National Defence Committee on March 22nd, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'd like to call the Standing Committee on National Defence to order.

We are here to discuss with our witnesses the defence of Canada and North America, and security and threat assessments focusing on the Canadian NORAD region aerial readiness.

Our witnesses today from the Department of National Defence are Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, director general, international security policy; and Stephen Burt, assistant chief of defence intelligence, Canadian Forces intelligence command. From Global Affairs Canada we have David Drake, director general, international security and intelligence bureau.

Thank you, gentlemen, for taking time out of your day to come and speak to the committee.

Each person can take up to 10 minutes to give opening remarks. We'll start with both gentlemen from DND, at 10 minutes each, and then Mr. Drake from Global Affairs will have 10 minutes. Either Mr. Burt or Mr. Bishop can lead off.

Thank you for coming.

[RAdm Scott Bishop, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear before this committee as you examine what we believe to be a very important subject.

I'm Rear-Admiral Bishop, director general of international security policy at National Defence headquarters. I report to the assistant deputy minister for policy, and I'm responsible for managing our bilateral and multilateral defence relationships including, of course, our very important relationship with the United States of America. I hope that my comments today will help you with your work as you study the defence and security of North America.

I'd like to begin my remarks by providing a broad overview of some of the key initiatives and highlighting some key areas of our defence and security co-operation with our partner, the United States, including our participation in the North American Aerospace Defense Command, commonly referred to as NORAD.

As you know, the government has committed to undertaking a defence policy review which will examine Canada's defence priorities and drive our strategy to deal with a dynamic security environment and the uncertainties of the future. The defence of North America will almost certainly figure prominently in the defence policy review, as it has always been an immutable and enduring task for the Canadian Armed Forces.

Consequently, the Canadian Armed Forces is focused on ensuring that we are interoperable with the United States military and we're capable of conducting operations together across the spectrum of conflict. We do this through regular operations, joint exercises, and personnel exchanges in close co-operation as full and equal partners on virtually every defence issue of significance in North America. At any given time, there are more than 700 Canadian Armed Forces personnel serving in the United States. Approximately 300 of them are committed to the NORAD mission, including 147 who are posted to NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, and there are literally dozens of others at many other locations spread across the United States.

Our minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense meet regularly in Canada and Washington and at NATO meetings and other international forums elsewhere in the world. In addition to such senior leader engagement, a wide array of bilateral institutions and agreements help sustain and deepen our defence relationship.

The most important of these is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which has met continuously since 1940. This board serves as a bilateral forum to discuss and provide advice on policy issues related to homeland defence and security, including global military challenges that affect continental defence. To adapt to the changes in the defence and security environment, the membership of the board has evolved significantly over the last decade and a half. Specifically, its composition has been expanded to include other security departments and agencies as well as our new military command structures in both our countries.

Today meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence are attended by senior representatives in the Department of National Defence but also by members of Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and the Department of Public Safety, with similar departments and agencies represented in the United States' delegation. The board continues to be the most senior political military advisory board on defence and security between our two countries, and it plays a crucial role in fostering frank discussion on the wide range of emerging issues that could potentially affect our continental defence and security.

In addition to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the many other Canada-U.S. forums focused on defence issues, there are more than 800 agreements and arrangements that govern the day-to-day defence relationship, including the NORAD agreement. NORAD itself is a cornerstone of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship and it has evolved significantly since it was established in 1958. Nevertheless, it remains today the key means by which our two nations jointly defend North American airspace. Canada works very closely with the United States to ensure that NORAD remains able to effectively deliver its three missions. These include aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning.

NORAD also plays an important role in ensuring Canadian sovereignty and security, serving as a deterrent against potential attacks, and providing crucial surveillance capability for North America's approaches. As a partner in NORAD, Canada provides a significant contribution to the surveillance of the continent's northern approaches, and this is why we're committed to protecting the status of NORAD as a critical element of North American defence and to continuing to explore options to ensure NORAD can modernize and evolve to meet existing and emerging challenges. A key part of these efforts is examining opportunities for the renewal of the north warning system.

To ensure that we are well positioned to discuss these important issues, we've established the mechanisms to bring together all relevant defence stakeholders, military and civilian, on a regular basis with our U.S. allies to discuss these issues.

Aside from cooperation through NORAD, a vital component of our day-to-day operational defence relationship is conducted under the Tri-Command Framework. The Tri-Command brings together Canada's Joint Operations Command, NORAD, and U.S. Northern Command. The Tri-Command is the primary venue through which Canada and the U.S. collaborate on preparing for and responding to civil emergencies, particularly through the Civil Assistance Plan. The Civil Assistance Plan facilitates military to military support from one nation to the other during natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or other crises.

For defence planning, the Combined Defence Plan provides a framework for the combined defence of Canada and the U.S. Similar to the Civil Assistance Plan, it provides a framework for how military forces from one nation can be provided in support of those of the other nation. In both contexts, our regional commanders have established relationships with their U.S. military colleagues across the border to ensure our countries can support each other if required. To ensure readiness, our two nations train and exercise together on an ongoing basis.

I'd also like to touch briefly on the Arctic. While the geographic and geopolitical landscape is complex and rapidly evolving, there is currently no military threat to Canada in the Arctic. However, National Defence does have an important role in the north, particularly in support of whole-of-government activities in the region, as well as through surveillance and sovereignty operations.

Here again our relationship with the United States is critically important. In addition to NORAD's responsibilities in the north, we also benefit from a tri-command framework for Arctic co-operation between CJOC, NORAD, and U.S. northern command. It identifies specific areas of co-operation on safety, security, and planning in the Arctic as it pertains to the defence of North America.

In closing, I'd like to emphasize that our defence relationship with the United States has been and continues to be of critical importance to Canada. As we look at the future and are confronted with a threat environment that remains volatile, unpredictable, chaotic, and ambiguous, this special relationship will continue to be of pre-eminent importance to both nations, as both Canada's and the United States' defence and security will depend on our continued collaboration as full and equal partners in North American defence.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much, Admiral.

Mr. Burt, you have up to 10 minutes.

[Stephen Burt, Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair and members of Parliament, thank you very much for the invitation to testify before you this morning. It is my distinct pleasure to address you today and provide our views on threats to North America.

I'd like to take a moment before I get into the prepared remarks to acknowledge the serious event this morning in Brussels, in Belgium writ large. Obviously I do touch on terrorism in my remarks, but I'm happy to take any questions you have. It's an evolving situation. We're getting things minute by minute on this. Much of it is coming in over open sources, through the media, so I'm not that much further ahead than any of you are, but I'd be happy to take questions on that.

Before I talk about possible threats to Canada as we see them, I would like to provide some background on the role of the Canadian Forces intelligence command—CFINTCOM, as we call it. The role of the command consists of helping the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces to make sound decisions in exercising their duties. Whether that's conducting operations in the Arctic, providing support to events such as the 2010 Olympic Games, or carrying out overseas operations, the Canadian Armed Forces have need of the most accurate and up-to-date intelligence in order to achieve their military objectives and ensure the security and protection of their personnel.

Defence intelligence is also a key element in the ability of the Government of Canada to make informed decisions on defence issues, national security, and foreign affairs. In carrying out our mandate, I can say with pride that our intelligence capability is world class and offers the necessary tools, 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, to give our leaders an information advantage in making those decisions. Intelligence is a leading factor in operational success.

I should also note that we benefit from productive relationships with our whole-of-government partners, working closely with the Privy Council Office, the RCMP, CSIS, CSE, Public Safety, and Global Affairs, to name a few. You and the Canadians you represent may be certain that your intelligence organizations are promoting the interests of this country in the areas of defence and security.

Canada also has a solid defence intelligence relationship with our Five Eyes partners, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Permanent liaison offices in Ottawa, Washington, London, and Canberra help manage these relationships.

Now, to the subject at hand—threats to North America. I appreciate the opportunity to help situate the committee and your subsequent report in how we see the current threat environment. CFINTCOM focuses the vast majority of its energy on military threats and support to Canadian Forces operations abroad.

We define threat as a combination of intent and capability. An entity with the desire to harm Canada but no capability to do so does not in our view represent a threat. Having discerned a foreign actor's intent to harm Canada, the intelligence apparatus must track any advancement in its capabilities in order to determine if that entity presents a threat. Tracking or predicting changes in capability is sometimes challenging, but is usually possible within a reasonable margin of error. Gauging current and evolving intent is more complicated but still possible. However, predicting future intent is highly risky. Where a state may not exhibit hostility while it is developing a capability, once acquired, that capability remains in its arsenal whatever changes happen in its political calculus and intent.

With that definition in mind, I can say that at this time we do not see a state actor that has both the capability and the intent to harm Canada militarily. Nevertheless, we view the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, as well as the development of ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America, as worrisome. States of concern, such as Iran and North Korea, will likely continue in their attempts to acquire, develop, and improve weapons of mass destruction, along with the ballistic missile capabilities to deliver them.

The dual-use nature of most biological and many chemical-related technologies makes monitoring weapons programs and procurement involving these materials difficult. Furthermore, the ostensible civilian application of nuclear technology and the use of space launch vehicles can mask military intentions. It is important to note, however, that we assess that only states can master the complexities of ballistic missile delivery systems.

In the case of Iran, its current missile arsenal lacks the range to strike targets within North America. With the current P5+1 joint action plan, we assess that the potential for Iranian covert nuclear weapons development has been substantially set back, and is more likely to be detected should it occur.

North Korea, on the other hand, has expressly indicated that it wants to be able to target North America with nuclear armed missiles. While it is actively developing ballistic missiles that could potentially reach North America, whether North Korea has developed a practical weapon is unclear. North Korea's recent claim of successfully testing a thermonuclear weapon or H-bomb is unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, that country's history demonstrates continuing efforts to develop a viable nuclear weapon capability, which we will continue to watch closely.

Terrorism is obviously at the forefront of our minds as a challenge to the security of North America. While the primary Government of Canada agencies responsible for countering terrorism domestically are the RCMP and CSIS, the Canadian armed forces are ready to play a role in supporting their emergency management partners across Canada. We also work closely with these and other partners to ensure the safety of our CAF personnel and infrastructure.

Finally, with regard to cyber, there are two specific areas of interest for the Canadian Forces intelligence command: threats that affect the ability of the armed forces to operate, and the cyber-capabilities of foreign actors. The bigger picture of cyber-threats, that is, threats to Canada in general, and threats emanating from non-military cyber-actors are the purview of the Department of Public Safety.

The potential exists for foreign states to employ computer network exploitation capabilities in support of strategic intelligence collection. More simply put, this means using computers to spy on Canada. They may also use network reconnaissance in support of planned or anticipated computer network attacks. That is looking at our computer systems so at the moment when we would have to be defending ourselves, they would conduct a cyber-attack in an attempt to render our command and control systems inoperable. As well, they may use network attacks against private and government data and communications networks on which we in the Department of Defence and the armed forces rely.

CFINTCOM is interested in all such incidents because they affect the ability of the armed forces to operate.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for the opportunity. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much, Mr. Burt.

That concludes the opening remarks from DND. I'd like to give some time to Global Affairs Canada and David Drake.

[David Drake, Director General, International Security and Intelligence Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you very much.

Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. It's my pleasure to be here today to discuss the foreign policy considerations related to the defence of North America.

First, allow me to say just a few words about my own role at Global Affairs Canada.

As Director General of the International Security and Intelligence Bureau at Global Affairs Canada, I am responsible for the management of the foreign policy dimension of all of Canada's defence and security relationships. However, my bureau is also responsible for our relationships with other bilateral allies and partners, as well as engagement with key multilateral security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Canada's commitments to the U.S.-led Anti-ISIL Coalition.

My bureau also acts as a focal point within our department for intelligence matters and has the responsibility for advancing Canadian positions to address international crime and terrorism as well as to provide advice on certain programming initiatives in support of these objectives.

Let me focus on Canada's foreign policy responses to potential threats to the North American continent. Then I will examine the Canadian activity outside North America to address potential challenges before they reach our shores.

First, let me begin by underscoring that beyond the clear domestic and sovereignty prerogatives of my National Defence and Public Safety colleagues, from a Global Affairs Canada perspective, the security of North America is the primary enabler for the close economic ties with the U.S. that underpin the prosperity of both Canada and the United States.

Almost 25% of Canada's GDP is generated through exports to the U.S. Comparatively, exports to all other countries generate only an additional 6% of Canada's GDP. In 2015, Canada-U.S. trade in goods and services reached almost $881 billion in annual trade for goods and services. Canadian exports to the U.S. were about $450 billion, representing more than 72% of all Canadian exports. Canada imported $431 billion in goods and services from the U.S., representing more than 64% of total imports. Goods and services worth over $2.4 billion cross the U.S.-Canada border every day.

As such, the importance of maintaining a relationship of mutual confidence, including assurances that potential threats will not originate or pass through our respective countries, is fundamental to the continuation of the free and open relationship that Canada and the U.S. currently enjoy.

Moreover, the North American geographic reality necessitates close bilateral co-operation between the U.S. and Canada. We have the world's longest shared border, which has led to close transnational co-operation on domestic security measures. We are surrounded on almost all sides by rugged coastlines, a reality that has driven increased Canada-U.S. collaboration on maritime domain awareness and the 2006 expansion of NORAD's mandate to include maritime warning.

Also, the vast Canadian Arctic and its approaches are of undeniable geostrategic importance for the defence of both Canada and the U.S., as Admiral Bishop has just mentioned, which is the reason that we have invested significant resources into our northern defences.

In an increasingly resource-constrained environment, and given the high cost of operating over significant distances and in the north, the benefit for Canada of close co-operation and cost sharing with the U.S. are obvious. While defence imperatives always require delicate decisions on military investments, without the close defence co-operation that Canada enjoys with the U.S., Canada would be required to make some very difficult decisions on military investments.

As mentioned, one of the primary mechanisms for North American defence is NORAD, the binational command staffed by both Canadian and American military and civilian officers. This organization is unique in the world and has been a priority for Canada since it was formed in 1958. Furthermore, it is seen as a foreign policy priority as well. Global Affairs Canada, for example, contributes a political adviser to NORAD in Colorado Springs, who reports directly to the commander of NORAD.

Over the past several decades, the geopolitical situation to which NORAD has responded has shifted and evolved, and NORAD has undergone several adaptations to its roles and responsibilities as a result.

This includes the addition of a domestic airspace monitoring and response role following the 9/11 attacks, and the addition of a maritime warning role in 2006, which I already mentioned earlier, to ensure seamless monitoring and assessment of North America's maritime domain.

Global Affairs Canada continues to work closely with National Defence, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. State Department to ensure that NORAD is able to evolve and modernize to address emerging threats. This work includes the support of bilateral consultations to examine North American defence infrastructure, organization, and planning required for the combined defence of North America.

Admiral Bishop has mentioned the PJBD, the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and I will not repeat the important points he made except to note that obviously this is something that involves very much both sides and that also recently added board members from both Public Safety and PCO to give a wider breadth of discussion and co-operation to this discussion.

While our relationship with the U.S. is clearly a priority, allow me to now take the discussion a bit further afield, by noting that our strong preference is to prevent threats to North America at their source, by employing the full range of diplomatic and military tools and the Canadian tool-kit.

This includes diplomatic efforts to engage and de-escalate tensions wherever possible, including through the promotion of nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament, combined with the provision of development assistance, security programming, capacity building, and peace operations.

Global Affairs Canada maintains key security programming tools including the counterterrorism capacity-building program, intended to build the capacity of beneficiary states to prevent and respond to terrorist activity globally, and the anti-crime capacity-building program, which aims to enhance the capacity of beneficiary states to prevent and respond to threats posed by transnational criminal activity, principally, in the Americas.

Furthermore, through a range of multilateral and bilateral engagements, Canada has also focused its diplomatic efforts on addressing trans-national organized crime and illegal migration, and countering violent extremism including through Canada's support to the U.S.-led Anti-ISIL Coalition.

Finally, Canada is also a member of a range of multilateral organizations, the goals of which are to prevent escalation through a combination of military and diplomatic co-operation, confidence building, and deterrence. These include institutions like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and others. Canada's membership in these organizations has additional benefits as well, such as, for example, increased situational awareness, training, and joint exercises.

Global Affairs Canada works closely with our colleagues at National Defence to ensure that our strategic and policy directions are well aligned with Canada's interests and our bilateral and multilateral relations are supportive of a more secure North America and a more secure global situation as well.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much, Mr. Drake.

We're ready to go to our first round of seven-minute questions.

Ms. Romanado, you have the floor.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop for his service to Canada.

Rear-Admiral, you spoke of the importance of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Canada currently consists of 14 wings across Canada, including two fighter wings, which are in Bagotville and Cold Lake.

Given the fact that we have these 14 wings across Canada and these two fighter wings, I'd like to get a sense from you as to why, in the recent past, U.S. fighter planes have conducted directed landings on Canadian soil.

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

Obviously, Canada and the United States together represent a big space, and both countries have limited resources when we're talking about such a large area. A key tenet of the NORAD agreement is that the commander of NORAD, who is an American four-star admiral or general, whose deputy is always a Canadian, normally a three-star air force general, has the authority to move air assets that are assigned to NORAD back and forth across the border, depending on the threat or the need to position aircraft for a potential threat.

One of the benefits of being in this NORAD agreement is that we're essentially pooling our resources given the difficulty of defending such a large continent. Those decisions are taken by NORAD and that's all covered under the NORAD agreement.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Okay, but in terms of our sovereignty, you mentioned that Canada is a big space to cover. Do you think we currently have the aerial support we need with our current fleet, in terms of where they're located and in terms of fuelling capabilities, and so on and so forth? Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I would start by saying that NORAD is always looking at the mission they've been assigned, and they're always looking at making sure they have the resources they need to meet the mission they've been given. There are constant discussions in NORAD, looking at the threat, where aircraft are, and how many aircraft they have assigned.

The commander of NORAD right now is looking very seriously at the evolving threat, and is in a process of having some very preliminary discussions about where NORAD should go in the future, under the context of NORAD modernization. Part of that is taking a look at the north warning system, as I said in my opening remarks, and making sure the system is appropriate to deal with the kinds of threats we may see in the future. The other part of it is looking at the resources NORAD has. That is all looked at on a regular basis.

We have fighter aircraft who are on alert in Canada. They're essentially put on alert state by NORAD. If there's an increase in a threat, they can increase their alert posture and essentially call more aircraft into an alert state, and be ready to respond given a higher threat.

I think in terms of numbers right now, NORAD is achieving the mission it's been given. We have those wings, as you said. We have two operational fighter bases. We also have some forward operating locations in Canada's far north, which NORAD regularly forward-deploys aircraft to if they perceive that the threat condition has changed. They regularly practise that.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Further to that, in your opening statement you mentioned there are currently no military threats to Canada in the Arctic. My concern is around why we have one of our fighter wings in Cold Lake when there isn't a presence on the west coast. I know we're depending on our partners with NORAD, but I'm just curious to know why we're not on the west coast.

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

Well, we don't have a permanent presence on the west coast in terms of a fighter base, but the aircraft that are based in Cold Lake do regularly move out to Comox and operate from that operating location.

Again, these are decisions that are made by NORAD, based on what the threat is and where they perceive they need aircraft based on what's going on in the world. On a fairly regular basis, they will forward-deploy fighter aircraft, including fighters from Cold Lake, Alberta, to operate from Comox for as long as they need them there. The west coast of Canada is not cut out of the process, and we're not reliant on the United States to have fighters on the west coast. As I said, quite often fighters will move from Cold Lake to Comox and operate from there, if NORAD assesses that they're required there.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Okay.

On that basis, right now a CF-18 range with ordnance is 3,330 kilometres, and combat radius is 537 kilometres. The distance from Cold Lake to Vancouver is over 1,000 kilometres. My concern is that we're putting not our eggs in one basket, but we're looking at our partners with NORAD and the States to cover our western assets. You have elaborated on that. In terms of the—

Pardon?

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

He didn't hear what you said.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Oh.

In terms of our western fleet, I believe NORAD has bases in Portland and Alaska. Is that correct?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

I would have to go back and check on specific U.S. basing in Alaska. There are a number of bases in Alaska that the United States operates from, but I would have to confirm that.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Okay.

In terms of our capability to cover the large space of Canada, how important is our tanker support for our fleets?

[RAdm Scott Bishop]

It's vitally important. We all understand that Canada is a huge country, and the aerospace dimension of Canada is even larger as it extends to seaward. We would be hard pressed with our fighter aircraft to be able to achieve the NORAD mission without refuelling support from tankers. That is a critical element of the NORAD mission, just to be able to cover the geography.

That again is another advantage of working inside this NORAD agreement with the United States. We're able to share our tanker resources with the United States when they require them, but also we're able to draw on U.S. tanker resources for NORAD missions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's your seven minutes, with perfect timing.

I'd like to give the floor to Ms. Gallant, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, through you, to our witnesses.

You mentioned that there are no immediate conventional threats; however, we're working on a white paper that will have to do for at least a decade, and all our procurements going forth will be predicated upon these potential threats. What are the top five threats—conventional, asymmetric, and hybrid—to the safety and security of citizens in North America?

[Stephen Burt]

The top five threats, all types...? That's what you said?

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Yes.

[Stephen Burt]

In terms of the top five threats, the most urgent one, the one that takes up most of the time and energy at the moment, is terrorism. I think what I said in my statement is that we see no state actors that are currently threatening North America militarily, which is a statement that I would stand behind.

Terrorism is certainly at the top of our list in terms of the amount of time and energy it takes. That's not for state actors, obviously, and not, I would say, an existential military threat, but it's a threat that we watch closely and help out on with our partners wherever we can, as well as watching closely as to what it means for our personnel.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

That's immediate, but—