National Defence Committee on Oct. 4th, 2018

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

I will still ask my question and perhaps someone can answer.

Earlier this year, at a conference on women in peacekeeping missions, you said you were proud to see that Bangladesh was sending all-female contingents.

Can you elaborate on this initiative and give us a bit of feedback on that experience?

[Adam Day]

I'm afraid that because that was Ms. Haq's point, from her experience with the Bangladeshi troops, I actually don't have anything to add. I don't think Richard does, either. My apologies.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Okay. I'll try another one.

Last week at the United Nations, Donald Trump announced a huge cut to the U.S. contribution to peacekeeping missions around the world. What can Canada do in this regard? Do you see this as an opportunity for Canada to resume its role as a world leader in peacekeeping operations?

[Adam Day]

We'll both take a stab at that one.

The short answer is yes. The cuts to peacekeeping are not happening right now. It had been happening over the past several years. Peacekeeping was at a high watermark of $8 billion, and is now under $7 billion. Big missions like MONUSCO have cut up to 20% of some aspects. I think it's absolutely creating new needs. Some of Canada's commitments made in Vancouver perfectly match those needs. The answer is yes, you can fill those gaps.

In terms of leadership, absolutely, some of the points Ameerah was making about standing by the principles are also very helpful with troops on the ground and being able to guide the strategic direction of the mission. Canada, for example, has very important roles within a mission like MONUSCO, with staff officers and planners. I think that is another place for Canada to lead even more in some of the other missions.

I do want to give Richard a chance to make a point also.

[Richard Gowan]

I would merely point out that although the U.S. has attempted to impose very severe cuts on the peacekeeping budget in the last two years, in fact, American officials have been willing to compromise on this issue. Despite the overall anti-multilateral rhetoric of this administration, the U.S. has recognized the value of peacekeeping forces in cases such as South Sudan and the Central African Republic. This is one case where I think the president's bark is a little worse than his bite.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you.

My other question is for Mr. Adam Day.

What are the challenges in conducting United Nations peacekeeping missions involving multinational tactical groups?

[Adam Day]

I assume by that you mean the use of multiple different troop-contributing countries within a single.... Okay.

It differs from country to country. I think one of the main difficulties has been a wide variety of training and capacities across different kinds of peacekeepers. In some of the most important missions in terms of protection of civilians and those other key tasks, having a widely differentiated set of troop contributors has been a challenge.

I think that points to the need for countries like Canada to engage even more.

Linguistic challenges are obviously there, especially in a lot of the francophone missions and many of the troops from the region are francophone. Having anglophone staff officers creates a strange asymmetry, I've found, and having more francophone staff officers would obviously be helpful.

I think there is an underlying dynamic where the African Union still considers sometimes the UN to be a slightly western imposition, so those partnerships that I was talking about—bringing in the neighbouring states, partnering with the African Union, partnering with the ECCAS and others—have helped address some of those issues of multinational tensions. I think, actually, there's a lot of success there on the ground, despite not particularly good success in places like Darfur on the ground.

[Yves Robillard, Liberal, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

The Liberal side still has two minutes if someone wants to take some time.

Mark Gerretsen.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Mr. Day, in an article titled “Political Solutions Must Drive the Design and Implementation of Peace Operations”, you mentioned that in cases such as that in South Sudan, “decisions by national leaders to pursue violent conflict rather than political reconciliation has left little room for the UN to broker political outcomes.”

Can you expand on that?

[Adam Day]

Sure. I think that was in the context of South Sudan. Is that correct?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

That's correct.

[Adam Day]

When the mission in South Sudan was first set up in 2011, the impulse behind it was essentially to do a state-building project. In 2013, the civil war that broke out between the president and the vice-president essentially closed off a lot of the space for the kind of process we were doing. Then we had to change our posture to a certain extent away from the focusing on this state building and much more on reconciliation between these two sides and the protection of civilians.

Over time, several years into this civil war, there wasn't a very clear political track or role for the UN to actually broker that. We kind of had to make it up. We had an office in Addis trying to broker a deal. My understanding there is that the traditional peacekeeping set-up—where you have an agreement and the peacekeepers are deployed to oversee the agreement—wasn't there. We were already there on the ground, and then the civil war broke out. It was a kind of non-traditional peacekeeping setting where there wasn't much of a political entry point for the UN at the time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

You have 30 seconds.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

What can be done to effectively prevent that kind of scenario from happening in the future in terms of the UN's relation?

[Adam Day]

I think one of the issues that Ian pointed to is the mandating, having a mandate that very clearly sets out from the beginning what the political objective is and not having 290 other tasks that also need to be done at the same time.

Also, there's some work that can be done in mandating a new mission or a mission that's in transition, in working with the parties to the conflict so that they have a better understanding of what the deployment is about from the outset and have expressed consent to it, rather than imposing mandates from the outside.

The HIPPO report proposed a two-step mandating process that would have done consultations ahead of mandating.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you. That's awesome.

We'll go to five-minute questions now.

The first five-minute question will go to MP Dzerowicz.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Davenport, Lib.]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

I'm going to continue that line of questioning. The question is for you, Richard, but, Adam, if you want to also comment, I'd be very grateful.

It sounds a little odd. Richard, as part of your presentation you talked about the missions in Africa. You talked about how a peacekeeping mission provides a framework for long-term peace, vital humanitarian aid, and you went through a list.

Does the UN have the right peacekeeping objectives? Every time the UN goes in, does it have the right things in mind as it is actually going into these peacekeeping initiatives, into the different countries? I'm assuming that we're working with the local governments to come up with those objectives.

Let me start off with that, and we'll go from there.

[Richard Gowan]

It's worth being honest that the Security Council often throws peacekeeping missions at crises without a completely clear strategy, and it is often incumbent on UN officials on the ground to work out what is possible once they are deployed. In the Central African Republic, or indeed in Mali, the UN went in with a sense of urgency, and then it took some time to develop a political plan.

The Security Council could be more responsive in asking for peace operations more flexibly than it currently does. The Security Council is a heavily overburdened organization running multiple missions.

As Ameerah Haq mentioned, there is also a strong recognition that the UN needs to invest more and get more help from friendly countries like Canada in terms of analysis and information about the countries it's going into. This would enable it to develop its political strategies more credibly and more rapidly.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

If I understood that correctly, you're saying that the UN Security Council will say, “We have a problem in Mali,” and deploy a group, but once they get there, they say, “Okay, what do we need to do to be able to create the conditions for peace?”

You're suggesting there could be some more advanced thinking and advanced strategic work, where they would say, “Let's set our objectives before we actually get on the ground, so that we have a better idea about how we're going to get to peace.” Have I understood you correctly?

[Richard Gowan]

Yes.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

How does the information on the ground get shared back with the UN? It seems we are into more complex initiatives. The work is long-term. It's not like we're in for a few weeks; we're there for years. How is there constant feedback, and how do adjustments happen as the operation continues to unfold and move its way toward peacekeeping?

[Adam Day]

There isn't a lack of information flow from the field to headquarters. In fact, there is probably sometimes too much information, and it's a matter of culling it. There are daily reports, cables, and an entire centre set up to receive information and flash reports and other things.

The more interesting part is how you shift gears and make changes over time. There is a process of strategic reviews that goes on which is increasingly independently led. It assesses what the direction of the mission is, how well it is meeting its objectives and whether changes need to happen. That can be driven by a crisis, as happened in 2013 with the civil war in South Sudan. It can be driven on a regular basis; it can be mandated by the Security Council, and it can also be mandated by the UN Secretary-General. That's the traditional way of shifting gears.

What you also see in some missions now is a lot of innovation on the ground that is being fed back. The creation of intelligence capacities in places like Mali and Congo was largely an innovation which arose out of a need on the ground. That filters back into new policies that are now driving other missions as well, so there is also quite a lot that happens on the ground that feeds back in and creates a loop.

Then there is obviously annual mandating, where a mission can shift gears based on the UN Secretary-General's report. That is fed from the ground as well.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

Do you think that's going well for the most part, in terms of the intelligence that's going back and forth, or is there something that needs to be improved in that area?

[Adam Day]

I only have 20 seconds for my answer.

It can always be improved. The strategic review initiative is a very good one, and the more we can make it independent and transparent, the better it will be.