National Defence Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2017

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

I believe that's a bit different vision of the peacekeeping mission than we've heard from others at this time.

You made reference earlier to being told that the technical assistance might be ending in 2018. I want to go back and make sure we've understood who said that and which programs in terms of technical assistance. Are these the programs where the Canadian government offers assistance to the NGOs in doing those things, or are we also talking about bilateral assistance programs?

[Paul Grod]

Essentially they're meant to support various reforms in Ukraine. Examples of that, again, are training of judges or training of the new police force in Ukraine.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

So it's both the bilateral assistance and others.

[Paul Grod]

Correct.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Who gave you this warning about there being no more money available?

[Paul Grod]

When we met this summer with Minister Bibeau, she advised us that there was no commitment for any further funding past the 2018-19 expiry date of the existing programs.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

We have about 40 minutes left, so we'll go around table again with five-minute questions: Liberal, Conservative, NDP, and there are more, but we'll start with that.

The first question will go to Mr. Spengemann.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much. I didn't get a chance to ask my third question in the previous round, so I'm grateful to have the opportunity.

What is the current status of the Minsk agreement? What is its normative pull? Perhaps as an add-on to that question, how united is the European Union in its views on Ukraine and Russia?

[Chris Westdal]

There have been two iterations of the Minsk agreement. It remains what's on the table in terms of the way forward, but both parties are saying, “After you.” The Russians are saying, “We won't act until you have the elections and the decentralization that were part of the Minsk agreement,” and Kiev is saying, “We won't do that until you pull forces back from the border.” I don't know how many Minsk agreements it's going to take, but I expect there will be more.

The Minsk agreement is criticized often in the Rada, and this talk of roles the UN might play working with the OSCE is really an indication that, so far at least, it looks like Minsk is not implementable, or at least it's not being implemented.

If you ask what the Europeans think of it, Angela Merkel regularly recites her belief that there is no military solution. Time and again she has said that, and that we have Minsk to work with. However many Minsk agreements it takes, that's a path we have to follow.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Grod.

[Paul Grod]

It is important to understand the context in which both Minsk agreements were signed, the second one in particular. That was a time when there was an active taking of territory, and significant casualties and losses being suffered by the Ukrainian soldiers, or the Ukrainian army, as they tried to defend themselves in Debaltsevo and other areas. Essentially Ukraine's hand was forced into accepting a pretty bad deal.

That being said, when you look at the Minsk agreement, I find it quite insincere to say both sides are not implementing. You can't have elections in a territory that is controlled by foreign agents. You can't have any kind of resolution or any kind of democratic process. It would be similar to the democratic process when they voted during the referendum in Crimea, when you had essentially Russian armed forces under other non-insignia, trying to allow for that.

The reality is that until that war ends and Ukraine is able to take control of its border and its territory, you can't ask Ukraine to hold elections. The Minsk agreements are essentially stale-dated, and when Russia wants to have a resolution and stop the ongoing conflict and military aggression, that's when you can start talking about implementation.

But Russia is not prepared. We have had an increased escalation of violence over the last week, and that is directly controlled and manipulated by Russia, so let's not get into games about elections or other things like that. Russia has to stop the war in Ukraine.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

We talked about incentives or disincentives for behaviour change, and it seems a lot of us are familiar with the sticks that are on the table, which are sanctions and ratcheting up military capacity in Ukraine to deter or make it costly for Russia to continue. Are there any carrots on the table, outside of removing sanctions? Is there anything we could offer to bring Russia into an agreement that is sustainable in the longer term and doesn't involve sanctions, or sticks?

[Chris Westdal]

Well, if the sanctions are going to remain and you take off the carrot of removing them, because they are costly, we could respond to Russia's invitations to co-operate more in the Arctic. We could respond to Russia's invitations to co-operate more against terrorism. There is an agenda we could address with Russia that pays it respect. That kind of respectful engagement, I suppose, could be described as a carrot.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Grod, would that lead to a behaviour change on Russia's part in your view? Could it?

[Paul Grod]

We've seen what the reaction of resets by previous U.S. presidents has brought, and it hasn't brought a more co-operative Russia. Unfortunately, we've seen through the past that Russia only understands when there is equal strength on the other side and not necessarily this strategy of trying to engage. Unfortunately an engagement strategy without deterrents is ineffectual. Unless there are costs for a certain activity, essentially that is the strategy that needs to be implemented—a strong deterrence strategy with Russia.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

The next questioner will be either Mr. Bezan or Ms. Gallant.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Ms. Gallant.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to the witnesses, would you compare and contrast the Russian peacekeeping mission with Ukraine versus what Canada would do? Russia has its version of what the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine should be. How does that differ from what Canada's view would be?

[Paul Grod]

In 2015, Ukraine put on the table a proposal for a UN peacekeeping mission, and it has always been on the table since 2015. I believe, frankly, that because there was a threat of the U.S. providing Ukraine with defensive military equipment, which the White House is very seriously contemplating right now, it's only very recently that Russia has tried to come up with their own version of a peacekeeping mission. It would essentially provide UN peacekeepers. They would be part of that UN peacekeeping mission. It is a little bit strange to have the aggressor as part of the peacekeeping mission on the border where the conflict is happening. Essentially, they would ensure a frozen conflict.

What Ukraine has asked for, and other European and allied countries have supported, is essentially having UN peacekeepers on the Russian-Ukrainian border to stop the flow of arms. There are hundreds of tanks in Ukraine that weren't built in the Donbass. Stop the flow of arms and soldiers into Ukraine. That would be step number one.

Step number two would be to have a UN peacekeeping force in that region, which it is hoped would essentially demilitarize that situation and allow for a return of those internally displaced peoples, a return to normality, and a stop to the bloodshed in Ukraine.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Grod, you mentioned that the peacekeeping mission would be very much a hot war. Right now, we're in a hot war in that area. Taking that into consideration, and the fact that Ukraine wants to be interoperable by 2020, would it make more sense to have NATO-led nation troops be there doing the peacekeeping mission as opposed to Russia?

[Paul Grod]

I think that would, frankly, further instigate the tension. I believe that, again, a UN peacekeeping force would have to be endorsed by the Security Council, and of course Russia has a veto on the Security Council. I think that if there's a threat of further NATO support for Ukraine, then that could be the potential stick that will force Russia's hand to accept that peacekeeping mission.

Again, we don't want to instigate Russia. We want to create peace in that region, and quite frankly, the best way to do that today, in this environment, is to have a peacekeeping mission that Russia will accept. By accepting that, they will have to stop the continued military aggression. There are daily artillery attacks coming from the occupied territories into Ukrainian territory, so that needs to stop first. We need to get an agreement from Russia that they're going to stop the aggression in that region and then allow peacekeepers to come to Ukraine in order to demilitarize that zone.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

But really, what good is an agreement? We've had the Budapest memorandum which has been flouted. The Minsk agreements are not being upheld. UN conventions are continually overturned. Why are we even trying to have them involved? They go back on their word every time.

[Paul Grod]

That's why we need to return to rules-based international order, and that's why there have to be consequences for Russia's flouting of the rules-based international order. We've talked about various ways to do that. Those include excluding them and isolating them from various international institutions. Those include sanctions. Those include helping to support various missions around the world, including what Canada has done in supporting the NATO mission in the Baltic states, in Poland, in Romania, and even in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.