Based on the historical work we have done from the navy's perspective specifically, my understanding is we have not seen the degree of recapitalization in terms of its broad impact on the fleet since the Korean War. We have replaced one class over a relatively short period of time on a cyclical basis. As a result we've had these boom and bust cycles.
We have not engaged in such a widespread recapitalization since that time. The modernized Halifax class is a new class of ship, notwithstanding the fact that it's the recapitalization of an existing capability. At the same time we brought the submarines to their operational state and are now looking at the introduction of three new classes of ship at the same time that we're going to deliver a number of these other major projects that I referred to in the response to Ms. Murray's question around missile systems: underwater warfare systems; tugs, which are not exciting but are important; boats; and a whole bunch of other things that are all happening over a relatively short period of time. This is why when I speak to the sailors in the fleet I talk about two decades of continuous transition. In non-wartime we've never seen anything like this.
This is why it's so important that we work out not just the acquisition part of it, which is challenging in itself, but what I call the back end of the business because we can't continue to do business the same way. In order to make maximum use of these huge investments by the taxpayers we've got to sort out some things that we're doing on the back end, which speaks to the CRS report, which speaks to a whole bunch of other things that we're openly attacking.