National Defence Committee on April 19th, 2016

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Yes.

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

That always depends on the threats. I hesitate because some scenarios are considered. In peacetime, we could, but not in the context of an international emergency. It depends on what type of threat is involved.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

If we consider threats that might come from Russia or North Korea, we do not have the equipment we need to handle them, certainly.

As for other threats, Canada's air fleet, which is currently composed of F-18s that we are going to replace in the short and medium terms, cannot guarantee our sovereignty? Is that impossible at present?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

Once again, it depends on the nature of the threat.

For example, in the case of NORAD, we have complete control of what we do in our own airspace in peacetime. The commanders are Canadians, the military controllers are Canadians, the aircraft are piloted by Canadians.

We were talking about a response on the west coast. Having an agreement with NORAD enables us to respond very quickly, but that does not mean that we do not have sovereignty, since Canadians are involved in the decisions.

In terms of the most probable scenarios, we are capable of completely defending ourselves. If there were an international emergency, for example, a scenario where the extreme right set off a third world war, we would have to join forces with our allies to deal with the threat.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

What concerns do our partners in the United States have about our commitments to replacing our aircraft and our detection equipment? There must surely be concerns.

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

They are watching the situation closely. Our commander calls it recapitalization. Certainly, our equipment is aging, but that does not mean it is not effective for the missions assigned to us.

In addition, the Americans have a global perspective. They do not have the same considerations as we do. So when an event occurs in the world, they can decide to commit forces, when we will not do so. There are American forces engaged more or less everywhere in the world, while the scope of our work is more limited.

In the event of a series of extreme threats, there is no certainty that all their forces would be available to defend North America. That is why they are observing us closely.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Let us come back to the replacement of some of our aircraft. With Lieutenant-General Hood, we talked about interoperability. Do our American colleagues really think the F-35 is the best choice?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

No, in fact, as much energy is put into debating it in the United States as here.

At NORAD, we're married to mission requirements. We're platform-agnostic.

We will be satisfied as long as the plane that replaces the F-18 has the capacities we need for NORAD missions.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

In terms of maritime detection, I assume you use a network of satellites.

Two South Korean ships came to Canada a few months ago. I do not know whether you heard about this. They entered the St. Lawrence River. Because battleships are not required to have their transponders working, they did not communicate with the St. Lawrence pilots and made their way deep into the channel.

If enemy vessels approached our shores, or if civilian vessels deactivated their transponders, could you detect them ordinarily?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

NORAD does not own any maritime detection systems. We have a network of partners who do have these detection systems, so they are who give us the information. We merge the information and we distribute it to all of the binational agencies in Canada and the United States.

In the case you referred to, we would have had no role to play. If the agencies, including the intelligence agencies, had decided there was no danger to Canada or the United States, we would not have heard about it.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Lastly, you have confirmed that it is important that NORAD and all of the agencies connected with it receive information from everywhere.

On the question of the South Korean ships, the agency that handles maritime detection dropped the ball. You were not informed. If there had been a terrorist attack or some other attack, you would have been blamed for not detecting it, but it is not your role to do that. This brings September 2011 to mind.

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

This system functions so well that I have to propose a hypothesis. This is not a subject I am very familiar with. Given that we did not receive any information about the presence of the ships, I assume that the agencies responsible for surveillance had determined that they did not represent a threat. It was perhaps simply a maritime traffic problem rather than a threat.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

That's your time up.

We're going to move over to Mr. Rioux. You have the floor for five minutes.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here.

I am going to come back to a subject we discussed earlier. Yesterday, security expert Richard Fadden was quoted in La Presse. His comments translate as follows:

…cyber-attacks today represent a threat that is at least as concerning for Canada as terrorism may be, but the threat is often ignored, even though the potentially harmful consequences are significant.

Mr. Fadden was the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and national security advisor to two prime ministers.

This raises a number of questions that you have answered in part.

Given the fact that the Canadian Army is responsible for protecting our territory, what is NORAD's mandate in relation to possible cyber-attacks?

The article I am referring to pointed out that the hydroelectric utility computer systems were the least protected, including both Hydro-Québec and Hydro One in Ontario.

Does NORAD have overall responsibility for this?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

NORAD has no mission in relation to cybersecurity, except when it comes to protecting our networks.

Concerning the idea that all systems should be connected, I think we are in a good position. As I described, in the United States, there are 80 representatives of agencies that are concerned about these matters, that are represented in Colorado Springs.

In Canada, the system is different. The Canadian Joint Operations Command is in charge of the network, and I do not really know how advanced it is, but certainly we at NORAD rely on other commands to obtain the cyber network services we need.

Once again, we protect our networks. Our mandate is not to counter attacks, to be combative, or to take any other action in that regard.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Should that be in your mandate?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

As I explained earlier, it should be in our mandate only if we think there are benefits to the continental approach. I assume that it could be developed, eventually, but for the moment, it is a bridge that is yet to be crossed and that will take a lot of work. For the moment, I would say no.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

I am going to address another subject.

For 11 years, Canada has not participated in the missile defence shield. Does that mean that Canadian territory is not protected, that we are not part of the system, and that it is limited to protecting American territory?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

That is exactly right. I have nothing to add.

[Jean Rioux, Liberal, Saint-Jean, QC]

Should we be part of it?

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

That is a complicated question, because there are military and political aspects.

The responsibility for giving military advice lies with the Chief of Defence Staff, who handles the entire military aspect.

I have observed three things that might help you in your discussions.

First, there are the ballistic missiles.

The missiles are here to stay.

I am not talking only about the intercontinental missiles, but also the short- and long-range missiles. In the future, we will perhaps see Canadians in theatres of operation that will be under threat of short- or medium-range ballistic missiles. We will be defended by coalitions and by NATO, so things are fine in that regard.

Some countries, notably North Korea, are working very hard to develop the capacity to attack North America. So ballistic missiles are here to stay. I think this is a threat that will continue to exist.

The second thing I have observed is this.

In terms of the approaches in North America, command and control are a little complicated in Colorado Springs. NORAD is responsible for assessing an attack or identifying a missile that might approach North America. The Canadians can tell NORAD that it is an attack on North America, but as soon as a decision is made, or a missile is identified, the defence is entirely up to the Americans.

The command of NORTHCOM and NORAD is somewhat separate for the same mission. For that same ballistic missile that is approaching, one element is under NORAD and the other element, under NORTHCOM, which is American only. If the missile came back into the atmosphere, NORAD would again be responsible for determining whether there is a nuclear explosion.

For NORAD and NORTHCOM, the command and control are complicated. We ask that decisions be made in the space of a few minutes, to defend against or to assess an attack. It is a bit complicated. If we were part of the missile defence shield, that would enable the binational commands to simplify command and control for that threat.

The third thing I have observed is this.

Given that Canada is not part of the system, it does not have access to the technology or to the strategy and planning, and it certainly has no influence on the decisions made. I am going to say the expression in English, because it is not coming to mind in French.

The United States doesn't have a need to share, and we don't have a right to know.

Anything we have, we have out of good will.

Certainly they cooperate with us. We have been very close allies for a long time, but we simply are not part of that mission.

The three things I have described give me the impression that it is an important matter to revisit. That is all I can say.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you for your answer. I let that one go because I thought it was very insightful and appreciated what you were saying, but I'm going to have to give the floor to Mr. Bezan.

You have five minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Mr. St-Amand, it's great seeing you again, and we're looking forward to visiting you down in Colorado Springs as well.

I'm wondering about NORAD's feeling right now about Russia, considering that last week we saw the Russian Air Force take a whole new aggressive approach in dealing with the Americans in the Baltic Sea, first buzzing the USS Donald Cook on successive days, coming within 30 feet of the ship, buzzing it with two fighter jets at a time, and then at the end of the week we saw a Sukhoi Su-25 intercept a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane and barrel-roll above it. I'm wondering if we're seeing similar types of increased aggression against NORAD command's fighter jets, whether they're U.S. Air Force or Canadian CF-18s, or other aircraft for that matter, as we patrol our aerospace region.

[LGen Pierre St-Amand]

We're not seeing the same level of aggressiveness, that is very clear. But what we are seeing, if you look at the last, say, three years, is a peak in intrusions into our air defence identification zone. They have a right, of course, to operate there; it is international airspace. But at the same time, we have declared those identification zones so that we know what's coming towards America. So we have seen a peak, especially in 2014, and a difference in the degree of sophistication in how they approach us. Of course, at NORAD we are concerned about the behaviour of Russia as a whole, thinking about Crimea, thinking about Ukraine, thinking about even Syria.

This is why I said in my opening remarks that our area of interest is global for many reasons, and I characterize the reasons for that in this way: We should never let an adversary think even a second that North America is soft. Therefore, everything that we do, everything that is visible, our infrastructure in the north, our operations, this is all very visible, and there is a deterrence value to it.

We care about what's going on in the world; we haven't talked about China, for example, and the South China Sea. We're also concerned about it at NORAD. Now it's very far away, but what are the repercussions back to North America, both the U.S. and Canada, of what the U.S. is going to decide to do in that area? We're not sure.

So again, to summarize, there's been a peak in activity—although in 2015 there was a lull as a result of a crash, so the fleet was grounded for a few months. We expect the activity to peak again, but no aggressiveness in same way that we saw in the media.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Nevertheless, that may be a precursor to increased aggression here. It's something I'm hoping that NORAD is monitoring closely, because it was unbelievable what happened there.

When you're talking about the north warning system, something I've been concerned about for some time is that, when you really look at it, we do not have any surveillance of the Arctic archipelago. It's strictly continental-based. As Ms. Gallant and others have mentioned, we are expecting the north warning system to be at the end of its lifespan by 2025.

Has NORAD, and Canada in particular, started looking at what the options are, such as increasing RADARSAT, the whole RADARSAT Constellation mission of getting more satellites up there, and also looking at high altitude UAVs as possible ways to provide better surveillance?