There are 14. We await further information about the government's intentions for national security accountability mechanisms following the national consultations.
The main point I would make is that regardless of structure and the overall accountability framework, expert review, the type of review conducted by my office, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, known as SIRC, and by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, also known as the CRCC, is a necessary and key component.
My third key issue is related to the previous one.
Bill C-22 defines cooperation, or information sharing, between the committee of parliamentarians and the existing review bodies. However, the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will entail, and even require, greater cooperation among the existing review bodies, in addition to our cooperation with the committee of parliamentarians.
At this time, a certain amount of cooperation can occur between review bodies. For example, my predecessor and I have sent letters to my colleague, the chair of SIRC, with recommendations or findings from our reviews of CSE activities that implicate CSIS. SIRC must then follow up on those issues as it deems appropriate. However, as I said before, there should be an explicit authority in the legislation for cooperation among review bodies.
If intelligence agencies must work together, I don't see why we, the oversight bodies, can't work together officially. At this time, we can work together to a certain extent, but when operational information is involved, we can't share it. For example, if we want to conduct a joint review with SIRC, it's very difficult because we can't share operational information.
My fourth key issue deals with transparency. Since the disclosures of highly classified documents stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency by Mr. Snowden, public trust in the activities of the intelligence agencies and the effectiveness of review or oversight mechanisms have been put into question.
Greater information and explanations of why certain activities are conducted by the agencies would help the public debate, as it has in the United Kingdom. There, public reports by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation have provided a great deal of detail that has, among other points, presented an operational case for use of certain authorities and powers.
I believe that most people engaged in this debate accept that secrecy is a fact of life in national security. The intelligence agencies would not be effective if they could not work in secrecy. It is important to point out that it is because of this fact that the review bodies were established in the first place, with security-cleared staff, to monitor what is going on inside the secret agencies and to assess whether activities comply with the law, including the protection of the privacy of Canadians.
Secrecy and the Snowden disclosures have raised scepticism. When the public learns of mass data collection, they want to know whether it is really necessary and whether there are adequate privacy safeguards. Explanations, indeed, would help.
The four issues I’ve described briefly will all help strengthen the accountability of national security activities and strengthen public trust.
In particular, I look forward to working soon with the committee of parliamentarians when it becomes a reality.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. My executive director and I would be pleased to answer your questions. Anyway, we'll try.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. We're ready to answer questions.