Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me today. I think this study on North American defence is important, both in the context of the review of defence policy that's ongoing right now and beyond that, because I think the strategic situation surrounding North American defence has appreciably worsened in the last couple of years. I think this study is timely.
For more than two decades, the focus of North American defence and security has been largely on non-state threats, on things like narcotics trafficking and terrorism. I'd argue that Canada is currently quite well positioned to defend itself against those types of threats.
I would argue, though, that we're significantly less well prepared to defend ourselves against state-based threats, such as North Korea and their ballistic missile threats. North Korea has been developing this technology for several years and is now working to put these types of missiles on their submarines. While the United States has developed their ground-based midcourse defense system, which my colleague just referred to, and originally asked Canada to participate in that system, Canada declined to do so. As a result, I think the only thing you can guarantee about ballistic missile defence in Canada is that Canada currently has absolutely no say in potentially defending Canadians.
Beyond ballistic missiles, events over the last two years have reintroduced the need to defend North America against other potential state-based threats. The Russian military has significantly upgraded its air and naval forces in recent years, and it continues to do so. Over the last two years in particular, the Russians have demonstrated this new equipment's effectiveness, as well as a willingness to use it to advance their own interests.
Russian forces successfully employed in Syria a new class of sophisticated conventional air- and sea-launched cruise missiles that have greatly enhanced range, are difficult to observe, and are capable of precision targeting. Three aspects of this development are troubling.
First, these weapons come in both nuclear and conventional variants. Second, they can be carried by long-range Russian patrol aircraft and their newest and most capable submarines, and over the last decade Russia has resumed deploying both of these asset types in and around North America. Third, because of the increased distances at which these new missiles can successfully hit targets and their low observability characteristics, the current arrangements for defending North America against them must be upgraded to counter them effectively.
In sum, Russia has developed and recently used abroad sophisticated new technology that could be deployed against North America, using the same aircraft and submarines that now routinely patrol the air and waters around Canada and the United States. I would argue that it's not a question of whether the Russians are coming, because they're already here; the question is what their intentions are and how we should respond.
As part of the review of Canadian defence policy, I argue that we need to increase our ability to detect and effectively counter this type of state-based activity. Accordingly, I'd recommend five measures be taken to enhance Canada's ability to defend North America.
First, we should seriously examine becoming a full partner in the ballistic defence of North America, and if the terms are agreeable and the Americans are willing, we should join. This would give the Canadian government the ability to potentially defend Canadians from ballistic missiles, something which it cannot do at present.
At a minimum, even if Canada is not threatened directly by North Korea, the United States clearly thinks it is. This means that Canadian citizens could be threatened by an accidental launch or a wayward missile from North Korea, even if it's aimed south of the border. I am personally not sufficiently confident in North Korean missile technology to think that there's zero chance North Korea might hit Vancouver with a missile even if it's aiming at Seattle. Currently, the Canadian government could do absolutely nothing to prevent this from happening.
Second, the increased Russian activity around North America requires that we enhance our ability to know what is happening in our airspace and our maritime approaches, particularly in the Canadian Arctic. Since 2007 the Russians have conducted long-range aviation patrols towards Canada's Arctic airspace, and they've done so in ways that indicate an inclination on their part to link this type of activity to strategic confrontations with Canada elsewhere in the world.
Similarly, Russian submarine patrols in the Atlantic have recently reached levels not seen since the Cold War. To that end, progress should be made to further upgrade and life-extend the existing platforms we currently operate to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, so that we maintain an awareness of this activity. In the medium and long term, we need to acquire new platforms that would enhance our ability to do so in the future. This should include upgrading the Canadian component of the north warning system with a system better suited to the current and future threat environment.
Third, the government should move quickly to replace our fleet of CF-18 fighter aircraft to maintain our ability to successfully intercept long-range aviation flights approaching Canadian airspace, both today and in the future. Since the government has committed to holding a competition, a competition that is fully open to all interested bidders, it should begin as soon as possible.
Fourth, the government needs to invest in antisubmarine warfare capabilities to be able to counter Russian submarine activity if required. Canada's existing submarines, which are our most capable antisubmarine warfare assets, are rapidly approaching the end of their current lifespan. Options for extending the life of this fleet should be explored in the short term, and a project to acquire new submarines that could patrol all three of Canada's oceans should commence immediately.
Fifth, the government needs to ensure that the Department of National Defence has the needed financial and human resources to acquire modern capital equipment to defend North America. At present, in my assessment it does not.
Under the existing financial arrangements, a number of projects that are needed to maintain a modern capability to defend Canada against aerospace and maritime threats are not included in DND's investment plan and are therefore not funded. A list of unfunded projects would include the upgrade of the north warning system, a replacement of our maritime patrol aircraft, and the life extension and eventual replacement of Canada's submarine fleets. Funding for these projects must be found.
Similarly, the Canadian defence procurement system continues to be unable to acquire needed military equipment on schedule. We just witnessed this last March when almost $4 billion allocated for the procurement of capital equipment was deferred. This was the third time in six years this has happened, so a total of almost $10 billion in capital equipment funding has been pushed into the future, which means that that equipment has not been acquired.
Adequately defending North America requires a better functioning defence procurement system. In my assessment, improving the procurement of military equipment would require, at a minimum, a clear indication by the government that recapitalising the military is actually a priority, a prioritization of the defence equipment projects that National Defence is looking to pursue as part of the defence policy review, streamlining the currently unwieldy process that exists to procure this equipment, and finally, an increase in the capacity of the procurement workforce.
The combination of these measures would make an important improvement in Canada's ability to defend North America in conjunction with the United States.
I would now be happy to take any of your questions.