National Defence Committee on Oct. 30th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, colleagues, and guests.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we will continue with our study of the defence of North America.

We have two witnesses before us today from the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute: Mr. Brian Bow, a fellow with the CDFAI, and Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, retired, also a fellow of the institute. Gentlemen, please make your opening statements.

[Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute]

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I'm pleased to have the opportunity to participate in your review of the defence of North America. I'll keep my initial comments brief.

Previous witnesses have provided you with input on a wide range of issues related to the subject at hand. While my first-hand military experience is now dated given my retirement from the military some 10 years ago, I've maintained a direct interest in many security and defence areas through my consulting work and my association with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Having said that, I will focus my comments on NORAD to quite a few points on ballistic missile defence.

Several years of my military career were spent in NORAD or NORAD-related positions, the final one being the deputy commander of NORAD at the headquarters in Colorado Springs from 1998 to 2001. I am an ardent supporter of the partnership and am pleased to see that it remains a strong, efficient, and effective means of contributing to the defence of North America.

After 9/11, I was a proponent of expanding the NORAD mission to address other domains and was encouraged to see the inclusion of maritime warning as a step in that direction. Much of the binational cooperation that I thought we could achieve is now being coordinated bilaterally between CJOC and NORTHCOM, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and Northern Command, which is fine. It may or may not be the most efficient way of operating but it seems to meet the needs of both nations. Lieutenant-General Beare offered you a fairly complete perspective in this regard in his comments given to the committee in May.

On a more general not, I cannot overstate the importance of our partnership with the United States in NORAD. We don't just work together; we operate in a fully integrated command. Tasks performed by Canadians and Americans are interwoven to the point where in most cases the nationality of the person performing them is immaterial. Canadians report to Americans and Americans report to Canadians throughout the structure. We share sensitive and highly classified information in order to perform the mission. We are dependent on each other even though the U.S. provides the majority of the resources. Throughout, the NORAD relationship engenders a level of trust that serves us well beyond NORAD issues. The success of the partnership and the professionalism of the Canadian military personnel have cemented personal relationships in both nations consistent with our inseparable domestic defence requirements. We Canadians benefit in the achievement of a priority national defence mission at a fraction of the cost were we required to do it on our own. Pursuing a natural evolution of the NORAD mission to retain its relevance and effectiveness must continue to be a priority.

Cooperation for aerospace warning and aerospace control along with maritime warning is good and important, but we could do much more. To that end, we should reconsider Canada's involvement in the ground-based North American ballistic missile defence system. Just as Canada participates with the U.S. in NORAD for aerospace warning and aerospace defence, it is a natural extension that Canada's participation in ballistic missile warning should evolve to engagement in ballistic missile defence. I've been an active advocate for Canada's involvement in BMD and was disappointed with the decision in 2005 to decline participation. I felt at the time, and still do, that we missed a great opportunity to reinforce our NORAD relationship, not to mention ensuring the protection of our sovereign territory from a rogue ballistic missile threat.

We subscribe to the necessity of the alliance to defend North America and yet we have abrogated our responsibility to the partnership with regard to the BMD mission. We have left it to the American side of NORAD to perform using their territory, their resources, and their rules. With improvements to the BMD system over the years there's a real risk that NORAD involvement will be marginalized to the point where the U.S. will want to consider excluding NORAD from missile warning altogether and simply execute both the warning and the defence mission themselves. I believe that we should engage the U.S. to assess how we might become involved. It is the responsible course of action for Canada.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to providing whatever assistance I can in answering any questions you have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Bow.

[Brian Bow, Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute]

My thanks to the committee for the invitation. I'm very pleased to participate and look forward to the discussion that follows.

Canada is confronted with a number of complex national defence questions today, and there's a danger that we will lose sight of the less urgent but more fundamental challenge of defending the North American continent from large-scale threats. There's also a risk that when we do turn our attention to focus on continental defence, we may become fixated on the politically charged issue of ballistic missile defence. BMD is, of course, an important question which must ultimately be answered, but it is not the only question.

Today I want to make a general argument for re-examining not only BMD, but also the overall architecture of our defence cooperation with the United States. I do not suggest this re-examination because I think there is an immediate crisis to deal with or that the system doesn't work at all; rather, it's because the muddling through we have done to get through past crises may have taken us down a dead-end street, limiting our options for the future.

I would identify four key features of our current approach.

One, while NORAD persists as an integrated command structure within a particular domain, the main trend since 9/11 has been a reliance on building up separate national command structures and capabilities.

Two, rather than thinking about how to develop a more integrated command structure that would bridge many domains, the focus has been on trying to make the commands we already have—NORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC—work together more efficiently, that is, the tri-command system.

Three, where efforts have been made to pursue more integrated forms of coordination, they have taken the form of ad hoc extensions of NORAD to other domains, i.e., the maritime NORAD system which General Macdonald mentioned a moment ago.

Four, the prospects for building on NORAD and other domains are clearly affected by lingering questions about NORAD's role and relevance, many of which stem from the unresolved question of BMD.

On the one hand, I don't think there's any prospect for us to engineer from scratch the kind of unitary, integrated, multi-domain command structure that was called for by the U.S.-Canada Bi-National Planning Group. The two countries' perspectives and priorities are clearly not identical, and each rightly wants to maintain the capacity to act on its own under certain circumstances.

On the other hand, there are reasons to think twice about just carrying on with the ad hoc NORAD-plus approach that we're currently following. Building on NORAD does carry a number of advantages. Again, these were mentioned already. More concretely, it protects an already effective structure for integrated aerospace warning and air defence, and it may be a foundation for cooperation in space. Less concretely but equally importantly, it leverages existing relationships with key offices and personnel at USNORTHCOM, preserves a potent symbol of Canada-U.S. cooperation, and could sustain and spread a very positive binational organizational culture to coordination in other domains.

There are, however, some potential problems with building incrementally on the NORAD template.

First, NORAD is an air force institution, obviously, and using it as the foundation for a broader, multi-domain structure creates the potential for, or at least the potential perception of, an imbalance of influence. That has been an issue in the effort to build a maritime NORAD as the already difficult bureaucratic process of bringing together many different departments under one umbrella has been further complicated by the perception among some of the participating departments and agencies that the RCAF and USAF are poaching on others' turf.

Second, residual tensions within the partially consolidated CJOC itself, and the gaps between CJOC and NORAD within the contemporary tri-command structure may tend to sustain an unhealthy division of labour between the services, which may exacerbate turf battles and raise questions about overlap and redundancy. At the very least, the existing tri-command system clearly leaves some significant coordination gaps with ongoing complaints from insiders and outsiders alike about over-complicated communication and decision-making, information blockages, and ambiguity about roles and responsibilities.

Third, the branding of new forms of bilateral defence coordination as extensions of NORAD may tend to obscure the fact that these new initiatives are not nearly as integrated as NORAD itself. It is difficult to say at this point, but early reports suggest that the maritime NORAD initiative, for example, will mostly feed into national domain awareness efforts without giving Canadian commanders much influence on U.S. decision-making, or vice versa. In that sense, thinking about this as maritime NORAD may give us the impression we have created more NORAD when in fact what we have created is not the same, or doesn't work the same.

Finally, to wrap things up, if Canada is willing to make significant investments over the next few years to try to harden the outer edges of the continental security perimeter, it may find the United States receptive to the creation of new integrated structures, especially with respect to the surveillance and control of maritime approaches, inland waterways, shipping, and other cross-border transportation systems.

This is probably the only way to stop the post-911, post-BMD drift towards separate national efforts, and to secure greater consultation, intelligence sharing, and financial resources.

Unfortunately, there is little reason to think these issues will be prominent in the upcoming election, or that whatever government comes out of that election will be prepared to open a broader debate on these issues unless, of course, there is some new catastrophic early warning failure to catalyze public demand for a broader and more effective coordination.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bow.

We'll proceed now to the opening round of questions, which will be seven-minute slots, beginning with Mr. Chisu, please.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Thank you very much to the witnesses for the great presentation about NORAD.

I have an introductory question. How is the changing international security environment affecting North America from a defence and security perspective?

I'm speaking about the flexing of muscles by Russia lately in Novaya Zemlya. It is a neighbour of the United States, a neighbour of Canada. China is increasing its maritime component. They have 70 submarines on the west coast.

Could you elaborate on your opinion about these things, and what is a threat that you envisage in this area?

[LGen George Macdonald]

I don't think there's much doubt that the Russians' increased activity is a concern to us all. From a NORAD perspective, this isn't something that just developed since the Crimean crisis, or the Ukraine issue. It's more focused on capabilities that Russia has been working on for some time now.

They are re-establishing strategic aviation bases in the north. They are developing newer and newer technology to extend the range of cruise missiles, which are delivered by bombers. They have been more active in the north of late than they have been for the previous decade.

Even when I was in NORAD, there was a softening, if you will, of the relationship in that we undertook to advise each other when we were deploying to the north to provide some public warning of our activities.

I think that now in NORAD Russia is maybe not a direct threat, but certainly they have been penetrating international airspace and conducting flights towards North America, and of course ultimately, the cruise missile threat delivered by bombers is a threat.

No one also can detract from the fact that China is a growing power. The pivot of attention towards the Pacific is an important aspect of what we do. I personally don't think China represents a threat to Canada or to North America, but nevertheless, it is a power to be reckoned with and dealt with, and recognized throughout the international environment.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

Because we are speaking about the Arctic, and in all those activities of Russia probably they are developing the Arctic, do you think it is necessary to have an overview of the policy regarding the Arctic both in Canada and the United States?

[LGen George Macdonald]

Even though we have perhaps some diplomatic differences about boundaries in the Arctic, I don't think there are any differences about the need to protect the Arctic as part of NORAD's area of responsibility. Indeed there is excellent cross-cooperation between the Alaska NORAD region and the Canadian NORAD region.

I think it's recognized throughout NORAD and throughout our two countries that's an area of considerable priority for the future given the change in the environment. I don't think there's any hesitation to agree with you.

[Brian Bow]

I think that's right. I would just add there's nothing new about that. Our relationship with the United States in the Arctic has always been characterized by a kind of mixed agenda, where there are some things where we clearly do not agree and we choose to try to work around those disagreements, and then some other things where we clearly do agree. That's nothing new.

I think the same thing is going on today where there are plenty of opportunities for increased coordination with the U.S. Almost everything that's related to the increased uncertainty about Russia's intentions in the north, and the increased uncertainties about China's role in the Pacific are both things where we, for the most part, see eye to eye with the Americans, and there's still plenty of room for us to cooperate with them.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

I was looking at an increased military cooperation between Russia and China. Do you foresee any future threat or any necessity to change some of the policies in this regard, mostly in the Pacific area?

[Brian Bow]

It's true there is political cooperation with them, and some very low-level defence cooperation, but to me it doesn't seem any more prominent than their respective cooperation with a variety of other partners. There has been an overplaying, I think, of the importance of the connections between China and Russia in that, really, their strategic agendas clash more than they are aligned.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

I'm asking you this because they recently made an agreement between them on military cooperation—

[Brian Bow]

They've made a number of agreements recently, yes, but I don't think any of those agreements take away from the fact that their interests in the Pacific are not necessarily aligned. There is no reason to think of the potential threats that might be posed by either of them in the long term as being exacerbated in any really meaningful way by those agreements.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

General, did you want to add to that?

[LGen George Macdonald]

No, I agree.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

You were speaking extensively about ballistic missile defence. Do you see a necessity for cooperation with the United States in this field? Do you see a missile threat?

[LGen George Macdonald]

I don't think the missile threat has accelerated, if you will, but it has been gradually evolving over the past several years. North Korea clearly now has the ability to launch a missile to North America. Whether they can effectively mate a weapon with that missile and deliver it with any kind of accuracy remains to be seen. Iran continues to develop even longer-range ballistic missiles.

I don't think the threat has suddenly jumped up to be an immediate crisis, but I think it still warrants our consideration to participate in the ballistic missile defence warning and defence mechanism with the United States. It's something I suppose we could put off for some time yet, but I think there will come a time when we will find ourselves in a position where we will have missed that opportunity and it will be difficult for us to re-engage—to the detriment, I think, of the integrity of our NORAD participation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you. That's time, Mr. Chisu.

Mr. Harris, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming to our committee today.

On the defence of North America, I know you've both focused on NORAD to some extent. We're looking at all the broader issues, including cyber, maritime defence, etc., but just to focus a little bit on NORAD, I got the impression a little bit today....

Mr. Macdonald, you made a comment about NORAD retaining its relevance and effectiveness. Other people seem to be looking for new roles for NORAD. We know how it came about; NORAD came together in the Cold War with respect to a particular defence need. Are we really looking for something to tack onto that? I mean, cyber doesn't seem to work. In Canada it's public safety. In the U.S. it's national defence. It's both offensive and defensive, so we don't really have effective work there. There's maritime, of course; there's an aerospace command, so we're not really dealing with our navy.

Is that why we're settling on BMD, that maybe we can do it together?

[LGen George Macdonald]

In my opinion, BMD is the obvious natural NORAD mission that we could perform with the United States. I think it's something we've missed out on. I used the words “abrogated our responsibility” in my presentation. I believe it's something in which we morally have an obligation to participate, and we should. It's the obvious first choice, if you will.

I don't discount the possibility of working with the United States on cyber issues. I recognize the disparity between how they're dealt with in both countries, but I think there is perhaps an opportunity that we could explore, within the context of a NORAD-like undertaking, to share cyber defence issues.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Sir, I know that you've spent a lot of time in the military, and I clearly thank you for your service. I understand that in addition to being a board member of this organization, you're also an active lobbyist. I see actually that you represent, on behalf of your employer, some 14 different aerospace companies, including Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training, Magellan Aerospace, Lockheed Martin Canada, Kongsberg Defence Systems.

I don't mean to discount your statements, but clearly it may well be that some of your clients have interests in this sort of thing too. Is that correct?

[LGen George Macdonald]

I don't know. Yes, it's possible. The only company I'm aware of that has been actively involved in the last decade or so with ballistic missile defence was Raytheon, which proposed the installation of an x-band radar at Goose Bay as a Canadian contribution, if you will, toward ballistic missile defence before the decision was taken not to participate. Of the companies I currently work with, there's no substantive work we do that has anything to do with ballistic missile defence, and I think I'm right in saying not even NORAD.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you for clarifying that. I just wanted to make sure that was the case.

I know we give some prevalence to NORAD, and I think we're very proud of the relationship. I think you hear from time to time about the joint command and the fact that during 9/11 the Canadian commander was on duty. I think it works well for Canada and for what we do.

We were told the other day in a report prepared by a witness that in the United States their defence documents rarely or barely mention NORAD, but they emphasize the kind of binational work we do. I'm wondering if we're struggling to make more of it than it really is, in terms of the American priorities. It seems to work for Canada in terms of what we are doing now. We're being told by other witnesses that realistically, Korea is not a threat to Canada and the Russians are not a threat to Canada, from a missile point of view, and that this seems to be what we want to do because the Americans are doing it. I haven't heard a good argument that we do that, other than to say it seems logical, etc. Expense isn't obviously a question. Priorities for Canada are a question. Why would it really be necessary?

[LGen George Macdonald]

Joe Jockel, an academic who has written quite a bit about NORAD, said once that Canada needs NORAD more than NORAD needs Canada. Indeed, in my time in the United States, I found there were many senior American military officers who were unfamiliar with NORAD, and every time we'd have a visit to Colorado Springs I would take the opportunity to give them NORAD 101.

You're quite right in saying that there are maybe fewer in the United States who recognize NORAD's utility than there are in Canada, but having said that, General Jacoby, the current commander, is very supportive of NORAD. The PJBD is very supportive of NORAD and Canada-U.S. participation. Also, whether we continue to call it NORAD or not, or whether we change the name or develop some other arrangement, I think there will always be a need to have this bilateral, binational participation.

Ballistic missile defence is a responsibility of aerospace warning and aerospace control. We've signed up to that. Yes, you could argue that we could avoid it, that the Americans are making more of ballistic missile threat than really exists, but the reality is, too, that we are in NORAD, that it is a recognized mission of NORAD, and that the threat continues to evolve. There's hard intelligence that has identified what North Korea capabilities have developed to, and everybody knows that North Korea is an unstable regime, at best.