I would agree with that. It's important to recognize that maritime warning, whether it happens through NORAD or not, is an inherently much more complicated thing than air defence or air warning. If we go back to the Cold War context it's really just our air force and the American air force, two entities, cooperating with each other. It's a relatively straightforward thing, though in practice more complicated.
After 9/11 air warning obviously expanded. We had the FAA and other civilian agencies involved in the process, but it's still a relatively small number of players bringing information together into one package and trying to work with that.
Maritime warning is much more complex with many more players involved. It shouldn't be at all surprising to us that it takes a longer time for us to get to the point where we're not just in the process of actually exchanging information but we're actually in a position to make good use of it; the right kind of filtering is going on, and once information is packaged together, it can be put out to stakeholders in a way that is useful to them.
I think at this point in the process it's still very early days. A lot of the participants feel that they pool information into the centre and then it comes back to them, and they say, “That's what we told you two days ago and now you're sending it back us.”
I think in the longer term there is plenty of potential for them to get beyond that and to have a more meaningful centre that actually digests that information and can do more than just give out advisories.