National Defence Committee on Oct. 18th, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thanks.

Mr. MacGregor, you get a small three-minute question.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to change to the potential acquisition of a large amphibious assault-style ship. I know that's been discussed. The Royal Canadian Navy discussed that in “Leadmark 2050”.

Looking at the future, the changing nature of threats, and what the Royal Canadian Navy would potentially be involved in, I want to hear your opinion. Do you believe that this would be an integral part of any future Canadian Navy needs? Or should we be concentrating in other areas? Should we be concentrating more on the surface, on capital ships and submarines? Or do you think an acquisition of amphibious-style ships would also be important?

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

Simply put, an amphibious ship is quite different from a humanitarian assistance ship, or a humanitarian assistance-peace support-disaster relief kind of ship. A humanitarian assistance ship, while not quite built to warship standards, is still a complex undertaking, and not merely for the ship. It's a national capability that's delivered and that integrates land, sea, and air capabilities to, in effect, deliver to shore in a foreign country. Each piece of that has its own costs, as does bringing it all together into a package and deploying at an operationally relevant level. At a certain level, it's irrelevant because it's too small. At a level that produces operationally relevant capability, it starts to get rather expensive.

In view of what I've outlined in terms of the shortfall in defence capabilities and defence spending, I think that pushes the discussion of an amphibious capability far off into the future. One needs to have the basic capabilities first before one moves beyond that, despite the fact that Australia has procured two such ships from the Spanish shipbuilders to give them capability in their region.

[Capt(N) Harry Harsch]

I think the other aspect here, though, as the admiral alluded to, is that an amphibious ship means a fundamental change in how the Canadian Armed Forces does its business. It means, in effect, marines. Most countries that operate amphibious ships have marines. There are other countries.... The Danish run the Absalon class that has effectively a lot of air in a warship, and it provides that sort of flexibility that I was talking about in my remarks with respect to options for government in terms of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, operations such as counter-piracy, and those sorts of things, which aren't part of war-fighting. You can accept that level of risk on a less capable ship.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

We'll go to five-minute questions now. I'll give the first one to Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have a couple of quick questions.

First, we talked about investments. Of course, NATO has the aspirational target of 2% of GDP. Do you believe that if Canada were able to start making strides toward that aspirational target of 2% of GDP it would provide the money to make the investments into the extra ships that are required for the Royal Canadian Navy?

Second, is there the capacity in the existing shipyards to actually produce those extra ships? That goes above and beyond what's currently in the national shipbuilding strategy.

[Cmdre Daniel Sing]

The NAC believes that moving towards NATO's aspirational target of 2% would be a good thing for this nation moving forward, no ifs, ands, or buts. If the country were to move in that direction, we do not see why naval requirements and the requirements of other services in the Canadian Armed Forces could not be better satisfied.

With respect to capacity, I think this is an issue that can be worked on. If we see and obtain steady-state, predictable funding into the future—and by future I mean more than 10 years—I don't see any reason why we, as a nation, could not develop a plan to spend that money properly.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

Regarding that 2% aspirational target, I would only add that it's useful to have such targets, even if one doesn't see this country actually achieving 2%. What I can tell you is that the bipartisan approach to national defence in this country under eight previous governments—which was to decrease the resources available to defence—is not going to take us to where governments would like to be. Every time the 2% issue is raised to politicians, what they immediately do is misdirect to the success of the Canadian Forces today, which are using the legacy equipment that was purchased during a time when defence spending was indeed higher. Politicians point to the success and say that everything's fine, ignoring the fact that the legacy equipment, as I pointed out, is old. Everything that defends maritime security in this country is more than 20 years of age. I could talk about the Sea Kings, which are in their fifties at this point. Simply put, that average age means that we are headed for problems at the current funding levels.

While it doesn't have to be 2%, staying below 1% of GDP is going to mean a need to fundamentally rethink the defence of Canada, that is to say, Canadian defence policy. If it's going to be 1% of GDP that we're using, or less, then I think one has to start with what matters to Canadians. What matters to them is that Canadian governments always look to the defence of this country. To put it another way, what matters is that Canadians never lose confidence in government's ability to defend this country, and that we never lose the confidence of American leadership in our contribution towards continental defence.

If the starting point for a future defence strategy is a continuation of defence funding of less than 1%, then perhaps the starting point should be how to secure on, above, and below the water on all three ocean approaches. That doesn't mean that's all the Canadian Forces would do in the future, but it certainly means that you'd have a rational starting point from which to re-examine how to deal with much less funding.

Of course, it won't surprise you that the Naval Association and Navy League would then point out that those platforms procured for the defence of North America do the same job 13 miles off our coast that they'll do 13 miles off somebody else's coast. Consequently, they would be available not only for the defence of North America and the defence of Canada, but also for international operations as well.

[Capt(N) Harry Harsch]

Picking up on what the admiral said, as Canadians we want to matter. We want to matter both at home and abroad. My experience is that we do, when we're there. To throw it back to government, because of the funding level, we're not able to sustain the kind of presence that I think Canadians want us to sustain abroad, whether we're alongside in a port in a diplomatic mission, flying a large Canadian ensign, or whether we're sitting, as the admiral suggested, a little over 12 miles off somebody's coast in something which is a little more significant. We want to matter, and you matter by having the vessels and having the people flying the flag.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

I'm going to give the next question to Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Strangely enough, I want to follow on with Mr. Bezan's concern, because this is where the rubber hits the road.

Admiral Robertson, I want to go back to your original remarks about the budget. The Conservative Party just released a paper that says that in order to create a stable, predictable, long-term budget for the Canadian Armed Forces, the ultimate goal being meeting NATO standards, it would take a minimum of 2% of GDP. There's not really much to disagree with in their paper.

The problem, as I see it, is that if in fact you are to meet your 2% standard within a decade, that's about a $2-billion or $3-billion increase in the budget on an annual basis. If you say that publicly, then you hear this gagging sound on the part of the Canadian public, and that gagging sound is reflected in their politicians.

I would be interested in your thoughts as to how to get beyond the “we want to matter” rhetoric, “showing up when we show up” sort of thing, and how to convince, if you will, the Canadian public, and therefore the people who will vote on the budget, to get past this stall point? We are in a genteel decline, as we speak, given the current budget parameters, even with the escalator. It's just a glorified way of covering off inflation, military inflation, for the time being.

I would be interested in your thoughts with respect to getting off this dialogue of the deaf.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

If my answer is unsatisfactory, I'm sure my two colleagues would love to pile on to what amounts to a political question in reality.

My starting point would be that without a foreign policy review that informs why we're doing things internationally, you have a harder job starting off. This has been a common problem in Canada. It should be relatively straightforward, to look internationally at what's going on. Of course, my focus is on great powers, but there are many other aspects to foreign policy that would have to be included.

It's to look internationally, comment on what's happening, and to start to make the case that Canada has a role to play because it must, not because it would like to. The western democracies have a role to play, if they wish the international rules-based order to be maintained. That's something that has been favourable, not just for the western democracies, but indeed globally for the post-Second World War period.

Back in June, Minister Sajjan went to a conference called the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. He spoke about Canada's enduring interests and strategic outcomes when he was there. I will give you three quick quotes, because they stuck with me. He said:

Canada is...a Pacific nation....That is why Canada is committed to increasing our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

We are dedicated to building upon our past contributions as we adjust to an evolving international dynamic and reinforce a rules-based international order.

We are committed to making a meaningful contribution to preventing conflict and bolstering security.

Those are three great statements, but they are both the argument for, and cannot be accomplished without, a capable Armed Forces, especially in the eyes of folks in the Asia-Pacific region. It is actually demonstrating that those comments have something behind them, both the political will and the military capabilities. Without both, they will not be taken seriously by our partners in the Asia-Pacific region, all of whom recognize that there is a need for those kinds of statements today by countries that believe in the long-term maintenance—

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I wouldn't disagree with any of that.

My core question, if you will, is how you convince the people around this table, and the people in the House of Commons, and the public they represent. When the cheque hits the table, they all head for the washroom.

That's what is happening. It has happened for years. Everybody loves the military; they just don't want to pay for it.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

Right. It's not so much loving the military, it's loving the effect that can be achieved.

If countries don't wish to play a role in the Asia-Pacific region, one way of not being taken seriously at security dialogues or at international conferences, and also tangentially in issues related to trade, is to not have any capability that's been to the region recently. Of course, we have collectively had a problem—Canada has, that is—with respect to the modernization of Halifax class. There have not been ships to send abroad and so on.

But if I look at the grave risk of straying well beyond my area of expertise, it would be that the distance from Melbourne up to the middle of the East China Sea is about one day shorter than the distance from the East China Sea to Vancouver. So while Australia knows it's an Asia-Pacific nation, somehow Canada doesn't have that central in its mind. That Canada has an interest in what happens there is self-evident to us. So you look at what Australia is doing spending 1.9% of GDP. Why? The common phrasing is because of the neighbourhood Australia lives in. If they're 10 days away from that neighbourhood, we're 11 days away and our trade passes through it and so on.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

They put up $32 billion and we put up $20 billion. We've got a third more population.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

Indeed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Given the time we have left, I think we can go to three three-minute questions left. I'd like to offer Mr. MacGregor a question if he would like to take it. It may be bad timing, or I can circle back.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I'm good to go. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to just revisit the submarine issue because I'm very interested in our acquisition of the Victoria class submarines. When you look at the capabilities that China and Russia—which historically has been very strong in its submarine fleet—are developing, how do you see our Victoria class submarines, which were built in the late 1970s, matching up to that kind of a threat?

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

As somebody who's had American submarine commanding officers sit in my office—as a commander down on the east coast—and talk to me after they've done an exercise with the Victoria class boats it's easy to make the case that our Victoria class are British-built submarines that feature some aspects that are British technology and many aspects that are American technology, including silencing and a variety of other subsystems in the submarine.

Consequently, when you put the Victoria class against British or American submarines in exercises, you tend to wind up with a draw, or with the skill of the captain perhaps determining some outcome. But they're very closely matched, except that nuclear submarines of course can go from one part of the theatre to another part at 28 knots, whereas a Victoria class takes longer to get from A to B. So they are capable boats by design.

The boats that are being built by all of the countries that build submarines at the moment are all very good products. But certainly with the modernization that's been done to the Victoria class today, there is no hesitation in turning to the government and saying “ready”.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

The Russians have been probing our Arctic borders in a bit of a game of brinkmanship and I've heard it mentioned before that anti-submarine warfare, or at least detecting and catching them, is a team effort. Are you satisfied that our current submarine capability works well going into the future for that particular detection of Russian incursions, or is it still very much letting the Americans with their territory in Alaska take the lead and so on?

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

It has less to do with geographic positioning and more to do with ice. That is because our current submarines have limited capability.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I think it's about 90 hours.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

In fact, I'm not even sure—

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I'm just looking it up.

[VAdm Drew Robertson]

However, when it comes to all the other tasks that submarines take on, you should have no concern about their capability.

The other point I'd make about submarines is simply that it's important to recognize the contribution made to, let's call it the NATO navy, or on the west coast, to the allied navies. If you think of the RIMPAC exercises that unfold every two years off Hawaii, they are a great training opportunity, bringing the like-minded western nations together to practise their skills, and not only practise their skills but also make sure that what they're doing is known to the Chinese and the Russians by inviting the Chinese and the Russians either as observers or indeed, as happened last summer, sending a Chinese warship to participate in those parts of the exercises that were at an appropriate classification level. Why? Because it all contributes to deterrence when they get to come and have a close look at what our forces are capable of doing.

When you think of western navies, I'd like you to think as a practical example that China has 60 submarines, which it does; Russia has 40; and America has about 75. Remember that America's submarines are used globally every day, are demanded by each of the combatant commanders for all the things that they are able to do, including intelligence, surveillance, and special operations; and China and Russia have an advantage, which is that they can concentrate where they wish to be rather than worry about where platforms are around the world.