National Defence Committee on Oct. 4th, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Good late morning and early afternoon to our guests and witnesses today on our study on Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping. Thank you for joining us.

Today we have, from United Nations University in New York, Dr. Adam Day, head of programs, Centre for Policy Research. We also have Dr. Richard Gowan, senior fellow, Centre for Policy Research.

As an individual, from New York as well, we have Ameerah Haq, former under-secretary-general, department of field support, United Nations.

From Tufts University, we have Dr. Ian Johnstone. He is in Brussels, Belgium.

Thank you all very much for appearing. It is important that we have outside perspectives on what we're talking about today.

It is a bit difficult to manage a video conference with three or four people on screens, so if you see me make this gesture, it means I am asking you to wind down your comments in 30 seconds so we can have a nice, graceful exit, we can move on, and I can manage everyone's time.

Having said that, I will turn the floor over to Dr. Adam Day.

I would appreciate it if you would please stick to 10 minutes for your remarks and then we can get into the discussion.

Dr. Day.

[Adam Day, Head of Programmes, Centre for Policy Research, United Nations University]

Thanks, for this opportunity to brief this committee. I'll be under 10 minutes, so no worries there.

Today I'll speak from my experience as the former political adviser to the UN peace operation in Congo, and from sometimes serving in other large peacekeeping operations.

I'll try to cover three issues. The first is on current trends in peacekeeping. The second is on key gaps and entry points into missions that are created by these trends. The third is on some considerations and maybe some questions for Canada's re-engagement and contribution.

On current trends, in the past 15 years conflict has become more complex in three ways that have impacted peacekeeping. First, there has been a rise in intrastate civil wars, where civilians are increasingly the target of violence. Second, there has been a trend of regional involvement in these internal wars. Mali is one example, but Congo, Syria and Yemen are others. Third, the rise in importance of so-called jihadi groups has complicated traditional peacekeeping in several ways, which we can get into in the question and answer period.

One point to really flag is that across all conflict settings the risk to civilians has grown dramatically in recent years. Since the end of the Cold War, 2015 was the most dangerous year worldwide for civilians, and protection of civilians has become, really, the overriding priority of many UN peacekeeping operations today.

To meet some of these challenges, UN peacekeeping has increasingly entered into a range of partnerships with other actors and entities. There's the hybrid UN–AU mission in Darfur, UNAMID; the use of the G5 Sahel force in Mali; AMISOM's AU soldiers, who are deployed alongside the UN mission in Somalia; and the regional protection force in South Sudan, which is another example of a partnership that the UN has entered into. This does create new opportunities for troop-contributing countries to gain experience alongside other troops, but it also creates new challenges.

A final trend to note is the downward pressure on budgets. MONUSCO has undergone significant cuts in Congo three years running. UNAMID in Darfur is closing down within the next year or so. MINUJUSTH in Haiti is phasing out. Across the board, key member states are looking for cost savings and reductions. These trends combine to create concrete needs for UN peacekeeping today and opportunities for member state engagement. I'll list a few of them that may be interesting for this committee.

In MONUSCO, the reduction of the static footprint of the military component over the last few years has created a “protection through projection” concept, which requires greater airlift capacities and longer-range use of drones. That is a very concrete need that the mission has because of these reductions in static footprint.

In many of the more complex environments, including Mali, increased use of peacekeeping intelligence, as it's called, is also a premium, and new capacities have been created in missions like MINUSMA and MONUSCO to build this intelligence capacity.

Many of you may be aware of the action for peacekeeping initiative that was signed last week. There is a clear need articulated in that commitment for renewed commitment to training and equipping troops who deploy to ensure they're capable of responding quickly and effectively to protection threats. I would flag that the Elsie initiative is something worth discussing later on training as well.

All three of these—air capacities, peacekeeping intelligence, and training and equipment—are areas where demand outstrips supply today. This raises a set of questions for Canada's potential re-engagement in peacekeeping. The first question is, what kind of experience is Canada hoping to achieve through re-engagement? Is it to contribute directly to the robust protection activities of today's peacekeeping in places like Central African Republic, or is it more to gain important joint experience with European partners in the Sahel? Is Canada planning to contribute a long-term capacity to peacekeeping or a shorter one-off deployment, which you see in some contributing countries, in Mali and elsewhere? Is Canada interested in deploying only troops, or would it consider the deployment of something like formed police units, which might be more effective in some of the settings where there are large-scale urban risks as well?

Another question is how well the commitments made last year in Vancouver match the needs that I've just described. In my view they're an excellent match. The air task force in Mali is filling a crucial gap of the kind I just mentioned, air capacity. Strategic air lift in Entebbe would be a major asset to the missions in that area. A quick reaction force would almost certainly boost the protection capacities of the UN, which is exactly the set of needs I've described. The offer of training is exactly what the action for peacekeeping had in mind. I think that following through on the Vancouver commitments would be a great contribution to peacekeeping, as I've described it.

I'd add that, across the board, everybody I talk to in and around peacekeeping considers the Elsie project for increasing the role of women in peacekeeping to be a vital initiative that requires further support.

The final question I have is this: Where is Canada's value-added in peacekeeping? I work directly with Canadian officers in a range of settings and I think they're some of the best, if not the best, that I've seen in peacekeeping. I think specifically Canada can offer a combination of linguistic capabilities and excellence in military training that almost no other country in the world has today, and it's much needed in some of the bigger missions that I've listed here.

At a time when the bulk of today's peacekeeping requires both the ability to engage with the local population and the experience to develop complex strategic plans, true contributors like Canada are needed more than ever.

I will stop there and turn it back over to the committee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much. Since he's sitting right beside you, I think I'll give the floor to Dr. Gowan.

[Richard Gowan, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, United Nations University]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to the committee for the invitation to address you.

Thank you also, Chair, for promoting both Adam and me to the status of doctor. I think we must be honest and admit we are both actually mere misters.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That is noted.

[Richard Gowan]

I would like to focus my remarks on three issues, building on Adam's statement. I will look at the strategic effect of current UN peace operations, peacekeeping's place in Canada's broader strategic relationships and the need for strategic innovation in UN operations.

To turn first to strategic effects, I think we must admit that the effects of peacekeeping are currently in question. The UN is going through a difficult period, with missions from Congo to the Golan Heights under a high level of pressure. We have seen the end of a series of largely successful UN state-building operations in places such as Liberia, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, and I think all those cases, despite many problems such as the cholera scandal in Haiti, showed that the UN can build states and can stabilize very weak countries.

But today, three-quarters of UN peacekeepers are deployed in five big missions in Africa—in Mali, Central African Republic, the Congo, Sudan and South Sudan—where they face even greater challenges and the chances of an easy win are essentially nil. UN forces in Lebanon and the Golan Heights also face heightened risks due to the insecure situation in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, I think we should emphasize that peacekeeping operations today do still have positive strategic effects. Even if they cannot deliver easy stability, they limit and contain violence in fragile states such as Mali, ensuring that jihadi groups and other non-state groups do not overthrow governments and create regional instability. They protect and facilitate vital humanitarian aid, saving many lives. Most importantly, they provide frameworks for long-term political peacemaking processes.

They do not do these things perfectly. The UN is honest about its failures. We have seen a series of UN reports, including the HIPPO report, which Ameerah Haq led, being very straight about the challenges that the blue helmets face. There is considerable space for improvement. UN peace operations are not always the right tools for dealing with weak states—cases such as Somalia.

Nonetheless, peacekeeping has proven to be resilient. We have not seen a collapse of the peacekeeping mission as we did in the 1990s in cases such as Bosnia and Somalia. I think peacekeeping is continuing to prove its strategic worth.

This relates to peacekeeping's place in Canada's broader strategic relationships. In addition to their immediate impact, peace operations are a rare source of consensus among states in a period where there is very little consensus about international security. The vast majority of UN members continue to support blue helmet operations. Adam referred to the action for peacekeeping initiative. It's worth noting that 149 nations and four regional organizations have endorsed that initiative, showing that this is an area where the international community can still find common ground. It's also worth noting that all members of the P5, including China and Russia, have signed up for that initiative.

More specifically, I would argue that peacekeeping operations contribute to Canada's strategic relationships in three ways.

First, UN peacekeeping is part of your transatlantic burden sharing. You sometimes hear analysts draw a sharp dichotomy between NATO contributions and UN contributions, but for many European governments, especially France and the Mediterranean governments, the UN mission in Mali is a very important part of the regional security architecture, just as the missions in the Baltic run by NATO are an important part of European security. By contributing to UN peacekeeping in the Sahel, you are contributing to the security of your NATO allies, even if not under a NATO flag, and that is appreciated in Europe.

Second, there is a link between peacekeeping and your trans-Pacific security relationships. We're seeing a lot of Asia-Pacific countries investing more in peace operations, and most notably, we're seeing China really investing in peacekeeping as part of its global footprint. In an era where we face growing strategic competition with China, peacekeeping is an area of co-operation.

Although China still only has roughly, I think, 3,000 troops in UN missions, that number is likely to rise very dramatically in coming years. I think it is worth seeing working in peacekeeping as a way of developing relationships with the PLA.

It's sometimes said that China spies on other peacekeepers in UN operations. That is true. It is also worth saying that other countries spy on Chinese units in UN peacekeeping operations. This is a fact of life. More generally, I would emphasize that peacekeeping is a platform for co-operation with a number of Pacific partners.

Finally, peacekeeping can contribute to global counter-terror efforts. Peacekeeping operations should not become counterterrorism missions, and there are dangers where peacekeepers come into contact with jihadi groups. Nonetheless, in a case such as Mali, the presence of a UN force does help provide broad security and relief and a framework for political and economic work with communities recovering from jihadi rule. I think we should understand that peacekeeping can be an element, although only an element, in challenging terrorist organizations, especially in Africa.

I have one last very brief point about strategic innovation. I think it's important to recognize that the current peacekeeping system centring on the five big missions in Africa that I've mentioned is not permanent. UN peacekeeping often goes through periods of rapid change. We saw that in the 1990s and again in the 2000s. In recent years we've seen the UN take on new operational challenges, including the removal of chemical weapons from Syria and containing Ebola in west Africa, and we're seeing the UN at least considering new missions in new regions such as potentially patrolling the eastern Ukraine to end the Russian-Ukranian standoff.

As Adam has noted, the UN is also developing a new range of modalities for working with partners such as the African Union in places like Somalia. Peace operations are a flexible tool, and they're a tool that evolved often in response to crises.

Canada has long played an important role in guiding the evolution of peacekeeping. After all, essentially Canada made up peacekeeping in the 1950s. I think it is important that, not only the Canadian government, but also Canadian research institutes and think tanks continue to contribute to fresh thinking about the future of peacekeeping in an increasingly complex international security environment.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

Ms. Haq, the floor is yours.

[Ameerah Haq, Former Under-Secretary-General, Department of Field Support, United Nations, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for inviting me.

A lot has already been said by Adam and Richard, so I'm going to try my best not to repeat but perhaps to emphasize different facets of what they said.

First of all, I want to set the context of where we are and how we define terms. Even though we're talking about peacekeeping, I think we see ourselves moving more and more into arenas of conflict resolution. This we recognized in the HIPPO report. Even though it's been four years since that report was written, I think much of what was said there remains quite current.

With the shift in thinking, and putting into context peace operations as opposed to peacekeeping per se—and even from four years ago, as I said—we find ourselves much more in an arena of conflict resolution. Within conflict resolution, of course, we see that regional and international competition among powerful states is influencing these conflict resolution efforts around the world.

I think the UN's role as a peacekeeper is now seen in an environment of great power politics, and therefore special envoys and SRSGs are facing and having to deal with increasing regional tensions, much more deepening geopolitical fissures, and we must also recognize, in an environment of growing skepticism towards multilateralism.

That, I hope, will frame some of what you take to New York. We certainly see—at least I do—Canada performing a very important role against this tide of skepticism towards multilateralism. I think that initial broadening support and reiteration of multilateralism is very important.

Richard also mentioned, and I want to make the point, that we cannot relabel peacekeeping as countering violent extremism. The question is, how are we going to operate in these theatres where we find ourselves in these situations?

As we said in the HIPPO report, in terms of making and resourcing the missions that we are and we have, I still recall the intense debates we had internally within the UN before going into Mali, as to whether the UN was actually equipped to be in Mali with the kinds of resources we have.

We need to understand that it is a tough time for peacekeeping, particularly when expectations of the population are high, but also expectations of the member state. There are very easy and dismissive comments about the inability of the UN, when the UN in fact is not resourced.

I think the push to make sure that the UN and its troops are adequately resourced.... This does not just mean with more technology and sophisticated equipment and intelligence and all of those things, but it also means things like training, which both Adam and Richard referred to.

We also need to be cognizant of the fact that this notion of an international community is also disappearing. We tend to use that in terms of understanding there's a world out there that thinks as one, but I think that is also eroding slowly.

Again, I think Canada's role is very important in countering that kind of thinking and attitude of powerful states in terms of “might is right”.

The whole validity of the UN is being questioned.

In this context, you probably have very specific questions about your own involvement in peacekeeping, based on the experience of what your troops are encountering in Mali. That's important, but the fundamental positioning of where the UN should be on this notion of how we can rebuild the concept of the international community and fight against this attitude toward multilateralism that's being questioned is very important.

Specifics that I have are that training, of course, remains very important. In the kinds of operations we've seen, whether it was in Congo, or where we have partnerships in Somalia with the African Union and all of that, training is very important and Canada can play a very important role in that.

Adam mentioned formed police units, but I would also say that Canada has a stellar record and reputation in terms of community policing. That kind of training and embedding of those who are sensitive to community policing is important, particularly when we look at inherent cases of domestic violence and abuse.

Last, the whole issue of sexual exploitation and abuse is still very much at the fore. Canada can play a very important role there, too, in assisting in the training of those countries that are deploying troops to the United Nations. As much as we have all the pre-deployment training, we have seen through experience that even that is not enough. Canada can bring a lot to bear on that whole issue of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you, Ms. Haq.

Professor Johnstone, the floor is yours.

[Ian Johnstone, Dean ad interim and Professor of International Law, Fletcher School, Tufts University]

Thank you very much.

I apologize for doing this from a hotel room in Brussels and I hope the link is fine. Wave at me if you are not hearing me clearly.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

We know you made your bed.

[Ian Johnstone]

If someone comes in and puts a chocolate on my pillow, you'll know why.

Also, I'll be with you for a little more than an hour. I have to leave a little past noon your time. Please forgive me for that.

In my opening remarks, like my colleagues, I'm going to start by highlighting what I see as two broad trends in peace operations in the last 20 years or so, and then present four propositions on how to make peacekeeping more effective.

Before doing that, I want to begin by emphasizing that while the record for peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War is mixed, it has had its fair share of successes. Various academic studies have concluded that, on balance, peacekeeping works. Measuring or even defining success is difficult, but there's a broad consensus in the academic literature that deployment of a peace operation substantially reduces the chance of a relapse into full-scale conflict. In that sense, it has a preventative effect.

Some of the more widely touted success stories are in Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique in the early 1990s, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, and Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire more recently.

That being said, as my colleagues have pointed out, the enterprise is not getting any easier. The environment into which peacekeepers are being deployed is getting more dangerous and the ability to get at the underlying causes of conflict more difficult.

There are two broad trends. This won't be new to you, but I think it's worth summarizing in order to put some of the contemporary challenges into perspective. The first trend is that operations have become more robust, with force being used for a wider range of purposes. The second is that civilian functions of peace operations have become more expansive, getting deeply involved in certain aspects of governance. The progress has not been linear, but the trend lines are clear.

What is also clear is percolating concern about the implications of both. Some worry that the growing robustness of peace operations is at the expense of political strategies and solutions. Others worry that expansive state building is both impossible to achieve and ideologically suspect. I understand both sets of concerns, but I believe that they are exaggerated.

I will be turning first to robustness. Originally, as you all know, peacekeepers were deployed on the basis of chapter VI of the UN charter and used force only in self-defence. Today many peace operations use force not only in self-defence, but also to protect civilians and to counter spoilers, typically with a mandate under chapter VII of the UN charter.

The protection of civilians goes back to 1999 in Sierra Leone. It has been included in the mandates of most peace operations since then.

How to protect civilians with limited resources is a major challenge, and the UN has had to innovate in recent years through devices like the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and opening its bases to 180,000 displaced persons in South Sudan.

As regards spoilers, the Brahimi report of 2001 said that peace operations must have bigger and better equipped forces in order to deal effectively with groups that seem to undermine the peace process via violence. That, plus the protection of civilian mandates, was the basis for giving the Force Intervention Brigade the mandate to carry out, and here I'm quoting from the resolution, “targeted offensive operations” to “neutralize and disarm” armed groups in the east.

The protection challenge in Mali is how to do it without engaging in counterterrorism, which most agree UN peace operations should not do. MINUSMA does not have a proper counterterrorism mandate, but it does have the authority, and here again I'm quoting from the resolution, where it says, “to take robust and active steps” to counter asymmetric threats against civilians, and to prevent a return of armed elements to areas where civilians are at risk. In Mali, the line between protecting civilians and countering terrorism has become fine, indeed.

There is still strong support for robust action by the UN, especially for force protection and to protect civilians. There's also concern that the militarization of peacekeeping is overshadowing, and may even be crowding out the search for political solutions. I'll come back to that in a moment.

What about the second trend, expansive state building? Multi-dimensional [Technical difficulty—Editor] since the Cold War [Technical difficulty—Editor] and state-building functions for refugee repatriation and human rights monitoring, holding elections, and rebuilding justice [Technical difficulty—Editor].

Conventional peacekeeping is to get at the root causes of conflicts, and you can only get at those root causes through a holistic approach, combining military, police and civilian elements. It starts with mediation among the parties but must go beyond that to supporting inclusive political processes, building legitimate institutions and providing a foundation for economic development.

The backlash against this expansive peace-building agenda stems from at least two sources. First, it's seen by some as a wish list that's impossible to fulfill. As Secretary-General Guterres said to the Security Council last year in a reference to the so-called Christmas tree mandates, “Christmas is over, and the [UN] Mission in South Sudan cannot possibly implement [its] 209 mandated tasks.”

Second, most governments are increasingly resistant to being tutored on how to govern. This is true in Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It's tempting to respond by invoking the principle of national ownership and letting those governments call all the shots, but if that means helping them to impose their authority on wide swaths of a population that sees them as illegitimate, it's deeply problematic.

Those are the two big trends I see in peace operations and some of the operational complexities they raise now.

I'm going to turn now to the four propositions about how to manage those complexities.

First, as the HIPPO report and others have said, we must design more tailored, context appropriate and adaptable missions. The practical challenge is not to concoct some ideal end state and design a mission to achieve that, but rather to determine what is achievable in light of conditions on the ground. The prospects of achieving any outcome will depend heavily on local, regional and global political dynamics.

In some circumstances [Technical difficulty—Editor] state building may be possible. In others, reducing the level of violence and providing some protection to civilians may be all that's achievable. The point is that one size does not fit all. The trick is to figure out what is achievable in the circumstances, design a mission accordingly, and prepare to adapt as the circumstances require.

The second proposition as regards the [Technical difficulty—Editor] first steps.

Third [Technical difficulty—Editor]

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Professor Johnstone, if you can hear me, the quality of your Internet has deteriorated to the point that we are only getting every third or fourth word, so they're going to work on that.

[Ian Johnstone]

All right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

It seems that as soon as I intervened it worked itself out.

Let them work on that for a second. I'm going to open the floor to questions. We can circle back.

I want to remind members that we have Mr. Johnstone and Miss Haq only until the top of the hour, so if you want to direct your questions to them, you only have about 20 minutes to do so.

We're going to go to seven-minute questions. I'm going to give the floor to MP Gerretsen.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Ms. Haq, I want to circle back on one thing you said. You said that international peacekeeping efforts are “eroding”. I don't think anybody around this table would disagree with you, but can you expand on why you think that's happening?

[Ameerah Haq]

What I talked about was the overall push against multilateralism, that this notion of international community is eroding. In other words, I think the positions of many of our member states, and then some of the key ones that are against, make it a kind of fight now, almost, for the UN.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Right.

[Ameerah Haq]

That's part of what I hope Canada and other like-minded countries.... As I said, when you go to New York, I hope you can push against that in terms of your unwavering support for multilateralism.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Ms. Haq, I'm limited in time.

My question is, why do you think that's happening? What are the underpinning social or cultural reasons that are driving this erosion?

[Ameerah Haq]

I think part of it is, as we see in many countries, is the rise of a sort of nationalism and tendencies towards more isolationist policies. I think the UN becomes a very useful scapegoat in the debates of politicians and leaders in this country. This kind of attack on the UN.... I don't at all quibble with efficiencies in the UN. I mean, I've worked there for many years, and I think those efficiencies are absolutely right at the core. Those efficiencies are right on, but I think—

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

I picked up on what you said about the UN being a scapegoat, and I wouldn't disagree with that. I think that quite often people look at the UN and use that narrative to almost push back against this elitist organization or something.

Would you say part of the problem is that people don't fully understand and appreciate what the UN contributes? When I talk about people, I don't mean the people sitting around this table, those who go to the UN, those who participate, those who are actively engaged, or academics. I'm talking about the people who are driving these populist movements that we're seeing in countries. Would you say that they don't fully appreciate and understand the need to have the peacekeeping efforts throughout the world and why they contribute to the security of their own nations?

[Ameerah Haq]

Yes, I think there is a lack of understanding.

I also want to say that, even from Canada's perspective, there are two ways to look at it. One is that you can put your own troops into the peacekeeping arena. However, there's also another very important element, which is to support the principles of peacekeeping without necessarily putting one's troops in theatre. That's where I feel that.... One would wish for both, but in the absence...or a reluctance in national parliaments to expose their own nationals to the theatres within which the UN operates, there is still the support.

There were efforts to get other countries to support and to provide troops. There can be efforts to provide training. There can be efforts to provide equipment. There can be budgetary support. There can be support at policy levels, crafting the right kinds of mandates that set up expectations where the UN is not set to fail because of these Christmas tree mandates.

There is a lot that can be done, but this, I think, is—

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

The objective of this committee is to make recommendations to the government through our parliamentary system on what the government can do to improve upon its role in the peacekeeping community. What recommendation, given everything you've said, would you suggest that we make?

[Ameerah Haq]

First of all, as I said, I think the broader issue is your continued and steadfast support of multilateralism in general. However, specific things that all of the other colleagues have also said are your own involvement in peacekeeping operations, your own involvement in resourcing peacekeeping missions in the way that they need to be, and your own involvement in the training that you can provide to other countries so that they increase their capacity.

Part of it is just to continue a supportive tendency. I think peacekeeping is a very important part of the whole international response to conflict. In a sense, Canada needs to be sure that it's leading that supportive way to peacekeeping.