Maybe I will answer first.
The differences you refer to are at the heart of the challenge within the nuclear posture. As I said, we have a consensus document, but it's papering over the cracks. I don't perceive the Germans, the Dutch, and the Belgians to be hosting B61 bombs in 10 or 15 years' time, because they don't perceive Russia to be a threat. This is a problem, because the Baltic states in particular see NATO's nuclear posture as crucial to the article 5 commitment, and nuclear weapons here are symptoms rather than the ultimate cause of the problem.
Similarly, in response to your second question, when it comes to Russian perceptions, I personally don't think the Russians lie in their beds worrying at night about the B61 bomb in Europe. It doesn't have the range and therefore isn't a particular threat to the Russians, but they see it as a very useful way of ensuring that the alliance is not as cohesive as it might be.
Now, that's the case today. If we go through with a modernization process as proposed, the B61 Mod.12, which is the modernization of the current B61—which the Americans are now estimating will cost them somewhere in the region of $10 billion—will be putting tail fins on those bombs and making them far more capable. Putting them on the F-35 stealth planes could well change the Russian dynamic and perspective, and I think they will be perceiving this as symbolic, yet again, of the American and NATO's allies prioritizing their own capabilities over the relationship and over a more cooperative future relationship.