National Defence Committee on March 22nd, 2016

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

At home and abroad—that's a key point.

From a military point of view, I think the big issue on the military planning side is looking at the potential long-term impacts of climate change on areas of the world where we see fragile and failing states, and how that may exacerbate the security situation in those countries, which could spill over into regions and cause a threat to Canadian security interests. Climate change is something that military planners are looking at. It's obviously very difficult to predict with any kind of certainty, but it is a key concern for military planners and thinkers looking out into the future.

Again, climate change is such a significant issue. In the defence policy review, nothing will be off the table. I'm sure there will be some discussion about the impacts of climate change on global security and how that could affect our policy.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your answer.

A three-minute question to close off round two goes to Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

I was very glad to hear from Global Affairs about the increased emphasis and desire to respond to threats at the source, before they're threats in North America. Also we had statements from the new government that it intends to rely more on diplomacy and development-assisted multilateralism in responding to these kinds of threats.

It brings me back to the question of acquisition of capacity. We're facing some very major questions, both in air capacity and naval capacity. My question comes back to here. What threats would drive the choice of a fighter to replace the CF-18? What are the threats we're responding to in making that decision?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

That's a really good question. One of the key things is that we need to take a look over a really long horizon at the kinds of situations Canada could potentially face. Those situations are very difficult to predict with any accuracy. I think that almost always drives a worst-case type of scenario, where we have to be able to be prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict. That's what essentially drives a lot of the requirements, and I'm sure those same requirements will drive decisions about the future fighter aircraft.

[Stephen Burt]

Sorry. If I could just interject, we do know and we do track.... As I was saying earlier about tracking maritime capability developments, we do track air force developments around the globe. We know that China and Russia are working on fifth-generation fighters. We know that both of those countries have a tendency to sell maybe not their best stuff but their second-best stuff to others. These are the kinds of capabilities we could run into in any number of operations around the globe.

What other countries are doing does play in this space. Obviously it's not my job to determine what capability we get to respond to it, but it is something that we monitor closely.

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I would emphasize that point. When we look to the future, we have to look at what possible aircraft we'd be required to fly against. It's not just aircraft. It's also ground-based, surface-to-air missile systems. It's a whole package of military capabilities that are emergent or could be in the future that we would have to contend with.

The other part of that threat formula of capability plus intent is often the most difficult to forecast with any kind of accuracy, so we look at countries like China and Russia, which have very high-end military capabilities, and the potential for some of those capabilities to proliferate to different areas of the world. If we're going to operate in the future and in the time frame that we're talking about for something like a fighter aircraft that's going to operate for many decades, then we need to make sure we're getting something that's going to be able to operate against those kinds of adversaries.

It is a very difficult question.

[Stephen Burt]

Certainly if you were going to fly into western Syria today, you would want a very capable aircraft, given the level of air defence in that country.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

We have some time left, so I want to ask a quick question, and then we agreed that I would divide the time up. We'll go to five-minute questions, and we'll start with you guys.

I have a quick question to kind of wrap up this whole Arctic RSA threat. It was mentioned and we never really had a chance to finish it. I think we all would agree that the Arctic is important and is probably a growing concern as we move forward. Currently we don't see a major threat, but we understand, as was just mentioned, that it's about intent and capability. Since Russia has capability, it can change its intent on a dime and then we would have an issue.

As we move forward, whether we're buying fighter planes or sensors or whatever it is that we need moving forward with NORAD next, and even considering what we have today, would you say it's critically important that, whatever we buy moving forward, that equipment or kit is able to sense and react in the north to a change in Russian intent? Would you say that's a very important thing to think about when we purchase things, moving forward?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I think that's a critical requirement. Any aircraft, or for that matter any military capability, we acquire needs to be able to operate all across Canada, particularly with a fighter aircraft. We do need a fighter aircraft that can operate in the far north, and that would certainly factor into the calculus of the people building the statement of requirement for that aircraft.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for that.

I'll move over to the other side of the table for a five-minute question.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's comforting to know that we don't have any military threats in the next 10 years, so that gives us some time. What type of surveillance and interception capabilities does Canada have in place in terms of ballistic and cruise missile defence? While we recognize that there may not be a threat at the moment or in the next 10 years, what do we have now and what can we do in that time span to make sure that when these threats do present themselves through either state or non-state actors, including launchings from air, land, or sea, we know what we need and we have it in place?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

There are a couple of components to that question. The first one right off the bat is ballistic missile defence. Since 2005, Canada's position has been that we're not participating in North American ballistic missile defence. Having said that and looping back to this defence policy review, I think that's certainly a question that could be considered in those discussions. I know that the minister sent a letter to this committee suggesting that as a potential area for you to consider.

For surveillance of North American approaches from ballistic missiles and from cruise missiles, again, we operate in NORAD headquarters. We have Canadians on the watch floor, and despite the fact that we don't participate in North American ballistic missile defence, our officers on the floor are not excluded from conducting surveillance and warning of airspace. NORAD has the capacity to detect ballistic missile launches from other countries, but it's important to focus on what NORAD is doing with ballistic missile defence, because it's not meant to be a defensive umbrella for all of North America against a big state-armed nuclear power like Russia. It is designed to deal with rogue states like North Korea or potentially Iran some day. It does have the capacity for ballistic missile surveillance.

In terms of cruise missile defence, we have a north warning system, which has been put in place across the Canadian Arctic and across Alaska. That system has some limited capabilities for cruise missile detection. I can't really get into them at this security classification, but this again is one of the reasons why we're looking at north warning system renewal as part of NORAD modernization, to make sure that our ability to detect threats to Canada is keeping up with the threat and how the threat evolves.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Canada is not going to participate in the interception of ballistic or cruise missiles. Given what the potential trajectories are from the threats that you mentioned, there may be some of these going over Canada. Do you know what is in place, if anything, to protect Canadian airspace should we be in the pathway of these missiles?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

As I said, with regard to ballistic missile defence, our position is that we're not in the North American ballistic missile defence program. Cruise missile defence is separate from ballistic missile defence. There is a capacity for the Canadian Forces to conduct some form of defence against cruise missiles, but I wouldn't want to get into any details on that, based on the security classification that we're operating at.

On the NORAD side with ballistic missile defence, they have an architecture to deal with this. Again if this was something that Canada wanted to officially participate in, I think that would be a key item to consider or talk about in the defence policy review that's about to launch.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Canada is considering a purchase of drones. What threat are these armed drones supposed to protect Canada against?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I would phrase it differently with respect to drones. I'll start there.

Drones have proven to be invaluable for military operations. Almost all of our western like-minded nations are acquiring uninhabited aerial vehicles for military operations. They're particularly good at intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions, where you need an airborne platform, with sensors, that can loiter in a specific area for a long period of time. These unmanned aircraft have proven their worth in countless operations over the last decade, including in support of Canada's operations in Afghanistan.

Really, drones are a military capability that most countries are pursuing, and Canada is no different. We have the JUSTAS project, which is looking at our operational requirements for an unmanned aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance.

The issue of whether or not those drones should be armed is a question that, again, I think will be tackled in the defence policy review. I think that's a very good question for a policy review to look at. From a military standpoint, I can say that armed drones provide a useful tool to military commanders in operations, just like other weapons systems do. As to whether or not Canada should have that kind of capability, I think that's a very important policy question and one that I would expect to be tackled in the defence policy review.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much. We're going to move on to the next questioner.

Mr. Gerretsen.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Following up on the discussion about ballistic missile defence and Canada's non-involvement in North America with respect to that, can you comment as to what your position is on it? Do you believe that Canada should be involved? If so, to what degree?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I think what I would say on ballistic missile defence is that Canada made the decision in 2005. We're now more than a decade from that decision. I think it's really important for any country to regularly look at decisions they've made in the past to make sure those decisions are still good decisions in today's day and era.

As I've said a couple of times in response to questions, the question of BMD is a very good policy question that should be looked at in a defence policy review.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Let me ask the question a little differently. Can Canada become marginalized when it comes to making continental defence decisions as a result of not being involved in that program?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

Well, I would say that it would be pretty obvious that we are marginalized to a degree because we don't participate in North American ballistic missile defence, and when those decisions are taken in NORAD, we have to step back from those decisions and not participate in them.

You have a policy that's different from our key ally in NORAD, so there is going to be a certain element of that. Is this a major obstacle that hinders our operations with NORAD on a daily basis? No, not at all. The NORAD mission is one that we're full participants in. It's just on this one issue of ballistic missile defence that we don't have a voice.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Just so I understand this, if there's an incoming missile that's directed towards Canada, towards Kingston in particular, in my riding, would NORAD, the decision obviously having been made without Canada's inclusion, come to the defence of Canada to intercept it? If so, does that not pose some kind of question with respect to our sovereignty in terms of our ability to be making decisions on behalf of our own defence?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

That's a very good question.

On the watch floor, Canadians are allowed to participate in surveillance. On the watch floor, they would see the development of a ballistic missile launch and its trajectory. To stay pure to our decision to not participate in North American ballistic missile defence, we would not have a voice in any decision about what to do with that missile. I think that kind of answers your question.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

So it would be....

I won't say it, because it will show on the record, but I was going to reference a current presidential candidate.

[Voices]

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