National Defence Committee on Nov. 1st, 2018

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I call the meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the defence committee. My apologies for being a little bit late. We had votes and they went the usual 15 minutes for a stand-up vote, and then we had to travel over here. I appreciate your patience with us.

We welcome your comments on our review of Bill C-77.

Today we have with us Ms. Haddadi, from the Barreau du Quebec, secretariat of the order and legal affairs. We also have with us Mr. Lévesque, president, criminal law committee. As individuals, we have Sheila Fynes and Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Jean-Guy Perron.

Thank you all for coming.

Before I begin, I would like to acknowledge and formally recognize the death of Corporal Langridge, thank him for his service and acknowledge your grief.

I'm going to turn the floor over to Ms. Haddadi for opening remarks.

[Siham Haddadi, Lawyer, Secretariat of the Order and Legal Affairs, Barreau du Québec]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, first, we would like to thank you for inviting us here this morning to discuss Bill C-77. We are very pleased to be here.

My name is Siham Haddadi, and I am a lawyer with the Barreau du Québec. I am also the secretary of its Criminal Law Committee. I am here with M^e Pascal Lévesque, who is president of the Criminal Law Committee.

The Barreau du Québec's mission as a professional association is to protect the public and the rule of law. The protection of victims and the principles of procedural fairness are part of the Barreau's mission.

Given the time allotted to us this morning, we'll get right into the topic at hand.

First of all, we would like to say that the Barreau du Québec supports this legislative initiative, Bill C-77. In our view, this reform was needed to ensure that victims rights and Canadian values are respected. This bill was necessary to ensure that what are deemed minor infractions are handled as efficiently and fairly as possible.

However, we feel that some aspects of the bill are problematic and that it is important for us to point them out to you this morning.

Now I'll turn the floor over to M^e Lévesque, who will continue our testimony. Thank you.

[Pascal Lévesque, President, Criminal Law Committee, Barreau du Québec]

First of all, we welcome the fact that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is being integrated into the act. The charter grants a right to information, protection, participation and restitution. However, the Barreau du Québec questions the scope of a victim's right to information in the context of paragraph (b) of the new section 71.04 introduced by the bill. Does this mean that the victim would have a right to personal information concerning the offender?

We are also in favour of creating the role of the victim's liaison officer, but we feel it might perhaps be desirable to require that the officer have a minimum level of training and the professional skills to occupy that position.

We also note and welcome the fact that new powers would be granted to military judges to facilitate the testimony of victims and witnesses. Victims may fear reprisals or pressures. These powers will therefore help ensure their safety. However, we wonder why the regime of protections and rights conferred on victims is limited to military offences and does not include service infractions. In our view, the act should protect victims from one type of offence and an infraction.

The second major feature of this bill is the paradigm shift with regard to the summary procedure. We note the will of Parliament to move away from a criminal justice system toward something resembling a system of disciplinary law. We are in favour of this initiative, which is designed to reduce military stigmatization and to make the trial process more efficient and fair, but we would remind you that this paradigm shift should not come at the cost of reducing the rights of military members.

By eliminating detention, the bill removes from a commander's sentencing options the authority to impose a sentence of detention of up to 30 days at a military detention facility. It seems desirable, at first glance, that military personnel should be less exposed to penal consequences, but the fact remains that serious questions arise over the effects of this removal.

With the detention option ruled out, it could be more difficult to address the types of misconduct committed in a theatre of operations. It is a more complicated proposition to conduct a court martial outside Canada. Would it not be more useful, in certain circumstances, to provide for detention, which would definitely be a harsher sentence, but one of shorter duration, in situations in which quick action is required? In our view, the problem is not detention, but rather its usefulness. The real challenge is to guarantee that the fundamental rights of military personnel are respected when they are faced with it.

Another effect of this reform of the summary procedure is a lowering of the evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt to that of a preponderance of probabilities. This seems consistent with the desire to depenalize the process. Despite this change in the burden of proof, however, military members still be exposed to serious consequences such as demotion and suspension of allowances and pay. This last sanction can have a significant financial impact on a service member.

If Parliament decided to abandon the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the path we feel should be favoured, there could be a compromise suggestion, along the lines of disciplinary law. To this meet the burden of proof, the evidence would have to be clear and convincing, and thus somewhere between "beyond a reasonable doubt" and a "preponderance of probabilities". We nevertheless prefer proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" for as long as service members are exposed to penal consequences. I'll come back to this later.

Now I'm going to discuss undefined expressions. The expressions "service infractions" and "minor sanctions" are not defined in the bill, but they will be in future regulations. This aspect raises concerns since we think there must be greater transparency and assurances that the bill's provisions are, from the outset, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Moreover, the spectre of what a minor sanction may be looms large.

Consider, for example, confinement to quarters or to ship, a penalty that can amount to deprivation of liberty similar to a conditional sentence as provided for under section 742.1 of the Criminal Code. In our opinion, minor sanctions must be defined in the act, and confinement to quarters or to ship must be considered as a serious sanction eliciting protections.

Now I will discuss procedural protections for service members. We repeat that it is necessary to provide better protection for service members, despite the removal of certain penal attributes of the military justice system's summary procedure. The reform neglects to provide certain procedural fairness protections, even as it moves closer to an administrative disciplinary law model applicable to professional associations.

The bill doesn't alter the fact that it's the commanders who determine whether service personnel have committed infractions and who impose sanctions, if need be. We understand that, by removing certain penal aspects from the present system, the bill makes the requirement of an independent decision-maker, within the meaning of paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, less necessary. The fact remains, however, that, when you compare this regime to the disciplinary regime applicable to police officers of the Sûreté du Québec or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, military decision-makers are less independent. In our view, offsetting measures should be adopted to ensure that commanders perform their duties as impartially as possible.

There is another situation that we consider problematic, and that is the removal of the option to elect a court martial. We feel that, to the extent service members are still exposed to serious consequences for infractions that remain to be defined, it is desirable that this option be retained.

The bill is also silent on the representation of service members facing infraction allegations. For the moment, only lawyers of the Director of Defence Counsel Services are authorized to provide legal counsel and legal information—that's the term used in the regulations—but that information must be general in nature and pertain to the issues involved in the accused's summary trial, and counsel providing that information must distinguish between a court-martial and a summary trial. That does not seem to include the option of providing comprehensive legal advice or representing the accused. We find this problematic, since, by comparison, RCMP and Sûreté du Québec officers receive either real legal assistance or full representation.

We recommend that the legal services offered to service personnel be expanded to include at least an offer of full legal advice, at no cost, in preparation for trial and that they be given the option of electing a court martial.

The bill is also silent on the possibility of recording hearings and on the way decision-makers must provide reasons for their decisions. In our view, summary hearings must be recorded where possible, and, out of a concern for transparency, fairness and accountability, decisions should be accompanied by written reasons.

The bill provides that the decision or sanction imposed by a summary authority may be reviewed automatically or at the request of the person concerned in accordance with regulations made by the Governor in Council. In the circumstances, we wonder whether the review upon request or the automatic review under the present regime will be continued. Will decisions from summary hearings and review authorities be excluded from the field of application of the military grievance procedure because they are made in accordance with the code of discipline? In our view, once again having regard to the penal consequences to which service members are exposed, provision should be made for a right of appeal from summary hearing decisions. This appeal could be made following the review process and be possible only where the service member has suffered a penal consequence.

In short, having regard to the various points mentioned that we find problematic in this reform of the summary procedure, we think it may be better to defer it in order to give all necessary consideration to the protection of service members' rights.

Lastly, several amendments are designed to harmonize military and civilian justice, such as the addition, in clause 16 of the bill, of the option for a victim to seek an order to abstain from communicating him or her. We are very much in favour of this amendment, which will enable military judges to provide more effectively for victims's safety. However, we question the use of the term "victim", which we find restrictive. In our view, the term should be "person", as is the case in the Criminal Code.

In addition, the bill contains significant amendments pertaining to sentences. In particular, it requires that special attention be paid to the situation of aboriginal offenders at sentencing. Provision is made for sentences to be served intermittently. The bill also provides for the possibility of ordering suspension of a sentence and, lastly, the option of directing an absolute discharge.

Although the Barreau du Québec is in favour of these significant amendments, it questions, first, the reason why Parliament has limited the option of directing an intermittent sentence for periods of imprisonment or detention of up to 14 days, whereas this type of order can be made under the Criminal Code for sentences of up to 90 days. Second, we question the reason why a suspension may be directed only where incarceration or detention is required, the opposite of what is required under the Criminal Code. Lastly, we welcome the power of a military judge to direct absolute discharges, but we wonder why this power has not been extended to include conditional discharges.

In closing, the Barreau du Québec has noted the change in the essential sentencing objective, which is no longer to contribute "to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society", but merely to the maintain discipline, efficiency and morale of the Canadian Forces. The Barreau du Québec feels that the previous wording was more consistent with the dual nature of military justice, which is both similar to a system of civil justice and unique.

That completes the review of the major issues that the Barreau du Québec wanted to address with you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, as part of this consultation on Bill C-77. More detailed explanations of the various issues that we have just presented are provided in a brief that may be found on the Barreau du Québec's website, in French only, although you will have a bilingual copy as of November 16.

We hope our presentation has contributed to your study of this matter. We are now available to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Fynes.

[Sheila Fynes, As an Individual]

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and committee members. I begin by thanking you for this opportunity to address the proposed revisions to the National Defence Act, specifically paragraph 98(c).

My son, Corporal Stuart Langridge, was a recce soldier who, following deployments to Bosnia and Afghanistan, took his own life at CFB Edmonton in 2008. He was a son, a brother, a grandson and above all, someone who loved the military. He was posthumously awarded the Sacrifice Medal and his death attributed to service to Canada.

Since then, given the growing awareness of suicides of service members and veterans, our military has made great advances in recognizing the reality of operational stress injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. The chain of command has implemented programs aimed at mitigating suicides through training and messaging that medical help and support is available. There is a desired culture change from formerly held stigmatizations our servicemen and women endured.

We are part of an informal military fraternity and have heard the old mantras of, “Suck it up, buttercup”, or “We don't get PTSD; we give it”, but thankfully, they are no longer deemed appropriate. When Stu was struggling and seeking help, he commented unhappily that he too had become one of those losers. A proud solider, he felt ostracized and humiliated.

Past understandings of operational stress injury victims justified formal and informal punishments as appropriate responses. Perhaps the most tragic example of that was when, a century ago, the blunt exercise of discipline resulted in the execution of 23 Canadian soldiers. They have all since been pardoned posthumously on moral grounds, because of a realization that they too may have been suffering with OSIs.

In that context, it is disturbing that even today, under paragraph 98(c), a service member could face life imprisonment for an attempted suicide. It would be more appropriate to consider self-harm under such circumstances as being symptomatic of a serious and urgent mental health concern, and signalling the need for appropriate and immediate medical intervention. I would also note that if a forces member reaches a state of dysphoria where suicide presents as their best option, then the threat of some future discipline holds little deterrence and becomes utterly moot if they succeed.

More specifically, I believe punishment of a service member who may be suffering with OSI or other brain injury is potentially de facto abuse of a subordinate, which is contrary to the spirit of the code of service discipline. Such exercise of discipline becomes especially abhorrent if used to punish for an injury that has resulted from service to Canada.

Having said that, I clearly understand that you need to weigh that proper discipline is essential in our armed forces and provides a vital tool in guaranteeing cohesion and adherence to high standards. I would ask, however, that you please measure twice and cut once, to ensure that the results of your efforts do not provide an unintended consequence.

If attempted suicide is considered a form of punishable errant conduct, then the underlying message to victims of debilitating operational stress injuries is not that they should seek help, but rather to continue in attempting self-management to avoid legal jeopardy. It is contrary to the very programs now addressing the problems of OSI and suicide. For someone suffering with a stress injury to be punished instead of helped is like throwing a drowning man an anchor.

In the civilian world, there is no comparable legal sanction for attempted suicide, and provincial laws instead allow for emergency medical treatment. It is a mental health issue, not a crime. In our home province of British Columbia, workers' compensation has already accepted some cases of post-traumatic stress disorder as workplace injuries, and the resulting suicides have been adjudicated as fully compensable.

In the military too, I believe we should also start from a place of acceptance of an injury as bona fide until and unless there is evidence to the contrary. Any threat of being subject to prescribed discipline will deter the early seeking of medical help and will harm not only the member, but by extension, negatively impact operational readiness.

Our son Stuart struggled for a year under medical care before succumbing to his injury. At the time of his death, he had been removed from a psychiatric hospital where he sought help and was being subjected to ordered restrictions akin to defaulters discipline. We feel strongly that this quasi-discipline was a factor in his death. He was humiliated and without hope when he wrote in his farewell note that he needed to end the pain.

My husband I are now part of this informal military fraternity, and I can honestly say that of all the servicemen and women we have met, many who have injuries, I know of none who truly wants to die. They are proud of their service, and most would like to step up and continue to serve their country again.

Our sincere hope is that some good will come from Stuart's death and that positive changes regarding the treatment of victims of OSIs will form a part of his legacy. At this time, the provisions of paragraph 98(c) have become ill-suited to how Canadian patriots should be treated.

This is not a matter of politics. We are not motivated in a partisan way but view this problem as one with real casualties and fallen. The ripple effect that occurs when a member takes his own life extends beyond those immediately involved and to the larger community.

Despite the different political affiliations, I truly believe that everyone in this room wants to be part of the solution regarding the issue of suicide in the armed forces. This should be an easy issue for you to consider. It is inconceivable to me—and I think to you—that threatening a code of service offence and the possibility of life imprisonment will help ease the epidemic of suicide in the forces.

There is no benefit to leaving paragraph 98(c) in the National Defence Act, nor is there a downside to removing it. In my heart, I believe it is morally responsible. Each of us must do everything within our power to ensure that not one more person dies. Each of our men and women must feel valued and worthy of our attention in this matter. Our injured troops have earned our support, not our disdain. They are not simply disposable military assets. If the deletion of paragraph 98(c) saves even one life, your actions will be worth it.

Thank you for your efforts to effect positive change and to enhance our military.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for those important words.

Mr. Perron.

[Lieutenant-Colonel, Retired) Jean-Guy Perron (As an Individual]

Good afternoon. My name is Jean-Guy Perron, and I am a retired lieutenant-colonel.

I enlisted in 1978 and graduated from the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. From 1983 to 1990, at the start of my career, I was an infantry officer with the Royal 22^nd Regiment and the 1^st Battalion of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

I studied law at the University of Ottawa. From 1995 to 2006, I was a military lawyer with the Office of the Judge Advocate General. I commanded the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit from 2004 to 2006, I was appointed as a military judge by the Governor in Council in 2006, and I was released from the Canadian Forces in 2014.

I was deployed to Bosnia, Rwanda and Uganda and travelled to Afghanistan on several occasions, in particular, to preside at the court martial of Captain Semrau.

I wish to focus my comments on summary hearings and the related provisions of Bill C-77. I will start with a comparison of Bill C-71 with Bill C-77.

Bill C-71 uses the term ”disciplinary infraction” instead of “service infraction”. Both are created by regulations and are not an offence under the NDA or the Criminal Records Act. Under Bill C-71, a disciplinary infraction can only be tried by a summary trial. Under Bill C-77, a service infraction may only be dealt with by a summary hearing. The sanctions found in Bill C-71 are identical to those found in Bill C-77.

As for the principles and objectives of sentencing found in Bill C-71, they too are practically identical to those in Bill C-77. A summary trial under Bill C-71 is a service tribunal that deals with disciplinary infractions and not service offences. It offers the accused practically all of the protections of criminal law. A summary hearing under Bill C-77 is, in effect, identical to the summary trial in Bill C-71, except for one critical element. Everything will be defined in regulations. A hearing under Bill C-77 is not described. If one follows what we now have in chapter 108 of the QR and O, which describes the procedure for a summary trial, one should expect that the future chapter 108 of the QR and O would be quite similar for a summary hearing. If that is the case, a finding in a summary hearing is made on a balance of probabilities, instead of beyond a reasonable doubt, as what is in Bill C-71 and presently for a summary trial.

The objectives and principles of sentencing in Bill C-77 are practically identical for the purposes and principles of sentencing presently used by service tribunals and the purposes and principles of sentencing found in the Criminal Code. However, Bill C-77 mentions minor sanctions that may be imposed at summary hearings but does not define them. Would minor sanctions be identical or quite similar to the minor punishments that exist today? It would be most probably so.

The punishments of confinement to barracks and extra work in drill would raise concerns. Commanding officers can confine a person to barracks for up to 21 days. The rules relating to confinement to barracks could constrain the liberty of movement and action of a defaulter. A defaulter cannot go beyond the geographic limits prescribed by the commanding officer in standing orders. This deprivation of liberty can be very strict and would be similar to a conditional sentence of imprisonment: house arrest.

A person subject to confinement to barracks could be ordered to stay within unit lines during the complete period of the punishment. This means a person with a spouse or a family could be forced to live apart from them for the punishment period. A person undergoing a sentence of house arrest still lives with his or her spouse and family. This is a significant difference. Strict confinement to ship or barracks conditions could be very restrictive on the person's liberty and could equate to detention.

Under Bill C-77, the accused is liable to be sentenced to have more severe punishment based on a lower threshold of conviction. A summary hearing under Bill C-77 offers less protections to the accused than what was present in Bill C-71 and what is actually present in the summary trial process.

I'll now turn to the role of the commanding officer. “The commanding officer is at the heart of the entire system of discipline”, so stated Justice Dickson in his 1997 report. Currently, the National Defence Act and the QR and O reflect this key role. A review of the JAG annual reports from fiscal years 2008-09 to 2017-18, 10 years, provides very useful information to help one understand the current military justice system. Data indicates that COs presided over 16% of summary trials, delegated officers over 80% and superior commanders over 4%. This distribution is probably similar today, but the JAG ceased providing these statistics after 2010. This is unfortunate, because it does offer a clear picture of how discipline is enforced within units. It does appear that the great majority of summary trials are presided over by the officer closest to the accused and who possesses the least severe powers of punishment.

Bill C-77, just as Bill C-71 did, radically transforms this concept. Bill C-77 gives more powers of punishment to the superior commander than it does to the CO. This brings into question whether the CO is still the most important actor in disciplinary matters within his or her unit.

Next, on the need to change the military justice system, why does the chain of command need new service infractions and a new disciplinary system to ensure the proper administration of discipline within a unit? Over the 10-year period, approximately 70% of the summary trials occurred without the accused being offered the election of a court martial. Over that same 10-year period, the five minor offences in disobedience of a lawful command represented 94% of the charges tried by summary trial.

The punishments, in order of those awarded the most often, are a fine, 59%; confinement to barracks, 24%; extra work and drills, 6%; a reprimand, 4%; and detention, approximately 2%. Based on these statistics, why is there a need to create new disciplinary infractions and a new disciplinary process to assist the CO in enforcing discipline within his or her unit?

With regard to decriminalizing disciplinary infractions, a person found guilty of any of the service offences listed at section 249.27 of the National Defence Act and sentenced to a punishment of imprisonment, dismissal from Her Majesty's service, detention, reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority, or a fine exceeding one month of basic pay will have a criminal record. The service offences found at section 249.27 include the five minor offences—insubordinate behaviour, quarrels and disturbances, absence without leave, drunkenness, and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.

Section 83 of the National Defence Act, disobedience of a lawful command, is not included in section 249.27. A person found guilty of a purely military offence—for example, disobedience of a lawful command, insubordinate behaviour, absence without leave, drunkenness, or conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline—may have a criminal record.

The consequences of having a criminal record are significant. Applying for employment or attempting to cross the Canadian border are but two of the everyday consequences that can have an important impact on a veteran's life. Do we truly wish to burden a veteran with a criminal record, when he or she has committed a service offence, which may have no equivalent in our criminal justice system or in Canadian society? The answer to this question is not found in section 249.27 or the creation of service infractions.

One should examine the nature of the service offence to determine whether the offender should suffer the consequences of a criminal record. One should examine not only the punishment but the service tribunal that tried the offence.

A thorough and comprehensive review of the Canadian military justice system is definitely required. Any discussion on the subject of discipline and military justice must start with a basic understanding of the uniqueness of the Canadian Armed Forces and its specific role in Canadian society. Canada maintains a military force whose primary purpose is to ultimately use deadly force to execute the government's directives.

This armed force must be well led, well trained and disciplined. Military justice is but one facet of discipline. It is actually the means of last resort, when all other aspects of discipline have failed. The military justice system is not synonymous with military discipline.

Any major reform to the military justice system must be discussed in a public forum. A parliamentary committee could listen to Canadians, academics, lawyers and members of the Canadian Armed Forces. It would have the independence and necessary resources for the thorough review and creation of a modern system of military justice that will effectively balance the needs of discipline with the rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

For those who haven't been to committee before, part of my responsibilities is to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to express themselves and interact with you. If someone sees me going like this, if they could wind it down in 30 seconds or less, it would be very helpful for me.

We're going to go to seven-minute questions, and the first one will go to MP Dzerowicz.

The floor is yours.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Davenport, Lib.]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

Thanks so much for the excellent presentations, very different presentations.

I'm going to start off with Ms. Fynes.

Thank you for your wonderful presentation. I'm very sorry for your loss, for our loss. I'm very thankful for the service of your son to our nation. Thank you.

[Sheila Fynes]

Thank you so much.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

I just want to be very clear on the issue you've raised in your key recommendation. I think you've made an impassioned plea and I want to make sure that I'm clear on it.

I believe that your key recommendation is the removal of paragraph 98(c). You feel it is not necessary and it somehow might actually, for those who might be attempting suicide, put them into some sort of a conflict with the Canadian Armed Forces.

Could you explain what you think the issue is? I want to be very clear on it. I understand that your recommendation is to remove it.

Thank you.

[Sheila Fynes]

When a service member gets to the point where they're seriously thinking, “I'm done; I can't do this anymore”, I think telling them that they will be tried and put in jail.... I just don't see how that fixes anything. I don't think it's beneficial to the service member. I don't see it as beneficial to the military.

That is not going to produce a soldier, airman or someone who is going to be out there being a benefit in any way whatsoever. It's just going to make them feel worse. To me, it pushes along the decision they make.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

My understanding—and I could be wrong on this—is that 98(c) exists because it's trying to be a deterrent to people somehow indicating that they might be ill as a way of trying to get out of continuing to serve. That's my understanding.

[Sheila Fynes]

I think some of that might be covered in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that same section—malingering, faking being ill and all of that.

Paragraph (c) speaks specifically to if you try to kill yourself, in basic language. People who get to that point need help, not punishment. It just is so contrary to not just the military but to anyone who is at that point.

I don't come at this perspective just from our experience. We do know a lot of young people who have served overseas. We get the same message from everybody. It's antiquated.

I tried to find out if anyone had been charged and put in jail with this. I couldn't find anything quickly and readily. My friend here has told me that there have been three summary trials in the last few years for that exact offence. To me, it just is a completely antiquated law.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

I thank you for that.

Your raising this as an issue and giving voice to it is very important, so thank you so much.

I'm going to move over to the Quebec bar and ask a couple of questions.

I had been rereading some of the notes of the bill. I was looking at the fact that we provide caseworkers to victims of inappropriate sexual behaviour. I was also looking at the fact that we provide liaison officers to ensure victims are able to exercise their rights.

First, you made a number of wonderful recommendations—some big ones, some small ones, some cleanup stuff. I'm really grateful for all of them.

I want to get you to clarify a bit more in terms of your recommendation around minimal training for the liaison officers and the caseworkers, because I think that's important.

[Pascal Lévesque]

Just for the record, on Ms. Fynes' point, I've retrieved some stats on section 98 at the summary trial, but it doesn't say whether it's paragraph 98(a), 98(b), or 98(c). We could dig that out. I'm sure my colleagues at the Department of National Defence could find out.

With regard to the victim's liaison officers, the people who help the victims of criminal acts are generally social workers who work in the field on a full-time basis. Consequently, they are used to working with victims. You obviously can't ask an officer charged with handling victims in a theatre of operations to have any particular training and to do only that. However, he must have received basic training from professionals used to working with victims because, if you don't treat victims properly, you may make matters worse and cause them to withdraw.

However, we understand the legislator's wish to have someone who is appointed to every trial, but it has to be made clear in the regulations that the Canadian Forces must provide basic training to assist victims, particularly since certain service members have had training in social work.

[Julie Dzerowicz]

Thank you very much. I think that was important.

I will be reading through your recommendations again, because you've made a lot of them. They were very thoughtfully done. I really appreciate that.

I thought you also made very thoughtful recommendations, Lieutenant-Colonel Perron. Thank you for that.

I want to clarify something. I know you went through the different sections in your recommendations, and you had issues with some of them. I really appreciated that. You may have mentioned this at the beginning, but I want to make sure you did agree with the objective and our intention with Bill C-77 and what we're trying to do overall. I want to verify that you are supporting what we're intending to do with this bill, which is to ensure that victims receive the support they need and deserve, so that victims rights are actually enshrined within the National Defence Act.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Unfortunately, I'm going to have to hold it there. We don't have a ton of time left, and I have to make sure everyone has an opportunity.

MP Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing and for your testimony.

Ms. Fynes, again, our condolences for Corporal Langridge. I'm very familiar with the case. I was previously chair of the committee and the parliamentary secretary making sure that records were turned over so that you had them for information purposes and legal proceedings.

Lieutenant-Colonel Perron, thanks for your service to Canada. You've had quite a distinguished career—a Van Doo, a commando, a JAG and a military judge. You've done it all and seen it all.

To follow up on Ms. Dzerowicz's question, are you making recommendations for amendments to Bill C-77?

[LCol (Ret'd) Jean-Guy Perron]

I have provided the clerk with my written submissions. They will be translated and then provided to the committee. I have 15 recommendations in my written submissions. I've also provided you with three annexes that contain what I think is useful information for when you are considering my submissions.

Yes, I do make recommendations pertaining to Bill C-77.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Are you picking up any of the language that was used in Bill C-71 as a better way of interpreting military justice than Bill C-77?

[LCol (Ret'd) Jean-Guy Perron]

No, because, on the issue of summary hearings, these changes to military justice, Bill C-71 and Bill C-77 are practically identical.

The major fundamental change, which is critical, changes the summary trial to a summary hearing, thus keeping basically what I consider, as I discuss in my submission, what is still a penal proceeding with penal consequences, but replaces the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard with a “balance of probabilities”, which is, for me, very problematic.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Would that be a violation of charter rights?

[LCol (Ret'd) Jean-Guy Perron]

As far as I'm concerned, yes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I think, Mr. Lévesque, you mentioned that as well in your presentation. You're also concerned that there is this issue of beyond a shadow of a doubt, that justice will not be served if it becomes a balanced position. Essentially, the CO is making a determination without respecting the charter rights of the accused.