I think, sir, you have summarized the nature of the dilemma there. The dilemma is that we should use deterrents more effectively, but to be able to do that we have to believe in our own defence, because you have to believe in defensive capability. The problem is that the United States has shouldered the greatest proportion of the burden over the years, but the United States is also very distracted in the Middle East, and I must say in Asia, as is Canada.
The real problem at this point seems to be how you get a convincing capability to the eastern front. Particularly in Poland, that means a heavy capability. The Poles are certainly aware of this problem, and the difficulty with the Baltic republics I think is even graver.
The issue to some degree is that the people who live in the area have to be the first to be concerned. They ought to be the ones coming to us to ask us to assist them after they have done as much as they can to help themselves.
I just attended a conference there titled “The Power of the Powerless Revisited”. I had to say to my European friends that they are not powerless; they are as rich and populous as any area in the world and they can spend more on military capability. If they do that, or if they use that capability more efficiently and more effectively, they could face down Putin as well.
So there's a problem here of who goes first, sequencing, as well as overall capability in place. At the end of the day, it probably doesn't matter because we need the capability in a convincing way, placed where it will act as a plausible deterrent. I don't think we have that at this point.