National Defence Committee on Sept. 20th, 2011

[Sandra McCardell]

I would say that there were two fairly significant signals we had. One was the convoy you mentioned going to Niger. Also, there were family members who went to Algeria and who still, to our knowledge, are there.

All through the last six months we have pressed neighbouring countries and reminded them of their obligations under UN resolutions 1970 and 1973. We have encouraged them and more to respect what those resolutions said about supplies, arms embargoes, provision of mercenaries, and so on. Those discussions are continuing with neighbouring countries on the importance of maintaining respect for those resolutions now as well; they remain in effect. We are doing that, as are other like-minded countries.

For the broader sorts of insurgent movements, I don't think there's a great deal we can say about that, and probably not a great deal we can say in a public forum. But certainly broader links between Gadhafi and those he supported in the past or has looked to for support now are being watched closely.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

I have a couple of questions myself before we start our third round.

General, I'm looking at the map you provided to the committee about where there is still strength for the pro-Gadhafi forces. How are those forces being supplied? This conflict has been going on for several months now, yet they still seem to have munitions. They're still in the fight. They still have access to resources and personnel.

Where are the lines of supply coming in when it seems like we're virtually land-locked, with the exception of Sirte? We have control of the entire coastline with the naval blockade, so how are they getting their goods and how are they still able to inflict pain on their people and resist the NTC?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

That's a great question.

No effort at any blockade embargo is perfectly immune to penetration. There is some porosity, I suppose, and from the south especially.

The Gadhafi forces aren't being supplied in the way that you and I would normally think of armies being supplied. They're existing off the country. So in Bani Walid.... And they've had 42 years to get ready for all sorts of things, so there are all sorts of munitions there. There are incredibly well-developed defences. They're using the food and water and so on in the towns and villages they're in. So the classic sense of resupply, in a way that we could categorically chop it off like you would in conventional warfare, doesn't exist. If it did, we would have dealt with it a long time ago.

We are making certain that the borders are as non-porous as possible and that nothing is coming in from the Mediterranean. I think we're doing extremely well in terms of closing access to the country from the north, but as we've discussed, there's a regional dynamic there. Some of those nations to the south may be more sympathetic, or individuals in those nations, not even acting on behalf of those nations, could be more sympathetic. As you know, in a fairly wealthy regime you can pay for support in some respects.

The good news is that they can't last long this way. They've lasted till now. They are showing signs of running out of important things needed to wage war. They haven't run out yet, but they will eventually.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

When we're looking at Canada's role in the air support that we're doing through the Royal Canadian Air Force, and especially with the number of sorties, and strike sorties in particular...we have been in theatre there for several months. Is the frequency of those sorties staying fairly consistent, or are they actually increasing based on the dynamics of the conflict today?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

The sortie rate goes up and down. We are extremely sensitive to a number of key factors, the first of which is what is the NTC doing. What are their forces doing on the ground? We're not in the lead here. We are acting to a mandate. It is not our war to run and win. It is one that is very carefully guarded and controlled by this mandate. All of General Bouchard's actions must respect that. All of his aircraft must respect that.

There will be some days when we're hitting a lot and some days when we're not hitting as much. The fact is that the targets that are hit are legitimate. There has been lots of work done to make certain that we don't cause collateral damage. It would be very unfortunate to be harming civilians while you're protecting them, so we're very careful about that.

Then there's the response to what actually occurs on the ground. It's a fluid dynamic. As you know, warfare has its moments that you simply cannot easily predict. An act against civilians or a threat against civilians--in other words, if they bring out a Scud launcher and get ready to fire it, well, the sortie rate that day might go up as we try to find it with reconnaissance and then deal with it once it's found.

I would say overall it has been a fairly consistent rate that has gone up and down depending on the situation on the ground. That weekend where we saw Tripoli starting to collapse, it was impossible to try to target easily into the city, as there was a lack of clarity as to who was on the ground and who was doing what.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, General.

We have time for a third round, with six minutes or so per party.

Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

Could I just go back to this issue of arms in Libya, either left over from Gadhafi or captured? I know the international community is concerned particularly with these potential shoulder-launched attacks on the aircraft and getting into certain hands.

You've talked about non-proliferation. I'm with you on that one, but is there a disarmament agenda of the NTC? We have many years of the Gadhafi regime building up arms and ammunition all over the country. Some of them have been so-called “liberated” by the rebels. They are going into all sorts of different hands. I know the NTC have their hands full, but as part of the stabilization of Libya, there seems to me to be a gross need for some sort of actual disarmament plan. They've got lots of arms, some of them supplied by our allies, frankly. Is there going to be an effort by the Libyan NTC to get rid of them, and is there any ask by them for countries to help in doing that?

[Marie Gervais-Vidricaire]

Briefly, what I can tell you is that the disarmament issue is one of the issues for which there will be a needs assessment mission, led by the UN. It will look at these very serious issues and at what the international community can do to help.

[Sandra McCardell]

If I could just add to that, while I was there I spoke to the NTC, and they are very aware of the danger, quite frankly, of having so many weapons in circulation. So many young men have been using them for six months. They spoke informally of intentions to create a national army, to create police forces, and to find a way of bringing these groups into structured security forces under government control and finding ways to extract the weapons. The plans at that point weren't developed. It will require the assessment mission that Madame Gervais-Vidricaire was referring to. But they are clearly aware of the need.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

I'd like to follow up on the chair's question on the number of sorties. We're now at September 20. I know these things go up and down. As you say, the Gadhafi forces, although relatively strong in local areas, are in an eroding defensive position. That would lead me to conclude that the number of actual strikes would be expected to decrease. I know these things can go up and down, depending on operations, but can you tell us that there has been a decline over the last week or two?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

The broad trend from the very beginning of the conflict, as we would tail off, Mr. Chair, would absolutely go from a high.... Because sortie rates don't always translate into bombs dropped. The sortie rates remain high because we're trying to gain intelligence. Fewer bombs are dropped, but there is a lot of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. So we're generating planes--and even our own, because we have the parts to do it--to see what's going on, to make certain that civilians are protected, and to see the results of the conflict.

NATO has any number of types of aircraft they could put into a situation. Not every one results in the dropping of a bomb—I think that's really important—and we drop them only when we need to.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

General Vance, is it your view that the Bani Walid conflict is pivotal to this war, to this conflict, and that once Bani Walid goes, pretty well everything else will fall apart?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

Thanks for the question, sir.

As a military officer, I hesitate to pin all our hopes on any one act. There are lots of pivotal acts before us here. I don't think there is necessarily any certainty that the effective capture or elimination of Bani Walid as a stronghold will stop fighting. I believe, as do our allies, that former regime forces will hold on and fight in self-interest, as the ambassador suggested, for as long as they can, to try to discredit other actions, to try to destabilize the situation. It's in their best interests to try to do so.

We suspect that the overall geometry of the fight will be from where it is now leading to the south where they are maintaining lines of communication with their southern neighbours. That's the overall geometry. As for how it actually works out on the ground, we're not in charge of the fight.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Right.

In your statistics here on boardings, it appears that the coalition boardings are at a rate of about 10% to 11% and that Canadian boardings are at a rate of about 2%. Is there any meaningful reason why there's a discrepancy between the hailings and boardings by Canadians and those by the coalition?

[MGen Jonathan Vance]

I don't think there's anything meaningful behind that statistic. The employment of the ship, particularly of the Vancouver, was actually interesting. She was tasked with essentially port control, so there was less hailing or boarding and more coordinating of what the allied effort would be in that area. She was actually managing the situation.

There's nothing that would indicate a difference, in terms of our management of ships. I think the high number of hailings is probably mostly consistent with where the ship was. She was right in the port. Don't forget, we were one of the few nations that would put their ships in such close proximity to the shore. That was a good thing. We played a vital role. So she had probably much more contact with traffic in and out of those ports.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Okay.

My final question is a bit softer.

The NTC has argued that we're here for a democratic transition, yet this is not a neighbourhood of democracy. Just look at the countries: Niger and Chad and Sudan and Egypt. This is not fertile ground for a democracy.

Is this notion that we're fighting for democracy really kind of political, when in fact what it will be is a transition to hopefully a more benevolent form of government—I was going to say of dictatorship—that just simply has an appearance of democracy but not a reality of democracy?

[Sandra McCardell]

I think certainly the future remains to be seen. I would say a couple of things. One is that the structures that take root in Libya will be Libyan; it is not Canada and it's not populated by Canadians. There will be the governmental structures and legal structures and the implementation will be reflective of local society, local expectations, and local norms and cultures. That doesn't mean it's not going to be democratic.

It's a difficult region, absolutely, but the people there have spent a long time waiting for a chance to determine their own future, to be able to express themselves freely, and to be able to talk even among friends without worrying about microphones in the rooms or knocks at the door. They are absolutely determined not to return to that. They put out a constitutional declaration in early August. Several of the articles--a fantastic percentage of the constitution--deal with how you won't come into people's houses and you won't listen to their phone calls and you won't.... They have a number of things that we wouldn't even think would be required in a constitution, quite frankly, and they're there in great detail for that reason.

I think that having come this far and having worked this hard there is really no desire to revert to a new dictator. Within that, there will be a government that's right for Libya and for Libyans.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you.

Personally and on behalf of the Liberal Party, I want to thank you for your briefings over time. They've been helpful and thoughtful. We all appreciate them. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Finally, Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thanks very much, Chair.

Coming back to the question of supporting the government, which is obviously key to sustaining stability and peace, Canada has unlocked a very significant amount, more than the U.K. and some of our other major allies, I believe. What are we looking for in terms of accountability?

Obviously a lot is going to depend on decisions the UN takes and assessment missions by the World Bank and so forth, but is there some model that we as Canada prefer at this stage, based on our consultations with the new government? We've been heavily involved in trust funds in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Haiti--usually World Bank-supervised trust funds. Is that the kind of model we'd look to repeat with refinements, or is there something else in mind?

[Sandra McCardell]

There's something in place. On the $2.2 billion, what we did was move to unfreeze everything that was being held by Canadian institutions in other countries. That money will flow into a mechanism already created by the contact group: the temporary financial mechanism. It has an international agent that watches transactions and has a steering board set up with members of the NTC and international members to watch over and safeguard transactions and ensure they're in line with the intentions of the funding and the desires of the NTC.

That mechanism exists, so we're not required to create a trust fund at this point. In the longer term, yes, we--“we” being the international community--need to look at providing technical assistance to ensure that there is sound financial management in the country going forward, with proper accountability and lines of authority.

[Marie Gervais-Vidricaire]

If I may, I will just add that one of the areas the assessment missions will look at is shared services in the area of public financial management, for example, such as budget preparation and execution and banking. The World Bank is leading on that.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I have a related question with regard to the use of those funds. Obviously the new government has a certain form of legitimacy based on their ability to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people to be free of Gadhafi, but they will want legitimacy in other forms soon. Is there any indication of what that agenda might look like?

It will take a long time to organize elections, obviously, and that's a Libyan decision, but are there intermediate points such as national meetings and outreach? Because this inclusiveness issue is so key to ensuring stability down the road, locking it in as early as possible obviously would have to be part of our thinking, even from a defence standpoint. Could you give us some context on that point?

Second and finally, on the courts and the justice system, how functional are they? After 42 years of Gadhafi, they obviously have major shortcomings. But is there a court system that the new government can rely on and build upon?

[Sandra McCardell]

I'll start with the court question because it's more specific.

The courts, to my knowledge, are not currently up and running in Tripoli. I can't speak for Benghazi, but in Tripoli they were not. They are now looking at how to address cases that were tried under the previous government. What do they do with cases that were partway through? There are a number of legal issues that are going to consume them for some period of time. Legal advice is something we mean to give through our trade law expert, and others will contribute as well.

I would say that probably overall the court system itself and the legal system that underpins it in theory were probably not that bad. The real problem was the political interference in the system. So if you extract that element, you may find you have a base to work with that is fine. As you're familiar with, in many of these cases in these countries, the theory is great; it's the practice that was terrible. So we'll look at that.

The revolution began, both in Benghazi and in Tripoli, with lawyers protesting in front of court houses determined to have a constitution and a better democratic future for Libya. I've spoken to some of those lawyers who were doing that, and they're either back or are on their way back to the country committed to rebuilding it, and obviously they're professionally and keenly focused on the court system.

They are also aware, by the way, of what they will do to try those who come to trial who were part of the previous regime, and they are quite concerned about ensuring, among other things, that they actually get a proper defence. So these things are being thought through.

Just on the construction of the government, the NTC itself established a road map, which was presented to the Rome contact group--I think that was back in April--and it has a number of steps coming out of it, including the naming of a caretaker government and a broad national congress that will launch a national reconciliation process and so on. These elements are timed from a declaration point at which they will consider their country liberated. They have not done that yet. There were discussions about how to handle that. They have Tripoli now liberated, which is the capital and obviously significant, but they have parts of the country that are not yet. So they are looking at that date, and it is something they are discussing right now. They mean to have all of the country able to participate in the process, and that is not the case currently.