Evidence of meeting #6 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A recording is available from Parliament.
9:50 a.m.
Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Well, it's not just a matter of where you deploy; you have to have something to deploy. If we don't have enough aircraft, there is no magic.
9:50 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
Yes, sure, but let's assume today. We do have the capacity, and I said deploying current or future assets, whatever they are.
9:50 a.m.
Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Well, we have some capacity. We obviously have to try to deploy them as wisely as possible and where the most likely threats are going to be. But we have to cooperate with our allies. We just don't have enough and will never have enough, so we have to do it jointly. I'm sure we can refine the policy, we can adjust it. Any good military deployment adapts, and adapts to ongoing threats.
9:50 a.m.
Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual
That's the sensible way to do it. If that is what you're advocating, it makes eminent good sense.
9:50 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
Thank you for that. That's the point I was trying to get to.
As a broader question, switching lenses a little and taking a look at the Arctic, let me suggest that the most imminent threat may not necessarily be even a land grab from Russia or from China or from any other state entity. We have melting Arctic sea ice, we have access to the Northwest Passage, we have sharply decreasing oil prices, and a corresponding increase in the interest in other resources that are in the Arctic and potentially on the seabed.
You could imagine a scenario, and this question is for all three of you, wherein you may have a non-state entity—a consortium of sorts—simply starting to do mining in Canadian territorial waters, whether it's on the ocean floor or elsewhere. That might be the kind of threat—in the shadow, perhaps, of some military state-entity posturing—that we would face in the short term.
The answer, of course, would be a political, diplomatic one, in terms of what steps to take immediately, but from an air-readiness perspective, what kind of assets would be required to address such a scenario, and do we have those assets in place at the moment?
9:50 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Detecting that would require the ability to detect ships, and that's what the RADARSAT Constellation will be able to do. RADARSAT-2 already can do it; the problem is that it's not a Constellation, and in order to have persistent surveillance, you need.... I know the Constellation plan is for three satellites, but it might be that they need four or five for persistent surveillance of the Arctic region. As I mentioned, unmanned aerial vehicles would also be able to conduct the surveillance of the region.
That's the detection component of it. I believe we also have underwater sensors at some locations in the north.
In terms of responding to it, the Arctic offshore patrol vessel will be an important asset to have, but only in the summer months. Of course, it can only go through one-metre-thick ice. It's very important that our Polar-class icebreaker be built, the new one that's supposed to be built in Vancouver.
9:50 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
But staying with aerial readiness, from the perspective of interdiction or potential dissuasion, what kind of assets would you see being deployed?
9:50 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Are you referring to mining and offshore oil and that sort of thing?
9:50 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
An aerial asset can be used for detection but would not be used for response, in my view.
9:50 a.m.
Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual
I say that's exactly how they could detect, but to respond, you need to have ships. You need to have troops on the ground and you need to have icebreakers. This is where Russia has a tremendous advantage.
I'm not that concerned about non-state actors. They're not likely to do it; there's not that much capacity. But there is a problem with Russia, and there is a legal problem. The Russians have been extremely aggressive in legal terms. In legal terms, it is a kind of Cold War. The kinds of argument they're making, in terms of international law.... This is a self-plug: I'm completing a book on Russia, the western Arctic, and security.
One problem is that there are competing claims to the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges and about where exploration can take place.
There's also the issue of navigation. The Chinese have become much more interested in it, because if you can shorten the route through which you can navigate, that will have a dramatic impact on trade. They now have observer status—it's not just the Arctic Council—and they really are pushing for this. We thus need detection capacity, and any capacity, not just.... NORAD since 2006 has looked more to offset maritime threats, but you need to have a system and you need to have the proper tools.
This is why I think, in the debate we're having about aircraft, it makes no sense to look at anything other than the F-35, because it is a system; it is something that is integrated. It is what the United States is getting; it is what Norway got; it is what Denmark is likely to get. It is part of a detection and response system at the aerial level, which has then to be combined with other things, including getting those icebreakers—and what is the timeline for the new icebreakers? Is it 2020, 2022?
9:55 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
It will be a long time before they'll be built.
9:55 a.m.
Liberal
Sven Spengemann Liberal Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON
Mr. Chair, thank you. Those are my questions. If there's any remaining time, I would like to allocate it to the next Liberal.
9:55 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
You're actually a little bit over. Good timing.
We'll now move to our five-minute rounds of questions.
The first questions will come from Mr. Gerretsen.
April 12th, 2016 / 9:55 a.m.
Liberal
Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My first question is for you, Ms. Sloan. We've talked quite a bit about ballistic missile defence and how we're part of the detection but not part of the response. You've advocated, at least to my interpretation, that we be part of that response.
Can you share a little bit about what's involved in that? What is involved from a commitment level? Is this a financial commitment or more of a political commitment? Can you give some clarity to that?
9:55 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
What was requested originally in 2004 by the Bush administration was a political commitment. There has been no request since then. Although we talk about it north of the border, and I'm sure the United States would want Canada to join, they have not officially requested that we join again. But should we join, this time around it is my understanding that it would be more than a political commitment and that it would involve a financial investment of some kind.
9:55 a.m.
Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
I don't know what the financial investment would be.
We were talking about notable detection problems, and I mentioned that perhaps the United States is looking for another location to locate sensors or interceptors. It is looking in different locations across the United States, but it could also look at Canadian territory.
9:55 a.m.
Liberal
Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON
Thank you.
I'd be interested to hear what all three of you have to say with regard to my next question. Perhaps I'll start with Ms. Assenova.
We've had a lot of discussion here today about our sovereignty, in particular in the Arctic, and our northern defence. We've talked a lot about state actors, the Russians, and China's interest. Yet this committee, both before this membership and as recently as March, heard comments to the effect that there's no military threat from other states, at least not within the next 10 years.
Ms. Assenova, I know you talked a little bit about the intent. My interpretation of what you were saying was that there could be changes in intent. I'd be curious to hear your comments on that. Do you think those are valid comments that there's no military threat to Canada within at least the next 10 years? Or is it very easy for that intent to all of a sudden change?
9:55 a.m.
Director of Programs for Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, The Jamestown Foundation, As an Individual
Well, we saw the evolution of Russian intent and Russian behaviour over the last 10 years. It is difficult to predict whether there will be a military threat or not.
One thing that I think is clear is that Mr. Putin is not going to be willing to use nuclear weapons, because that means suicide for him, and he is pretty fond of life as it is. I don't think he's suicidal. This is more of a tactic of irritating adversaries. It's more of a tactic of demonstrating superiority or demonstrating capabilities in order for Russia to be taken seriously and to take back the place they used to have during the Cold War, when we had a two-power world.
Mr. Putin is not willing to accept that there is one leading force right now, one leading country in the world. He wants to restore this so-called multipolar world at this time and make Russia a great pillar of that world. We can see that cruise missiles have been used as a demonstration of that, as was mentioned before. That's extremely dangerous for the countries around the Caspian Sea, because they get involved in a war that's not their war at all. They get manipulated by Russia as well.
That said, we cannot predict intent at this point. The U.S. military leaders are very worried that the pattern of behaviour may eventually change the intent. At that point, it is very important to have sufficient defence. At the same time, psychologically, as Professor Braun mentioned, it's very important to have that defence.
Unlike in the Cold War, when things were predictable, we have now a very unpredictable situation. We have a situation where Russia is calculating and calibrating its moves according to the gains it wants. It is no longer the established, balanced system we had during the Cold War. It actually is worse now. This is why showing the bully our strength is very important at the moment, regardless of whether we're going to have to use it or not.
10 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
Yes, your time is up.
We'll move on to Mr. Paul-Hus. You have five minutes.
10 a.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before us today.
Since the beginning of our meetings with the various stakeholders, including Mr. Burke, who is a research associate on national security studies, we have been attempting to accurately assess the threat to our country. At this time, I think Canadians need a mental reprogramming in the wake of the old cold war. We were programmed in a way to consider Russia and the former Soviet Union as a single block and a nuclear threat, whereas today's situation is entirely different.
I will first ask you whether you believe that Canada really sees Russia as a potential threat? Personally, I would say that that is not the case, but what do your studies and analyses say? Does Canada see Russia as a threat? The question is for any one of you.