National Defence Committee on May 15th, 2012

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

I thought I had five seconds.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

It came in just over the five-minute mark.

Mr. Norlock.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Through you to the witnesses, thank you for appearing.

I'd like to carry on with the Soviet theme, although it's now a Russian theme. Historically, of course, there's been a tension. The reason for NATO's existence is...not in part, but it's a major role in the relationship between, shall we call it, the Siberian state now called Russia, and of course our increased desire to maintain a dialogue and to improve that dialogue.

There are exacerbating circumstances, in particular surrounding nuclear disarmament and the missile defence systems that are being contemplated by NATO and NATO nations, and the statement by...I believe it was the military chief's recent comments surrounding the ballistic missile defence system.

I wonder if you would comment on this pursuit of a stronger relationship vis-à-vis those relationships, or those recent issues, and how you see them progressing.

[Paul Chapin]

It's an underappreciated, looming problem, Russia.

I served in the Soviet Union back in the seventies. My colleague, Chris Alexander, was there much more recently than I was. There was a sense that cooperation was going to be possible only at the margin. Maybe we could do a little bit of crisis management together, but their system and ours were just fundamentally incompatible.

That fundamental incompatibility isn't there anymore. The Soviet Union is history. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is history. And Russians have demonstrated in very graphic ways over the years that they want to be a democratic society. But it's going to take them more than a generation, as we know, to achieve anything approximating that. They are moving rather too rapidly back to a one-party state. It's not a Communist Party state, but it has a lot of the old Communist Party attitudes about how you run things. And that's a serious problem that is going to limit our ability—NATO's ability and individual countries' ability—to cooperate with the Russians.

There is a NATO-Russia council that tries to put some structure into conversations with the Russians. It has been helpful. It's not a particularly useful vehicle, but it does mean that on a regular basis the Russian ambassador sits around the table with all the other ambassadors of NATO to discuss things. They do the same thing with the Ukrainians.

The Russians have been coming to G-8 meetings, and sometimes have been invited to NATO meetings and so on. But I think there's a limit, and the limit has been established by the Russians, not by us. They have one of the fastest growing defence budgets and military development programs in the world. They're not getting along particularly well with their neighbours.

I think their threats about ballistic missile defence are just as bogus as could be. It seems to be universally ignored that the Russians have a ballistic missile defence system of their own. So what are they complaining about us developing one of our own? Clearly, the notion that our ballistic missile system is a threat to them, when the missiles couldn't go a tenth of the distance to get there, is a kind of nonsense.

At some point, we have to recognize that the Russians have a long way to go internally to establish democratic credentials, and only at that point can they really expect something more than polite conversation with us. They have been helping in Afghanistan in ways that served their interests and ours, so there's some cooperation going on. They've been helping on counterterrorism. They've been helping on counter-piracy. Where it's in their interest, from a practical perspective, things work well. But the regime in Moscow has ambitions that I think make it a long-term problem for us.

[Rick Norlock, Conservative, Northumberland—Quinte West, ON]

I'd just like you to comment. As we know, dictatorships, when they have trouble within their own borders, usually like to pick a fight with somebody internationally. If the current regime in Russia were to come under some kind of constraint, would you change that view that the missile defence issue is bogus? I can see it becoming serious if Mr. Putin begins to have a threat to his democracy.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Norlock's time has expired, so give a very brief response.

[Paul Chapin]

I can give you a very short answer on ballistic missile defence. They use it I think as a political football. Back in Lisbon, barely 18 months ago, there was a nice comfortable agreement worked up with the Russians to cooperate on ballistic missile defence. What's happened in the meantime? Well, it wasn't on our part that the story changed.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Mr. Strahl, you have the floor.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for your contribution here today.

I haven't seen any polling on it, but I think Canadians in general are supportive of our participation in NATO and are certainly proud of our men and women in uniform who've been deployed recently in NATO-led missions.

There is also I think a public perception that just a few NATO countries carry most of the load. Do you think NATO is at all threatened, long term, by that fact or that perception that not each of the 28 nations is an equal partner and that some seem unwilling or unable to participate as fully as some of the others?

[George Petrolekas]

There are two parts to that. The alliance recognizes that there are differences in economic capability between nations. So they are taxed, if you will, for common funding programs based on the size of their economy, and so on.

I led the NATO certification team to Slovenia in 2004, and I recall speaking to their chief of defence staff. They were making very modest contributions, I think it was about 300 to 400 people in total to various missions—not just Afghanistan, but that represented a contribution from an armed force of 4,000 in total. It was still a sizeable contribution from a percentage standpoint. So you have to be careful when you look at the levels of those contributions.

What really worries us—and we do address the fear of a two-tier NATO—is the willingness to commit and to look beyond the European geographical construct, and also the difficulties that happen in a particular mission. In Libya, for example—and again, our colleague, Dave Perry, will be talking about this on Thursday—there was an entire rebalancing of AWAC crews once Germany decided to support the mission politically but not militarily. So AWAC crews that were assigned to the Libyan mission had German aircrews taken away and moved to Afghanistan, which were then backfilled by others. Those are some of the things that are different.

The third part that concerns us is a willingness to look beyond. We've identified a number of countries that seem to have a more global view than some other nations within the alliance. That has become a bit of a conflict within, because there are nations like ours that look beyond their own borders and other partner nations that do, but then there are others that don't, either from their own interpretation of interest or their ability to economically support it.

Are there two tiers emerging? Absolutely.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

I think you've identified some of the threats. Are other countries like ours, as our defence budgets globally become more stretched...? You've just indicated that it is a concern. How does that manifest itself? What is the threat there in the way that NATO operates?

[George Petrolekas]

I'll give you an example of how it manifests itself.

When the United States announced its strategic pivot, part of that announcement also said there would be base closures in Europe, there would be reductions of brigades, and there would be reductions of troop commitments to Europe. That's influenced by fiscal constraints on the United States, by whether it can afford to maintain previous levels, but also by those levels being affected by changes in strategy, indicating that it is not the primary interest anymore.

So, yes, absolutely, nations will sharpen and decide what they do based on fiscal constraints, and those are some of the things that you are seeing, such as the Dutch eliminating all of their tanks as part of their smart defence initiative, because they can no longer sustain that capability. But there are ways to address it.

[Paul Chapin]

Let me make one final point about NATO, and that is that of the 28 members, 26 of them are European. Of those European members, some are large and some are quite small. As long as they continue, as they have for a very long time now, to understand that what they have in common and what they have to protect in common is more important than anything that might divide them, NATO will survive. It's at the point where people's loyalties get pulled in other directions and they see other interests superseding their common interest that the alliance I think is beginning to fold.

There's a whole history of prophecies that NATO is about to die. It's still around and it's still striving. I fully expect it to be around for at least a generation.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Time has expired for the scheduled meeting, but because we got started late due to the votes in the House, I'll entertain one supplemental question per party.

Mr. Harris, go ahead for the NDP.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thanks.

I wish we could have had more time. It's been very interesting.

My question is a bit broad. Let me preface it by saying that people are members of NATO for different reasons. The eastern Europeans, perhaps Lithuania, Slovenia, or others are there because they still feel the need for that collective security. NATO requires consensus for action. You said there were 20-plus NATO countries involved in Afghanistan, for example.

NATO still has a value in terms of building that consensus for action, and even for the strategic concept, which is broader than those narrow interests of some of them. Does it not have a value in continuing to broaden that consensus and developing that consensus even if members can't participate in actions? And wouldn't you see the fact that other nations, such as the 20 involved in Afghanistan, want to contribute to some international peace and security efforts as an argument for taking that larger group back to the United Nations as a focus for diplomatic initiatives—as you said, we're weak on that score—and trying to enhance the role of the United Nations, and get rid of some of what you called the nonsense or histrionics and whatnot and the scepticism about the UN that I see in a lot of defence people in Canada? Can that not be improved using that consensus, politics, and diplomatic efforts?

[Paul Chapin]

Mr. Harris, I think you've just described the only avenue for salvation for the UN Security Council's functions. That is that the NATO countries and the countries that are democratic and think like NATO begin to work more as a block within the UN and take the UN back, in some respects, from some of the influences that have really distorted its basic purpose and direction over the last couple of generations.

I think NATO, if it plays its cards right and remains the anchor of the international security system that it has become, can spawn good work in a lot of other areas. NATO is helping the African Union develop its peacekeeping capabilities. It can do useful things in a lot of areas. To the extent that it's prepared to work together in those fields, I think its broader function on international peace and security through the UN and through making the UN more effective is vital.

The UN's effect on international security right now is almost entirely a function of NATO. The UN can do all the easy things in peacekeeping and peace operations, but the hard things all have to be done now by NATO. So let's see if we can't figure out a way to merge those two operations and make them mutually reinforcing.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I want to pick up on Ms. Moore's question about a continuing role in Afghanistan. You said you think the public appetite for fighting insurgents will be at an end in 2014, but you didn't think it was necessarily at an end for the purposes of continuing to train Afghans to fight insurgents. I guess others might interpret differently, but my interpretation of the parliamentary resolution is that in 2014 we're gone, and we're out of there regardless of whether the Afghans are ready to carry on their own security. What's your view on that?

[Paul Chapin]

I'll give George a chance to answer that as well, but I think the name of the game has always been, or should have been, maybe much sooner than we've now realized, that in due course Afghanistan has to stand on its own feet and look after its own security and deal with its own internal problems. We can help in a lot of different ways up until 2014, but at a certain point you have to say that this is as far as is reasonable for you to expect us to go in certain functions. We'll stay in other ways and do some other things.

It seems to me that the biggest problem, one of the major problems, Afghanistan has is Pakistan. I'd like to see a great deal more of our collective effort focused on helping Pakistan. It's a Commonwealth country. We used to have military training cooperation. There are Canadian soldiers who trained in Quetta. We've lost all of that, and somehow or other, for its own reasons, Pakistan has collapsed internally and it's a major sower of problems in Afghanistan.

I think we're Afghanistan-bound way beyond 2014, but what we do and how we do it will be very different from what we've done in the last 10 years.

[George Petrolekas]

I'd also add that we aren't here to interpret the parliamentary motion or what that means. What we were describing to you is what is going to be on the agenda at the Chicago summit. It is inconceivable for anyone to say to any of you that NATO and other allies will not ask Canada for some sort of contribution, whether it be military or financial. We were trying to flag for you that it is going to be a subject at the Chicago summit.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Mr. Alexander, you have the final question.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

We have the strategic concept. You've given us some additional insights into it. I think a lot of food for thought stems from your describing it as aspirational in some way. It's a declaratory document. Some real work needs to be done to make sure the alliance is acting in the ways it needs to fulfill those aspirations.

Could you, in closing, give us a sense of where you think Canada falls short in being able to deliver on these aspirations? Clearly we've done some things well historically and recently. You've covered that. We've heard about that here.

Where do you think the gaps are in our capabilities, in our commitment under this strategic concept as an ally? In your strategic outlook paper you talk about certain scenarios. We hope they don't come to pass with regard to Syria, Iran, and North Korea. You mentioned that your analysis of the strategic concept had been made in a darker frame of mind.

Could you share with us some of those dark thoughts, but with regard to Canada's capabilities and the gaps we might find in seeking to fulfill our obligations under the strategic concept?

[Paul Chapin]

Let us both take a crack at answering that. Looking back at Canadian foreign and defence policy, because they're intimately linked, I think one of the real disappointments for me is the decline in our capacity for intellectual leadership. Over the years we've talked about Canada being a middle power, of Canada being a peacekeeper, and so on. What that really always implied was that Canada had its ear to the ground, was thinking creatively, and came up with solutions to problems that sometimes nobody else was able to do, either because they didn't have the freedom to think that way or they didn't have the temerity to articulate these kinds of things.

When Mr. Brahmi talked about our recommendation 7 and some of the things that are past their prime, the institutions, laws, and so on were all created between 1899 and 1945-1949. There's not much intellectual novelty in our thinking about international issues since that time, with the possible exception of R2P, responsibility to protect. There we're schizophrenic. Look at Libya. That was a classic example of where the responsibility to protect should have kicked in. And Syria in spades. But what did we do in Libya? We said you can intervene but no boots on the ground; you can protect civilians but only from the air and from the sea. Since when is that the way you structure soldiers to go and do good to protect civilians? Imagine police being required to operate under those kinds of parameters.

We have to do something about that sort of thing, the doctrine of pre-emption. We're still focused on how much do you have to know and when do you have to know it before you can take some action. The international law of a war, armed conflict, detainees, all that kind of stuff—instead of arguing about those things, we should put our minds to coming up with new international conventions, and if necessary institutions that reflect those conventions to give people some guidelines about how to manage security in the 21st century. For me that's the biggest downside.

[George Petrolekas]

I guess we're running short on time, but specifically on weaknesses from a Canadian standpoint, I think we're losing our regional expertise. I don't think that either in Foreign Affairs or the military we are tapped into the undercurrents going on in areas that should interest us, so as to understand them. We have a tremendous multi-ethnic population resource in this country with linguistic capability, which resides in parts of the Canadian Forces as well and which could give us insights into parts of the world better than what we have now. I don't think we've exploited that to a level we could.

The second area of weakness is that we're designing forces possibly based on the last war and the last decade. I think there has to be some thinking now about what these shifts mean. At the end of the day, these are the shifts that start influencing what kind of equipment you buy, what kinds of forces you have, how you man them, what the balance of those forces is between east coast and west coast and the balances between army, navy, and air force. I don't think we have yet broken out of the various silos that drive procurement, missions, thinking, and application in various regions. I think we could do a better job of that. That's a weakness I see.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

Before I adjourn this meeting, I want to ask that the members of the steering committee stick around for a very fast informal conversation with me about future scheduling issues.

Colonel Petrolekas and Mr. Chaplin, thank you for coming in and for sharing your expertise with us today. It will help us form our opinion. We're looking forward to your colleague speaking to us on Thursday.

With that, I'll entertain a motion to adjourn.