National Defence Committee on Feb. 15th, 2018

[Robert McRae]

This is why we have not gone down this road. The prospect is to have British, French, Italian, and German frigates somewhere off our coast in the north in an exercise, and every government under which I've served has not wanted to go there. That's their judgment of public opinion.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

I have to share the rest of my time with Ms. Alleslev, but I would love to hear other people's comments on this.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

I would like to hear your thoughts, so please continue.

[Richard Fadden]

What I was going to add to what Rob said was that I think the Canadian public is generally ill-informed. I think that is in part because successive governments—I am not focusing on a particular government, neither the current one nor previous ones—have not commented on the level of threat we face.

Just speaking of the Arctic, as I mentioned a minute ago, they are spending hundreds of millions of rubles re-establishing their bases. They restarted, I think about 18 months ago, their long-range bomber runs down both coasts and in Europe. I think if the government authorized the public service to explain some of this, the understanding you're seeking would come.

[VAdm (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau]

We have to move beyond the simple visits of NATO squadrons to come across and go all the way up to Montreal, do exercises just outside Halifax, and then move south to off Norfolk. We have to make it more visible that we are a member of that organization. As for the north, as the ambassador has said, for a long time Canada would tell NATO that it is none of their business, that the north is not part of their worries. It should be.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'm going to yield the floor to MP Genuis.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you so much. It's a real honour to be here.

I won't name any names to start off, but should there be a process for removing a country from NATO if its behaviour is beyond the pale at a certain point? If so, what should that process be? Hypothetically, how would we undertake it?

[Robert McRae]

I'll take a run at that.

There's no provision for that in the Washington treaty. A country could in theory elect to leave, provide notice and so on, but there's no provision for other members of NATO to remove a country from the alliance.

With regard to Turkey, if I might, there is a current concern, and there has been for a number of years, in light of what's going on in Syria. The Turks have said on occasion that they would like to create a buffer zone inside Syria in order to protect their country. Other NATO allies have provided warnings in a sense, a yellow light to the Turks, which is that if their entanglement across the border leads to an attack on their territory from abroad, that's an article 5 event, and we would just as soon not become involved in their adventures. They wouldn't put it that way, but that's essentially what they'd mean.

There has already been a discussion with regard to one specific ally as to how their behaviour outside their borders could entangle NATO in a conflict in which it does not wish to become involved. This is, in a sense, heading down this path, which is why allies can call for a consultation on any specific issue. There have been consultations of this kind in the past. That's not removal of an ally; that's a sign from other allies that we are concerned about a specific military operation.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I'm curious to get the views of the other panellists on this point.

If I could follow up on that, Mr. McRae, so I understand how this would play out, let's suppose hypothetically that Turkey got itself into a conflict as a result, at least in large part, of its own aggressive intervention. Canada reasonably says that we're not going to participate, and most other NATO countries say that as well. Presumably it would be up to us to decide not to contribute under article 5. Article 5, as you mentioned, says that nations determine the way in which they contribute.

Doesn't that, as an effect, mean that the country has put itself outside of NATO in terms of operational significance? As much as it continues to be part of meetings, which maybe influence what can or cannot be discussed in those meetings, the operational implications are the same as if they had left. Is that fair?

[Robert McRae]

I agree. I mean, it would be very damaging.

However, I don't think it would actually get to declaration of article 5. The way this works is that a country comes to council and says their homeland has been attacked from abroad and here's the evidence. They then ask that the alliance declare article 5.

To declare article 5, you need the agreement of all 28 allies. I think in this specific instance, some allies would say that this is not an article 5 event and they are not going to therefore permit NATO to declare article 5. I think the thing would kind of grind to a halt before article 5 was declared.

Article 5 is not automatic just on the basis of an attack. It needs to be agreed to by all 28 allies.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

If that's the direction, then the remaining issue is that Turkey is at the table. That potentially has implications on what nations can discuss if there's somebody at the table that they're not totally sure about what kinds of other entanglements they have on the other side.

Mr. Fadden, do you have comments on this?

[Richard Fadden]

I would add that if Turkey's behaviour, or any other country's, became totally egregious, it would not be a matter for the North Atlantic Council. Heads of government and heads of state would decide there's a problem and they have to do something about it.

It's not just Turkey. There are a number of the former Soviet states as well. The gleam in Putin's eyes is that he can somehow drag them back from NATO into his orbit. I would worry as much about them as about anything else.

Mr. Chairman, with your leave, I'm going to have to leave in about five minutes. I hope that Ms. Kingston mentioned it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thanks for the heads-up.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I have one quick follow-up.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I'm sorry, Garnett, but there's no more time. I'm going to have to give the time to Ms. Alleslev.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

I would like to go back to burden sharing. I know we have an ally in General Mattis. There is a perception around the fairness and the contribution. As part of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and as the chair of Canada's delegation, I go to these meetings a lot. What a government and NAC are saying is not what the other parliamentarians are saying directly to us. These are congressmen and, of course, members of Parliament from the U.K. There is significant pressure on us.

How do we talk about the perception of being at the table and the contribution? It's about what the other nations perceive as our stepping up as much as whatever it is.

What would you recommend? What do we say? How would you address that?

[Richard Fadden]

I'll just try to answer a little bit on that, and I'm sure Rob will have something to say.

I think one of the things we have to do is to be careful about being too self-congratulatory. I actually agree with my two colleagues that our contributions are very good. They're very effective—they're usually not without caveats—but we have to stop saying that the only reason we don't go to 2% is because we're so good. If other countries want to tell us that we're good, I think that's great. I think we continue to be excellent, but I was told by some of my colleagues when I was the NSA, “Enough is enough. We know you're good. We just want you to do a bit more.”

Having said that, I absolutely agree that we need a new formula in NATO that takes into account mobility, willingness, civilian contributions, and military contributions. There have been efforts over the year—Rob probably knows more about it than I do—to modify the formula.

To your point, a lot of people don't want to hear about it. They're worried and they want more of a contribution. I think the key for us is to demonstrate that while we're not at 2%, the graph line is going up, and then make a variety of other arguments.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Part of that is to be able to communicate to Canadians. As you said, the public is woefully uninformed—an incredible statement, and I think it's important.

We are the parliamentarians. Part of our responsibility is to inform Canadians. Do you agree? How do we now start to have a significant and realistic conversation about the threats?

[Richard Fadden]

It's a real problem for Canada, I think, because fundamentally, Canadians don't feel threatened. We have three oceans, and we have the United States.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

But we are.

[Richard Fadden]

We are.

I don't know if this committee went across Canada. One way to spread the word is to ask the House for permission to hold hearings across the country. It's for Parliament or for the government to provide additional funding to think tanks and academics so that there can be more discussions.

I'm not directing this at a particular government, but I argued until I was blue in the face when I was still working that sharing more information publicly is possible. Governments, generally speaking, don't like to talk about national security. That's not an irrational position, but I do think that sometimes if you aggregate what you're talking about up a level or two, we can be more open. I don't think your goal is going to be met unless we're willing to be a bit more open.

I'm not talking about operational secrets that would worry my two colleagues, but if people read the CSIS annual report, for example, they would see that there's a lot in there every year about the kinds of threats we're facing. Maybe we should ask the Department of National Defence to produce one on the military front—things of that nature.

I think it's going to have to be a multi-pronged effort with the things that I've talked about, and probably a whole raft of others, such as y'all—if I can use an Americanism—getting out on Sunday morning talk shows and talking more to the media about these things in a non-partisan way.

I've worked long enough with politicians to know that's not easy, but I would submit with great respect that when you deal with military and foreign policy, it should be easier. We haven't seen a lot of that. I think that if there's some way of developing a little more unity of language between the political parties, it would help a lot.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Can you add anything?

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

If you could do it in about 30 seconds, it would be helpful.

[Robert McRae]

I fully endorse what Dick has just said.

I have a variety of ways you can come at this. One way that has been used in the past in the area of international security is to introduce some form of white paper or discussion paper. It used to be called a green paper, at one time.

It's something that the government of the day puts out, not necessarily as a position of the government but rather as a piece that describes the international security environment and the challenges and threats that we face as a country. It's a way of supporting debate, which could then be a prelude to broader discussions around the country, both on missile defence and on the kinds of threats in the Arctic that Dick described. These are new things that really do merit more public discussion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

The last formal question is three minutes. I appreciate that you might have to leave. Can you hang in there for three?