National Defence Committee on Feb. 25th, 2015

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Thank you, Chair.

Admiral, thank you for coming in today. We get to hear from the opposition, the opposition that cancelled the replacement of the Sea King helicopter, of course, when it was in office, and now continues to criticize the good work the government has done, particularly around the warships we will see coming on line over the next generation.

However, I digress.

Admiral Newton, I understand that in February of last year, you gave a talk at Dalhousie University in which you spoke about the Royal Canadian Navy's contribution to the strategic defence of North America, what we are studying here before us, and you included counterterrorism. Could you please elaborate on the counterterrorism measures undertaken by Canada's navy?

[RAdm John Newton]

Wow, did I say that?

The Combined Task Force 150, in the Arabian Sea, in sea lanes that reach all the way back to Africa, through the Suez Canal, into southern Europe, and actually flow drugs into the United States—the very thing that HMCS Toronto was just provided a meritorious unit commendation for— their mission is counterterrorism and maritime security. It's to prevent the seaways of the world from being used to move illicit cargoes and terrorists, and from being used for other activities, such as human smuggling and arms shipments. We're there to network with like-minded nations, with police services such as Interpol and the RCMP, to actually try to get into the undercurrent of these illegal activities.

In North America we do the same thing with the marine security operations centre. The partners there are CSIS, the RCMP, and the Border Services Agency. All of us have an interest in closing down the seaways, especially the big ships carrying containers, but also the ships under 300 tonnes that can actually slip underneath our radar coverage if we don't pay attention to them.

The platform that Canada has created and is running very effectively is the MSOC. Just to give you an idea of how effective this MSOC is, which normally looks out to sea, when the shootings occurred here on Parliament Hill and the tragic event happened at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, the partners of the MSOC turned inward in Halifax, called me up and said that the three police agencies of the country— CBSA, CSIS, and the RCMP—were actually looking at their defence partners and keeping our backs safe. That was from the partnership created looking outwards. They were able to give me the confidence that our soldiers were safe in Halifax while we were trying to understand the depth of the issues happening in Ottawa.

I would say that the relationship is very effective. It allows us to exercise a scenario such as we did last year in Pictou, Nova Scotia, where we actually ran a counterterrorism scenario.

The Special Operations Forces of Canada participate in the scenario. They're brought in to do strikes at sea using their own maritime capacities, which are married to the Royal Canadian Navy capabilities and married to the other agencies, such as the coast guard and their ships, and aircraft.

Then we brought in a decontamination capacity from the Canadian army to deal with the chemical agents that might be involved in a terrorist-type strike.

This is the kind of thinking military men and women do. We don't do it on our own. We have a whole-of-government agency behind us to allow all the elements of security to work in order to defeat the terrorist threat.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Very good.

I'm actually noticing a theme, coming back to your number one preoccupation, which is the sea lanes and monitoring them.

We're preparing this report for Parliament. It will be looked at by the government. What are the things that we as lawmakers should be considering to better understand this? What things would you impress upon us that are important to better understand the challenges around that focus you have? What could be done to make life a little easier for members of the Royal Canadian Navy in doing that job day in and day out?

[RAdm John Newton]

The marine security operations centre is not run by the navy, but we are participants in it. We are an equal to all of the other five security partners.

I think all the security partners of the MSOC would benefit from a greater public and a greater legislative understanding of the role of this marine centre.

I do a lot of peddling to the region of the east coast, telling the story to the provinces so that they understand who to phone and who to trust when issues happen in their provinces.

We do a lot of bridging of provincial and federal authorities so that in a crisis we will all know how to respond as a group.

The marine security operations centre has gone from a project and is moving very quickly to its full operational capability. There will be legislative requirements in due course in that shift to operations.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Admiral.

We're at time.

Ms. Michaud, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Rear-Admiral Newton, thank you for your presentation.

Previously, in committee, there have been a lot of discussions on the various threats to Canada and North America in the Arctic, but what about the Atlantic? Could you elaborate on your assessment of the threats? How do you set your priorities in the Atlantic? Do you work with other organizations or other regional forces?

[RAdm John Newton]

If I understand correctly, you are asking me how we coordinate our operations and how we work with the other forces.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I am talking about other regional forces, in the Atlantic at least.

[RAdm John Newton]

As I have already explained a number of times, we must first work with the Marine Security Operations Centre.

Have I understood your question?

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I don't think so. If I may, I have several other questions, so I will move on to the next one. Thank you.

We expect the Royal Canadian Navy to play a greater role in the Arctic once you finally receive—one day perhaps—the Arctic offshore patrol ships. We know that this program is way behind schedule, and it is no longer certain that the operational capabilities of the ships—whose current construction is delayed—will be enough to accomplish everything we want.

Regardless of that, if the Royal Canadian Navy were able to fully participate in the operations in the Arctic, what do you think its role would be? How will it collaborate with the Canadian Coast Guard or how will it complement the Coast Guard's work? Tasks should not end up overlapping either. These two entities should each have a specific role to play in the Arctic. How do you see the work with the Canadian Coast Guard?

[RAdm John Newton]

Okay, I understood the question.

We have a relationship second to none with the Canadian Coast Guard. The coast guard term, unfortunately, is a name of a service, the Canadian Coast Guard. The function of coast guarding is shared by many marine agencies, whether you're in Canada, United States, France, or anywhere. Some countries have the coast guard in the navy. In some countries, the coast guard is the navy. In Canada many of us share the coast guard function. I am a coast guard fonctionnaire. We have a very close relationship in guarding the coasts of the Canada with the Canadian Coast Guard. We plan our annual activities together. The navy plans its fuelling operations with the coast guard so we can reach way into the Arctic. We share platforms for fisheries patrol because the coast guard comes under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. We help them crew the inshore rescue boats so we can learn small boat skills while providing boating safety with the coast guard in the recreational waters of Canada. The coast guard bases some of its inshore rescue stations at our naval reserve divisions.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I don't have much time.

More specifically, how do you think you can complement the work in the Arctic?

[RAdm John Newton]

As we move to the Arctic, we plan the annual season. It's a very short navigation season from mid-July to mid-October. The coast guard goes in to break ice, to help resupply the communities and to patrol the corridors and do a lot of science. The navy goes in to support constabulary affairs in the north. We support the whole-of-government exercise in Nanook. We monitor the shipping of the north. We share the ice plot with the coast guard. We collaborate on community visits. In an amazing demonstration of intergovernmental capacity the coast guard, the navy, the ice service, the hydrographic service, and Parks Canada worked together to discover the Franklin lost ship, HMS Erebusand we will go back to rediscover the next ship. Why do we do it? It leads us to demonstrate Canadian technology. It helps us survey the channels of the central Arctic. And we're doing it as a team.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Okay, thank you very much.

I have another question for you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Please be brief, Ms. Michaud.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

My goodness, how time flies.

What is your current relationship with the Mexican navy? We have heard a lot about the relations with the U.S. navy, but I would like to know more about our cooperation with the Mexican navy in protecting North America.

[RAdm John Newton]

That is a good question.

Op CARIBBE is our foundation of operations in the Caribbean. Op CARIBBE is an inter-agency task force that goes after illicit trafficking especially in drugs. It is run by the department of defence while the U.S. Coast Guard actually does the interdictions. That is our main platform. In that platform there are 14 partner states that collaborate just like Canada does to effectively execute the mission. You can't help but be off Mexican waters when you're doing these missions. So, although Mexico is not a partner nation there is a tri-party relationship called the North American security initiative, NAMSI, which draws Mexico, United States, and Canada into a collaboration to help effect this counter-drug and North American border security mission. It is really a counter-drug mission.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you. That's time.

Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral Newton, thank you so much for taking time to be with us today and providing us with your words.

NORAD has expanded to include maritime defence. With all of the different hats you're wearing, what are your responsibilities in providing the NORAD component through maritime Joint Task Force Atlantic?

[RAdm John Newton]

Sir, it goes right to the heart of my mission. With my mission, one of my principle day-to-day jobs is to develop domain awareness.

Maritime domain awareness is more than just dots on a chart of the sea of positions of ships or ice. For every ship and every boat, it's an understanding of where that track is heading, who is the owner, agent, insurer, charterer, or broker, who's on that crew list, and what's in those cargoes. Maritime domain awareness is this very deep understanding of the intent of these tracks. Normally, 99.9% of everything is legitimate and legal, but in that very complex environment of shipping, where there are brokers and agents and owners and containers and insurers and product, you can lose a small detail.

Our job is to provide maritime domain awareness to NORAD, which is a client of the awareness. Their worry is that a submarine, cruise missile launching boat, ballistic missile launching ship, or an intelligence-gathering ship, like the one that is currently off the U.S. eastern seaboard, would do something damaging to the North American security enterprise.

Since 9/11, NORAD has adopted this role called “maritime warning”; it's an adjunct to the aerospace defence. We provide them with the information; they turn it into a warning.

It really comes to fruition when we do theatre anti-submarine warfare because cruise missiles launched from submarines are probably the biggest threat.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

You've enhanced a couple of your capabilities recently, that being the Aurora, to do more of that tracking.

If you wouldn't mind, would you speak to some of the capabilities it has in anti-submarine surveillance? Secondly, having the Victoria-class submarines that are now in Atlantic waters with near complete operational status and high readiness, how does that enhance your ability to do your NORAD responsibilities?

[RAdm John Newton]

I don't do the NORAD responsibility piece per se; I work the theatre ASW with operational control authorities in the North Atlantic, like my colleagues, Commander, Task Force 84, in Norfolk.

Our job is to keep track of submarines that break into the North Atlantic from ports and oceans more distant than Europe. Our job, day to day, is to always determine where those submarines are. If they break out and are coming toward the North American continent, our job is to clean the ocean surface of all of those tracks—container ships, oil tankers, pleasure boats, and fishing ships—so you have a chance of determining where the underwater submarine is located. It's a very noisy environment, and ships are contributors to the noise of the sea. There are false tracks or they mix up the track information, because to hunt for the submarine you have to see past the ships and their noise.

One piece is the maritime domain awareness piece on the surface, and then we start the hunt under water. The hunt sometimes calls for Canadian Armed Forces assets, depending on the commander of the joint operations decision-making and the permission of government to deploy forces into the Atlantic. Generally, you'll go after a submarine with a long-range patrol aviation, or another submarine. Those are the two most useful tools: submarines and long-range patrol aviation. That's typically what we send for.

We're at the point now of being able to send Victoria-class boats into these operations. That's the government's decision, and we'll wait to see what they say once I signal to the commander of the navy that HMCS Windsor is at high readiness.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

I appreciated your earlier comments and candour in doing the threat assessment, and the concern not only of terrorist attacks, especially in shipping lanes as they approach Canada, but also in Arctic waters with Russia.

I know we always report on the increased activity from an aerial threat, but can you talk about what you're seeing from the standpoint of other foreign navies approaching Canadian waters in the Arctic?

[RAdm John Newton]

I'm going to have to be very circumspect.

Submarines generate an intense amount of confidential information because of the sources, and how we know what submarines are up to is a very compartmental type of information.

Suffice it to say, countries are building submarines. In the northern oceans new ballistic missile-carrying and new attack submarines have been built and are being trialled after a long lull in shipbuilding.

In the Indian Ocean new submarines have been imported from a submarine shipbuilder. One of our global competitors has been selling a certain type of submarine to foreign navies, and submarines are being used by these navies as area or access denial tools. They are an incredible weapons system that own vast areas of ocean because they're hidden in it and you must assume, like a mine, that they are there somewhere. It gathers intelligence and it just forces everybody to stand back and take a far deeper breath when operating in that area.

The utility of submarines to our potential adversaries is quite clear to them, and they're good shipbuilders in this regard.

We work with an alliance and the power of the alliance of Britain, France, the United States, Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and all our NATO allies together creates a much stronger force than a single potential adversary.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, Admiral. That is time.

Mr. Brahmi, you have the floor for five minutes.