What's unique on this project is that when we started down the path of delivery this.... Quite frankly, the Protecteur caught fire in February and then in June of that year Preserver was deemed incapable of going back to sea due to rust out. When we proposed a fast-track solution, we did not specifically want to have layer upon layer of bureaucratic resistance.
In my comments, I made the point about how in a lot of the rules we looked at we had to say, “This isn't really adding to success. Why are we doing it? What is this policy guidance on a specific item?” What we settled on was a provision of service. To your point about what our penalty is, we don't get paid and our financiers who are funding the project are not going to be happy if we're late.
We do have a very lean, very innovative.... We've avoided the Frankenstein requirement. If we say it has to have monitoring machines that are not mil-spec, so they can submit to a nuclear blast, we try to bring over, as much as we can, the oil and gas expertise and people who get things done quickly.
What's important to point out, though, is that we have a really good model here. Right now my team of 10 people run the whole project. In the shipyard, there's a management team of about 30 or 40 engineers who are doing the production engineering and the kind of program management you talked about. There's one project manager in charge.
The government has a third-party assessor who comes into the yard once a month and has unfettered access to look at how things are moving, and then we get feedback. We have a quasi-governance group where we talk about any problems we're leading into. Touch wood, right now, as Mr. Vicefield said, we're ahead of schedule.