I think one of the most important things to bear in mind is that the NATO council, 28 countries around the table, chaired by the secretary general, is all civilian at the top. The summits are our leaders, prime ministers, presidents, and so on. Ministers are on the next level, and then ambassadors. So there's civilian leadership of NATO. Our military colleagues have their military committee, other military subcommittees, and so on, which provide advice to the political leadership. The decisions as to whether or not to conduct an air campaign over Kosovo are made at the political level. These are political decisions. That's, in a sense, the most important thing.
Second, within NATO—and this happens in different forums—some of the formal NATO council and the ambassadors, for instance, meet informally at least once a week, often more. There are political discussions of the issues of the day. Prior to the Libya air campaign, there was a discussion in January of that year about what was happening in Libya, what the implications were for NATO, and the values that NATO stood for.
Interestingly, a lot of these operations, whether they were in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya, were effectively humanitarian operations. These were to protect civilians in situations of conflict. That's where the origin of these missions often began, through the political discussions around the kinds of values and rights that NATO espouses and—