I could share the lessons learned grosso modo, the first lesson is to ensure that you have strong relationships with your provincial and territorial partners, which we did. So for us, it's a lesson that we need to continue what we're already doing well in that area.

The second lesson was to have forces on standby ready to deploy, which we did, so again that spoke to the success piece. In a broader context, it also showed that the current framework the Government of Canada has in place for dealing with these issues across the country is the right one.

What am I speaking to? That we have an emergency management committee of senior government officials who meet every six weeks to talk about upcoming and ongoing issues of hazards and crises that are happening, who maintain a dialogue, and who can pick up the phone and speak to each other to do one thing very quickly—and that's to get resources, authorities, and capabilities where we need to.

What it did for us over the summer was it kind of came back and showed that what we were doing was the right thing, and we need to continue doing what we're doing and strengthen it even more.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Chisu, your time has expired.

Mr. Brahmi now has the floor.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To our witness, previously you talked about the importance of education and training to operational readiness in the Canadian Forces.

In my riding of Saint-Jean, there is a lot of talk, and increasingly so, of restoring the two years of university at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.

As you were the head of military personnel until 2010, I would like to know your opinion on the fact that superior officers are no longer receiving bilingual training within the Canadian Forces. What do you think are the consequences of that for readiness?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

It's a question that will have to be posed to the new chief of military personnel. I haven't been in that portfolio for about a year and a half, and I'm not very current on the details or the facts.

Secondly, I can tell you from a bilingual point of view that the leadership of the Canadian Forces is bilingual. Its command is expected to be bilingual. It's always been an issue for us and what we have to do. As we deploy men and women across the country, their bilingual capabilities become very much an asset and have proved to be very effective for us.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

My next question concerns another aspect. In his report on the transformation of the Canadian Forces, Lieutenant-General Leslie suggested a two-division structure: one would consist of the regular force, and the other, the reserve force. The regular force would focus on international operations, whereas the reserve force would be focused on domestic operations.

Last week, we heard from Lieutenant-General Devlin. When this aspect was raised, we got the impression he did not share that two-part vision of the organization of the Canadian Forces.

I would like to know your opinion on this issue. Should we maintain a more integrated vision, as Lieutenant-General Devlin suggested, or should we have a two-part vision, as suggested by Lieutenant-General Leslie?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

Issues of transformation would need to be raised to others, because that's not my area. What I can tell you is that when you look at the domestic scene in a situation when it comes to these crises, we've always been able to put together the forces that we've needed, both regular and reserve, to be able to deal with these issues. If you look at all of our operations here, the ones that became a crisis in which we had to deploy forces immediately, there was a mix of regular and reserve. In particular, if you look at Operation Igor in Newfoundland and Labrador, there was a mix of the two.

To say that you can only take a force and organize it for the home game and a force for away may not prove to be the most effective way, in the sense that who knows when something is going to happen? What you need to have is forces, men and women in uniform, who are ready to be deployed across the country at a moment's notice, either regular or reserve, in whatever they're required for. We've seen this in the past. We've had both regular and reservists deployed on operations and it has been successful.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

The potential separation between the reserve and regular forces raises an issue of perception.

In that connection, as the member for Saint-Jean, I witnessed a curious incident that occurred last spring. When we asked the Canadian Forces to intervene on the ground, we saw that the military personnel who intervened in Saint-Jean came from Valcartier. There were military personnel who came from Valcartier, which is about two hours away by road, to intervene in my riding. At the same time, on the highway, we saw military personnel coming from Saint-Jean to Valcartier to engage in manoeuvres.

Those movements resulted in a perception by the public, which does not necessarily understand these matters. It saw two forces crossing paths on the highway, whereas a lot of military personnel were available in Saint-Jean.

How do you believe that these incidents influence the perception the public has of the Canadian Forces?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

When you look at the capabilities of the men and women in uniform in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu at Montérégie at the time, clearly the capabilities needed were there, which is why they came from Valcartier--to have mobility and vehicles to move around.

The issue and challenges in that region were looked at. The decision made by the commander on the scene at the time was to bring forces out of Valcartier instead of the local forces, because they may not have had the capability that was needed. They were put into place very quickly after the Province of Quebec asked for their support.

Again, it's not either/or, one or the other. It depends on the situation, when it's going to happen, who's the closest, and who has the capabilities to provide that support to meet the challenge. For example, in Manitoba there is a continuing challenge with flooding. We deployed a reserve company because it was the closest and had the capabilities. So from the perspective of time and space, it met the requirements.

Coming back to the situation in Quebec, forces from Valcartier had that capability, with vehicles and heavy equipment that may not have been locally located.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Strahl, it's your turn.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you very much.

It's good to have you here today.

I want to talk about British Columbia, my home province. I was looking around the room and realized that I'm the only member from west of Selkirk, Manitoba.

I want to talk about our province specifically. As you know, there is no land forces base in British Columbia. CFB Chilliwack was closed in the mid-nineties. We have the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Air Force there. The Canadian Forces have assisted with forest fires and flood threats--the slow-moving threats you can see developing. It's not a problem to get people from Edmonton to drive to Kamloops, for instance, to help.

When CFB Chilliwack was closed, the concern was what would happen in the event of a catastrophic event--the earthquake we're always told is coming within the next 100 years in the Vancouver area. What would happen now that there is no land forces base there, should there be a problem coming through the Rocky Mountains? How quickly could the Canadian Forces land troops respond in the case of a major catastrophe that we couldn't see coming?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

If I can provide a context to this first, remember the Canadian Forces have men and women in uniform in Comox, Esquimalt, and Vancouver. There are regular and reserve forces throughout that area--navy, army, and air force.

In the case of a domestic response, not just land forces have provided that response. As we saw with Hurricane Igor, naval personnel actually went out and provided support on the land. It's not just about having land forces in the location. There are already a number of forces in place, and we have a two-star naval commander on the west coast who maintains close relationships with the Province of British Columbia, and has exercised with them as part of their pre-planning for an earthquake or event. That's the context.

We have found throughout all of these events, activities, and exercises that we have been able to put the forces where we needed them if there was any type of issue in the Vancouver area. I would throw out to you from purely a scenario point of view that we have discussed this issue. If something happens in that area, it's probably not where you would want military people to be, because they'd be part of the crisis, not outside bringing support in.

I would submit that in any scenario where there is any type of natural disaster, it's better to have forces coming in to provide support. In this case they would come from either Calgary, where there are forces, or Edmonton, which has all the capabilities. In that case Canada Command would turn all of its efforts and energy to providing all the capabilities needed on the west coast to deal with the situation.

So we already have men and women in uniform across the area. We've exercised with the province any likely scenarios. We don't foresee any issues with being able to put additional men and women on the ground if needed to deal with any issue there.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

What was left behind in a military footprint when CFB Chilliwack closed was an area support unit. Can you expand on what their role is and how you use them day-to-day, and certainly in the case of an emergency?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

What is quite critical to all that we do across Canada is sustainment, and sustainment is all about support. That's to ensure that as we have men and women on the ground in uniform doing what they have to do, they have the accommodations, the food—all the support and medical support they need. In many cases that comes from support units and bases across the country. That location actually provides support to a number of different agencies, organizations, and military in its geographical area of responsibility, which it does on a day-to-day basis. Again, we could use that as a staging area. We could bring troops into that area and then deploy them forward, if needed, for any additional support. There are area support units across the country, as well as bases and wings, that provide that support structure and framework to support men and women in uniform anywhere across the country and in the north as well.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

When there is an event, let's call it, and the Canadian Forces are deployed, what does the command structure look like? Obviously I wouldn't expect civilian authorities to be directing the operations of individual members. How do you integrate those two different command structures in case of an event?

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

From a military perspective, we turn to whichever of the regional joint task force commanders is responsible. One is responsible for B.C. and he's located in Esquimalt. Another is responsible for the west and he's located in Edmonton, so he's got Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba. One is in the north for the three territories. We also have one in Ontario, one in Quebec, and one in Halifax for the east coast. Their job is to maintain those strong relationships, which is why they become the commanders of those operations.

As in all of the cases, what we found in the flooding was that the commander of the joint task force west in Edmonton was the military commander responsible for the military operations throughout that area. His demand, then, is to work closely with the territorial, if needed, or provincial and other federal partners to come together in a whole-of-government approach. Clearly, the military is only one part to that response, but in the case of the joint task force west commander in Edmonton, he flew into Winnipeg, located himself there, and then worked closely with the Province of Manitoba to be able to show what he could provide in support. As well, he works with--and this is very important--the Department of Public Safety, which has federal representatives from their department across the country, who also work closely with the departments. They kind of interface for us as we work with the different territories and different departments in each of these issues.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Time has expired.

Ms. Perreault, you have five minutes.

[Manon Perreault, NDP, Montcalm, QC]

Good morning. I've watched your progress through the Canadian Forces. Your record is really impressive. I want to thank you for sharing your knowledge with us.

You mentioned operation NANOOK in the Arctic, and the fact that you conducted some tests there involving drones, that is to say unmanned aerial vehicles. I recently met some veterans from the Royal Canadian Legion in Mascouche, in my riding. We wondered whether it was possible to obtain the results of those tests. If so, we would like to know whether it will one day be possible to ensure Canada's aerial sovereignty solely by means of these types of drones or whether that's a crazy thought.

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

If I can provide a framework, when you look at the need for situational awareness, the framework is that it's not just these unattended aerial vehicles that are flying around. At the top you would need satellites, because it's very much a layered approach. You would need satellites, UAVs, surveillance aircraft, going all the way down to somebody on the ground providing that overall view. Just having UAVs will not answer the mail, will not ensure that you will have situational awareness. You need to have this very layered approach.

When it comes to the issue of sovereignty, in the end what you will need is to be able to have someone in a plane flying, who actually can provide that eyeball on the ground to see what is going on. That's what we're looking at. How could we have that framework, develop that framework, to be able to have full situational awareness across the north?

When it comes to the testing of the UAVs, we continue to look at how it has worked and how it hasn't worked. We've only looked at it once, up in Resolute, for a short period. We continue to examine the challenges of using them in the north. It's an issue I'll bring back to the department, and leave it up to the department to decide if it can get you the information.

The testing was very much focused on the technicalities of getting the UAV into the air. What were the challenges flying around in the north? What was the value that it then provided to the ground station?

People do need to be at a headquarters in order to receive the data.

The information is coming from the UAV that's flying around. So we looked at all the technical aspects of it, the first time to see whether or not we could continue to use it. We got some very positive results, but again, not to be too premature, we've got to look at it in some other ways.

[Manon Perreault, NDP, Montcalm, QC]

Earlier we talked about security. Unless I'm mistaken, you're also responsible for Canada's defence. I'd like to know whether the main threats are currently known and, if so, who or what you have to be ready to face.

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

Thank you.

When we look at major threats, it comes back to the definition of a threat. Clearly, every nation needs to be prepared, and I think Canadians would expect Canada's military to be prepared as a force of last resort to deal with any threat or hazard that could happen. We have capabilities in place across the Canadian Forces, as we see in the case of NORAD, where if an aircraft tries to interdict our space, we send up aircraft to see what that is before any other action is taken to ensure that those that do come toward our airspace know that this is Canada, this is Canada's sovereign territory. So we have that capability for that type of threat.

[Manon Perreault, NDP, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you.

I know this is a somewhat controversial topic, but the F-35s are currently said to be specialized ground attack aircraft, that they are slower than aircraft currently on the market and that there are also problems of communication between those aircraft and land bases. I'd like someone to explain to me how those aircraft could really be effective in protecting Canadian territory.

[LGen Walter Semianiw]

I remind the committee that you'll have other force employers here. Our job as force employers is not to figure out what's coming next; it's to take what we have today and be able to use it. So when it comes to the F-35, it's a question that you're going to have to pose to the Chief of the Air Staff, who is responsible for bringing in capabilities. But from all my readings, clearly it will provide the support we will need in the future, given the generation of aircraft that it is, the technology that it has, to be able to protect and defend Canada.

I throw out for the committee that none of us knows where the world is going to be in 10, 15, 20 years. We know where it will be perhaps in the next number of years. It's something I would expect Canadians would expect us all to ensure, that we are ready not just today but in the future for anything that could happen.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Norlock, you're up.