Thank you very much for the question.
It is certainly the case that deterrence, everything considered and expensive as it is, is a lot cheaper than defence, and defence is a lot cheaper than trying to get a force out of a territory that has been occupied, such as that in Crimea.
As we look at specifics, and that's what you invited us to do here—as we look at the security, for example, of the Baltic republics and of Poland, both members of NATO—this issue that you raise is becoming very central. It's one thing to have a few troops who are available and who can be moved. As recently as this week, the Europeans have decided that they will get together a multilateral force of, I think, 3,000 troops. But what is so striking is how rapidly the Russians moved 20,000 to 40,000 troops to their border. They have a geopolitical advantage there.
There's another issue. What about heavy capability to back up the troops? If you have a heavy capability in place, it is a very effective deterrent, because no other actor would want to mess with that. But if that capability is not in place and the potential aggressor can move such a capability in very fast, I think we'd have problems on the eastern frontier.