National Defence Committee on Feb. 28th, 2012

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to continue the discussion.

Mr. Battiss, you touched on the question of the Multinational Interoperability Council, the MIC. It is quite an interesting topic, one that we have not discussed to date. Could you expand a little on the question and tell us how that association of countries could be an alternative to NATO?

[Samir Battiss]

It isn't an alternative to NATO. I simply mentioned the institution. That institutional body, based in Norfolk, engages in doctrinal thinking. It is a member of what I consider the most advanced military nations in the areas of technology, know-how and conceptual and doctrinal thinking.

NATO is an observer for the moment. As it is located in the same place, in Norfolk, it takes part in the Allied Command Transformation, in particular. It is simply a group that goes further in its thinking than the member countries as a whole. It reflects on future threats, military concepts that should be developed in the area of logistics and operations, and everything an operation entails. Generally speaking, it is strategic and operational thinking. The leadership of the organization, which was founded around 1999, is American.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Could that organization result in a closer alliance than NATO, particularly in operational terms? Politically speaking, we could definitely include 75 or 100 countries in NATO, but, from an operational standpoint, the Libya example showed us that there were actually two leaders, France and Great Britain. Five countries that took part in that mission were more followers than leaders. In addition, 21 other countries did nothing or were firmly opposed to the mission, including Germany and Turkey, which are two heavyweights in terms of population.

In short, could MIC give rise to a group that, in operational terms, would be more effective and more real than NATO, which today looks more like a social club than an operational force?

[Samir Battiss]

Coalition operations are central to the work of MIC, which, I remind you, is a think tank at the moment. The organization's major work is a document entitled Coalition Building Guide. It was updated in November 2011.

They think there, but it also includes the most capable nations, the ones found in contact groups in operations like Libya.

It is really not by chance that the council isn't politically institutionalized. It is simply a strategic think tank that provides its thoughts to NATO and the European Union through their member states. It has no political future. It is not a second version of NATO. It remains an institution where people think and their thoughts are spread among the member states and observer institutions, in particular the Allied Command Transformation.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

We are dealing with a small group of seven countries. Is the involvement of Germany, which most of the time adopts a very different position from other countries on whether to take part in operations, a handicap for the group?

[Samir Battiss]

I believe we exaggerate Germany's role somewhat. Germany is definitely an economically very powerful state—we talked about that earlier—but the decisions remain essentially political. I believe you're also referring to the conduct of the German government in the Libyan affair. The restrictions that German authorities sought in Afghanistan are part of the negotiations inherent in all coalition operations.

I know that that can frustrate a lot of allies, but that is the price you pay for a form of international legitimacy and credibility. Germany's presence is not absolutely harmful, far from it. The Germans have know-how that they share with the others within that institution, within NATO and within the European Union. In general, I do not see any obstacles or harmful action coming from Germany's part. The Germans have know-how that they make available. That remains in technical and strategic areas, but don't forget that the decisions are essentially political. Military advice often is not followed.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Strahl, it's your turn.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral, I heard your first comments about the shock you felt coming from Victoria. I am a British Columbia native myself. The tulips are coming up in the flower beds. I'm starting to tune up my lawn mower. It was about 10 degrees and sunny when I left Vancouver on Sunday. I'm looking forward to getting back on Friday already.

I was honoured to be at CFB Esquimalt earlier this month with the Chief of the Defence Staff to welcome home the HMCS Vancouver from their mission in Libya and their patrol on the high seas. It was good to be in Victoria. I know that the general was going out the day after that event to tour and participate in exercises on the submarine. I understand that you were vice-chief of the defence staff when the government of that day purchased the four Victoria-class submarines. Perhaps I'm wrong there.

Are you able to provide some insight as to why the decision was made to purchase the submarines? Perhaps you could give us your opinion as someone who's worked so closely with the navy as to whether you think that program is turning a corner or whether, as some witnesses have stated, it should be scrapped?

[VAdm Gary Garnett]

I'll provide you with a few facts and my opinion.

I was the vice-chief of the defence staff when the Liberal government decided, just after April 1, 1998, to acquire the submarines. It cost me, as the resource manager, some money that had been set aside to pay the down payment, but you know when you go past April 1, the then finance minister gleefully took the money away from me. But that's another story.

The acquisition of the Upholder-class submarines was the result of the 1994 white paper, but perhaps more importantly, there were no resources in the 1990s to build new submarines or indeed to acquire new submarines. The 1994 white paper was very clear. There were four programs supported by the government, and the third one said something to the effect that if resources could be found within the Department of National Defence to acquire a used class of submarines, namely the Upholder class, then DND should go ahead and do that.

At the time, despite the constrained environment we were in, there were sufficient resources post-white paper to acquire those submarines. There have been lots of stories about the costs and the costs since then. In effect, if we had not acquired those submarines, Canada would have no submarine capability. We were out of the game by the end of the 1990s. When you're out of the game, you're out of the game. It took 10 to 15 years to make the O-boats operational in the first case, and we had a whole bunch of Canadian sailors sailing in British Oberon-class submarines prior to that.

So if we wanted to retain that capability in a balanced navy and a balanced force structure, there was no other option but to acquire them, and consequently we did.

We all know what has happened since then. Certainly there were errors, mistakes, a terrible tragedy in the case of Chicoutimi. Decisions were made. Decisions were changed, and a fair period of time elapsed before Canada or DND moved forward to establish a contract with industry called the Victoria-class in-service support contract, or something to that effect, so that industry is now fully involved in maintaining the submarines. Victoria herself had her long refit in the fleet maintenance facility in Esquimalt, and that's happening to Windsor in Halifax, I believe, at this time. The Chief of the Defence Staff was on television. They had the local press on board, and Victoria, I believe I read in the paper today, is undergoing the complete work-up program this week, and next week she will be in the news firing weapons.

So we will have the first fully operational Canadian submarine, Victoria, around Easter, and I'm told we will then have Windsor fully operational by the end of the year.

My opinion is that we wanted to stay in the submarine game, as a balanced navy and a balanced force. There was no other way to do it. Yes, there was a period of time when things did not go well, but I certainly believe what I'm hearing from the head of the navy—that we've come through that. Industry is involved—it's too bad it wasn't fully involved before—and we have a capability into the future.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Can you talk about—

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Time is up.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

That's too bad.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

That's what happens when you talk about your good weather on the lower mainland.

So, Mr. Chair, I've just been out in the snow and the cold, experiencing these arctic conditions.

I want to thank all of our presenters for their very stimulating contributions to our study. I have a number of brief questions, and I'm going to ask for brief responses.

Professor Battiss, you said that NATO capabilities are evolving. Could you give us a comparison between NATO's capabilities in 2001 and today with regard to readiness? What do you see, in very overall terms? I am not requesting a detailed answer, just your general assessment.

[Samir Battiss]

Essentially, NATO's capabilities boil down to aerial supervision and intelligence. Those capabilities are mainly put at its disposal by the member states. However, there are some major deficiencies, and the Libya operation clearly showed that, despite the fact that NATO authorities declared it a military success.

As the member noted, we saw that some countries were able to participate, while others were not. That's a real challenge that will be have to be addressed at the next meeting of the heads of state and government, which will be held in Chicago, in addition to the progress of work on smart defence.

If I had to assign a mark, I would give it a B+.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Professor Roussel, let's talk about the development of expertise in all fields relating to the Arctic. First of all, what does that entail?

You mentioned good governance, science, military capabilities and search and rescue capabilities. What is the most essential aspect in that regard?

[Prof. Stéphane Roussel]

There are three priorities, because they are immediate questions and problems.

The first priority is scientific research. The sea bottoms must be mapped because we need to know that environment. Consequently, the scientific research conducted, in part, with the support of the Canadian Forces must be strongly encouraged.

The second priority is a field that we cannot forget and on which we must focus. We are starting to do so, but we must go further. That is the social aspect. Northern communities sometimes experience situations of distress that we in the south vastly underestimate. One of the habits of southerners is that we transpose our fears and concerns to the north, whereas they are not consistent with the situation there. We must pay much more attention to the social and economic aspects of northern communities.

The third priority is the Canadian government's ability to determine what is going on in that region. It must know who is going into the region, who is likely to be there and whether the government is in a position to know at a specific time what is going on in a very specific area of the Arctic. That means knowledge of the area on a daily basis. That is the third element that should be developed.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I'll put my final question to our last two presenters.

Both in Admiral Garnett's presentation and in yours, Professor Bercuson, I detected a bit of tension between the idea of planning and having the capacity to participate in missions, and the ability to lead and plan in pursuit of our national interests. We all agree that coalitions are the rule now. But we have seen in Libya and elsewhere, and even at certain stages of the Afghan mission and in the ill-fated mission to the Congo and so forth, that Canadians are planning and acting before other members of the coalition are prepared to act, at least on that scale.

Give us your comments on this. How important is it for us to have this higher level capacity to plan, to have intelligence from other parts of the world, and to have a global vision now that the U.S. role is potentially diminishing and our economic role is growing? Are there implications for readiness, as Canadians, in terms of the imperative to train in joint and combined contexts, as well as at unit level within your environment?

I'd just like some general comments on that point.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Alexander, your time has expired, so I'd ask that you be very concise in your response.

[Prof. David Bercuson]

I think it's a lot easier to develop the military capabilities than it is to figure out politically how you, as a coalition partner, are going to have your voice heard in the overall determination of the policy, whether it's political policy, the political objective of the operation, or the overall military strategic objective of the operation.

I think we can easily do the first, but I think we have not done the second well, and we haven't done it well since at least 1990.

[VAdm Gary Garnett]

I think the ability to plan and lead expeditionary or international operations ups the game, but it's not just the military. There is almost the whole of government in these kinds of operations. U.S. seagoing battle-group admirals have ambassadors on their staff. So there's a bigger picture here beyond the military component.

We did some trials on what General Hillier called his “big honking ship”. To put together the three services and not only conduct, but lead a Canadian operation from the sea, as I'm reading this committee's hearings and others, I believe that some thinking is going back into that.

So it ups your game. It's costly. It's a higher level of training, but it gives Canada the capability to play at the highest possible levels. I would endorse that as something Canada would like to do.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

We have time for the third round.

Madam Moore.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I would like to go back to a concept that we addressed at another meeting and get your opinion on the subject.

The committee's meetings are currently open to the public. However, for logical reasons of security, we don't have access to information classified as secret or top secret.

I would like to know whether you think it would be advantageous to establish a parliamentary committee that could have access to information on matters such as genuine threats to the country or detected security breaches. That committee would therefore be genuinely in a position to assess readiness in a more comprehensive manner.

[Prof. Stéphane Roussel]

It is clear to me that you should hold in camera meetings in which you are allowed to access certain information. However, you should understand that neither we in the social sciences nor anyone else is really able to tell you what the actual situation is. If you invite a firefighter to your place and ask him whether there are any fire risks in your home, he will find some. The same will be true of a security professional: he will always find threats.

I think your work requires that you find the necessary balance and qualified views on this matter. If you only speak to security professionals in a closed or in camera context, you may get too dark a picture of the situation.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Would anyone else like to comment?