I think my remarks here are more about, as you say, these huge cost overruns and delays in these large defence programs. There's no doubt in my mind that we are not procuring them correctly. That means civil servants, military, and industry have somehow got it wrong. Having looked at it for some time, it seems to me that those three bodies are not capable of looking at themselves and saying, “What shall we change?” I think it's up to parliamentarians to say, “This is not acceptable. You three must change.” I think there is my recommendation or my thought, that parliaments and parliamentarians in all of our nations—not just NATO, but it will feed down to NATO later—should be saying, “It is not acceptable to have these cost overruns and you have to relook at procurement.”
You mentioned modular ship construction or procurement. I think that is the way to go.
There's another word I've heard used in terms of an “architectural” approach to procurement. When I look at what's going to happen in the future AWACS or the allied future surveillance capability, it is almost certainly going to be an architectural approach to the procurement. I think it would be worth any nation's looking very carefully at defence procurement as to how we marry the cutting steel that lasts 50 years to the PCs they're going to buy and use that only last two years. How do we match those disparate procurement cycles and technology cycles and make a smart procurement? The acquisition cycle really needs looking at again. That would be my answer there, I think.